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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Gentlemen’s Diplomacy: 
The Foreign Policy of Lord Lansdowne, 1845-1927. (December 2006) 
Frank Winfield Winters IV, B.A., University at Buffalo, State University of New York; 
M.A., Texas A&M University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R. J. Q. Adams 
 
 As British Foreign Secretary from November 1900 to December 1905, Lord 
Lansdowne operated on a long-held coherent body of principles on which he based his 
foreign policy.  Throughout his political life, in fact, he pressed for the renewal of an 
enlightened—if informal—‘Concert of Europe’ which he hoped could be implemented 
worldwide.  His ‘policy of the entente,’ which reflected his belief in the efficacy of 
reasonable and ‘gentlemanly’ diplomacy to settle outstanding disputes, left him ill-
suited, however, to manage Britain’s position as a world power during this period of 
perceived relative decline. 
 If Lansdowne did indeed have some innate talent for diplomacy, he aspired not to 
be the next Talleyrand, of whom he was reputedly a descendant, but to become an 
appropriately detached liberal-minded arbiter.  He was the true gentleman-diplomat who, 
as enlightened reason dictated, always wished to play cartes sur table.  In these waning 
years of the supremacy of British power, the marquis believed in an empire forged no 
longer through fire and sword, but through the example of free institutions, just 
administration, and the influence of English culture.  He certainly believed that foremost 
 iv
it was these aspects of Western civilization that brought Pax Britannica to the Khyber 
Pass.  In pursuing his ‘policy of the entente,’ Lansdowne presumed initially at least that 
his fellow European gentlemen would aid him in the higher mission of preserving 
civilization, and consequently, although secondarily to the Foreign Secretary, the status 
quo.  This, however, proved not to be the case.   
Lansdowne was perhaps the right man to administer the empire, in much the 
same manner he dutifully tried to look after and maintain his great estates and care for 
his many tenants and servants.  He was, however, not the right man to charge with its 
preservation and defense.  Fortunately, his policy proved impossible to carry out fully.  
He received little cooperation from the leadership of other great powers, and in the end 
the path of British foreign policy was impossible to guide or engineer in the direction he 
wished. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The symbolic and in many ways real end to Britain’s policy of “splendid 
isolation” came with Lord Salisbury’s surrender of the Foreign Office portfolio in 
November 1900.  Believing the Prime Minister’s failing health and “masterly inactivity” 
in the face of Britain’s relative economic and military decline in the world necessitated a 
change in the direction of British foreign policy, the Cabinet forced Salisbury’s 
removal.1  Still First Minister, however, Salisbury remained a force in foreign policy 
decisions for two more years.  Reacting to a draft proposal of an Anglo-German alliance 
put forward in May 1901 by his hand-picked successor at the Foreign Office, Henry 
Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, the fifth Marquis of Lansdowne, he continued to 
champion his erstwhile policy of maintaining Britain’s ‘free hand’, arguing that “it is 
impossible for us to judge whether the ‘isolation’ under which we are supposed to suffer, 
does or does not contain in it any elements of peril.”  Pressing for caution—and 
effectively quashing any approach to Germany for the time being—he asserted, “It 
would hardly be wise to incur novel and most onerous obligations, in order to guard 
against a danger in whose existence we have no historical reason for believing.”2  
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Albion. 
 
1 J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: the Close of the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Athlone Press, 1964), p. 322. 
 
2 Salisbury memorandum, May 29, 1901, Public Record Office: Foreign Office Private Papers 800/128.  
Hereafter cited as PRO FO. 
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Lansdowne’s response came some five months later and he spoke for a majority in the 
Cabinet when he openly questioned the assumptions on which British foreign policy had 
heretofore been based.  He noted that though “this country has until now fared well in 
spite of its international isolation . . . we may push too far the argument that, because we 
have in the past survived in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the 
effect of that isolation in the future.”3   
 Lansdowne was a primary author of a new direction in British foreign policy, 
what became known as the ‘policy of the entente.’  This policy would remain in place—
with some adjustment—under the marquis’s Liberal successor, Sir Edward Grey.  When 
war broke out in August 1914, however, the ‘policy of the entente’ came under 
immediate attack by liberal intellectuals such as J. A. Hobson, Norman Angell and the 
mathematician philosopher, Bertrand Russell.  Noting the policy’s complete and utter 
failure to preserve the peace, they revealed it now to be that same “foul idol” that John 
Bright had joyously if prematurely declared dead in the previous century—the ‘balance 
of power.’4  Joined by future Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald they founded 
the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) in September 1914.  The UDC blamed the 
outbreak of war on secret diplomacy and the formation of alliance systems which it 
perceived to be the direct result of foreign policy being conducted in accordance with the 
theory of the ‘balance of power.’  Moreover, they believed that the remedy for war was 
                                                 
3 Lansdowne memorandum, November 11, 1901 in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British 
Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. II (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 
1967), no.92.  Hereafter cited as BD. 
 
4 John Bright’s speech in Birmingham on January 18, 1865, The Times, January 19, 1865, p. 9. 
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for the common people—who naturally abhorred war and therefore would never start 
one—to have a greater say in international affairs.     
 Prolific in his anti-war activities, Russell published a series of articles during the 
first years of the war in which he presented the liberal case against foreign policy as 
conducted by Grey and Lansdowne.  In his essay entitled, “Is a Permanent peace 
Possible?,” he asserted, that “Ever since the conclusion of the Anglo-French entente in 
1904 the war had been on the point of breaking out, and could only have been avoided 
by some radical change in the temper of nations and Governments.”  Unfortunately, he 
noted, it was the diplomatist who was “the chief obstacle to internationalism,” because 
“The mental atmosphere in which he lives is that of the eighteenth century, with its 
‘Balance of Power’ and other shibboleths.”5  In his essay on the “Entente Policy, 1904-
1915” Russell declined to personally blame Grey and Lansdowne for an “ancient” 
diplomatic tradition that they had merely “inherited,” but insisted that “if our foreign 
policy in recent years had been conducted with more courage, more openness, and more 
idealism, there is a likelihood that the present European War would never have 
occurred.”  He saw little difference between German and English policies over the 
previous decade, maintaining that they had both been “immoral in aim and brutal in 
method, each in the exact degree which was thought to be to the national advantage.”  
Employing the idea of ‘false consciousness,’ he argued that the “English people,” had 
they been conscious of “such a policy as its chosen rulers have carried on for the last 
eleven years,” would never have tolerated it.  For Russell the turning away from a 
                                                 
5 Bertrand Russell, “Is a Permanent Peace Possible?” in Bertrand Russell, Justice in War-Time (Chicago: 
The Open Court Publishing Co., 1916), pp. 83, 98.  
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democratic foreign policy that worked “in furtherance of peace and freedom” began with 
Gladstone’s retirement and the subsequent “closing up of the ranks among the governing 
classes of England.”  “Generosity and wisdom,” according to Russell, should have urged 
a great and powerful country like England towards a more worthy and honorable foreign 
policy that might “lead the nations [of the world] peacefully along the road to freedom.”  
Standing in the way of such an enlightened policy, however, was the “money market and 
aristocratic prejudice.”6 
 Russell’s liberal interpretation of the ‘policy of the entente’ lays the groundwork 
for the principal questions this essay considers.  Foremost among them is the idea that 
Lansdowne was the epitome of Russell’s aristocratic diplomatist who stood in the way of 
a more progressive and peacemaking British foreign policy.  Although much of Russell’s 
moral admonition and progressive preaching has disappeared from the dry scholarly 
monographs of modern diplomatic historians, a residue of this original liberal 
interpretation has remained in the historiography.  Of course, there has been scholarly 
advancement.  In his work, The Policy of the Entente, Keith Wilson challenged parts of 
the existing narrative that in many ways were still by-products—although distant ones 
perhaps—of that initial liberal wartime interpretation of events.  Specifically, Wilson 
sought to focus more attention on the complexities involved in foreign policy decisions, 
and in this questioned both the assertions and approach of George Monger, J. A. S. 
Grenville, and Zara Steiner among others.  Wilson asserted that there must be greater 
“appreciation that the sources reflect several layers of reality—not only in the sense that 
                                                 
6 Bertrand Russell, “The Entente Policy, 1904-1915: A Reply to Professor Gilbert Murray,” in Russell, 
Justice in War-Time, pp. 123, 137, 209-210, 212, 215. 
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some participants in the policy-making process had a firmer grasp than others of what 
the policy was, but also in the sense that cynicism lay below expressions of devoutness, 
despair behind confidence and bombast.”  Moreover, in broader strategic terms, Wilson 
noted that these earlier historians perceived in the Foreign Office an “adjustment of 
priorities . . . from the British Empire to the European continent,” which coincided rather 
conveniently with a supposed realization in the Foreign Office that Germany presented 
the greatest threat to British power.  Wilson argued, however, that “the makers of British 
foreign policy,” including Lansdowne, in fact remained “less interested in Europe than 
in their Empire.”  It was fear for the empire and fear of Russia, he maintained, that 
focused Lansdowne’s attentions on the (not so newly formed) European alliance 
groups.7   
This essay will reaffirm that when formulating policy, preservation of the empire 
was Lansdowne’s foremost concern, although he certainly made reference to the 
grouping of European powers as a reason for ending Britain’s isolation.  These factors 
alone, however, do not explain fully his foreign policy.  Answers must be sought 
elsewhere, in, for example, the foundations, predispositions, and character of the man.  
To date, and despite the countless but mostly perfunctory references to the marquis’s 
great Whig heritage, this aspect undoubtedly has been the least emphasized in those 
diplomatic studies concerned directly with his policies.  While this essay will not focus 
                                                 
7 Keith Wilson, The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-
1914 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1-3. 
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exclusively on this neglected facet of Lansdowne diplomacy, it will attempt to redress 
the balance. 
Throughout his political career—as a member of mostly Conservative 
governments—Lansdowne never strayed very far from Whiggism or from William 
Ewart Gladstone’s six principles of a moral and upright liberal foreign policy, namely, to 
“reserve the strength of the Empire . . . for great and worthy occasions,” “preserve to the 
nations of the world . . . the blessings of peace,” “cultivate and maintain to the utmost 
the concert of Europe,” “avoid needless and entangling engagements,” “acknowledge the 
equal rights of all nations,” and lastly to ensure that the “foreign policy of England 
should always be inspired by the love of freedom.”8  It should be remembered that 
Lansdowne did not leave the Liberal Party because his political views had suddenly 
transformed, but because he was one of the propertied “Ten Thousand” that the Grand 
Old Man inveighed against and that the party eventually left behind.9  Moreover, 
Lansdowne never abandoned what Gladstone held to be the most important of his 
principles, which was respect for the equal rights of nations, and the forging of a new 
more enlightened, if less formal, ‘Concert of Europe.’  It is thus worthwhile to consider 
whether Lansdowne’s conception of the ‘policy of the entente’ actually differed very 
much from the liberal foreign policy ideals as espoused throughout the nineteenth 
century by Richard Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone, or in the early twentieth century by 
Russell and the UDC.    
                                                 
8 Gladstone’s speech during his Midlothian Campaign on November 27, 1879, The Times, November 28, 
1879, p. 10. 
 
9 Peter Stansky, Gladstone: A Progress in Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), p. 132. 
 7
In order to assess that question as well as appreciate the “layers of reality” 
beneath foreign policy decisions that Wilson asks us to consider we must first attempt to 
know the mind and character of those who formulated policy.  Notwithstanding the vast 
number of existing monographs and articles devoted to this crucial period in British 
foreign relations, very few even attempt to fully assess the beliefs that lay behind 
Lansdowne’s foreign policy, much less the mind and character of the man.  Despite the 
marquis’s long and prestigious career, during which he held some of the most important 
and coveted posts of the British Empire—governor-general of Canada (1883 -1888), 
Viceroy of India (1888-1894), and most importantly, Foreign Secretary (1900- 1905)—
there is a stunning dearth of published studies about his life.  The official—and only—
biography of Lansdowne was published in 1929 by Lord Newton, a friend and Unionist 
colleague.  Writing a mere two years after the marquis’s death, even Newton lamented 
that his subject’s abilities, even among contemporaries, “were to a great extent 
unrecognized,” while his name “has perhaps already been almost forgotten by the 
unthinking mass of Englishmen.”10  In Algernon Cecil’s grand assessment of all of 
England’s Foreign Ministers from Castlereagh to Grey—published the year Lansdowne 
died—the foremost question with regard to the marquis’s tenure at the Foreign Office 
that the author found himself unable to answer was whether to attach the three page 
summary to the end of the chapter on Salisbury, or to the beginning of the one on Grey.11   
                                                 
10 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 496. 
 
11 Algernon Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries 1807-1916: Studies in Personality and Policy (Port 
Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971, c.1927), p. 311. 
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 Indeed, whether Lansdowne in fact ever really directed foreign policy at all is 
still an open matter for debate.  He was judged by some of his closest political 
colleagues to be a cipher under the command of Arthur Balfour.  Lyle McGeoch has 
gone so far as to assert that the existing evidence points to Balfour himself as “a leader 
in Lansdowne’s political ostracism and character assassination” following the 
publication of the marquis’s infamous and so-called ‘Peace Letter’ of November 1917, 
in which he sought to press the warring parties to consider a negotiated end to the First 
World War.12  Specifically, at a luncheon held by Balfour in 1926, he and Austen 
Chamberlain were overheard agreeing that Lansdowne’s portrait did indeed belong 
among a display in the Foreign Office of the “six famous Foreign Secretaries,” but only 
because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French Entente, and 
notwithstanding that at the time “he hardly realized what he was doing.”13   
Chamberlain, a lifelong friend of Lansdowne, did his friend’s legacy a further 
disservice when, in his autobiography, he argued that it would not “detract from 
Lansdowne’s services as Foreign Secretary to say that his chief accomplishments would 
never have been achieved but for the constructive mind of Balfour and the constant 
support he gave him, not only in executing his foreign policy, but in conceiving and 
shaping it.”14  If, as Chamberlain asserts, Balfour helped conceive, shape, and execute 
Lansdowne’s foreign policy, the marquis’s standing in the whole process is rendered 
                                                 
12 Lyle A. McGeoch, “Balfour and Lansdowne after the ‘Peace Letter’ of 1917” (unpublished paper 
delivered at the Western Conference on British Studies meeting at Las Cruces, New Mexico, October 26-
27, 1984), p. 11. 
 
13 Ibid., p. 9; Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 93-94.  
 
14 Sir Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1935), pp. 209-210. 
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marginal and perhaps ultimately undeserving of a major study.  If one discounts 
Chamberlain’s implication that Lansdowne lacked a foreign policy conception 
altogether, however, his remarks could lend credence to the idea that the marquis’s 
foreign policy actions and goals simply differed in a fundamental way from his 
colleagues in the Cabinet.       
The general conclusion of Lansdowne’s contemporaries that he was at best of 
secondary importance in the direction of foreign affairs does appear to have carried some 
weight in such seminal works as George Monger’s End of Isolation (London, 1963) and 
J. A. S. Grenville’s Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy (London, 1964).  Monger’s work 
remains one of the most straightforward and thorough monographs addressing 
Lansdowne’s time at the Foreign Office.  While many of the Foreign Secretary’s actions 
are portrayed as calculated and thoughtful, however, far too often the author’s insight 
into the workings of Lansdowne’s mind is entirely speculative.  Monger attributed most 
of the marquis’s foreign policy successes to his being “extremely lucky,” and 
notwithstanding Wilson’s criticisms he also noted that Lansdowne never truly 
understood the implications of his diplomacy, namely “the estrangement from 
Germany.”  According to Monger, the marquis was an “unremarkable” and unoriginal 
man with the lone redeeming virtue, ascribed to him in part by Balfour, of a Whiggish 
detachment, “free from both prejudice and emotion.”15  While this assessment might yet 
hold true, it is still in need of elucidation.   
                                                 
15 George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons Ltd, 1963), pp. 233-235. 
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Similarly, Grenville credits Lansdowne for recognizing Britain’s new position in 
the world and the need for a new course in British diplomacy, but finds that “in fact 
there was no ‘master plan,’” and that his numerous “piecemeal decisions” were not 
based on “settled principles” as Salisbury’s had been.  Moreover, Grenville concurred 
with Monger that Lansdowne “had no clear conception of what the final outcome of his 
policy would be.”16  It is curious and unaccountable, however, that though there was no 
“master plan,” there apparently was a “policy.”  Because these two works became the 
essential groundwork for many future foreign policy studies, these assessments in some 
form or another have endured, and if they are not wholly unwarranted, they remain to a 
degree unexamined.17       
   More recent scholarship bears this out.  In his work, Balfour and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge, 1997), Jason Tomes argued that Balfour set the foreign policy agenda of his 
administration while Lansdowne was competent enough to handle only the details.18  
Where Balfour had once been Lansdowne’s fag at Eton, their roles were deemed 
reversed when the latter became Balfour’s Foreign Secretary.  Since Lansdowne is 
mentioned in no more than twelve pages of Tomes’ work, however, the author’s 
conclusions, while persuasive in revealing the diplomatic and strategic philosophy of his 
subject, are less convincing with regard to Lansdowne.  The marquis’s actions as 
                                                 
16 Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp. 434, 438. 
 
17 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 294. 
 
18 Jason Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 13, 121. 
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Foreign Secretary require greater examination, even if only to demonstrate his 
irrelevance.  Although others have been more positive in their evaluation, remarkably 
they have been no more satisfying in revealing more about the man or his foreign policy.  
In his essay on Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary in Keith Wilson’s British Foreign 
Secretaries and Foreign Policy (London, 1987), P. J. V. Rolo concluded in a mere 
eleven pages that Lansdowne, while not an “artist,” was a good and competent 
“craftsman” whose ability and intelligence were underrated by his colleagues and 
historians.  Rolo even suggests that Lansdowne’s tenure at the Foreign Office might 
serve as a template for how diplomatic work should be carried out in future.19  Within 
such praise one can discern a hope for future diplomacy conducted by upright 
gentlemanly diplomats working sincerely to engage the international brotherhood of 
nations in order to preserve the peace.  The impression drawn from B. J. McKercher’s 
article, “Diplomatic Equipoise: the Lansdowne Foreign Office,” is comparable.20  
Although both pieces—even in their errors—come closer to revealing the real Whiggish 
Lansdowne, they also both share the unsettling whiff of presentism.  It would appear that 
for many scholars, however, the end-product of Lansdowne’s liberal minded foreign 
policy—the outbreak of the First World War—so readily resembled that which might 
have been the result of traditional ‘balance of power’ diplomacy they did not bother to 
fully consider other alternatives. 
                                                 
19 P. V. J. Rolo, “Lord Lansdowne,” in Keith Wilson, ed., British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: 
From Crimean War to First World War (London, Croom Helm, 1987). 
  
20 B. J. C. McKercher, “Diplomatic Equipoise: the Lansdowne Foreign Office, the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905, and the Global Balance of Power.” Canadian Journal of History 24 (December 1989): 299-
339. 
 
 12
One such alternative is that as far as Lansdowne conducted foreign policy, it was 
a policy based on a set of liberal principles that would have suited a Gladstone Ministry 
better than those of Salisbury or Balfour under which he served.  Moreover, if one were 
to maintain as Russell did, that the inevitable denouement of the ‘policy of the entente’ 
was the outbreak of war in August 1914, then one might justly consider whether 
Lansdowne’s foreign policy simply reconfirmed the ineffectiveness of the liberal-
humanist ideology to eradicate human conflict in the face of man’s inherent need to 
establish an identity in opposition to the ‘Other.’ 
In considering such a hypothesis, as well as those put forward earlier, this essay 
will follow new paths for analysis and discovery.  These new paths have been hinted at 
in the historiography, but have as yet not been pursued.  Almost offhandedly, Monger 
noted that in many foreign policy areas Lansdowne was “predisposed to believe in the 
need for a new departure,” yet he offered little in explanation of this predisposition.21  
More recently, Avner Cohen, in seeking to discern why Joseph Chamberlain and 
Lansdowne took different paths in their attitudes towards Germany after 1901, 
concluded that the source of the growing differences between the two “probably 
originated in the differences in social background, personalities and general beliefs.”22  
In order to move beyond the extant studies and interpretations of Lansdowne’s foreign 
policy, this work will follow this new path and in doing so encompass the marquis’s 
entire political career, searching out foreign policy relevancies.  It will take a more than 
                                                 
21 Monger, End of Isolation, p. 51. 
 
22 Avner Cohen, “Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British Foreign Policy 1901-1903: From 
Collaboration to Confrontation” Australian Journal of Politics and History (June 1997): 130. 
 13
cursory look at Lansdowne’s social background, early life, personality, as well as his 
time spent on “the fringe of diplomacy” in Canada and India, in the hope that they might 
aid in revealing, if not a “master plan,” then the aspirations or motivations of the man.23    
 This essay is not intended to be a full reconsideration of the issues and events of 
British foreign policy during the period covered.  Most of the major and even minor 
foreign policy issues during Lansdowne’s tenure at the Foreign Office have been fully 
examined in many studies, many times over, since the Foreign Secretary’s death.  Over 
the last four decades, however, very few of these narrowly focused studies have even 
cursorily sought to address the whole of Lansdowne’s diplomatic career, or with any 
confidence assess his particular impact on events.  Through a synthesis of the existing 
secondary works, to be supplemented by primary research in the Lansdowne Papers—
most recently deposited and maintained in the British Library—it is my hope that this 
essay will advance the historiography by contributing both new history as well as new 
interpretations of the issues and events addressed within.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Lyle A. McGeoch, “The Role of lord Lansdowne in the Diplomatic Negotiations Connected with the 
Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April 1904” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pennsylvania, 1964), p. 206. 
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CHAPTER II 
FOUNDATIONS AND PREDISPOSITIONS 
 
Ancestry 
The origins of the Fitzmaurice family lay in Ireland, and in the Norman 
ascendancy, which was the foundation of their wealth and earliest nobility, reaching 
back over eight hundred years.1  When Strongbow invaded Ireland in the twelfth century 
he was accompanied by Maurice Fitzgerald, ‘the Invader,’ and founder of the 
Fitzmaurice root of the Lansdowne family line.  Fitzgerald’s third son would gain lands 
in the northern parts of County Kerry, and father the future Lords of Kerry and Lixnaw, 
as well as the future Earls of Desmond.  Of the first eighteen Lords of Kerry only one 
married an English woman, and that marriage ended without issue, so that after four 
hundred years in Ireland the Fitzmaurices were of mostly Irish blood, Catholic in their 
religion, and had displayed a consistent streak of rebelliousness against the crown.  In 
the mid-seventeenth century, however, the nineteenth Lord of Kerry took to English 
ways, became a Protestant, and left Ireland.  Although he and his immediate descendents 
later sided with the Stuart kings in their battles with Parliament, by the end of the 
century the twenty-first lord had reversed course and made amends with William III, and 
was created first Earl of Kerry.2    
                                                 
1 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 1. 
 
2 Sixth Marquis of Lansdowne, Glanerought and the Petty-Fitzmaurices (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1937), pp. 221-224. 
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Though the Fitzmaurice family line was ancient and noble from its beginnings, 
the lands and wealth that survived to support the Lansdowne Marquisate in the 
nineteenth century must be credited to Sir William Petty.  Petty was author of the ‘Down 
Survey,’ a complete survey of Irish lands in preparation for Cromwell’s planned 
eradication of Catholicism and Catholic proprietors in Ireland.  In the process, he 
managed to gain some 270,000 acres for himself, in part as compensation for his work.  
Most of this land was in County Kerry, and as Petty himself noted, it was the least 
desirable and most difficult section of Ireland to control.3  When his daughter Anne 
married Thomas, the twenty-first lord and first Earl of Kerry, the union marked an 
alliance between two of the greatest landholding families in the county.  Moreover, the 
first Lord Lansdowne was of the opinion that it was Anne—though an unattractive 
woman—who “brought into the family whatever degree of sense may have appeared in 
it and whatever wealth is likely to remain in it.”4     
The expansive Petty lands, along with the earldom of Shelburne, passed to 
Thomas and Anne’s younger son John in 1751 on the death of Sir William Petty’s son 
and last remaining heir in the Petty line.5  Upon his succession, John purchased the 
Bowood estate in Wiltshire and thereafter spent most of his time in England.  John’s son, 
the famous Earl of Shelburne—briefly Prime Minister in 1782—was created first 
Marquis of Lansdowne.  Although the original Fitzmaurice lands did not outlast the third 
                                                 
3 Ibid., pp. 4-8. 
 
4 Shelburne quoted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 2. 
 
5 Lansdowne, Glanerought, p. 225. 
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Earl of Kerry—who had sold the family legacy, settled in Paris, and lost everything in 
the Revolution—the ancient Kerry title remained.6  In 1818, this passed to the third 
Marquis of Lansdowne, now the twenty-fourth Lord of Kerry, and known to history as 
the great ‘Nestor of the Whigs.’  Notably, during his long political career, he refused the 
premiership in 1852, and turned down a Dukedom in 1857.7  The fifth Marquis’s father 
held the title for only three years, and spent much of that time speaking in the Lords on 
behalf of business interests in an attempt to improve the family’s finances.  He had 
previously held the post of Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1856-1858) and was 
involved briefly in the failed attempt to set up a coalition government with 
Conservatives under the direction of moderate Whigs in 1866, in order to “protect 
England from the trade unionists, the democrats, and the equalitarian sentimentalists.”8 
 
Education 
The education of the fifth Marquis was quite traditional and ended in 
disappointment.  At the age of ten, Viscount Clanmaurice, or simply ‘Clan’ (his courtesy 
title and the name of affection used by his closest friends until his death), was sent off to 
a private school at Woodcote, and from there on to Eton, where due to one of those 
interesting twists of fate, Arthur Balfour, the future Prime Minister under whom the 
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp. 58, 225. 
 
7 New York Times, July 12, 1854, p. 4; Lansdowne, Glanerought, p. 126; It would appear that he was 
prepared to accept the title of Duke of Kerry in 1863 upon the marriage of the Prince Of Wales, but died 
before the honor was bestowed (New York Times, February 17, 1863, p. 5). 
 
8 James Winter, Robert Lowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 229. 
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viscount would serve, would become his fag.  Balfour would later recollect that his 
fagmaster was “rather strict.” 9  After Eton, however, and for most of the last twenty-five 
years of his lordship’s life, their roles were reversed.  During Clanmaurice’s abbreviated 
time at Eton, his tutor, Mr. Birch, found him a “talented” and “clear-headed but rather 
uncertain” young man.  Most unflatteringly, though without malice, he noted that the 
young viscount was “without imagination.”  Birch eventually suggested to Lord 
Lansdowne that if the young man was to be a scholar, he should be taken from Eton and 
prepared for university by a private tutor before the “boating set” he followed instilled in 
him a poor work ethic, and the seeking of pleasure became his main objective in life.  In 
the hands of the Rev. Lewis Campbell, Clanmaurice was prepared for Balliol and 
showed signs of becoming a good classical scholar, but once again it was found that he 
had one troubling flaw—one which his new tutor thought might hamper his success later 
in life—and that was “a want of imagination.”10 
Clanmaurice entered Balliol in 1864 and came under the personal and supportive 
direction of the most celebrated of tutors, and later master, Dr. Benjamin Jowett.  Their 
relationship grew very strong and their friendship endured until the latter’s death in 
1893.  As Lansdowne’s true mentor in both politics and life, Jowett deserves some 
attention.  Jowett was a liberal reformer at Balliol, favoring a broad and progressive 
Church, and made efforts to bring in poor students who otherwise would have been 
unable to afford a university education.  Future Liberal Foreign Secretary, Lord 
                                                 
9 Balfour quoted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 4-5; Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, 
First Earl of Balfour, K. G., O, M., F. R. S., etc, Vol. 1 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 336.  
 
10 Birch and Campbell quoted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 4-6. 
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Kimberley, met the Oxford professor in September 1862, and believed him “the 
(perhaps) only liberal & agreeable don” he ever met.  A classical scholar, Jowett was 
known to take special care of the wealthy and titled, so that he might sway them to use 
their power and influence for the good of society.  Among the many he would take under 
his wing over the years were Sir Edward Grey, George Curzon, and Herbert Henry 
Asquith.11  Jowett took an immediate liking to the young viscount and informed Lord 
Lansdowne that his son showed a “great deal of ability & promise” and with hard work 
was “making a good use of Oxford.”  Moreover, he noted that there were “very few 
undergraduates to whose career I look forward with as much confidence as to his.”12  By 
the summer of 1865, however, Jowett found reason to be greatly disappointed in his 
pupil’s study habits when the latter failed to achieve a first class result in moderations.  
Jowett acknowledged that his charge was “not a great student” though “not at all 
indisposed to read,” but never entirely understood why the young man could not achieve 
greater marks on his exams.  Nevertheless, his support and affection for Clanmaurice did 
not waver.  He requested Lord and Lady Lansdowne’s help in limiting any distractions 
from their son’s studies in order that he might obtain a first in his final examinations, 
which were still two years away.  His prescription for academic improvement, if 
                                                 
11 Geoffrey Faber, Jowett: a portrait with background (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1957), p. 24; 
Angus Hawkins and John Powell, eds., The Journal of John Wodehouse, First Earl of Kimberley, for 
1862-1902 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1997), p. 75, entry of September 9, 1862.  Hereafter cited 
as Kimberley Journal; Jowett was persecuted after the publication of his work Essays and Reviews (1860) 
that among other things advocated the “use of reason on the interpretation of Scripture” (John Jones, 
Balliol College: A History, 2nd Ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 206; Jones, Balliol 
College, pp. 205, 207-208, 210, 221. 
  
12 Jowett to fourth Marquis, January 9, 1864, Lansdowne Papers, Further Correspondence, Jowett 
(Nightingale) 1862-1893.  Hereafter cited as LP. 
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Clanmaurice was to have a hope of achieving a first class, was a regimen of six hours of 
reading a day for nine or ten months for each of the next two years, as well as the whole 
month of September to be spent with Jowett at his retreat at a little inn at Tumnell Bridge 
in Scotland reading The Republic of Plato and The Ethics of Aristotle.13 
It is unclear whether Clanmaurice simply tested poorly, or if Jowett’s affections 
for his student colored his overall assessment, but at Tumnell Bridge the tutor again 
marveled at his pupil’s abilities and taste.  He wrote to Lord Lansdowne that he had 
“rarely known anyone quicker at apprehending a new or difficult subject: he sees the 
point of a thing in a moment.”  Jowett’s praise, most certainly genuine, was inevitably 
followed, however, with a listing of the young viscount’s defects.  He found his pupil 
“wanting in interests about political & general subjects: & this indolence or shyness of 
mind prevents his doing justice to his abilities which are really excellent.”  Jowett 
remained full of hope that Clanmaurice might succeed in his studies, and “take a 
distinguished part in life,” but the viscount’s work never matched expectations.14  In 
April 1867, Jowett was forced to report to Clanmaurice, who was vacationing in Paris, 
that his most recent papers were “not well done & gave no real evidence of the ability 
that you show in your essays.”  Jowett generously chose, however, to credit this poor 
performance to his pupil’s poor physical health at the time.15        
                                                 
13 Jowett to fourth Marquis, July 12, 1865, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-1893. 
 
14 Jowett to fourth Marquis, August 7, 1865, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-
1893. 
 
15 Jowett to Lansdowne, April 2, 1867, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-1893. 
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For Clanmaurice, the path to a first class degree was only to become more 
difficult, and beset with even more obstacles, some of which were not of his own 
making.  His father died suddenly in 1866, and he succeeded to the Lansdowne title, 
lands, and debts at the dangerously young age—dangerous for the landed elite—of 
twenty-one.  Lansdowne (as the fifth Marquis will hereafter be styled in this essay) 
proved his commitment to his studies by spending yet another vacation with Jowett at 
Tumnell Bridge preparing for final examinations to be taken the following year.  He was 
destined, however, to come up short once again. 
Perhaps at his least supportive, Jowett wrote to Lansdowne in September 1867 
shortly before exams complimenting his pupil on his “great talent for languages & 
uncommon quickness,” but still wished him to add to these qualities more “depth of 
mind,” and reminded him that “The object of reading for the schools is not chiefly to 
attain a first class but to elevate & strengthen the character for life.”16  After the last of 
his written exams in November 1867 Lansdowne reported to his mother that he had “no 
good account to give” of his “performance.”  As for Jowett’s high opinions and 
expectations for his pupil, Lansdowne wrote that he wished he could “confirm” them, 
but “for myself I have absolutely no hopes, and I am not a bad judge.”  He could not 
help but feel that “a very great prize has been almost within reach, and been missed by 
my own fault.”17 
                                                 
16 Jowett to Lansdowne, September 14, 1867, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-
1893. 
  
17 Lansdowne to his mother, November 28, 1867, excerpted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 8-9. 
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The sense of looming disappointment proved justified as Lansdowne missed his 
first class.  In his letter of condolence, Jowett first placed blame on unfortunate 
circumstances—which included that wondrous potential the marquis possessed, but 
seemingly never displayed—and reassured Lansdowne that he had “failed not from want 
of ability but from a certain want of interest & from the cares of this world coming upon 
you too soon.”  The tutor also blamed himself for having failed to make his pupil 
“understand the amount of interest & of hard work which was required.”  Jowett’s faith 
remained, however, and he stressed to Lansdowne that he was certainly not fated to 
“settle down ‘second class’ for life,” and in his estimation had “far greater ability than 
many first classmen.”18 
It is impossible to judge Jowett’s true influence on Lansdowne’s political 
philosophy, beyond that his instruction favored an aristocratic bearing, responsibility, 
and sense of greater purpose.  It seems likely that his influence would only have 
reinforced in the marquis Whig paternalist values, reminding him that “wealth and rank 
are means and not ends, and may be the greatest evil or the greatest good as they are 
used.”19  Notwithstanding Lansdowne’s disappointing second class, Jowett still assumed 
a future public life for his former charge, and pointed out that “though always willing to 
act with a party,” a man “should still keep his mind above party feelings and motives,” 
and that “reticence, self-control, freedom from personal feeling, are the qualities to be 
aimed at.”  Jowett had added, however, that he did not object to “a touch of idealism or 
                                                 
18 Jowett to Lansdowne, January 15-22(?), 1868, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-
1893. 
 
19 Jowett to Lansdowne, April, 1867, excerpted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 7.  
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speculation also if kept in its proper place.”20  In later life, Lansdowne was known to 
display all of these qualities, and if he did display touches of idealism, or even passion, 
in his political career, it was expressed somewhat ironically toward those emotionally 
detached ideals of which Jowett preached.  It was an idealism that would manifest 
especially with regard to the efficacy of diplomacy, but in the main the marquis carried 
on his political duties well within the confines of a Whig sense of progress in a world 
still run by the gentleman amateur. 
 
Early Political Career 
Jowett’s proffered advice, both personal and political, would continue on into the 
years when Lansdowne had taken up public office.  In 1869, Jowett wrote to the twenty-
four year-old and soon-to-be-married nobleman that he should carefully consider how to 
“use this great wealth & rank for the highest purposes,” and that “almost anything may 
be accomplished for the agriculture, for the houses & above all for the people.”21  It is 
notable too that both Jowett and Lansdowne soon experienced the opening of a breach 
between themselves and the party of reform.  Over the years, Jowett had had the 
opportunity of engaging in rather direct and argumentative discussions with the Grand 
Old Man, William Ewart Gladstone, especially with regard to Ireland.  After one such 
occasion while the premier was in Oxford in November 1883, Jowett reported to 
Lansdowne—disapprovingly—that the Prime Minister believed the country to be 
                                                 
20 Jowett to Lansdowne, January 15-22, 1868, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-
1893. 
 
21 Jowett to Lansdowne, August 8, 1869, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-1893. 
 
 23
heading towards “a sort of mild socialism” and that he was “not at all afraid of 
democracy.”  In a personal aside, the aging Balliol Master noted with surprise that as he 
got older, he found that he grew more conservative.22 
Prior to this, however, it would appear that Jowett played some part in 
encouraging Lansdowne’s political career in the Liberal Party.  It should be remembered 
that Lansdowne never had the chance to stand for election to the House of Commons.  
Due to the early death of his father, he would spend his entire public career in the House 
of Lords.  There is nothing to suggest that he regretted this circumstance.  As he noted to 
Lord Knollys, on the occasion of the latter’s elevation many years later, the House of 
Lords was “quite a pleasant resort.”23  Moreover, with the passage of a new franchise 
reform bill the year after his father’s death, it would now be increasingly difficult to 
secure the election of his own man to the Commons to sit for what had been the 
Lansdowne pocket borough of Calne.  His brother, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, however, 
did manage to sit for Calne as a Liberal virtually unopposed for the next seventeen 
years.24   
In November 1868, while Lansdowne was in France visiting relatives and also 
the court of Napoleon III at Compiègne, Jowett took it upon himself to encourage his 
former pupil to enter politics.  He argued that “a man of energy & character ought to find 
                                                 
22 Faber, Jowett, p. 350; Jowett to Lansdowne, November 29, 1883, LP Further Correspondence, Jowett 
(Nightingale) 1862-1893.  Gladstone actually played an important, though indirect, role in Jowett’s 
election as Master of Balliol in 1870.  The Prime Minister, who admired Jowett’s intellect if not his 
positions on the issues, offered the current Master of Balliol the Deanery of Rochester, thus opening the 
way for Jowett’s election as the new Master (Jones, Balliol College, pp. 211-212).  
 
23 Lansdowne to Knollys, July 9, 1902, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary, Private Letters: Court, f69. 
 
24 Winter, Robert Lowe, p. 157. 
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some real work to do,” beyond the usual occupations of “society or hunting.”  Jowett 
suggested that Lansdowne “contrive” his way into office, especially with a new 
Gladstone ministry about to be formed, reminding him that his grandfather, the ‘Nestor 
of the Whigs,’ had been Chancellor of the Exchequer at nearly as young an age.  He 
advised, however, that he “‘make love’ to any office as a beginning.”  Noting that Lord 
Granville had in the past spoken to him with “great regard & enthusiasm” about the 
young marquis, Jowett suggested that either Lansdowne or his mother approach his 
lordship about a post, as Gladstone was likely to consult him as to the new cabinet.  
Jowett also observed that it was quite the norm to get others to put one forward for 
office, and that Lansdowne should not think it improper.25 
Within weeks of returning from France, Lansdowne approached Granville and 
the latter wrote to Gladstone seeking—as a personal favor—to have the marquis 
installed as one of the Queen’s Lords in Waiting.  Granville noted that though young, 
Lansdowne had “more manner, conversation, and general information than most men 10 
or 15 years older.”  The offer Lansdowne actually received from Gladstone and then 
quickly accepted, however, was that of Junior Lordship of the Treasury.26  According to 
                                                 
25 Jowett to Lansdowne, November 17, 1868, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-
1893.  
 
26 Granville to Gladstone, December 16, 1868, quoted in Agatha Ramm, ed, The Gladstone—Granville 
Correspondence (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), document no.3; Lansdowne to 
Gladstone, ?December 16, 1868, LP, Further Correspondence, William Ewart Gladstone 1868-1883.  
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Newton, Lansdowne was able to secure such an appointment because the Liberal Party 
was at the time desperate for any young peer deemed capable of holding a minor post.27   
The core principles and beliefs that Lansdowne brought to his new political life 
were evident from the beginning of his government service.  Within three months of 
accepting his post, he offered to resign over the government’s position in a debate on a 
financial bill.  Gladstone asked him to wait until the issue under discussion was put in its 
final form before deciding whether or not he could in good conscience remain at his 
post.28  Lansdowne remained, but four months later he again almost scuttled his 
fledgling political career, only this time not by choice.  Quite inexplicably, he had 
returned to Oxford for dinner with friends and, in what Jowett could only later surmise 
was a “‘mad freak,’” entered the Dean of Christ Church’s garden with Lord Blanford 
and upturned many of the plants.  Jowett wrote to his former pupil in order to confirm 
the rumor of the incident that had been circulating in both Oxford and London.  Jowett at 
first thought the rumor a mistake, but learning the truth, he implored Lansdowne to send 
a written apology to the Dean.29  It would appear from the correspondence that the 
marquis initially hoped that his tutor would resolve the issue for him, but Jowett told him 
that he had to resolve it himself and then hopefully the matter would be “finished & 
forgotten.”  If Lansdowne persisted in doing such things, however, Jowett warned him 
                                                 
27 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 13. 
 
28 Gladstone to Lansdowne, March 11, 1869, LP, Further Correspondence, William Ewart Gladstone 
1868-1883.  
 
29 Jowett to Lansdowne, June 21, 1869, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-1893.   
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that he would get the unfortunate and unhelpful reputation of “being a ‘delightful person, 
but quite mad.’”30  
In the midst of struggling to answer questions in the Lords concerning the 
government’s financial decisions, of which he knew very little, Lansdowne married 
Lady Maud Hamilton, the youngest daughter of the Duke of Abercorn.  Newton credits 
Lady Lansdowne’s “dignity and charm” as being of “incalculable value in the discharge 
of the high offices of state” the marquis would hold during his lifetime.  The marriage 
was considered a happy and contented one for the whole of its duration, and there has 
been nothing uncovered since to prove this assessment false.  It is extremely difficult, in 
fact, to find a single word spoken against Lansdowne personally, outside of political 
rhetoric, even by the staunchest of political foes.  Lord Ernest Hamilton’s near 
hagiography of his brother-in-law—printed as an appendix in Newton’s official 
biography—cannot easily be impugned even after seventy-odd years.  Hamilton asserted 
that “most people in society would, I think, have nominated [the marquis] as our 
representative in any international competition for gentlemen.”  He added though that 
beyond a seemingly rigid veneer, Lansdowne was far from the cold and formidable man 
that he might have appeared to outsiders.31  Ten years earlier, Colonel House, the 
personal envoy of the American President Woodrow Wilson and an unlikely admirer, 
came to a similar assessment of the man, noting in his journal that Lansdowne was 
indeed a “great gentleman,” but “not merely in intellect and character, nor for having for 
                                                 
30 Jowett to Lansdowne, July 6, 1869, LP, Further Correspondence, Jowett (Nightingale) 1862-1893. 
 
31 Hamilton’s sketch in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 506-511. 
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a background an ancient and distinguished lineage, but in manner and in that intangible 
and indefinable air which comes as a gift from the gods.”32  Lansdowne was, as Newton 
described him, “a fastidious Whig of the highest quality,” but softened and molded by 
the progressive path of nineteenth century English liberalism. 
For example, Lansdowne’s first political speech in the Upper chamber not having 
to do with Treasury business dealt with the Marriage with a Deceased Wife’s Sister Bill.  
The arguments against the bill, founded in religion, history, as well natural law, all fell 
short of persuading him.  With regard to the religious objection, he believed that “a large 
section of the community would, where such issues were at stake, be reluctant to admit 
they were tied and bound by the merely literal interpretation of the Levitical law.”  As 
for the historical arguments against the bill—drawn from antiquity—Lansdowne felt 
they had no place in nineteenth century legislation, and that the natural laws which quite 
rightly barred consanguineous marriages could certainly not be applied to the marriage 
of a widower and his sister-in-law.  Moreover, he dismissed fears that this was but the 
“thin end of the wedge” for further bills legalizing marriage between other relations.  He 
declared, therefore, that he would vote for a second reading, not the least in order to 
legitimize the children of such unions and “promote the happiness of families.”33             
Two years later, at the age of twenty-seven, Lansdowne accepted the office of 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.  He questioned his abilities for the post, 
and for the first time but certainly not the last, considered his state of health before 
                                                 
32 Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 
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accepting it.  Newton observed that the marquis was “Always a delicate man,” and for 
the remainder of his life Lansdowne would battle one ailment or another, which at times 
left him completely debilitated.  The most prominent of these was chronic sciatica that 
developed as early as the late 1870s, and which could on occasion lay him up for 
weeks.34  Lansdowne accepted the new post only after assurances from Viscount 
Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War, that his “complete ignorance of War Office 
matters” would not “interfere seriously with the workings of the department.”35  These 
qualities of self-effacement and even self-reproach stayed with Lansdowne throughout 
his career and no doubt had a great deal to do with the respect accorded to him by 
members of all political parties.  The very same qualities, however, might also have led, 
deservedly or not, to his reputation as a political and intellectual lightweight.  Lord 
Selborne, who liked and greatly respected Lansdowne, would many years later describe 
him as “the most perfect gentleman in the world, of great experience ability & good 
sense,” but “ridiculously diffident” and possessing only “some vision.”36  J. S. Sandars’s 
assessment that Lansdowne was “the most scrupulous—if not meticulous” of all the 
Ministers he knew sounded a similar respectful, if somewhat dismissive, tone.37  
Lansdowne spent two unremarkable years at the War Office, ending when the 
Gladstone Ministry fell in early 1874.  It was thus as a member of the political 
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opposition that Lansdowne made his first public forays into the foreign policy arena by 
speaking out against Beaconsfieldism.  In April 1877, with Russia and the Porte drifting 
towards war—which Lansdowne predicted was not too far away—he echoed his mentor, 
Lord Granville, in criticizing the government not only for failing to put more pressure on 
the Turks, as the government’s own representative at the Constantinople Conference, the 
Marquis of Salisbury, had wished, but for lacking a firm policy altogether.38  Disraeli 
and his Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Derby, were caught having to appear concerned 
over the plight of Christians in lands under Turkish sovereignty, while more importantly 
blocking any Russian advance to Constantinople, something on which both parties 
would have agreed.39  Speaking in the Lords, Lansdowne charged that the government 
“from the outset hesitated between two lines of policy,” these being “complete 
abstention” and “active interference.”  He argued that by choosing neither, the 
government had put the Balkan Christians in danger, and undermined the peace of 
Europe.40  In this view, Lansdowne might have found some common ground with 
Salisbury, who privately derided his own government’s policy as floating “lazily 
downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions.”  
Salisbury did not understand the irrational fear of Russia displayed by many in England, 
or the point of “sticking to the carcasses of dead policies” such as propping up the Porte.  
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For his part, Disraeli abhorred those who would prefer a “policy of crusade” to the 
greater “imperial policy of England.”41  What Gladstone and the Liberals really sought, 
however, was to find a third policy option where Britain would not have to chose 
between the Turk and the Russian, and establish a Balkan region free from both 
powers.42  There is no question that Gladstone’s policy preference was high-minded, if 
lacking the greater practicality of a crusade. 
Lansdowne’s next pronouncement on foreign policy came after the army’s 
disastrous defeat at the hands of the Zulus at Isandhlwana in January 1879.  At the 
direction of his party, Lansdowne submitted a resolution stating that the House of Lords 
regretted the ultimatum sent to the Zulu King Cetewayo, which was “calculated to 
produce immediate war,” as well as the subsequent “offensive war . . . commenced 
without imperative and pressing necessity or adequate preparation.”  The resolution also 
noted surprise that even after censure by the government, Sir Bartle Frere, British High 
Commissioner in South Africa—the man deemed responsible for the whole unfortunate 
affair—remained at his post.  Lansdowne’s speech on the resolution laid blame for the 
whole episode squarely on British actions over the past number of years.  He argued that 
the annexation of the Transvaal had put Britain in the place of the Dutch Boers and 
threatened the Zulus with an unacceptable encirclement.  Believing that the 
government’s policy should have been to avoid conflict with the Zulus, he bemoaned a 
failure of diplomacy in settling such outstanding disputes.  Lansdowne asserted that the 
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British demand for the Zulu Army to disband, as it was “the pride and plaything of this 
savage despot,” was sure to have scuttled any negotiation.  He specifically regretted that 
such an ultimatum was given to the Zulu Envoys “who, it is said, belonged to the Peace 
Party.”43  With regard to foreign policy, Lansdowne was not a reluctant Gladstonite, and 
his famed Whiggish detachment from irrational passions never prevented him from 
searching out and nearly always finding the ‘peace party’ in what was to his mind a 
rational world under the purview of, and administered by, a brotherhood of civilized 
nations.44 
Considering the future path of the marquis’s career, it is also of interest to note 
his description of the responsibilities of imperial representatives throughout the empire, 
in the context of Sir Bartle Frere’s shortcomings.  He charged that as “the Representative 
of Imperial discipline and Constitutional authority in the South African colonies,” Frere 
had “shown himself indifferent to discipline and superior to Constitutional authority.”  
He added: 
It has been incidental to that [colonial] system that English 
administration has been found in all parts of the world in contact with 
independent races—races whose ideas of civilization and morality differ 
widely from ours.  Hitherto our endeavour has been to extend our 
influence, not by fire and sword, but by the example of free institutions, 
by just administration, by good government, by the assimilating 
influences of culture and education.  If these good practices are to be 
given up—if in our eyes independence is to be a crime, if all over the 
world the representatives of this country are to be allowed the arbitrament 
of peace and war—then I am afraid the day will come when, if it be said 
that the sun never sets on the Dominions of the Queen—it will be said 
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also that it never ceases to look down on the strife and suffering for which 
our policy will have made itself responsible.45    
                       
There are echoes of the Grand Old Man in these words, but what Gladstone 
might have uttered with unmistakable sarcasm, Lansdowne spoke with absolute 
sincerity.46  The dissonant notes sounded by Lansdowne are almost too many to address.  
Britain was of course only in contact with such independent races because of previous 
extensions of the empire by way of “fire and sword.”  Moreover, although Lansdowne 
stated his abhorrence of violence as the means to assimilate these independent races to 
British good government, education, and superior English culture, his support for 
assimilation is clear.   
In later years, when as Viceroy of India he was faced with the continued 
intransigence of non-assimilating peoples, his commitment to a more civilized—
liberal—world achieved without resort to “strife and suffering” was sorely tested.  The 
ultimate irony, however, was that—in a sense—Lansdowne already occupied an 
imperial post and had been in close contact and repeated conflict with such an 
independent race for most of his life.  He was after all one of the largest landowners and 
landlords in Ireland.  The continued strife and suffering taking place in that country put 
the more grandiose claims of liberal beliefs that the marquis espoused in public to a very 
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personal test.  Moreover, the Irish Question helps to put into focus the lines drawn in 
Lansdowne’s multifaceted belief system that simultaneously encompassed the Liberal 
and the Whig.   
It was the Irish Question in fact and the choices it forced Lansdowne to make that 
initially set the path of his future political career.  If the Earl of Granville, Lansdowne’s 
Whig mentor, had assumed the leadership of the Liberals as his protégé had hoped, or if 
Lord Hartington, the last Whig leader of the Liberals, had held on to that post, the 
marquis’s path might have been different.  Gladstone, however, reinvigorated from his 
great Midlothian campaign, returned to lead his party in 1880.  Lansdowne’s foremost 
concerns at this stage of his career centered around not only his desire for political office 
and steady work to fill his days—even if that meant the normally unpopular post of 
Viceroy of Ireland as was rumored—but also the need of funds.47  The “Bad Times” in 
Ireland, which at their worst lasted roughly three years beginning in 1879, hit 
Lansdowne’s finances particularly hard.  The marquis was one of only three men in the 
country who owned over 100,000 acres, including a 95,000 acre estate in County Kerry.  
The top fourteen landowners in Ireland, including Lansdowne, together accounted for 
one-twentieth of all the land.  It was as one of the ‘Ten Thousand’ in Ireland that 
Lansdowne’s principles and beliefs came in direct conflict with Gladstonion progress, 
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and some background on the Irish Question and the Lansdowne family’s place in it is 
warranted.48 
The lords of Kerry from the first marquis to the fifth had a conflicted relationship 
with Ireland.  They admired the countryside and the land that provided their wealth, but 
had very few words of praise for the people.  After a visit to his Irish lands in 1772, 
Shelburne, the first marquis, found to his dismay that the people reminded him of 
Scottish Highlanders, without the lone redeeming quality of “attachment to a chief.”  
Moreover, he observed that among the Irish “no man is worse look’d upon for being a 
scoundrel and cunning adds to man’s character.”49  As for the poverty of the Lansdowne 
tenants, Shelburne blamed the head tenants as well as the clergy.50  He admitted that 
foreign rule over Ireland was “the shame of England,” but found that the “real evil” of 
the absentee landlord in Ireland was the retardation of civilization and manners, and the 
absence of “many liberal improvements,” which were naturally enhanced when 
proprietors are present.51  For Shelburne and his heirs the people of Ireland were of a 
different and poorer race, to be looked after, pitied, and kept at a distance, lest one be 
robbed or sued.52   
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Lansdowne’s first experience of holding court, a durbar of sorts, came not in 
India but in Ireland in the fall of 1868 when he visited his Irish estates for the first time 
as lord and master.  According to his brother Edmond he was met with “processions, 
addresses, triumphal arches, fireworks and banquets,” and the fealty of his new tenants.53  
Lansdowne’s worldview, a product of his upbringing and social position—the equivalent 
of being “reared in another planet” according to David Lloyd George—unquestionably 
had a profound effect on his political views when dealing with domestic affairs.54  It also 
influenced significantly his foreign policy.  Domestically, Lansdowne believed in his 
paternal role as landowner and landlord as well as that Whiggish ideal of leading the 
masses toward a better life and more civilized future, however long that process might 
take, and in some very important ways the manner in which he approached conflict in 
Ireland paralleled his approach to conflicts in foreign affairs. 
In 1870 three-fourths of the farms in Ireland were still held as tenancies-at-will, 
and in hard times evictions were common.  Such evictions could quickly make an 
already uneasy and tense peasant/landlord relationship explosive.  Isaac Butt, leader of 
the Irish Home Rulers and leading Irish agitator, declared that “To evict a tenant in 
Ireland from his bit of land is to reduce him to beggary” under a system of laws more 
absolute in power than slavery.  The historical context and persistent nature of the 
peasant/landlord relationship made the land issue intractable.  Although so-called 
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“model” landlords such as Lansdowne could at times receive great praise, in the end they 
were still landlords and thus liable for hundreds of years of grievances.55     
The “Bad Times” which began in the late 1870s were the worst since the Great 
Famine, and yet many landlords refused to acknowledge that there was even a problem.  
In a speech at the Mansion House in November 1879, Disraeli reaffirmed common 
perceptions by asserting that although there were some difficulties in Ireland at the 
moment, they were not severe and the Irish were well known to be “an imaginative 
race.”  A special commissioner of the London Daily News sent to Ireland in early 1880, 
however, observed that the Irish might indeed be prone to exaggeration about their 
sufferings, “but there was ‘no falsehood in their gaunt, famished faces, no fabrications in 
their own rags, and the nakedness of their children.’”  Norman Palmer has argued that 
the eviction numbers for 1880 were in fact four times those of 1878, signaling that 
Ireland was indeed experiencing something more than mild distress.56 
Lansdowne in particular would come under great scrutiny and condemnation for 
his conduct during these times of economic hardship, not least due to the reports of the 
famous Nun of Kenmare who ran relief efforts in Kerry.  Her widely disseminated 
descriptions of the suffering in that county and the lack of help from the great landlords 
put the marquis up for severe criticism.  Michael Davitt, along with other ex-Fenians, 
seized this opportunity of agricultural despair to create the Land League to agitate for 
“Ireland for the Irish and land for the people.”  The land issue, they calculated, could 
                                                 
55 Palmer, Irish Land League, pp. 17, 23. 
 
56 Ibid., pp. 73, 76-77. 
 
 37
unite the Irish, unlike the movement to repeal the Act of Union.  With the two issues 
linked they concluded that the greater goal of independence from Britain might be 
achieved by first pressing the more explosive issue of the land redistribution.  For this 
new movement, the attack on the landlords was an offensive against the “‘English 
garrison’ in Ireland.”57  Charles Stewart Parnell found it politically wise to support the 
Land League, and in his famous “last link” speech in Cincinnati, Ohio in February 1880, 
he proclaimed that “When we give Ireland to the people of Ireland, we shall have laid 
the foundation upon which to build our Irish nation.”  The landlords, he charged, were 
the “cornerstone of English rule,” and the “last link” which keeps Ireland bound to 
England.”58  Of course, such firebrand rhetoric completely ignored the fact that the 
indebtedness of many Irish peasants was the result of the same folly farmers committed 
worldwide, namely excessive borrowing on their part during better times, which they 
could not later repay in bad times.  Regardless, the ancient strains—found in the chanted 
slogans of some—calling for community ownership of land by the Irish people, would 
fade away when the great land transfer between 1870 and 1903 hit its stride.59 
Ireland’s great draw on Lansdowne, enough to pull him away from Bowood in 
Wiltshire, was his beloved residence at Derreen.  Situated on his great estate in Kerry, 
and set between the Caha Mountains and the Kenmare River estuary, it became his 
primary residence when in Ireland.  He made alterations to the existing house in 1870 to 
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make it a more fit late-summer retreat, and by 1895 improved train service to Kenmare 
had shortened the forty mile trek overland from the nearest train station by half.  Newton 
speculated, however, that those remaining twenty miles from the nearest telegraph office 
must surely have enhanced Derreen’s allure for a man at the pinnacle of public service.60  
Although his frequent stays at Derreen were primarily for relaxation and the isolation it 
provided, Lansdowne did not believe that he in any way shirked his duty as landlord and 
protector.  He spent the winter of 1879-80 in Ireland and on his return remarked on the 
condition of his tenants to lifelong friend and fellow Wiltshire Liberal Edward Bouverie.  
First making sure to keep his own costs down, he admitted that “the people are very 
poor, but there is no starvation about us, and the liberal terms [on loans] offered by 
Government [sic] enabled me to give an immense amount of employment.”  Moreover, 
Lansdowne argued that if it were not for his actions most of the 900 men he put to work 
on “their own land” when he left “would have spent their time in making believe to be 
busy without any result worth naming.”61 
It was in the midst of this agricultural crisis in Ireland that Lansdowne found that 
he was to have a place in the new Gladstone Ministry as Under-Secretary of State for 
India, with Hartington as his chief in the Commons.  The marquis was one of a number 
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of Whigs appointed in order for Gladstone to show he was not a radical.62  The 
Gladstone Ministry’s solution to the crisis in Ireland, new Chief Secretary for Ireland W. 
E. Forster’s Compensation for Disturbance Bill, however, came as an affront to 
Lansdowne’s belief in sacrosanct property rights, as well as his Whiggish pride that he 
was dutifully taking proper care of his people.  The bill was a temporary measure 
intended to address the current Irish crisis and designed to protect tenants from eviction 
for non-payment of rent, if non-payment was the result of crop failure or the agricultural 
depression of the preceding couple of years.  If a tenant was evicted and a court found 
the circumstances to be as noted above, a landlord would then be compelled to 
compensate his tenant.  Moreover, the bill only applied to especially hard hit districts in 
the south and west of Ireland, and then was only to last through the end of 1881.  Its 
measures, however, satisfied neither the Irish, nor many in Gladstone’s own party.  
Those in opposition characterized the bill’s essence as “payment by reason of non-
payment.”63   
Lansdowne’s reaction to the bill was principled, unbending, and swift.  Within 
ten days of the bill being put forward in the House of Commons he sent the premier his 
letter of resignation.  Seeing the measure as merely the thin end of the wedge in Irish 
affairs as a whole, the marquis argued that in the districts affected under the bill “it will 
produce an immense amount of mischief, while its remoter consequences, extending as 
they will to the whole country and beyond the present time, will be most unfortunate.”  
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He noted with fervor that his convictions compelled him to protest what was “an unjust, 
and impolitic proposal,” and his position as an Irish landlord and a member of the 
government could not be reconciled on such an important matter.  Lansdowne regretted 
not communicating his thoughts sooner, but having taken the time to consider the bill 
thoroughly, he now “entirely condemn[ed]” it.64  Gladstone replied that as an Under-
Secretary, the marquis was “in no way responsible for what the Government are doing, 
outside your own department and your own House of Parliament.”  He even suggested 
that if Lansdowne were to remain in office he was free to express his own personal 
opinions, and regardless he did “not yet know that the House of Commons will agree to 
the Bill.”65  While such principled pragmatism allowed Gladstone to progress in his 
career from a Conservative defender of slaveholder’s property rights to a Liberal 
crusader for all the oppressed peoples of the world, the political loophole he offered 
Lansdowne had no effect and such a piece of nuanced ambivalence might very well have 
left the latter baffled.  Even given the time to reconsider, the marquis resigned his post, 
writing to Gladstone that he could not continue on with the issue being publicly debated 
and “allow it to be supposed that my feeling was one of indifference.”66  The premier’s 
further attempts to persuade him back into the fold were for naught.67  Lansdowne’s 
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resignation, if not of tremendous importance at the time as he held a relatively minor 
post, was in Newton’s words the “first visible rift in the imposing façade of the great 
Liberal party.”68  It was an example followed in the coming years by fellow Whigs, 
including Hartington—later Duke of Devonshire—who left the party over Irish Home 
Rule in 1886, and served with Lansdowne in the Unionist governments of Salisbury and 
Balfour.69 
The Compensation for Disturbance Bill was passed by the Commons, but was 
resoundingly defeated in the Lords, with enough Liberal peers opposed to have scuttled 
it alone.70  Lansdowne’s speech in which he explained his resignation notably impressed 
both Disraeli and Arthur Balfour.71  He told his fellow peers that he regretted not being 
able to vote for a bill that was designed to relieve distress in a country to which he was 
“bound by the warmest sympathy,” but that the “just and generous intentions” behind it 
were not good enough, considering the long term effect.  Moreover, he had no sympathy 
for those he thought most likely to reap the rewards of compensation.  He warned the 
House to “Recollect you are not compelling the landlords to concede, in consequence of 
the failure of the crops, a general and proportionate abatement of their rents,” but to 
compensate in “99 cases out of 100 . . . the worst and most improvident farmers, and the 
most careless cultivators, who have failed when their more skilful and thrifty neighbors 
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have kept their heads above water.”  Lansdowne believed it impossible for a judge to 
determine how each individual tenant came to distress.72  Beyond such public criticism 
of the land bill, however, he did not otherwise intrigue against the government, and The 
Times would note two years later, on the occasion of his appointment to the governor-
generalship of Canada (by Gladstone’s hand no less), that the marquis’s “subsequent 
refusal to do more than criticize was patriotic and statesmanlike.”73     
As for the dangers of Irish agitation, specifically with regard to Fenians and 
Home Rulers, Lansdowne dismissed them as ill-organized temporary movements that 
only had a “superficial hold upon the minds of the Irish people” and merely “gave 
expression to the vague aspirations of a sentimental and imaginative race.”  The Irish 
were his people, but Lansdowne never considered himself one of them.  What the 
marquis did fear was a breakdown of law and order if the government insisted on 
encouraging through lax enforcement of the law what were up until then the “vague 
aspirations” of poorly organized agitators.  He warned that “a single step across the 
frontier which divides justice from injustice” could upset the basis of land tenure and 
society in Ireland.  Lansdowne predicted that what was a temporary bill would soon 
become permanent, for there was always going to be distress in Ireland, populated as it 
was by hundreds of thousands of tenancies worth less than four pounds a year.  The 
government, he argued, would in effect “open up a new branch of Irish industry—the 
manufacture of distress—and, instead of self-reliance and thrift, you will have perpetual 
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appeals for assistance at the public expense.”  He concluded by declaring that the 
landowners were the foundation of the Union and to betray them now would be a grave 
mistake.74 
The verbal attacks on Lansdowne—as well as the physical ones on his agents in 
Ireland—continued for years.  A delegation of English miners who journeyed to Kerry in 
July of 1881 declared that the lord’s tenants “have been to him as dumb cattle out of 
whom pelf was to be got.”75  More harmful were the reports of a special correspondent 
for the Daily Telegraph, Charles Russell, who was sent to County Kerry in order to 
discover the true state of things.  He drew a depressing picture of the conditions he found 
on the Lansdowne estates, contradicting his own paper’s previous claim that the marquis 
with “liberality and justice” had managed to produce “what may be called English 
comfort on Irish soil.”76  Lansdowne took particular offense at this new attack and along 
with his brother launched a defense in the newspapers, later published at the marquis’s 
expense.  In this defense, Lansdowne maintained that the cries and complaints of Irish 
tenants could never entirely be trusted, noting that fortunes as high as £1000 given as 
dowry for a farmer’s daughter were not rare, and not unlikely to come from “men who 
will demonstrate to any unsuspecting interrogator that their farming operations cannot 
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result otherwise than in annual loss.”77  He also argued that tenants on his Iveragh estate 
were calculating rent rises, of which they were complaining, from the temporarily 
reduced levels of the Great Famine.  Lansdowne could not help but regret that “in a 
country where ex parte evidence certainly does not require less careful sifting than it 
does elsewhere, Mr. Russell should have collected with avidity and published without 
hesitation so large a mass of such evidence.”78  In the end, this kind of public dispute 
was not one likely to change minds or solve the larger issues of the Irish problem, but 
Lansdowne believed that his reputation as a responsible landlord demanded an 
immediate response. 
When in May 1882 the new Secretary of State for Ireland, Lord Fredrick 
Cavendish, and his Under Secretary, T. H. Burke, were murdered in Phoenix Park, 
Lansdowne wrote to his mother that the former “will not have died quite in vain if his 
tragical end has served to tear the scales off the eyes of the fatuous idiots who believed 
so readily in the new millennium.”79  There was no new millennium in Ireland, but 
neither was there any respite or reasonably just compromise for the landowner.  
Lansdowne was well aware of the near intractable position Irish landlords were in, and 
though he stuck to a firm principled stand when it came to property rights, he was wont 
to believe that there existed eventual solutions.  He wrote to his friend Lord Spencer in 
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1886 that no measure of agrarian reform could be successfully undertaken while the law 
in Ireland was being openly flouted.  Once tenants were free to withhold their rents, he 
argued, they would not likely pay it ever again unless forced.  Indeed, Lansdowne 
believed there was a need for new acts to enforce the law; “sooner or later what people 
are pleased to call ‘coercion’ must be resorted to.”80  He did not blame the English 
people, however, for not standing for more coercive measures, but put it squarely on 
successive governments for their “shilly shallying between courses of action instead of 
applying measures which after all meant merely the adaptation of the civil and criminal 
law to the protection of life and property that being it is commonly supposed the raison 
d’être of all Govts.”81   
Nevertheless, in this same year that the Hawarden Kite was let fly, Lansdowne 
could not deny the reality he saw before him and wrote to fellow Liberal peer Lord 
Spencer that “public opinion appears to be steadily setting towards expropriation,” 
which “has always appeared to me the inevitable end.”  The difficulty, he observed, was 
how to achieve justice for the landowners in a climate where “political expediency 
requires that the question of the land should be disentangled from the question of the 
union.”  He maintained that “Till the rent problem has been disposed of we shall never 
get at the exact dimensions of the Home Rule difficulty.”  It was a coming battle that he 
thought “could not be fought upon more treacherous ground than the landlord’s 
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estates.”82  Lansdowne believed that the Home Rule and independence movements 
lacked widespread support, but Spencer had discovered the merit of government policy 
and moved in the direction of considering concessions toward Home Rule once thought 
impossible.  Lansdowne was not pleased and argued that he had “never been able to see 
the force of the argument . . . that there is no alternative between coercion of the most 
stringent kind and a ‘wider concession in the direction of Home Rule than we have yet 
thought possible’ whatever that concession may be.”  He took this opportunity to outline 
a reasonable alternative which he copied straight from a letter that the pre-converted 
Spencer had written him the previous August.  Lansdowne argued that Ireland might be 
given wider local government in the form of local county boards, but not a central one 
that might then speak for the country as a whole.  Moreover, he proposed dealing in 
general more liberally with Ireland, the reform of Queen’s College, greater access to 
education for Catholics, and abolition of the viceroyalty.  These, along with other 
moderate reforms, he argued, “‘might win over such a body of people in Ireland that an 
independent party in favour of law and order and the present constitution will be formed 
and battle with the Parnellites.’”  Even before this route was attempted, however, 
Lansdowne stressed, in agreement with Spencer’s views of the year previous, that the 
government should wait to see what current measures produced.  He was even hopeful at 
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the rumored signs of a “split in the Parnellite camp, and of antagonism between the 
labourers and the tenants.”83   
Lansdowne refused to believe the elected Parnellite members of the House of 
Commons truly represented the people of Ireland, citing doubts as to the “mature and 
deliberate judgment of the country” in such present circumstances, and arguing that the 
“new electors are entirely without knowledge or experience.”  He noted that “most of 
them never read a newspaper article or listened to a speech except of the kind to be 
found in the Nationalist press,” and that the peoples’ votes were “obtained partly by a 
direct appeal to their cupidity.”84  Their unreasonable behavior in the Commons 
provoked the marquis to refer to them as “Irish savages,” and “cur dogs.”85  Lansdowne 
was hardly a political tyro by this point in his career, yet his disbelief when faced with 
what must have been the true sentiment of a good many of the Irish populace, and the 
demagoguery of the Nationalists, points to a gentlemanly amateurishness that the 
marquis never entirely outgrew.  By November, Lansdowne believed that further 
correspondence with Spencer on the matter would not prove fruitful and suggested that 
they no longer discuss the issue.  Nevertheless, after having thus closed off debate, he 
proceeded to make a few additional points on the matter anyway.86  In hindsight, it 
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would seem that the middle road that Lansdowne wished to travel in Ireland, in fact, 
never existed, as it did not exist in his debates with Lord Spencer either.   
The Irish problem plagued Lansdowne for decades to come, severely reducing 
his income from those estates, which were at one point worth over £32,000 per annum.87  
The attacks of the Land League would even follow him across the ocean to Canada, but 
he had learned to harden himself against such public abuse, as well as the difficulties of 
defending oneself in the press.88  Although the marquis’s Whiggish sensibilities would 
through the years cause him stress and much inner turmoil, especially when faced with 
the domestic agenda of the New Liberalism in the early years of the twentieth century, 
his principles of foreign policy remained unscathed and undoubted right up to the 
ignominious end of his public career.  With the publication of his Peace Letter in 
November 1917, Lansdowne revealed to all that although the road was long—and not 
without many false dawns proclaimed by “fatuous idiots”—his sympathies had always 
lain with those who believed in the “new millennium.”   
After his break with the government over Ireland, when Lansdowne chose to 
speak in the Lords it was with a particular interest in foreign affairs.  In January 1881, he 
forced himself to give a speech on current Afghan troubles before an audience of only 
thirteen.  The speech was all the more difficult for it was bound to displease his fellow 
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Liberals.89  The question at hand centered on the possible retention of Kandahar as a 
forward base necessary for the defense of India.  This was a contentious detail within the 
greater partisan row over the previous Conservative administration’s controversial 
Afghan campaign, which was now in the hands of a Liberal government not entirely sure 
what to do next.  To Lansdowne’s mind the government had two rather poor choices.  It 
could either give up the forward position at Kandahar and admit the waste of money and 
lives that were required to obtain it, while leaving anarchy in the wake of a British 
withdrawal, or it could adopt a policy it had previously condemned, by recognizing that 
the city commanded “the principal military and commercial avenues to our Indian 
possessions, and its retention would add greatly to the estimation in which the power of 
this country was held in India.”90 
While admitting that the latter course might embroil Britain in the endless costs 
of neighboring tribal disputes, in choosing to retain Kandahar Lansdowne saw an 
opportunity for the future security of India’s frontier, and to improve Britain’s overall 
relations with Russia.  He declared that he would “rejoice” if Britain could use her 
current dominating position to advantage in its dealings with Russia, asserting that 
relations “had lived too long in the region of vague understandings, which no two people 
understood in the same sense.”  Earlier understandings, he pointed out, had dissolved 
into “lecturings, suspicions, and recriminations, anything but conducive to neighborly 
and mutually beneficial relations.”  He asked: “Why should we not endeavor to settle 
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these questions once and for all upon an intelligible basis?”  “Both parties,” Lansdowne 
argued, “were in a position from which they could negotiate without forfeiture of self-
respect in their own eyes, or in the eyes of Native races by whom their conduct was 
narrowly watched.”  He hoped the government, which “had endeavoured consistently 
and successfully to maintain the European concert in Europe,” could see its way to 
“create a European concert in Asia.”  This would be to the benefit of both nations as well 
as the native peoples under their control, Lansdowne argued, and such a settlement in the 
long term would allow British forces—one day—to retire from such forward positions.91  
With peace predominant for the moment in Europe, Lansdowne rather foolishly 
represented it as a settled matter, and then implied that such a European concert was 
easily transplantable to a different continent and entirely different circumstances.  Of 
course, the Russian advantage in Asia lay precisely in those vague understandings, 
misunderstandings, and forward positions, which placed unrelenting pressure on British 
forces in the region, and caused ever increasing alarm among British military planners.  
It was a geographical advantage that the Russians could not have given up even if they 
wished, and notwithstanding the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, they never really did.  
Even a minor episode this early in Lansdowne’s long political career, such as his 
chairmanship of the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons on the Channel Tunnel in the spring of 1883, reveals—however dimly—
something of the liberal optimism that was almost always manifest in Lansdowne’s 
approach to international relations.  The Committee was charged with assessing the 
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feasibility of a channel tunnel, its potential economic benefits, and whether it could be 
rendered militarily secure.  The issues considered thus included a review of current 
European relations with regard to the possibility of future wars, and specifically Britain’s 
future relations with France.   
Thoughts about, and realistic proposals for, a possible cross-channel tunnel 
stretched as far back as the first decade of the nineteenth century, and by 1876 two 
companies, one English and one French, had convinced their respective governments 
that a tunnel was indeed feasible.  A treaty was very nearly signed, but the English 
backed Channel Tunnel Company failed to follow through on its commitments, and the 
window of opportunity on the signing of a treaty lapsed.  New backers soon came 
forward however, and Gladstone’s government was forced to address the matter.92 
The government was to find that as in the past the greatest opposition to a tunnel 
came from the War Office.  Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 
in particular, was adamantly opposed.  In his memorandum on the proposed tunnel, 
Wolseley argued that it would necessitate universal conscription in Britain as existed in 
the major continental powers, for in effect, if Britain were connected to France by a 
tunnel, it would itself then be a continental power.  Those in the War Office who favored 
the tunnel project, however, stressed the diplomatic positives that might result.  Colonel 
Sir Andrew Clarke, Commandant of the School of Military Engineering, viewed the 
tunnel as a foundation upon which to rest a new Anglo-French alliance, and argued that 
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“if the industrial and social progress of our country, and the larger interests of humanity 
can be promoted by a work of this kind, it is not the rôle of the soldier to check the 
aspirations of his country.”  Wolseley scoffed at such arguments, wondering if “human 
nature [had] so utterly changed that it has become certain that what has been may never 
be again?”  “Surely, John Bull will not endanger his birth-right, his liberty, his property, 
in fact all that men can hold most dear,” he maintained, “. . . simply in order that men 
and women may cross to and fro between England and France without running the risk 
of sea-sickness.”93     
Lansdowne, not surprisingly, believed the benefits of a tunnel too good to be 
passed over.  In his final draft report on the Joint Select Committee’s findings, the 
marquis stressed the economic benefits of a tunnel and found the fears expressed by the 
military baseless, if not downright ridiculous.  At their worst, he argued, they were 
“purely political.”94  Lansdowne found it hard to fathom the scenario put forward by the 
military chiefs of a sneak attack on the tunnel in a time of relative peace, without an 
official declaration of war, and without any foresight of potential crises.95  Moreover, in 
his earlier testimony before the Committee, Wolseley had given assurances that a force 
of 50 at the tunnel’s mouth, which would be located within the grounds of the fort at 
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Dover, and given notice of alert, could halt an invading army of 100,000.96  Faced with 
Wolseley’s contradictions and yet continued opposition to the project, Lansdowne asked 
the general as to the likelihood of five or six thousand men in an amphibious assault in 
the dead of night being able to move through the streets of Dover without the alarm 
being raised.  Wolseley was forced to admit that with the tunnel in place, the 
inconvenient but sensible practice of lifting the drawbridge at night to avoid such an 
assault on the barrack gates might indeed be introduced as a precautionary measure.  As 
for blowing up the tunnel in an emergency, Wolseley argued soundly, however, that he 
doubted that any colonel or lieutenant-colonel put in charge would readily take it upon 
himself given the alarm of a policeman, sentry, or any other warning to destroy such an 
expensive tunnel in time.  Wolseley asked the committee to assume the worst.  What 
were the chances, he argued, of the tunnel being blown if the government were to come 
under the control of man with the “character” of John Bright, who, he was quick to add, 
he respected as “a great orator.”97 
Lansdowne agreed with the military opinion that there could be no absolute 
guarantee of security, but maintained that this did not offset the benefits of the tunnel.98  
His inquiries and arguments were almost exclusively designed to amplify those benefits 
and downplay the risks.  At the conclusion of the hearings, however, Lansdowne could 
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only gain the support of his three fellow Liberal committee members.99  One member’s 
final draft report went so far as to cite as reason for his opposition the invasion “scares to 
which the country would be liable to be subjected, whether rationally or irrationally.”100  
Since a majority report could not be given, the idea of a channel tunnel died once again.  
With regard to the channel tunnel, Lansdowne’s liberal instincts were rather 
innocuous, but in larger foreign policy arenas such as India and the Foreign Office his 
ability to master and even manipulate the details of a particular issue at the expense of 
larger strategic considerations would hold greater potential consequences.  It is perhaps 
far too early to draw any broad conclusions about the marquis’s tendencies, but what we 
can begin to assess—or at least take note of—is the sort of reasoning process by which 
Lansdowne made policy decisions.   
Wolseley had argued on both practical and sentimental terms when he sought to 
preserve the sense of security Britain had always derived from that twenty mile wide 
“silver streak.”  It had proved a blessing in the Napoleonic Wars, and though since then 
Britain had been connected by what the Duke of Wellington had referred to as “an 
isthmus of steam,” and by a telegraph cable in 1851, the “silver streak” remained an 
obstacle that any foreign army would at least have to float across.101  If a tunnel were 
built, an invading army could march all the way to London.  For many it meant that 
England would henceforth be a continental power, in need of a large standing army fed 
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by universal conscription.  The British Empire, however, already had long, nearly 
indefensible land borders in both the Americas and Asia, and the pressures on imperial 
forces were already great.  Lansdowne soon left England to administer that empire, first 
as governor-general of Canada, and then as Viceroy of India, and although engaged as 
he was, merely on the “fringe of diplomacy,” his time overseas provides further insight 
to understanding his tenure at the Foreign Office.102       
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CHAPTER III  
 
FROM PROCONSUL TO CABINET MINISTER:  
 
CANADA, INDIA AND THE WAR OFFICE   
 
 
Canada 
 
 Although it was Gladstone who offered Lansdowne the governor generalship of 
Canada in May 1883, the choice was really that of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby.  
Derby informed the Queen that beyond being of a suitable rank—which was immensely 
important, for the “Colonies were not content,” noted Joseph Chamberlain, “unless a 
person of high rank and remarkable distinction was appointed”—Lansdowne’s greatest 
qualifications for the post were that he was “respected by all parties in England,” was 
“moderate in his opinions,” and had “manners” that were “unusually prepossessing.”1  
The marquis’s decision to accept, however, was due overwhelmingly to financial 
distress.  His penury was so widely known that it was the only reason reported in the 
New York Times for his accepting the post.2  Lansdowne was still servicing a debt of 
some £300,000 he had inherited from his father seventeen years before, and the income 
from his Irish estates had decreased almost to nil due to the agitation of the Land 
League.3  A few months before setting sail for Quebec, the marquis was forced to sell a 
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Rembrandt portrait from the gallery at Bowood to a wealthy American collector for 
£5,000.4  It would not be the last time that a well-timed sale of artwork would be made 
in order to provide maintenance for the family.  The lifestyle he would maintain while in 
Canada also pointed to the demand for fiscal restraint—relative of course to the normal 
living standards of a marquis.  One long-time society gossip—the wife of a Canadian 
Judge—revealed that while the Lansdownes kept “up a fine show” and “do things 
magnificently . . . close economy is the everyday rule.”  It would appear that Lansdowne 
was able to put away at least some of his £10,000 a year.5     
After a brief stay at Derreen, Lansdowne, and his wife and four children, 
journeyed to collect his ‘outdoor relief,’ arriving in Quebec City in late October 1883.  
There was a good deal of fear and a great many rumors that the marquis’s Irish troubles 
might follow him to Canada, and that Fenian terrorists might make an attempt on the 
new Governor General’s life.  Fortunately these fears proved largely unfounded, 
although in January 1884 a package bomb was mailed to Lansdowne at Government 
House.  Its rather poor construction, however, rendered it harmless.6  At his swearing-in 
ceremony in Quebec, before a crowd mostly of French-Canadians, Lansdowne was 
greeted with much enthusiasm, that much greater thanks to his nearly flawless French.  
His arrival and welcome in Ottawa also proceeded smoothly, but the capital and its 
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people did not impress.7  In a letter to Derby, Lansdowne referred to the city as a 
“lumberyard.”8 
More upsetting than Ottawa’s significant lack of cultivation, however, was the 
marquis’s need of a summer retreat to substitute for Derreen over the next five or six 
years.  Lansdowne’s predecessor, Lord Lorne, had established a lodge on the banks of 
the Cascapedia River in the Gaspé Peninsula and leased fishing rights from the Quebec 
Government.  He had intended for these to be transferred to the new Governor General, 
but the provincial government prematurely leased the fishing rights to an American, to 
whom Lorne then felt constrained to sell the lodge as well.  Attempts to find Lansdowne 
a new and suitable situation proved difficult because most all of the prime locations 
seemed to be in the hands of other well-to-do Americans.9  Still without a place in March 
and with the summer fast approaching, the Governor General went so far as to protest to 
the Minister of Public Works.  Endeavoring to speak “frankly,” he complained that if he 
was not to have his “predecessor’s cottage, or his river, or his summer quarters,” he 
could only conclude that he was being “rather hardly used.”10  The next month a suitable 
place on the Cascapedia was found, which, as Lansdowne acidly noted, had not been 
bought up by the “liberal expenditure of money” and even “intrigue” of millionaires 
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from America.  He happily named his new retreat New Derreen.11  For several months 
out of each year in his new home he could once again enjoy the pleasures of some of the 
finest salmon fishing in the world.12  
 Such annoyances notwithstanding, Lansdowne was pleased with his post and did 
not regret his decision.  Balliol College even took notice of his appointment and 
permitted him to take a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in 1884 by accumulation.13  In 
his administrative capacity, Lansdowne got along well with Canada’s Conservative 
Prime Minister, Sir John Macdonald—who remained in power for the duration of 
Lansdowne’s tenure as Governor General—and met with him nearly every day when 
both were in Ottawa.14  Despite his old tutor Jowett’s counsel that the Governor General 
did not necessarily have to be a “mere figure head,” this was largely Lansdowne’s role.15  
The Canadian colony was by this time largely self-governing and beyond frequent 
meetings with the Prime Minster the responsibilities of the Governor General were 
minimal.  After Confederation in 1867, and the drawing up of revised instructions for the 
Governor General in 1878, the latter could at most “warn and advise” the Canadian 
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Cabinet, or on extraordinary occasions—and then only on orders from London—reserve 
a bill passed by Parliament.  The Governor General remained Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces, but his most important role was as a buffer between the Canadian 
Government and the Colonial Office, a role for which, according to David Farr, 
Lansdowne was a “model . . . whom future holders of the position could profitably 
emulate.”16   
The everyday duties of the Governor General too often revolved around his role 
as the social and cultural leader of the country, amounting to a continuous series of fêtes, 
ice carnivals, and official ceremonies, for which Lansdowne could usually raise little 
enthusiasm.17  In its summary of the marquis’s achievements after five years as 
Governor General, The Times noted prominently that he had “acquired a skill [at ice 
skating] rare among even Canadians.”18  Lansdowne also had occasion to entertain the 
poet Matthew Arnold and his wife during their visit to Ottawa in early 1884.  In the late 
1840s Arnold had served as private secretary to the third marquis.  As he did with many 
of his guests, the Governor General took them to ride the toboggan run at Government 
House, where they “courteously” refused a second run—no doubt a wise decision 
considering Arnold’s weak heart.  Lansdowne’s rather light duties were not entirely 
without hazard however.  Four years later at an outdoor fête and ice carnival hosted by 
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the Governor General, six people—including two Canadian MPs—were seriously 
injured in a toboggan accident.19   
Lansdowne declared shortly after his arrival in Canada that he had “been 
cherishing for some time the hope that I may be the first Governor General to cross the 
Rocky Mountains on Canadian metals.”20  In late 1885 he got his wish as he traveled the 
nearly completed Canadian Pacific Railway across the vast western plains, through the 
Rocky Mountains, all the way to the Pacific.  At a time when only four percent of 
Canada’s four and a half million people lived west of the province of Ontario, the cross-
continental railroad was meant to imitate the American experience by opening up the 
West to further settlement and development.21   
Lansdowne’s month long journey was not without its share of seemingly trivial 
incidents which afford us a glimpse of the marquis’s world, the vantage point from 
which he drew his rarefied impressions.  For example, his brief stop in Winnipeg was 
marred when many leading citizens reportedly refused to attend his drawing room 
reception as it required evening dress, and separate entrances had been arranged, “one 
for the gentry and the other for the common folk.”22  The Winnipeg Free Press was 
forced “most unwillingly”—and without ill will toward the Governor General 
personally—to declare that, “The unreverend and unhonourable and unbetitled and 
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unwashed, with a surprising lack of appreciation of local government house etiquette, 
and of small official snobbishness, not to say caddishness, decline to subject themselves, 
much less their wives and daughters, to the humiliation of seeking his Excellency’s 
presence through the back door.”23  To his credit, and as he noted proudly to his mother, 
Lansdowne did manage to contain his laughter when he greeted the natives of Alberta 
who bore such names as “Bad Dried Meat” and “The Louse,” and wore soup plates as 
necklaces.24   
At first glance, Lansdowne’s time in Canada does not appear to provide the most 
fertile ground for an exploration of the foundations of his foreign policy.  The most 
difficult diplomatic issue he would face as Governor General was the continuing 
fisheries dispute with the United States, and even these negotiations were turned over to 
London’s special envoy, Joseph Chamberlain.  Nevertheless, Lansdowne’s 
responsiveness to Canada’s treaty rights and reaction to American-style diplomacy—
specifically that of US Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard—are informative to an 
extent, namely as to the marquis’s near instinctive devotion to diplomacy conducted 
justly and straightforwardly.   
The fisheries dispute centered on the rights of United States citizens, originally 
secured by John Adams in his negotiations at Paris in 1782, to fish off the Grand Banks, 
the coasts of Newfoundland, and in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.  Adams secured for 
American fishermen the “liberty” to fish the coasts, bays and creeks of Canada, as well 
                                                 
23 Winnipeg Free Press commentary quoted in the New York Times, September 19, 1885, p. 3. 
 
24 Lansdowne to his mother, October 1, 1885, printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 34-37. 
 
  
63
as the right to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors and creeks of 
Labrador, Nova Scotia and the Magdalen (Madeleine) Islands.  Canadian complaints 
about fleets of American fishermen crowding the fishing grounds, including in the Bay 
of Chaleur, however, began as early as 1792.25   
 After the War of 1812, the British claimed that the war had abrogated the Peace 
of Paris, and British warships began seizing American fishing vessels within Canada’s 
inshore waters.  Making use of the multiple definitions of “liberty” that thirty years 
before in Paris they had insisted did not exist, the British sought to forge a better 
agreement for themselves and Canada.  In the Anglo-American Treaty of 1818 the 
United States gave up rights to fish in certain parts of Canada’s inshore waters, while 
gaining areas to cure and dry fish along uninhabited coastline.  American fishing vessels 
would also be admitted to the bays and harbors in the restricted areas, but only “for the 
purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of 
obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever.”26  Vessels caught “preparing to 
fish” in restricted waters would be subject to forfeiture.  The restrictions meant that 
American fishermen would not be able to purchase bait in Canadian harbors, and they 
were forbidden from landing their catches in Canadian ports for transshipment.  The 
British and their Canadian subjects were also disposed to interpret the terms of bay 
loosely and to the greatest benefit of the Canadian fishing industry.  When the fishing 
industry hit hard times after 1830, Canadian and British officials further defined the 
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restrictions against American fishing vessels and drew lines from headland to headland 
of the bays of Fundy and Chaleur which American fishermen would be forbidden to 
approach within three miles.  In May 1843, Canadian authorities went so far as to seize 
and auction an American schooner anchored some ten miles offshore in the Bay of 
Fundy.  The United States and Britain soon faced the prospect of open conflict over the 
contentious matter, and in 1852 President Millard Fillmore ordered Commodore 
Matthew Perry to the fishing grounds in anticipation of imminent trouble.27  Neither 
government sought open warfare, however, preferring instead to settle the matter 
diplomatically. 
 After two failed attempts to resolve the dispute by treaty, the second of which 
was terminated by the United States in July 1885, Canada once again began to seize 
American fishing vessels.  These renewed seizures put the Governor General in the 
delicate position of balancing Imperial and Canadian interests.  Charles Tansill argued 
that despite Lansdowne’s “deep affection for Canada . . . he never forgot that Canada 
was merely one portion of an empire on the seven seas, and at times he insisted upon 
lifting the gaze of Sir John Macdonald from Dominion considerations to the distant 
horizons of imperial goals.”28  While much of this assessment might hold true, 
Lansdowne in fact actively sought to show a firmer front in dealing with the United 
States than the Colonial Office wished, and at one point his Whiggish detachment from 
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partisan passions seemed to waver in the face of American rhetoric and what he 
considered the shabby diplomacy of Bayard. 
 Throughout his entire political career, Lansdowne was wont initially at least to 
show a firm front in any dispute, but almost always with the full expectation that this 
would in due course lead to a complete resolution of the matter at issue.  When the 
Canadian cruiser Lansdowne seized the American fishing schooner David J. Adams for 
buying ice and eight and a half barrels of bait in the port of Digby, Nova Scotia, 
Lansdowne wrote to MacDonald encouraging conciliation, but only so far as to suggest 
that he “concoct a mollifying dispatch” to Sir Lionel Sackville-West, British Minister in 
Washington, “explaining Captain Scott’s conduct” in seizing the ship.29  When the 
MacDonald Government then attempted to pass legislation to expand its enforcement 
powers against American fishermen, however, Lansdowne wished to avoid further 
“bitterness” between the two nations and advised the Canadian Prime Minister to adopt a 
policy of moderation.30  He did not want the actions of overzealous Canadian customs 
officials to “accumulate against ourselves such a volume of irritation as to render a 
reasonable settlement unattainable.”31  Lansdowne was “convinced” after all that 
“Reasonable public opinion on both sides of the frontier” was in favor of opening 
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negotiations “for a final and complete settlement of all the matters in dispute.”32  On 
orders from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, the Canadian bill was reserved by 
the Governor General in June 1886.  Notwithstanding his own call for moderation, 
Lansdowne remained upset that the Colonial Office did not seem fully to appreciate 
Canadian sensitivities.33 
 In the early summer of 1886, with tensions near the breaking point—Canadian 
authorities boarded nearly 700 American fishing boats during the year’s fishing 
season—some senior officials in the United States were advocating a show of force by 
an American naval squadron.  Parallel appeals on the Canadian side for the support of 
the British naval squadron at Halifax Station were led by Lansdowne.34  The Governor 
General was also more than a neutral party transmitting a Canadian Government request, 
and further pressed the matter again while on a visit to Britain in August.  He even wrote 
to MacDonald from London arguing that far from escalating tensions, “a firm front” was 
needed to push the Americans into serious negotiations.35  Although requests for naval 
support had been granted previously in 1854 and 1871, Granville thought better of 
sending British warships to cruise Canadian coasts just to avail himself of this 
opportunity to placate Canadian sensibilities.  Wanting no part in such a wanton 
escalation of tensions, the government would only promise the support of one cruiser for 
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the next year’s fishing season if no agreement had by that time been reached with the 
US.36 
In his defense of Canada’s interests, the Governor General also appeared to have 
absorbed a little of the anti-Americanism inculcated in all Canadians from birth.  
Disputing accusations from Whitehall that Canadian customs officials were quite 
probably precipitating trouble by unjust and unfriendly treatment of American 
fishermen, Lansdowne shifted the blame to men like the American captain of the Mollie 
Adams, “a person so illiterate,” he declared, “that he appeared not to have been qualified 
to make out the ordinary entry papers on his arrival in a Canadian port.”  Moreover, the 
Governor General noted, the captain’s statements, “many of which bear upon the face of 
them evidence of their own untrustworthiness, appear to have been accepted in globo 
without question by the [American] Secretary of State.”37  Lansdowne’s countervailing 
aspersions, however, did not persuade.  A Foreign Office memorandum written in 
February of the following year stated that it was “clear that Canada is now asserting her 
rights in a more stringent manner than on any previous occasion in the history of the 
question, with the object of forcing the United States to conclude a Reciprocity Treaty; 
and though there can be no question that in the main Canada is within her strict Treaty 
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right, it may be that she will lose more than the United States by too harsh a policy, and 
the result may be extremely dangerous for this country.”38  
 When the matter was subsequently referred to a special Joint High Commission 
the next year, Lansdowne was disappointed in the Commission’s instructions 
empowering it “to consider and adjust all or any questions relating to the rights of 
fishery in the seas adjacent to British North America and Newfoundland which are in 
dispute . . . and any other questions which may arise.”39  Thinking the wording too 
vague, the Governor General had hoped—and thought he had been led to believe—that 
the Commission would be entrusted to deal with “every outstanding dispute between 
Great Britain and the United States, including even such questions as that of the 
Nicaraguan isthmus.”40  If Lansdowne was perhaps overzealous in his desire to show a 
firm front in disputes, even at the risk of open conflict, it was always with such grand 
hopes and expectations for subsequent peace. 
 Lansdowne’s expectation of gentlemanly diplomacy from the representatives of 
first-rate nations, and his honest surprise and indignation at encountering shabby dealing 
instead, was also evident in his reaction to what transpired and belies the usual 
characterization of Lansdowne as the epitome of Whiggish detachment.  His sentimental 
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attachments lay not with nations or peoples, but with what he judged to be higher things.  
The Commission began its deliberations in Washington in November 1887, with Joseph 
Chamberlain leading the British contingent, accompanied by Sackville-West, and Sir 
Charles Tupper, the Canadian High Commissioner.41  On being shown a report from 
Tupper that the American delegation refused to expand the scope of the Commission’s 
deliberations, Lansdowne charged Bayard with duplicity, and later confessed to 
MacDonald his disbelief at “How Bayard can without blushing, after all that took place 
between himself and Sir Charles Tupper, state gravely that he cannot discuss commercial 
relations without . . . an extension of his own instructions, passes my comprehension.”  
He could but conclude that there was “a disingenuousness throughout [Bayard’s] 
argument which lowers him in one’s estimation.”42  Of course Lansdowne had wanted 
more than just an extension of discussions to commercial matters, and had come to 
expect more from Bayard based on correspondence he had seen between the American 
Secretary and the Canadian High Commissioner.  In his memoirs Tupper maintained that 
the conference in its original arrangement was supposed to have encompassed the 
Behring Sea seal fisheries as well as the Alaska Boundary dispute.  The correspondence 
between Tupper and Bayard in the early summer of 1887—copies of which the former 
then passed on to Lansdowne—does not, however, entirely bear out the rather extreme 
charge of duplicity.43 
                                                 
41 Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, p. 65. 
 
42 Lansdowne to MacDonald, December 10, 1887, quoted in Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, p. 69. 
 
43 Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 177, 182-183.  
 
  
70
 After they met in Washington earlier in the year, Bayard wrote to Tupper in May 
1887 that “The immediate difficulty to be settled is found in the treaty of 1818,” and that 
the only way to “attain a just and permanent settlement” was “by a straightforward 
treatment on a liberal and statesmanlike plan of the entire commercial relations of the 
two countries.”44  Tupper concurred and proposed in response that “Her Majesty’s 
Government should be invited to depute a Canadian statesman to negotiate with you a 
‘modus vivendi to meet present emergencies, and also a permanent plan to avoid all 
disputes.’”45  While Tupper and Lansdowne might have hoped for the inclusion of 
Behring sea seal fisheries dispute, it was certainly a stretch to think that discussions on 
the proposed inter-oceanic canal and the Alaska boundary had been disingenuously 
implied by Bayard.  Moreover, Chamberlain’s opening letter to Tupper with regard to 
the upcoming event referred quite narrowly to “the new Fishery Commission.”46  In the 
end, even the government’s instructions to the British commissioners empowered them 
only to “consider and adjust all and any questions relating to the rights of fishery in the 
seas adjacent to British North America and Newfoundland,” adding that they were 
permitted to discuss “any other questions that may arise,” but only if the American 
plenipotentiaries were authorized to discuss it (the Behring Sea seal fisheries being the 
only issue Prime Minister Salisbury gave as an example).47 
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 The final treaty produced by the Commission removed the more extreme bay 
restrictions, limited the acts that would result in the penalty of forfeiture, allowed 
American fishing vessels informal entry into Canadian ports on any and all occasions, 
and permitted American fishermen to purchase bait and other supplies through the 
purchase of an annual license obtained for a relatively small fee.  Chamberlain and 
Bayard were both satisfied with the final arrangement, and Tupper led the fight for its 
passage in the Canadian House of Commons.48  Although Lansdowne approved of the 
main points of the treaty, he warned Chamberlain that it would be “difficult to induce 
[Canadian fishermen] to look at the matter from the broader point of view of Imperial 
interest.”49  In any event, the treaty went down to defeat in the US Senate, and many 
Republican Senators took the opportunity to attack Britain and its people in general.  
Much of the treaty’s substance survived, however, as the basis of a modus vivendi 
renewed every two years beginning in 1888 and continuing into the next century.50    
 It is difficult to ignore that while the widower Chamberlain returned home from 
his trip to North America with a new American wife, Mary Endicott, the daughter of 
President Cleveland’s Secretary for War, and in time became Parliament’s foremost 
‘Member for America,’ Lansdowne never fully embraced the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship.’  After nearly five years in Canada, Lansdowne had found American 
fishermen beneath contempt, American statesmen less than honest, and the American 
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press—which did not necessarily reflect upon the American people—“abominably 
personal and offensive.”51  Nevertheless, one should not attach too much significance to 
so few incidents, for however much Lansdowne recoiled at the improprieties of 
unreasonable gentlemen, they never overwhelmed completely his passion for 
gentlemen’s diplomacy and his particular pursuit of a policy of entente. 
 Lansdowne nearly departed Canada in January 1887 upon requests from 
Salisbury and Hartington that he join a Conservative/Liberal Unionist coalition 
government.  Depending on whom one believes, he was offered the post of Lord 
President of the Council, or his choice between the Colonial Office and War Office.52  
His “first impulse,” he wrote to his mother, was to begin packing his trunks, but with the 
Canadian Parliament on the verge of unpredictable new elections, and with the 
government still in the midst of the fisheries wrangle, which he considered a matter that 
he had “rather taken in hand,” it was his duty to remain.  He also noted that he “was in 
complete ignorance of the policy of the [Salisbury] Govt. on many important points, 
notably as to Ireland.”53  Another and more abrupt resignation certainly would have been 
supremely embarrassing, and meanwhile, Lord Rosebery’s occupation of Lansdowne 
House was helping to pay for the marquis’s war against the Irish Land League.  Without 
that additional income, Lansdowne predicted that there would most likely have to be 
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“another raid upon the pictures.”  He was quite fearful that when his time in Canada was 
at an end he would be forced upon his return to England to “live in a corner of the house 
at Bowood,” which he confessed “would be a dreary re-instatement.”54 
 Fortunately for him, on the last day of December 1887 Lansdowne received a 
telegram from Salisbury offering him the viceroyalty of India.55  In his own estimation it 
was a “magnificent post, the most responsible and honourable in the service outside 
England,” and due to continuing Irish troubles he would have accepted it even over a 
place in the Cabinet.  Although the posting probably meant another five years away from 
home, Lansdowne informed his mother that it would allow him to save Lansdowne 
House by continuing to let it out, and reduce the family debt by living entirely off the 
income of his new post.56  His salary would be nearly double that of his Canadian post, it 
would be untaxed and also include an entertainment allowance.57  Lansdowne was not 
necessarily happy with his lot and wrote to his friend Bouverie that it was “a great 
wrench to go away again,” but as he maintained to his mother, it offered him the chance, 
if he performed “reasonably well in India,” to have accomplished something to his credit 
when he was called on “to give an account of . . . [his] stewardship,” and he did not 
regret the decision.58  After spending a mere five months back home in the summer of 
                                                 
54 Lansdowne to his mother, November/December (?), 1887, excerpted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 
48-49.  
 
55 Salisbury to Lansdowne, December 31, 1887, excerpted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 49-50.   
 
56 Lansdowne to his mother, February 8, 1888, printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 50-52. 
 
57 Cannadine, Decline and Fall, p. 595.  
 
58 Lansdowne to Bouverie, September 2, 1888, LP, Further Correspondence, Edward Bouverie [?] 1872-
1930; Lansdowne to his mother, February 8, 1888, printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 50-52. 
  
74
1888, during which he set his various houses in order, consoled his mother, and 
consulted with Lord Cross, the Secretary of State for India, Lansdowne set off “to begin 
another term of banishment.”59             
     
India 
 
The news of Lansdowne’s appointment as Viceroy met with the approval of 
many in England and India, and he would not be without friendly support.  The 
Permanent Undersecretary of State for India, J. A. Godley, who Lansdowne knew from 
Balliol days, wrote to Lord Dufferin, the outgoing Viceroy, that “it would have been 
impossible for the government to have made a better choice.”60  Dufferin, also a 
longtime friend, was understandably quite pleased with the choice, while Lord Reay, the 
Governor of Bombay, believed that Lansdowne was “in every respect the man for the 
post.”61  Lansdowne had his misgivings, however, and as early as June had revealed to 
Dufferin that he was “getting a little frightened” at what lay ahead.62      
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The Lansdownes landed at Bombay on December 3, 1888, then by rail crossed 
the breadth of the subcontinent to the capital, Calcutta.63  After receiving an informal 
four-hour briefing from Dufferin, two days later Lansdowne was installed as Viceroy 
and put on the ‘Star of India.’64  From Burma in the east to the ill-defined borders of 
Afghanistan in the west, Lansdowne now ruled in the Queen’s name over 250 million 
people.  While Calcutta, in the new Viceroy’s opinion, was a most “unIndian capital” 
with its Classical style government buildings and Lord Wellesley’s baroque Government 
House palace, he could not say the same for the climate, which he noted was pleasant 
and livable only from the first week of December to the second or third week of March.  
For the rest of the year it was customary for the Indian Government to take to the hills in 
the annual mass exodus to Simla, some 150 miles north of Old Delhi and 100 miles 
north of the nearest railway station at Ambala.65  The government compound at Simla sat 
atop a 3,000 foot hill, and could be seen from at least sixteen miles away as one 
approached by carriage.  Surrounded by snowcapped mountains, its main attraction was 
the cooler climate it afforded during the summer months.  On his first visit there in early 
1889, Lansdowne’s relief was palpable as he exclaimed in a letter to his mother: “but oh! 
the joy of feeling the cool pure air entering one’s lungs again and the emancipation from 
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ceaseless perspiration and thirst.”  He remarked that he almost felt himself to be back in 
Ottawa again, and more importantly, his “finger joints which were becoming very 
painful and rheumatic at Calcutta are already better.”66  When the India Office 
questioned the added expense of a good part of the government removing to Simla for 
the greater part of the year—suggesting that it at least remain in Calcutta from the first 
of November to mid-April—Lansdowne protested the idea that there was anything like a 
mass abuse of public funds and even secured the opinion of the Surgeon General and 
other doctors as to the ill-climate that existed in the capital during portions of those 
months.67    
The Viceroy’s residence at Simla, the so-called “viceregal lodge,” was in fact a 
stately English mansion built at Dufferin’s insistence, at a cost of over £100,000.  The 
entrance-hall ascended three stories while the rooms were fully equipped with electric 
light, and it even had an indoor tennis court.68  On the whole, the house adhered to Lord 
Valentia’s near dictum that India was “a country of splendour, of extravagance, and of 
outward appearances,” and so should “be ruled from a palace, not from a counting-
house.”69  Although Lansdowne noted that the house had “many good points,” he found 
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that “the whole arrangement of the rooms and ‘anatomy’ of the building tell a tale of 
amateur architecture with its inevitable faults.”  Moreover, he thought the furnishings 
“deplorable,” and could not quite figure out why such “hideous” carpets had been 
imported from Maples of London, when “such lovely ones are made here.”70  It would 
turn out as well that the climate at Simla was not as pleasant as Lansdowne had first 
surmised.  In her “unvarnished account” of the drizzling rain that often lingered at Simla, 
Lady Dufferin declared that it “falls in the most vicious manner, with the plain intent of 
entering our new house and of discovering every weak place in it [,] . . . . . entirely hides 
our lovely views and rather spoils our angelic tempers.”71  Little more than a year into 
his reign Lansdowne discovered that one could suffer “rather an over-dose of Simla,” 
whose climate could be “extremely disagreeable during the rains.”  Indeed, he 
maintained that it was “much harder to bear than the heat of Calcutta.”72  After having 
been in India for less than two years, the Viceroy began to speak of his time spent each 
year at Simla as “six months’ imprisonment . . . completely cut off from the rest of the 
world,” and envisioning himself to be “like Prometheus, although with a reasonably 
sound liver, chained to this rock.”73   
Lansdowne was also soon to have his doubts, “judging by the number of one’s 
friends on the sick list,” that the climate at Simla really was “as healthy as it ought to 
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be.”74  In the summer of 1890, Lady Lansdowne was forced to leave the country due to 
poor health and return to England for a few months because, according to the Viceroy, 
Simla did not agree with her very well.75  Lansdowne himself, however, was usually the 
most prominent name on the sick list, and indeed one would not go too far in concluding 
that it was probably more of a surprise to ever find his name off of it.  During his tenure, 
he would suffer from fever, ague, and lumbago (to go along with his rheumatic finger 
joints).76  By far his worst affliction, however, was yet another nerve disorder, neuralgia 
in the eye—an acute pain radiating along the optic nerve—the rarest form of the 
disorder, and also extremely rare in one so young; Lansdowne was only forty-three years 
old.  Making it impossible at times to do any serious work as it drove him “almost crazy 
with pain,” Lansdowne remarked that he had “never suffered any pain more difficult to 
bear,” and it was only assuaged by the administration of “big doses of quinine.”77 
Between ailments, the Viceroy did manage to take advantage of his exotic 
surroundings.  Although he disliked Indian style horse racing, Simla had a small 
racecourse and Lansdowne was forced to admit that “on occasional evenings pony 
racing is, to my mind, the most attractive form which the sport can assume.”78  For his 
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gardens at Derreen, he actively collected new and interesting plant seeds, as well as 
bamboos.79  For sport, he was instructed as to the “mysteries in the art” of pigsticking, 
and went as well on the requisite tiger shoot, taking along his son Kerry, and his new 
son-in-law Victor Cavendish, Lord Hartington (later the ninth Duke of Devonshire).  
The latter two each got a tiger, while the Viceroy “put a bullet into the head of a 
miserable elephant,” but failing to bring it down, left the poor animal “still at large.”80       
Governing India, of course, engaged the majority of Lansdowne’s time, and 
before he had even left Canada he found himself nearly overwhelmed.  After conducting 
a review of Indian affairs while still in Ottawa, Lansdowne found that “the number of 
questions, and of big questions” that required immediate attention was “appalling,” and 
it could not have escaped his notice that in India, as opposed to Canada, the 
responsibility for governing would rest more than ever in his hands alone.81  In his first 
address as Viceroy, at Bombay on the day of his arrival, Lansdowne told those 
assembled that a man about to assume such a post as he was about to do would have to 
be “infatuated if he does recognize that he is about to submit himself to an ordeal as 
severe as that to which any public man can expect to go through.”82  Even The Times, 
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which predictably declared Lansdowne’s stint in Canada a success, pointed out that “As 
Governor-General of Canada, Lord Lansdowne has had to exhibit a demeanour almost 
the exact reverse of that which will be incumbent on him as Governor-General of India.”  
Specifically, it stressed that he would be “obliged to be an autocrat . . . [who] must make 
his weight felt in affairs.”83  David Cannadine has suggested that in fact, “In governing 
India, previous Canadian experience might even have been a positive disadvantage, 
since the one post required an inflexible figure-head, while the other—especially in its 
later phases—required different abilities.”84  As The Times noted, however, the 
Viceroy’s powers were not entirely unrestrained and absolute and that thanks to the 
telegraph there was always a ready connection to London and the India Office.85  
Lansdowne’s meeting with Lord Cross in the summer before he departed for India had 
not been very helpful though, as the Secretary of State avoided setting specific policy 
guidelines, and throughout his tenure retained a relatively hands-off approach to his 
duties.  It was clear, however, that the next Viceroy would have two areas of foremost 
concern.  First was the rising Indian nationalism in the country which was now 
embodied in the nascent and increasingly assertive Indian National Congress, while 
second was the continued need to improve India’s defenses especially along its 
northwest frontier.86   
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In domestic matters Lansdowne’s viceroyalty was the epitome of moderate Whig 
governance.  He immediately took up his Whig predecessor’s scheme for reform of 
Indian Provincial Councils and the Viceroy’s Supreme Council.  A sort of “Reform Bill 
for India,” the proposals put forward by Dufferin were to allow native Indians—who had 
been in some manner elected—to sit on both Councils, and also allow questions to be 
asked in the Supreme Council with regard to the budget.  Echoing Dufferin’s reasoning, 
Lansdowne hoped that “A timely concession of this kind would . . . take a great deal of 
the wind out of the sails of Congress, whereas, if the reform is delayed too long, it will 
be assuredly regarded as having been extorted from us.”87  It was not to be “anything 
like representation, in the English sense of the word,” Lansdowne assured Cross, but he 
believed that such a small step would “do good . . . by showing that our attitude is not 
one of obstinate or uncompromising resistance to the demands for a moderate advance in 
the direction of institutions, more representative in character than those at present 
enjoyed by the people of this country.”88  The Indian Councils Act eventually passed in 
1892, and contained language vague enough to allow the Viceroy to experiment with the 
elective principle in the Councils.89   
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Against considerable native Indian opposition Lansdowne also pushed through a 
bill that raised the age of consent for girls from ten to twelve years old.  The bill was 
prompted by the courts being unable to deal adequately with the recent case of a child-
wife in Bengal dying from the consummation of her marriage.90  Lansdowne admitted to 
Lord Connemara, the Governor of Madras, that it was quite “possible that legislation 
upon the subject may not produce any striking or immediate results,” but he did “not see 
why it should have the effect of impeding the cause of social reform.”  Moreover, he had 
become convinced that “legislation on questions of this kind often has good results by 
accustoming the people to sound views.”91 
Perhaps most revealing of Lansdowne’s general political attitudes was his 
correspondence with Allan Octavian Hume, a retired Indian civil servant, English 
“father” of the Indian National Congress and devotee of Madame Blavatsky’s 
theosophy.92  Hume had been a confidant of Lord Ripon, Viceroy from 1880 to 1885, 
and encouraged the latter’s reformist program.93  It was the failure of Ripon’s promised 
reforms however—reforms that were “to supply legitimate outlets for those aspirations 
and satisfy those ambitions” of that “small class of highly educated natives”—which led 
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directly to the creation of the Indian National Congress.94  Hume had initially meant the 
Congress to be in partnership with the Government of India, providing it with a ready 
repository of educated Indian opinion, but this idea was rebuffed by Dufferin and Indian 
nationalism only grew more assertive.95   
Hume’s first direct contact with Lansdowne came after the Bengal Provincial 
Government, acting “somewhat beyond those orders” issued by the central government 
in Calcutta, sent out a circular that not only forbid government officials from 
participating in Congress activity, but highly discouraged them from even attending 
Congress meetings or rallies.96  After a not unfriendly meeting with the Viceroy, Hume, 
now General Secretary to the Indian National Congress, sent Lansdowne an admittedly 
unaltered and uncensored five-page screed that had simply “flowed” from his heart.  As 
he also now considered himself “amicus curiae,” he did not hesitate “to violate all sorts 
of official convenances” in speaking his mind.  The initial purpose of the letter, wrote 
Hume, was to explain in advance why he and his Congress Party would in future be 
bound to denounce the Viceroy and his government.  After challenging what he claimed 
were Lansdowne’s self-proclaimed liberal credentials, and comparing the Indian 
Government’s unfair boycott of the Congress with the troublesome boycotts of Irish 
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agitators, Hume appealed to Lansdowne “—for the welfare equally of Great Britain and 
India—”: 
To try somewhat to realize the strength of the feelings which pervade the 
educated classes, the de-facto leaders of the people on these subjects, and 
realizing it, devise some golden bridge—some scheme to reconcile 
contending factions.  Be another witch of Atlas, kneading fire and snow 
together, and tempering the repugnant mass with ‘liquid love.’  Show 
strongly, unmistakeably [sic], your sympathy with and love for the 
people; rise above the common place routine of official platitudes, and 
guarded, grudging, insincere official utterances; show the people that it is 
with them in their countless millions, in their sorrows and their sufferings, 
and not with the tiny clique of foreign rulers jealous of their power, their 
emoluments, and their supposed fallibility, that your heart is, and earn an 
undying nation’s gratitude—the reward of a good conscience and the 
final verdict of a higher tribunal; ‘well done, thou good and faithful 
servant!’97   
                      
Despite the letter’s stunning violations of convention, its accusations, and strangely 
excessive familiarity, Lansdowne might not have been that surprised since he was 
informed by friends almost a year earlier that all that Hume “says and writes is to some 
extent tainted by his strange metaphysical belief, and that he will tell you, without 
moving a muscle of his countenance, that he has occult means, uncomprehended by 
Western civilization, of finding out what people think and are doing.”98  Almost always 
universally courteous, the Viceroy politely declined to become “another witch of Atlas,” 
but noted that he could not recall a “single instance” in which he had “spoken or written 
in an intolerant spirit of the proceedings or aims of the Congress.”  As for Hume’s plea 
that he interfere decidedly on the side of the “countless millions,” Lansdowne declared: 
“Of the duties of the head of a Government none are to my mind more important than 
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that of preserving what you have described as the character of a ‘purely independent 
statesman’ by an attitude of strict impartiality to all.”99 
A few days later, in a letter Lansdowne and his staff had “prepared with the 
utmost care” and in which “every word . . . was weighed,” Hume was informed that 
“The Government of India recognize that the Congress movement is regarded in India 
what in Europe would be called the more advanced liberal party, as distinguished from 
the great body of conservative opinion which exists side by side with it.”100  Lansdowne 
had essentially declared the Congress a legitimate movement, though without official 
approval, and Hume subsequently published the letter and called for public thanks to be 
voted to the Viceroy.101  Nevertheless, Lansdowne’s true attitude toward the Congress 
had probably not changed from his initial thoughts formed soon after his arrival in India 
when he informed Cross that as long as the movement was “content . . . with the 
academical [sic] discussion” of such questions that were already openly being dealt with 
by the government, and avoided the dissemination of seditious materials, he believed 
that the authorities could “afford to treat its proceedings with good-humoured 
indifference.”102  His greatest fear was that the leaders of the Congress movement would 
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“obtain for it a new motive-power by combining agrarian with political grievances,” as 
had already happened to such great effect in Ireland.103 
In their last substantive correspondence later that same year, Hume sent the 
Viceroy a copy of a speech he had made at Dulwich in England in which he expounded 
on the seeming curiosity that reforms that were once regarded as “wild and visionary” 
often had become acceptable or within the realm of the possible within one’s own 
lifetime.  Lansdowne responded that he was  
. . . almost tempted to add that, this being so, the reformers can afford to 
rely upon the inherent merits of their own cause, and upon the fact ‘that 
time is upon the side’ of the party of progress, without seeking to 
accelerate the pace by the use of what I should call inflammatory 
stimulants.  I should have liked your speech better if my sympathy with 
your argument had not been at times alienated by what seemed to me to 
be uncalled for attempts to excite class hatred.  These appeals to the 
employed against the employers, or to those who have not, against those 
who have, are becoming too fashionable, and will, I cannot help fearing, 
breed estrangement where there should be good-will, and mistrust where 
there might be hearty cooperation.104    
  
Hume, in his typically impolitic response, argued: “Of course a member of the 
aristocracy” with such an “altiora peto temperament, [was] incapable of conceiving such 
things without a practical acquaintance with them, from which your birth and position 
has saved you.”  He asserted that the Viceroy simply had “no idea of the justice of our 
hatred of the tyranny of capital and wealth,” and moreover, the Viceroy mistakenly 
credited others with “honourable feelings like your own.”  While Hume himself did “so 
wish to love all men,” when brought “face to face with the unmerited sufferings” 
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inflicted by the “great bulk of plutocrats and employers,” he found he could not do so.105  
In essence, he had charged Lansdowne with being more gentle and sanguine than he.  In 
its way, it is oddly reminiscent of Salisbury’s complaint of Gladstone’s “gorgeous, 
reckless optimism.”106 
 While Lansdowne admitted Hume’s greater familiarity with “the relations of 
capital and labour in Great Britain,” and that he surely knew “many things which are 
unrevealed to those who have been watchers from a distance,” the Viceroy maintained 
that he would not be “squeamish about strong language when it was directed at proven 
facts and against convicted offenders.”  What Lansdowne disliked, however, was “the 
assumption that capitalists, or employers, must be bad because they are capitalists and 
employers, or indeed that any one class of the community is bad ‘in the loomp.’”107  This 
was not to say that Lansdowne found all generalizations as to class objectionable, as 
little more than five years before he had declared to his mother that the longer he lived 
the “more firmly” did he “believe in blood and breeding.”  He was quick to concede, 
however, that “Many” of his own class were “poor, a good few disreputable, plenty idle 
and without sense of responsibility.”108  The Viceroy’s direct association with Hume 
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soon ended, and four months into the new year the Government of India nearly took 
action against Hume for the circulation of seditious materials.109 
Although domestic matters certainly occupied much of Lansdowne’s energies, 
India’s defense and foreign policy were from the beginning of his reign, his greatest 
concern.  One of the very first letters Lansdowne wrote as Viceroy was sent to Henry 
Mortimer Durand, his Foreign Secretary, to inform him that “Of all the high officials 
with whom I shall be in contact, you will, I have little doubt, be the officer with whom I 
shall be most immediately and frequently concerned during my term of office.”110  
Durand’s position, however, was akin to that of the Permanent or Parliamentary Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office, while the Viceroy was in effect his own foreign 
minister, directing Indian foreign policy in consultation with the India Office.111 
India’s strategic situation in the late 1880s was best characterized by Lansdowne 
at his farewell dinner at the Royal Exchange in Calcutta.  The retiring Viceroy reminded 
his audience that “the restlessness perceptible at different points of the frontier” during 
his reign was “merely the outward and visible sign of the fact that the Indian Empire is, 
owing to events beyond our control, passing out of the stage of isolation—out of the 
stage when it could afford to do without a definite frontier, into a new stage when it will 
be virtually conterminous with two, or perhaps three great Powers and when, whether we 
like it or not, the acceptance of definite frontiers and spheres of responsibility will be 
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forced upon us.”112  The end of India’s isolation was of course a different matter entirely 
from what Lansdowne would encounter as Foreign Secretary a decade later.  The great 
powers that threatened, however, were the same, and between the press of the French 
into Burma in the east, and Russian expansion towards Afghanistan in the northwest, the 
latter’s threat to India’s borders and domestic stability was by far the most feared.  
Moreover, despite Lansdowne’s talk of this being a “new stage” for India, recognition 
and fear of the destabilizing effect that Russia could have on British authority in India—
not to mention the fear of an actual Russian invasion of India—was not new at all. 
Since the Napoleonic Wars, these two great powers had been engaged in a grand 
rivalry, the so-called ‘Great Game,’ played out in the wastelands and mountains of 
Central Asia, an ever decreasing buffer zone between Imperial Russia and British India.  
Prior to this, Russia and Britain had actually been considered the most natural of allies.  
In 1806, George III told the Russian envoy, Magnus Alopäus, that “since the 
geographical position that forms the foundation of their union [Britain and Russia] 
cannot change, their union must be eternal.”113  Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt seven 
years before, however, had awakened many in Britain to the land based threats to their 
possessions on the subcontinent.  It was the genesis in many respects of Britain’s 
nineteenth century foreign policy tenet of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman 
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Empire, the western bulwark of the glacis.114  In November 1814, six months after 
Napoleon’s first abdication and four months before his return, Britain signed a defensive 
treaty with Persia, in which the latter promised aid against any invasion of India.  It was 
clearly a treaty directed not against France, but Britain’s ally, Russia.115 
By the 1830s, the idea of implementing an active ‘forward policy,’ pushing 
forward into the Central Asian buffer zone to meet the Russian threat before it reached 
the outer borders of India, was already being discussed.  Lord Bentinck, Governor 
General of India from 1828 to 1835, did not think a Russian invasion was probable but 
believed the establishment of military colonies further up the Indus River would in the 
long run provide greater security.  Other East India Company officials, however, were 
just as certain that such a policy would only prompt the Russians to react in kind, which 
in the end would only bring the armies of both great powers that much closer, or would 
aid the Russians militarily by moving British forces closer to Russia’s resource base and 
further away from their own.116  News of the unsuccessful Persian siege of the strategic 
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city of Herat in western Afghanistan in 1837—an attack that was known to have been 
supported and encouraged by the Russian representative in Tehran—prompted then 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, to argue that Russia had “opened the first parallels 
and it would not be wise in us to delay the defensive measures until she has reached the 
glacis.”  The Russian Foreign Minister, Nesselrode, attempted to calm British fears of an 
impending invasion of India, but such assurances went only so far for Russian actions 
tended to belie their verbal promises of peaceful intentions, and under Palmerston’s 
direction Britain initiated its forward policy.  In 1838 British forces occupied Kabul, the 
Afghan capital, and set up a pro-British Amir.  Four years later nearly the entire British 
mission—men, women, and children—were slaughtered while attempting to retreat from 
the country after the Afghan people rebelled.117 
Britain’s forward policy met disaster in Afghanistan, but Russian expansion 
continued, and after the Indian Mutiny in 1857 British fears only heightened.  Russian 
forces took Tashkent and Bokhara in 1866, Khiva in 1873, and Kokand in 1876, and it 
seemed inevitable that they would soon take Merv, and after that Herat.118  The response 
of the Disraeli Government in 1875 was to appoint the more aggressive Lord Lytton as 
Viceroy and once again adopt a more forward policy.  Salisbury, Foreign Secretary at 
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the time, argued that it was “evident that this Russian avalanche is moving on by its own 
weight . . . [and] it is likely to go on, whatever diplomacy may do.”119  The ultimate 
incongruity for Salisbury—and many who came before him—was that he had come to 
the conclusion that at present a Russian invasion of India was not very likely or even 
feasible, but recognizing that Afghanistan would necessarily end up in either the Russian 
or British sphere and with British public opinion more than a little concerned over the 
fate of the jewel in Britain’s Empire, it was impossible to do nothing.120  His hope then 
was to divert the Russian avalanche towards “the vast multitudes of China,” or at the 
very least keep it north of the Hindu Kush range of the Himalayas.121  The government, 
was unable to restrain Lytton, however, who believed that with regard to war with 
Russia, “If it is to be—better now, than later.”122   
When the Amir welcomed a Russian mission at Kabul in 1878, Lytton ordered 
British troops across the border.  British victory against the Afghans was swift, the 
Russians departed, and a resident was placed permanently at Kabul in support of a new 
pro-British Amir.  Three months after the resident’s arrival in July 1879, however, he 
and his entire escort were murdered by rebellious Afghan soldiers.  A successful reprisal 
expedition was soon launched, but the disaster helped bring down Disraeli’s 
                                                 
119 Salisbury to Lord Northbrook, January 22, 1875, quoted in Gopal, British Policy in India 1858-1905,  
p. 75. 
 
120 Gopal, British Policy in India, p. 83. 
 
121 Salisbury to Lord Northbrook, January 22, 1875, excerpted in Gopal, British Policy in India, p. 75. 
 
122 Lytton to Salisbury, October 25, 1876, excerpted in Gopal, British Policy in India, p. 80. 
 
  
93
Government in 1880.123  The new Liberal government under Gladstone returned all 
territories taken in the reprisal, including Kandahar, and Liberal policy on Afghanistan 
was to be complete non-interference in its domestic affairs, and cordial relations with the 
new Amir, Abdur Rahman.124   
Lansdowne’s immediate predecessor, Lord Dufferin, somewhat reluctantly 
followed this policy, gave Rahman money and guns, and tried his best to ignore the 
potentate’s brutal methods of governing.  This won him the support of successive 
Liberal and Conservative governments.  In the meantime, Russian advances continued.  
They occupied Merv in 1884, and forcibly took the Panjdeh from the Afghans in 1885.  
Since the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, and the Secretary of State for India, Lord 
Kimberley, both thought a treaty with Russia would be of no real use, a so-called 
“modified forward policy” was now contemplated.  This would entail greater control of 
the border tribes on India’s northwest frontier so as to provide a defensive shield, the 
building of more railway lines linking the west bank of the Indus River to more forward 
positions, and the formulation of military contingency plans in case Russia invaded 
northern Afghanistan, taking into account that no reinforcements were to be expected 
from London.  The most prominent military contingency envisioned, backed by General 
Sir Frederick Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India from 1885-1893, was 
to occupy a defensive position along a line running from Kabul to Kandahar, essentially 
the southern fringe of the Hindu-Kush.  Due to the costs and risks involved in 
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implementing such a modified forward policy however—which included possible 
alienation of Abdur Rahman thus pushing him into Russia’s arms, or even provoking 
further Russian advances—Dufferin thought it best to leave many matters undecided, 
and left the final policy decisions to his successor.125 
Lansdowne was almost immediately sympathetic to the new forward policy, 
writing to Roberts in February 1889 that he was “impressed with the necessity of 
‘assimilating’ the frontier tribes as rapidly as possible.”126  This, he hoped, would 
eliminate the unsettled tribal salient that at the time projected between the more settled 
areas of northern Baluchistan and the Punjab.  There was a general criticism even at the 
time that Lansdowne quickly succumbed to “the powerful contagion of the forward 
policy,” or more specifically fell too easily under the influence of Roberts.127  Durand 
for one was pleased to find that: “So far as India is concerned, anyone who troubles us 
will find we have a fighting Viceroy,” adding that the latter and “Bobs run neck and 
neck.”128  Lord Kimberley was rather less pleased however, and judged Lansdowne to be 
“decidedly the weakest of the Viceroys of India with whom” he had to deal.129  This no 
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doubt had a great deal to do with Kimberley’s belief that the marquis, while Viceroy, 
had been “a mere tool in Robert’s [sic] hands.”130   
This distinctly negative impression of Lansdowne as puppet has also found favor 
with modern historians, and it is all the more significant as it is a charge not limited to 
his time in India.131  Absent of evidence, however, a congruence of policies does not 
necessarily prove undue influence or manipulation of one actor over another.  It is an 
impression that must lose a good deal of its force in fact if it can be shown that the 
reasoning behind Lansdowne’s policy choices differed from that of the alleged 
manipulator.  It should not be so surprising to find that Lansdowne was ill-suited to 
address the need for greater border security through masterly inactivity.  He was in some 
manner throughout his life always the old Whig that the Earl of Crawford encountered in 
1919, who had “to investigate everything, to leave nothing and nobody alone . . . always 
giving the impression that somebody has got to be corrected or something put right.”132  
At the conclusion of Lansdowne’s reign he was boldly echoing to all who would listen 
Lytton’s eloquent condemnation of India’s previous and senseless frontier policy of 
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“alternate vengeance and inaction,” but no one would suggest this as an example of the 
undue influence exercised by the Viceroy’s archives.133 
Lansdowne was convinced of the correctness of a renewed forward policy on his 
month long tour of the northwest frontier in the fall of 1889.134  The journey began on an 
unfortunate note with the Viceroy sustaining a rather severe thigh sprain while 
attempting to mount an “awkward pony” on the initial leg from Simla to Ambala, but he 
was able to continue by train on to Peshawar, the northern starting point of his frontier 
tour where he met up with Roberts; and together they toured the Khyber Pass.135  
Lansdowne was impressed with the “soldierlike” comportment of the native troops, as 
well as the miniature version of Pax Britannica that British authority had been able to 
establish on the caravan road.  To the Viceroy’s mind, it produced the “edifying 
spectacle of gentlemen, who if they met each other on the mountain would most 
assuredly interchange shots or endeavour to stick a knife into one another, standing 
shoulder to shoulder in the most amicable manner in order to make their ‘salaam’ to 
us.”136  From here the Viceroy and his party boarded a flotilla of twenty-three flat-
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bottomed barges at Attock, and lazily floated down the Indus River.137  Lansdowne was 
impressed with the “most formidable barrier” the Indus provided, “even if we are to 
admit that it is to be only a second line of defence,” and best of all it came at no expense 
to the tax-payer.138  After an excursion through the Zhob Valley to inspect the Gomal 
Pass, through which a commercial road was to be pushed as soon as the local tribes were 
brought under British authority, the Viceroy continued on to Quetta and an inspection of 
the railway being laid all the way to the new Chaman station at the Afghan border.139  A 
reserve of rails and other materials were quietly to be stored at Chaman for an eventual 
extension of the rail line to Kandahar, either through an agreement with the Amir—
presumably following “a satisfactory adjustment of the whole frontier question” that 
Lansdowne believed lay sometime in the near future—or when military necessity 
required unilateral action.140    
At Quetta, Lansdowne met with Sir Robert Sandeman, Agent to the Governor 
General, Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan, and author of the famous “Sandeman 
system,” under which border tribes were to be brought effectively under British 
influence.  Specifically it was an open border system “of conciliatory intervention 
tempered by lucrative employment and light taxation,” as opposed to a closed border 
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system that invariably meant “non-intervention tempered by expeditions.”141  
Sandeman’s critics, of course, referred to his approach as nothing more than simply “a 
gigantic system of disguised blackmail.”142   
Before a durbar comprising the chiefs of the numerous local tribes, Lansdowne 
congratulated Sir Robert on his great successes and told his native audience that given 
their “ample opportunity of learning what British rule means,” he hoped that they had 
learned that it was “founded on Justice; that the British Government neither exacts heavy 
taxes nor interferes with your private affairs; that it has no wish to meddle with your 
religion; [and] that it desires to respect your ancient customs so far as it is possible to do 
so without injustice to individuals.”143  After meeting the tribesmen of the frontier 
Lansdowne was convinced that “Unless their countenances altogether belie them,” they 
were in fact “fit for something better than blood feuds and cattle-lifting.”144  Refusing to 
pass up an opportunity to improve the house at Simla, before leaving Quetta Lansdowne 
requested that Sandeman send him a few of the old-fashioned fire-arms, shields, and 
swords he had seen the tribesmen carrying so he could decorate the “deplorably bare” 
walls of the viceregal lodge.145 
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Lansdowne returned from his tour “with a strong impression that much which 
might have been done” in stabilizing relations with the frontier tribes “had been left 
undone.”146  If he was to remain a little bit skittish as to Sandeman’s operations, 
however, it was because he hoped it could “be carried through without attracting much 
public attention, and without firing a shot.”147  In his efforts to counter the Viceroy’s 
anxiety, Sandeman stressed the importance of his work as a matter of imperial defense.  
Not long after their initial meeting, Sandeman wrote to the Viceroy arguing that “If we 
do this now, when the time of trial arrives it will be found that [the tribes] will heartily 
identify themselves with us and place their services and the resources of their country at 
our disposal, as they did in Baluchistan during the late Afghan War.”  In time, Sandeman 
concluded, his work’s “inestimable value to the Indian Empire” would be proven.148  A 
few months later he reiterated that he considered “the question of the direction of our 
policy towards the frontier tribes as a matter of imperial importance.”149 
The greatest opposition within India to Sandeman’s actions came from the 
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir J. B. Lyall.  His province bordered the tribal 
salient on the north and adhered to a closed border system.  Lyall justly feared that 
interfering with tribes over whom the Amir presumed some suzerainty might alienate the 
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potentate, so he advised caution.150  Lansdowne soon found himself in the role of referee 
between these two increasingly antagonistic government officials, and noted to his 
friend, Lord Connemara, the Governor of Madras, that “Lyall’s one idea is to build a 
wall which Sandeman will not be able to climb,” while “Sandeman is for as little 
masonry as possible, and at least one foot beyond the boundary line.”151  Even a closed 
door meeting of all three in the Viceroy’s rooms at Simla could not resolve the dispute, 
and Lansdowne was forced to make a final decision for all provinces on the frontier.152 
In the end Lansdowne backed Sandeman almost completely, and even had to 
disabuse Lyall of the notion that Sir Robert was allowed to get his way whether “right or 
wrong,” simply because he was “overbearing in argument” and “difficult and dangerous 
to thwart.”  The Viceroy in fact thought that if anything Sandeman’s rather aggressive 
manner in debate tended to hurt his case.153  On his tour of the frontier, Lansdowne had 
already been struck by “The extent to which the policy of abstention has been pursued 
by the Punjab Government in dealing with the tribes along that portion of the Frontier 
for which it is responsible,” but he now also took issue with Lyall’s “assumption that we 
wish or intend to go a great deal further than we have any intention of going.”154  The 
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Viceory simply had far less faith than Lyall in the idea that Afghanistan could be 
indefinitely maintained as a true buffer state between the Indian Empire and Russia.155  
Lansdowne had therefore come to sympathize with Roberts’s argument that British 
India’s natural frontier was the Hindu-Kush, and that occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar 
line of defense should be implemented at the first sign of “fresh menace on the part of 
Russia.”  Maintaining that “Something will have been gained if this is accepted as an 
established understanding,” Lansdowne proposed “if possible, to ‘clinch’ this with the 
Secretary of State.”156 
There is no reason to deny that Roberts was a considerable influence on the 
Viceroy’s final conclusions on frontier policy.  It would indeed be odd if he did not take 
seriously the advice of his military commander, and Lansdowne certainly had a great 
deal of respect for his Commander-in-Chief’s knowledge of India, a country with which, 
he noted, the general had “thrown in his lot so completely.”157  Over twenty years later, 
in late October 1914, when he was informed that another large contingent of native 
Indian troops was to be transferred to the “seat of war” in Europe, Lansdowne’s anxiety 
with regard to Indian security, as well as his concern that the native troops might not 
“understand the rules of the game” as it was played in France and Belgium, led him to 
suggest to Lord Crewe that officials consult the then eighty-two year old Field Marshal 
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whom he declared “knows India better than all of us.”158  Lansdowne even successively 
lobbied to have Roberts’ command in India extended, and then pressed for the award of 
a pension or grant for the latter on his retirement, although without success.159  His 
concurrence with Roberts’s seemingly offensive minded ‘Kabul-Kandahar line’ military 
strategy, however, is once again misleading.  It should be remembered that the 
Commander-in-Chief’s military advice concerning Afghanistan and a possible Russian 
invasion had changed considerably in its tone since the late 1870s when he advocated 
offensive action against Russia launched from Herat or across the Oxus River.  It was 
subsequently made clear to the Government of India that if war with Russia were to 
break out they should not expect any reinforcements from Britain.  This essentially put 
paid to any more talk of offensive operations.160  In 1885 Roberts still contemplated 
advancing quickly and taking Herat before the Russians, but by the time of Lansdowne’s 
viceroyalty the taking of Kandahar was paramount in his thinking, along with the 
extension of the railway to that city from Quetta.  When Lansdowne promised to attempt 
to “clinch” acceptance of the Kabul-Kandahar line with the India Office, it was now 
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foremost a defensive strategy and limited to the southern half of Afghanistan.161  In this 
respect, Lansdowne’s forward policy in India was not incompatible with his advocacy in 
early 1881 of retaining Kandahar on the chance that a “European concert of Asia” might 
be the end result.  Lansdowne’s first impulse was always to show a firm front, but unlike 
Lytton he did not desire war with Russia now rather than later or even think war to be 
inevitable, as did Roberts.  Doing nothing, however, was not an option, and in this 
Lansdowne was in agreement with Roberts.162        
Roberts’s influence on Lansdowne was perhaps greatest and most enduring in the 
impression the former gave that British India—the Empire’s pre-eminent jewel—was in 
fact militarily indefensible.  When Lord Cross requested in the summer of 1891 a 
memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief detailing what defensive measures might 
be taken if Russia launched a mere diversionary attack on India, Roberts practically 
refused to submit one, declaring that no defense was possible without reinforcements 
thus it would be “impossible” for him to “show on paper how it could be done.”  
Moreover, he maintained that “Practically, the defence of India and the opposing an 
attack on Afghanistan by Russia is one and the same,” and that “in either case the only 
course to pursue is to occupy the Kabul-Kandahar line,” but that this had only “smallest 
chance of success, without the increase to the Army of India.”163  It was Roberts, as well, 
who in 1891 passed on to Lansdowne Alfred Thayer Mahan’s immensely influential 
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work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.  With the book, the Commander-in-
Chief enclosed a copy of a letter he had written to Sir Alfred Lyall—from whom the 
general had originally received the book—in which he noted that “the great advantages 
claimed for England’s ‘Geographical position’ . . . are considerably discounted now that 
the boundary of her Indian Empire has become conterminous with that of Russia in 
Asia.”  He warned the Viceroy that “Her Majesty’s Ministers must not shut their eyes to 
the dangers at present hidden by our undisputed power, and must make up their minds 
that, cost what it may in men and money, Russia ought never to be allowed to approach 
one yard nearer to India.”164 
Simultaneously with promising to “clinch” acceptance of the Kabul-Kandahar 
line with the India Office, Lansdowne was echoing the opinion of Sandeman when he 
wrote to Wolff that, notwithstanding the Amir’s disapproval of current British actions in 
opening the Gomal Pass, “in the face of the events which are taking place on the western 
frontier of Afghanistan, we cannot afford to sit with our hands in our pockets, and I am 
doing all I can in a quiet way to increase our influence amongst the frontier tribes and to 
prepare for the steps which we may be forced to take before we are much older.”165  
Both the Viceroy and Roberts recognized the need for the cooperation of the Amir in all 
their efforts to stabilize the border and other measures for India’s defense.  These 
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included connecting India to Kabul by telegraph and building the new rail terminus at 
Chaman; the station would have to be on level ground, which would require it to be six 
or seven miles past the extant fort and therefore on land Abdur Rahman considered his.  
None of this could proceed much further, noted Lansdowne, “without explaining to the 
Amir what we are driving at, and inducing him to help us, instead of obstructing us at 
every turn of the road,” while Roberts admitted that “Notwithstanding the very serious 
difficulties we should undoubtedly have to encounter in making overtures of any kind to 
the Amir, the advantages of coming to a satisfactory understanding with him would 
seem to outweigh them.”166  The most serious difficulty, however, was the Viceroy’s 
strained relationship with Abdul Rahman. 
In his first month in India, Lansdowne explained to Lord Reay, the Governor of 
Bombay: “The fact is that in the case of small and weak semi-barbarous States, placed 
between neighbors more powerful than themselves, it is often impossible to say with 
confidence that they can be properly described as the vassals or tributaries of any single 
ruler.”  He maintained that these states “have in all probability at different times 
acknowledged different supremacies, and paid tribute to any one who was strong enough 
to extort it.”167  From the start of his reign, Lansdowne was “impressed with the 
unsatisfactory relations with” the Amir, and thought that the Government of India had 
“scarcely any control over him.”168  This lack of control meant there was an ever present 
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danger that the Amir might anger Russia to the point of intervention, and thus force 
Britain into an unwanted international conflict.  While the foremost fear in the Foreign 
Office and India Office was that the Amir’s brutality and repression of neighboring 
tribes and his own people might present Russia “a pretext for interference” in internal 
Afghan affairs, or worse yet create trouble in Britain by producing “another edition of 
the Bulgarian atrocities scare,” Lansdowne’s concern appeared driven primarily by 
moral outrage at the atrocities themselves and the Afghan potentate’s unnatural 
cruelty.169  In the aftermath of putting down a rebellion in Turkistan, Abdur Rahman had 
subjected captured rebels—men, women, and children—to torture and starvation.  His 
methods of torture varied from exposing his victims to snow-storms while having them 
doused with buckets of water, to having them blown from guns, disemboweled, or 
simply having their throats cut in the “usual manner.”  Many of the prisoners were 
tortured simply in order to extract property, rather than for any actual treasonous 
offense.170  “Altogether, although one cannot help dreading what might happen if Abdur 
Rahman were to die,” noted Lansdowne, it was “by no means clear that we might not do 
better with a more humane and less unmanageable ruler.”171  Notwithstanding his rather 
comical tautology, Lansdowne’s focus was clear. 
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The Viceroy’s first impulse, beyond waiting for the potentate’s untimely death, 
was to send Abdur Rahman a strongly worded letter of rebuke for both his obstruction 
and cruelties; but Cross dissuaded him for fear of overly irritating the Afghan ruler.  
Lansdowne recognized the danger in such a letter, and agreed that they “might deal 
liberally with the Amir in regard to these if he is reasonable and accommodating,” but he 
found to his extreme displeasure that Abdur Rahman was a most unreasonable, 
“cantankerous and suspicious old savage.”172  The Viceroy therefore believed that the 
government “should stand no nonsense” from the Afghan ruler, and complained that 
they had “hitherto treated him too much as a spoilt child.”  Moreover, were Britain to 
continue to grant the Amir money and armaments, and to provide him with protection 
from attack, Lansdowne believed it ridiculous to allow him to “imperil the peace of the 
Indian Empire by his wrongheadedness and indiscretion—to say nothing of the 
abominable cruelties and acts of oppression of which he is guilty.”  Pending further 
instruction from London, however, the Viceroy informed Secretary Cross that “in the 
meanwhile I shall hold my hand.”173 
In the interim, Lansdowne informed Sir Alfred Lyall that he had “given 
instructions for the preparation of a kind of dossier of the Amir’s proceedings” upon 
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which he could later base his “admonition.”174  Over the next few months he pressed his 
case to Cross for some “plain-speaking” when dealing “with such a man as the Amir,” as 
it was better to leave him “under no misapprehensions.”175  In July 1889, Lansdowne 
wrote again that he was “much exercised” by the continuing reports of Abdur Rahman’s 
“barbarities,” and that although the Amir had “always been a cruel ruler,” the most 
recent incidents rendered him unable to see how he could “any longer pass them by 
without notice.”  Two weeks later, he even asked for permission to inform the Afghan 
ruler that the Queen herself was asking for an explanation of his atrocities—a request 
that was denied.  Reluctantly admitting that it would be a mistake to permanently 
alienate the Amir, and not entirely sure whether or not his letter would have any 
beneficial effect, Lansdowne again told Cross that he would consider the matter 
further.176  It was difficult for Lansdowne to remain silent, however, when such 
barbarities were committed by a man who owed his position entirely to Britain.  In 
October, the Viceroy was finally permitted to send his rebuke and would later conclude 
that there was “a good deal of evidence to show that it produced some effect,” or at the 
very least had resulted in the Amir “punishing his subjects with less barbarity than 
before.”177 
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In the next year, following the Viceroy’s tour of the frontier and after it had been 
concluded that the Afghan ruler’s cooperation and support were needed above all else, 
the Government of India was busy applying “soft soap” in its correspondence with 
Abdur Rahman.178  Lansdowne attempted fruitlessly to arrange a face-to-face meeting 
with the Amir, going out of his way to avoid needlessly offending the “surly savage.”179  
In October 1890, a formal invitation was sent to Rahman for a meeting in India in order 
to discuss frontier questions.180  After some delay, in early November 1890, Lansdowne 
was led to believe that Rahman had accepted his invitation to meet him in India, but such 
hopes were quickly dashed when the Amir begged off, citing ill-health (noting his gout 
and sciatica) as well as urgent business of state.181  Lansdowne admitted later to Lord 
Kimberley, who took over at the India Office when Gladstone’s final ministry came to 
power in August 1892, that he had it on “excellent authority” that the Afghan ruler had 
“never forgiven” and still “bitterly resented” the remonstrance that he had been sent.  
The Viceroy, however, asserted that he had “endeavored” to write it in the “most 
friendly and considerate manner.”182 
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In the following year, 1891, matters were at a standstill, and Abdur Rahman 
showed his true resentment toward the Government of India by launching his own 
forward policy and attempting to assert his suzerainty over various border tribes, 
including the Afridis, the dominant tribe in the Khyber Pass.183  In August 1892, 
Lansdowne sought to send a mission to Kabul to be led this time by Roberts, but the 
Amir had no intention of welcoming the hero of the Second Afghan War, accompanied 
as he would be by a large military force, and so refused to fix a date for the mission.  
Lord Kimberley, who took over the India Office the same month, did not want the 
Afghan ruler to be pressed further, and blamed the Government of India’s modified 
forward policy for the Amir’s renewed truculence.184   
Lansdowne was at least initially “pleased at getting Kimberley” at the India 
Office, although he was admittedly unsure as to whether the latter would support him “in 
the Afghan imbroglio.”  His reaction to Gladstone’s return to power, however, was one 
of seeming resignation that Britain was “but at the beginning of the triumph of 
democratic principles.”185  He wrote to Kimberly at the end of August informing him 
that he would “find a good many troublesome questions undisposed of,” foremost of 
which was Abdur Rahman’s hostility.  Lansdowne dismissed the idea, however, that it 
all stemmed from the new forward policy or the railway extension at Chaman, arguing 
that he doubted whether the Amir “would have been our friend, or at all events a 
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trustworthy friend, if none of these things had been done.”  Moreover, he believed that 
the “Amir’s friendship” was “under any circumstances, such an uncertain quantity in the 
calculation that I would not, for the sake of obtaining it, neglect any measure, which I 
considered of first-rate importance for securing our frontier.”  Lansdowne maintained 
that the Afghan ruler had never really been Britain’s friend, and that there had “been no 
time when we could safely depend upon his good-will,” adding tellingly that, “We have 
been in the habit of addressing him too much in the language with which European 
diplomats are familiar.”186  The Secretary of State’s response, noted Newton, “was not 
particularly reassuring,” as he informed the Viceroy that in his opinion there had been 
“an undervaluing of the importance of a good understanding with the Amir.”187   
This was not to be the only major disagreement between the Viceroy and the new 
Secretary of State.  In December, Lansdowne was brought to the point of threatening 
resignation when Kimberley took steps to overrule the Government of India’s plans to 
bring some uniformity in British India’s numerous provinces with regard to a number of 
offenses that would be subject to trial by jury.  This attempt at reform not surprisingly 
caused outrage, especially in Bengal, where it was determined that capital murder cases 
could no longer be trusted to juries.188     
When the Roberts Mission was finally determined to have fallen through in 
February 1893, the Viceroy resorted to withholding the Amir’s latest shipment of guns 
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and ammunition, to be released only upon receipt of Abdur Rahman’s acceptance of a 
British delegation to Kabul.189  There was also a renewed sense of urgency in getting the 
Amir to accept a mission, because the Russians had recently called on the Afghans to 
relinquish their control of provinces north of the Oxus, and London was anxious to get 
him to comply in order to avoid an even larger conflict.  Abdur Rahman was informed in 
July of the new mission to be led by Durand, which the Amir finally accepted in 
September.  Under the Amir’s special protection, and accompanied by only five officers, 
Durand arrived in Kabul in early October 1893.190   
While Lansdowne believed that Kimberley and the Foreign Secretary, the Earl of 
Rosebery, were not firm enough with regard to “Russian aggression” over the Amir’s 
Trans-Oxus possessions—an appeasing attitude he thought was “more likely to bring 
about a collision” than prevent one—he looked forward to a “great achievement” by 
Durand.191  Ultimately, Lansdowne wrote to Durand that he was willing to pay the Amir 
more money if it would “bring about a good ‘all round’ settlement, one which the Amir 
will accept ungrudgingly, and with the intention of abiding loyally by it,” as then it could 
be “fairly expect[ed] that all the tampering with our tribesman will be put a stop to, and 
that they will fall into their places, under our ‘influence’ or his.”  With this in mind he 
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urged his Foreign Secretary to return home soon having brought back “Peace with 
Honor.”192   
In the two separate agreements that were signed on November 12, 1893, the 
Afghans agreed to relinquish their claims to all lands north of the Oxus, and in the south 
agreed to a definitive border with British India, neither party to interfere with the tribes 
lying on the other side of the Durand Line, as the newly demarcated border was to 
become known.  Moreover, the Amir was promised continued shipments of guns and 
ammunition, while his annual subsidy was increased from 12 to 18 lakhs of rupees.193  
Durand believed that Abdur Rahman had honestly desired a settlement, and it was his 
“deliberate opinion that, though madly jealous of his independence, and by nature very 
suspicious, the Amir is at heart true to the British alliance.”194  This was despite the fact 
that the Afghan ruler had told him directly that he was forever Britain’s friend precisely 
because “The Russians want to attack India—you don’t want to attack Turkistan . . . 
Therefore, the Russians want to come through my country and you do not.”195  
Lansdowne informed Durand that he thought the settlement “a very satisfactory one,” 
although he knew some would view it as “too costly.”196  There was no question, 
however, that the Government of India’s military expenditures during Lansdowne’s five-
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year reign had increased steadily year after year.197  Shortly before leaving India in 
January 1894, the Viceroy declared to Lieutenant-General Henry Brackenbury, Military 
Member of the Viceroy’s Council, that he “hope[d] the Government of India will, now 
that we have come to an understanding with the Amir, find something better than the 
policy of ‘alternate vengeance and inaction’ which Lord Lytton so eloquently 
condemned.”198   
Marc Jason Gilbert has declared that Lansdowne’s reign as Viceroy constituted 
“a watershed in the history of British rule in India,” at least in part because “it was 
during his administration that India’s defense posture on its northwestern border marches 
was placed on a new firm foundation.”199  In this assessment he largely echoed his 
predecessors, Jagannath Prasad Misra and Rajesh Perti, both of whom were inclined to 
see Lansdowne’s policies with regard to Afghanistan and the northwest frontier as 
successful.  While Misra credited the success of the Durand Mission to Lansdowne’s 
“patience and earnestness in coming to terms with the Amir,” Perti argued that 
Lansdowne’s “dogged determination” achieved the safe entry of a British mission to 
Kabul—a feat which had rather conspicuously eluded both Lords Auckland and Lytton.  
Moreover, in Perti’s opinion, the Viceroy’s actions “stalled the Russian plan of 
economic penetration in Afghanistan . . . [and] The latter, in short, remained within the 
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British sphere of influence.”200  Lansdowne’s personal assessment of his policies was 
also positive, and quite probably he would have argued that what had been achieved was 
far more than a stalling action.  In his farewell address, in which the frontier was the 
major focus, he declared that with regard to Afghanistan he trusted that “All these heart-
burnings and jealousies” were “now at an end,” and that his successors would “find in 
His Highness the Amir, who has, during the recent negotiations, evinced the strongest 
desire to arrive at an honourable settlement, and to remove all causes of ill-will between 
his Government and ours, a firm ally and a friendly neighbor, well content to abide 
honourably by the contract to which he has lately become a party.”  Moreover, he 
declared that he was quite optimistic that an agreement with Russia over Afghanistan’s 
northern frontier was forthcoming.201  As evidence of this, in the list of the twelve most 
important questions the new Viceroy would face, that he gave to his successor, Lord 
Elgin, “Russian Frontier Negotiation” ranked only third, while “Relations with 
Afghanistan” had been reduced to next to last.202   
As early as 1895, however, Abdur Rahman was intriguing with the frontier tribes 
on the British side of the Durand Line, doing his best to keep the region in permanent 
disorder.  To this day, the region, now part of Pakistan, is still an area of turmoil and 
subject to tribal authority.  Notwithstanding continued Anglo-Afghan conflict, Russia 
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was not particularly pleased with what appeared to be an even closer relationship 
developing between the Amir and British India, and it had no intention of leaving 
Afghanistan alone.203  The Russian threat to India was in many ways geographically 
determined, incapable of being disposed of through negotiation, and of course Russia did 
finally invade Afghanistan in 1980, thirty-three years after India’s independence.        
Newton asserted that it was “probable that no Viceroy ever welcomed the end of 
his rule with greater enthusiasm” than Lansdowne and that he “looked forward with the 
delight of a schoolboy to his approaching departure.”204  The final letters he wrote to his 
mother from India certainly bear out that assessment.  With three months left before his 
departure, Lansdowne took one last grand tour of British India, this time to Burma.  
Writing to his mother from Mandalay in late November, and realizing that Lord Elgin, 
his successor would be in India in a mere two months, he let loose a “Halleluja!”  A little 
more than a week later while steaming “merrily” down the Upper Irrawaddy River 
toward Bhamo, Lansdowne declared that he hoped “never to be so far from Bowood 
again.”205  At the end of January 1894 he got his wish, and he and his family set sail 
from Calcutta for home. 
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The War Office 
The pure happiness that accompanied Lansdowne’s return to Bowood and his 
beloved Derreen, where he could resume “breeding pigs and planting trees” to his 
heart’s content, also came with a return to financial stability.  This had been 
accomplished through the government subsidized sale under the Irish land acts of a great 
number of his Irish estates.  If the Queen had had her wish, Lansdowne would also have 
been created Duke upon his return, but this was quashed by Gladstone.206  Sadly, little 
more than a year after the Marquis’s return home, his mother passed away.  By his own 
reckoning he had lost not only a mother, but an old friend to whom he told everything, 
“sharing joy and sorrow, sunshine and shade.”207 
In March 1894 Rosebery replaced Gladstone as Prime Minister, but his 
premiership lasted only until the following summer when the Conservatives were 
returned to power.  Lansdowne along with fellow prominent Liberal Unionists such as 
Joseph Chamberlain, and the Duke of Devonshire (formerly Lord Hartington), were 
invited by Salisbury to join what was to be the first Unionist government.  Lansdowne 
had in fact benefited by his long absence from the tumult of domestic politics, and as a 
leading Liberal Unionist he was offered the War Office, which he accepted.  
Unfortunately, it was to be the least successful period of his political career.  Although 
he had previously served as Under-Secretary of State for War, this was his first Cabinet 
post, and he did not handle himself well.  He inherited many difficulties at the War 
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Office which were only exacerbated by events in South Africa.  Nearing the end of his 
term, and in the midst of the Boer War, Salisbury concluded that Lansdowne was “quite 
overdone and the work beyond him.”208 
It cannot be said that Lansdowne’s tenure at the War Office was entirely without 
accomplishment.  When he assumed the post, the Duke of Cambridge was due to retire 
as Commander-in-Chief after nearly forty years in the post.  The opportunity was taken 
to reorganize the command structure by reducing the powers of the Duke’s successor, 
Lord Wolseley, and by creating of a five-member army board to give the War Secretary 
a greater variety of military advice.209  A year and a half later, Lansdowne battled the 
infamous fiscal parsimony of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and won a huge increase in funding for the army.  He still felt compelled to threaten 
resignation, however, because despite his victory he had met stiff resistance in the 
Cabinet, with some members intimating that they would not defend his proposals.210  
Salisbury refused to accept the offer to resign, regarding it as “absurd” considering the 
Cabinet had in the end consented to what the War Secretary had wanted.  He advised 
that in future Lansdowne not expect his colleagues to “accompany” their “submission [to 
his schemes] with a hymn of praise.”211  The marquis consented to remain, admitting 
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that the premier’s logic was superior to his own, “which was,” he confessed, “perhaps 
somewhat distorted by sentiment.”212 
As War Secretary, Lansdowne was preoccupied foremost with events in South 
Africa.  On December 30, 1895, some 500 men of the British South Africa Company 
under the command of Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, the Company’s administrator in 
Bechuanaland, invaded the Transvaal Republic in support of a non-existent uprising by 
the British immigrant miners (Uitlanders) of Johannesburg.  The “Jameson Raid” had 
been launched under the direction of Cecil Rhodes, the Cape Colony premier, and with 
the complicit approval of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, both of whom 
wished to see all of South Africa federated under British rule.  The utter failure and 
scandal of the Raid, however, threatened to postpone that dream forever.213   
Unfortunately for Jameson and his men, the Uitlanders failed to rise up, and the 
filibusterers were quickly forced to surrender.  After being handed over to British 
authorities, Jameson and the five senior officers involved were tried for their actions, 
convicted and then imprisoned in Britain.  Since these senior officers also held 
commissions in the British army or reserves, they were subject to additional punishment 
by the War Office.  It was decided that they would be deprived of their commissions and 
immediately dismissed from the service, and while Lansdowne was in complete 
agreement with the punishment, he consented to let the officers resign instead of being 
turned out.  Real difficulties for the War Secretary began in earnest, however, when 
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interested parties began to question the harshness of the penalty and pressed for 
leniency.  Lansdowne’s reaction to their efforts shows just how much in the dark he 
really was regarding the truth behind the whole episode.214    
The Queen was the first to question Lansdowne as to whether more support 
should have been given to officers like Major Sir J. C. Willoughby, who had received 
fifteen months imprisonment and was now claiming to have been following the orders 
not only of Jameson, but of authorities in London.  Lansdowne assured Her Majesty that 
she “need have no misgivings on the score of loyalty,” noting that the Queen “can 
whenever she is advised to do so, say to any officer, ‘I don’t think you are quite the sort 
of man to suit me and I, therefore, propose to get rid of you: go quietly: if you don’t, I 
will turn you out.’”  Lansdowne admitted that this was “violent but indispensable,” and 
that if proper “legal grounds” were to be required every time a “bad ticket” was to be got 
rid of “the army will come to grief.”  With the officers’ new-found defense, he had little 
sympathy, arguing that “The five officers must make up their minds as to the line which 
they intend to take,” and that even “If they have a defence, (hitherto not put forward) 
which on patriotic grounds they do not desire to put forward they must take the 
consequences.”  That was, he scoffed, if such “attenuating circumstances” as they now 
claimed, really “have any existence at all.”215   
While the Queen had some innate sense of the disloyalty being shown to her 
subjects by the government, the extent of the War Secretary’s ignorance is made clear by 
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his minute in response to a suggestion by the Adjutant General that a final decision on 
the five officers should await a War Office enquiry.  Lansdowne argued that he saw no 
reason for “altering a decision already arrived at,” especially in light of testimony not 
presented at trial.  He was “quite ready to suppose that [Willoughby] may have been 
intentionally or unintentionally misled,” but did “not for a moment suppose that the raid 
was ‘directed by orders from home.’”  He also sincerely doubted the advisability of 
questioning the officers, Balfour and Chamberlain, and then being put in the position of 
attempting to decide “between conflicting statements.”  Conversely, Lansdowne 
observed that so long as the War Office should “follow the finding of the Court,” they 
were “on sound ground.”216        
 In September, Salisbury—who by this time knew of Chamberlain’s complicity in 
the Raid and had decided to support him—reacted to Lansdowne’s minute, writing that 
he found it difficult to justify the officers “being turned out of the army for the offence 
of having believed the word of their superior officers.”  He asked Lansdowne to 
consider, hypothetically of course, that had the government indeed ordered the attack, 
and Willoughby refused to obey because he did not to believe Jameson, and that “in 
consequence a critical operation had failed,” surely the officer would have been “very 
severely and very justly punished.”  Intriguingly, the Prime Minister suggested that 
before any final decision was to be taken on the retirement of the officers in question, 
Chamberlain—against whom, he decried, “monstrous libels” had been “invented” and 
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backed by proof that had “been to a certain extent manufactured”—should be consulted 
to “hear how the matter strikes him.”217 
Lansdowne refused to countenance such artfully crafted excuses, however, 
insisting that “if Willoughby had exercised common prudence, he would have asked 
himself whether an order to invade a friendly state received from an official of the 
[British South Africa] Company was an order to be obeyed as unhesitatingly as if it had 
been given by his military superiors.”218  Twelve days later he added that regardless of 
orders, “it is laid down on the highest military authority, that, even to his military 
superiors, an officer does not of necessity always owe unhesitating obedience (e.g. if he 
were ordered to do a shameful thing).”  As ordered, Lansdowne consulted Chamberlain, 
and unsurprisingly, the Colonial Secretary concurred with the War Office’s 
determination that the officers’ resignations should be immediately accepted.  
Lansdowne was quite pleased to have gotten his way both on the merits of the case, but 
also, as he declared to Salisbury, “because it is within my knowledge that there has been 
something like a conspiracy to procure for these officers treatment more lenient than 
they deserve.”219  On the same day, a slightly more perceptive War Secretary wrote to 
Sir Robert Meade, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office—another who 
was probably aware of the extent of Chamberlain’s involvement in concocting the 
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Raid—that he hoped the whole matter was now concluded, and that any further 
developments might “not prove very troublesome, although when I recollect the kind of 
language which was used before the raid, I can well conceive that there may be some 
incautiously worded documents in existence.”220 
The Jameson Raid inevitably led to an ever deepening distrust between the Boer 
Republics and Britain, which had held a nominal suzerainty over the former since the 
early 1880s.221  Lansdowne’s military advisors now pressed for reinforcements to be sent 
to Cape Colony and Natal, both for defense and as a show of strength.  The military 
believed war with the Transvaal was imminent, since after the Raid the latter would 
surely take the first opportunity to break free of British domination.  Lansdowne rejected 
the request for extra troops, however, thinking it might just lead to war instead of 
prevent one; in this judgment he had the support of the Cabinet.  Nevertheless, a year 
later, as relations between Britain and the president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, 
continued to deteriorate, Lansdowne—always with an eye on fiscal responsibility—
relented but sent only 3,000 men to Natal.  The following year, he yielded to his military 
advisors once again and agreed to push for the purchase of additional transport for South 
Africa.  In August 1899, the War Office dispatched an additional 2,000 men despite the 
fact that both the Cabinet and the military believed that Kruger would eventually back 
down from his anti-English legislation and amassing of armaments.  The only question 
that needed to be answered was how many British troops it would take to intimidate the 
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Boers without accidentally provoking a war.  According to Keith Surridge, the only 
difference between Lansdowne and the soldiers was “one of scale.”  The War Secretary 
preferred “small additions [of troops], complemented by strong words.”222  Lansdowne 
was not blind to the possibility of actual fighting, however, as at some point in late 1898 
or early 1899 in discussions over the Dum Dum bullet, he “negatived” the suggestion 
that the British Army employ “two types of bullet—one for civilized the other for 
barbarian foes.”  He maintained that “Public opinion won’t stand ‘mushrooming’ a 
nigger to an extent which would not be tolerated were the victim clad in a white skin—
moreover it is sometimes just as necessary to stop a rush of white as a rush of coloured 
men.”  Moreover, he noted, “two sorts of ammunition always lead to confusion and 
expense.”223       
By late August 1899, war was almost certain and Salisbury complained to 
Lansdowne that it was most unfortunate that they would have to “act upon a moral field 
prepared for us by [Milner] and his jingo supporters.”  He also made a point, however, of 
complaining about deficiencies in War Office planning, and was forced to point out that 
in his opinion “more departmental drilling is wanted.”224  In early September 
negotiations broke down completely, and the Cabinet authorized sending 10,000 more 
troopers to Natal.  They arrived just in time to meet the surprise Boer invasion in 
October, and by November most were besieged in the town of Ladysmith.  The forces of 
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the Transvaal and Orange Free State, amounting to only 35,000 men at the start of the 
war out of an Afrikaner population of some 220,000, quickly laid siege to the towns of 
Kimberley and Mafeking as well.225          
The rise or fall of Lansdowne’s reputation as War Secretary was in the end going 
to rest with the performance of his generals.  Unfortunately, General Sir Redvers Henry 
Buller, who had only reluctantly accepted command of British forces in South Africa, 
lacked confidence in his own abilities, and less than two months into the war wrote to his 
chief that “Up to date we are hanging on by our eyelids.”226  The general’s telegrams 
were so disturbing that on December 8, Field Marshal Lord Roberts—at the Irish 
Command since 1895—informed Lansdowne that it appeared to him that Buller was 
“overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task imposed upon him,” and that the telegrams 
he had seen caused him “considerable alarm.”  The sixty-seven year-old Field Marshal 
offered to take over supreme command in South Africa, declaring that “A serious 
reverse . . . would endanger the Empire.”227  Lansdowne showed the letter to Salisbury, 
who thought Roberts far too old for such a task.  It had also come a few days prior to the 
onset of the infamous Black Week, therefore Lansdowne informed the Field Marshal 
that while he agreed “as to the gravity of the outlook” and that “Poor [General] Gatacre’s 
disaster makes it more serious still,” “up to the present” Buller had “not made any 
mistake” and thus he did “not see that it would be possible to supersede him merely on 
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account of the gloominess of his views.”  Moreover, Lansdowne had hopes for a 
“brilliant success on the Tugela [River]” in relief of Ladysmith in the next couple of 
days, and believed “that no one [could] say what turn of events may take.”228  Two days 
later, however, Lansdowne confessed to Chamberlain that he was “beginning to despair 
of our generals,” adding: “I had hopes for Gatacre and now!”229 
Unfortunately what followed was the infamous Black Week of the British army 
in South Africa, which saw reversals on all fronts in their efforts to relieve the three 
besieged towns of Kimberley, Mafeking, and Ladysmith.  The culmination was the 
repulse of Buller’s force along the Tugela River at the Battle of Colenso on December 
15, with a loss of 898 men killed or wounded.  Irreparably destroying his reputation, 
following the battle Buller not only suggested to the War Office that Ladysmith ought to 
be let go, but sent a message to the British commander of the town advising surrender on 
the best obtainable terms.230  According to Lansdowne’s own account, when news of the 
defeat reached the War Office on December 15, he immediately met with Balfour and 
Salisbury and suggested that Roberts be appointed as Commander-in-Chief in South 
Africa, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief of Staff.  Roberts was offered the command two 
days later on December 17.  Later that same day Lansdowne also had to inform the Field 
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Marshal that his son had been killed at Colenso.231  Along with Roberts, who arrived in 
South Africa the second week of January, the government now despatched nearly all of 
Britain’s available regular forces.232 
Lansdowne lost all confidence in Buller after the latter’s further defeat at Spion 
Kop in late January 1900, and after Buller, through several long dispatches home, 
attempted to lay the blame for all his troubles on the War Secretary, the two were soon 
openly feuding.  It may be reasonably assumed that this row likely played not some 
small part in the marquis’s subsequent public release of almost all of the Spion Kop 
military dispatches, which put Buller’s competence as a general in serious question.233  
Whether Lansdowne had even gotten Cabinet approval to publish the dispatches was 
also called into question.  Salisbury was of the opinion that the Cabinet had actually 
decided that nothing would be published, and the incident led him to question whether 
the “traditional practice of not recording Cabinet decisions is a wise one.”234  While the 
premier might have feared that Lansdowne would suffer at the hands of an official 
inquiry into the war, nevertheless, he had no qualms about generals justly being blamed 
for their own mistakes and military defeats.235 
For the remainder of his time at the War Office Lansdowne backed Roberts in all 
his actions and requests in order to end the war as soon as possible.  Roberts entered 
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Bloemfontein, the Orange Free State capital, in March 1900, and the state was annexed 
in May, while the capital of the Transvaal, Pretoria, was captured in June, and the South 
African Republic itself was annexed four months later.  As early as April, however, 
elements of the coming guerilla war had begun.  On September 2, Roberts informed 
Lansdowne that in the preceding twenty-four hours two trains had been derailed and 
burnt, “and the war is generally assuming a guerilla aspect.”  To deal with this new 
problem, British forces adopted a scorched-earth policy.  Roberts relayed to Lansdowne 
that in response to guerilla activity “the farms nearest the scene of any attempt to injure 
the line or wreck a train will be burnt, and that all other farms within a radius of 10 miles 
will be completely cleared of all their stock, supplies, &c.”236  At least in its initial stages 
Lansdowne had few complaints of such a harsh policy, and he telegrammed to Roberts 
that he “fully recognize[d] [the] necessity of the vigorous measures which the 
misconduct of the enemy has compelled you to adopt.”237  A month later Lansdowne 
reiterated his stance that “Severe measures are inevitable,” adding, however, that they 
were “in their ultimate result humane as tending to bring the war to a close.”238      
  In late August 1900, when it appeared the war was close to completion and 
major operations had all but ended, Lansdowne offered his resignation once again, this 
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time at least in part to anticipate the subject being raised by others.239  Salisbury again 
demurred—although he waited almost a week to respond—noting that with an election 
quite possibly in the near future, they “must all face it together.”  Moreover, he observed 
that a resignation at this stage “would give the impression that we were falling to 
pieces.”240  The Prime Minister most certainly believed that the work of the War Office 
had overwhelmed Lansdowne, but as he informed the Queen, the “colossal difficulty” in 
advancing reform in that particular office had claimed many victims in the past, of which 
the marquis was merely the latest.241  Reacting positively to reports that Lansdowne was 
in fact to be promoted to Foreign Secretary in the re-elected Unionist government, The 
Times—which had not shied away from openly criticizing his performance as War 
Secretary—concluded simply that it was to the marquis’s great “misfortune that the 
grave defects of organization and training which we have pointed out during many years 
should have been publicly demonstrated during his period in office.”242       
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CHAPTER IV  
IN DEFENSE OF EMPIRE: THE FOREIGN OFFICE 
 
 Following the Unionist victory in the ‘Khaki’ Election in October 1900, 
Salisbury reshuffled the Cabinet.  Lansdowne recognized that many considered his 
performance at the War Office less than stellar, and at age fifty-five he “fully expected 
to be relegated to an uneventful existence at Bowood.”  To his surprise, and to the shock 
and horror of many in his own party, he was promoted to the Foreign Office.  Although 
the steadily increasing work of that office had slowly worn on Salisbury, who served as 
his own Foreign Secretary, Lansdowne believed that the hard work that awaited might 
well be “less trying in many ways” than his current post.  His time at the Foreign Office 
would, by his own reckoning in later years, be the most interesting of his life.  Moreover, 
despite being asked to fill the place of a political giant, it was where Lansdowne left his 
greatest mark upon history.1   
 Those in the Cabinet who desired an adjustment in the course of British foreign 
policy, realized that there would have to be a change at the Foreign Office.  Salisbury 
had lost his wife in 1899 and this had left him even more remote and isolated from all 
but his immediate group of advisors.  At seventy years of age his energy had 
significantly declined while his eyesight continued to fade, and the concern of family 
and his doctors could no longer be ignored.  A lift had even been installed at the Foreign 
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Office so the Prime Minister would no longer have to climb the stairs, and often he could 
no longer remember lifelong friends by sight or even while in conversation with them.  
The Queen and Balfour both sought at the very least to persuade Salisbury to relinquish 
the Foreign Office.  In justification of their actions Balfour pointed out to Aretas Akers-
Douglas, Salisbury’s friend and the former Conservative Chief Whip, that he had had to 
take over the Foreign Office twice in recent years due to his uncle’s ill health.  The 
unwanted job of confronting the Prime Minister, however, was left to Akers-Douglas, 
and to his great relief Salisbury gave in to family pressure without too much of a push.2 
 Salisbury informed the Queen that his only possible successor was Lansdowne.  
In this choice he had Balfour’s support, the latter having assured Akers-Douglas that an 
arrangement that left Salisbury as Prime Minister and the Foreign Office “details” in the 
hands of Lansdowne would not alarm public opinion on the Continent.  The Queen 
acquiesced in the marquis’s appointment, but only after stipulating that all dispatches 
and telegrams were to be seen by Salisbury before being sent out.  Moreover, the new 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary was to be Salisbury’s eldest son, Lord Cranborne; and 
with Lansdowne’s consent, the Prime Minister retained three large reception rooms in 
the Foreign Office.  According to Lord George Hamilton, Salisbury would now spend 
more time in his former department than he had done before, which since at least 1896 
had apparently been no more than one day a week.  The new Foreign Secretary also 
inherited Salisbury’s private secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir B. Eric Barrington.  
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Despite how it may have appeared, with his aristocratic bearing and spotless character 
Lansdowne had always fit comfortably within the ‘Hotel Cecil’, as critics dubbed 
successive Cabinets that were inevitably filled with many of Salisbury’s relatives.3   
It is often noted how well suited Lansdowne was to his new post both in 
temperament and by blood, this despite the Lansdowne family motto, ‘virtute non 
verbis’ (‘by deeds, not words’).  Through his mother, he was reputedly the great 
grandson of Talleyrand, and one suspects that in part based on this old family 
indiscretion, he has since been celebrated as the practitioner, par excellence, of his great-
grandfather’s famous advice to young diplomats: “surtout, messieurs, pas de zèle.”  It 
was Lansdowne’s upbringing, temperament, and experiences in government, however, 
which made him particularly suited for diplomatic work.  Moreover, in his efforts to 
forge a new course in foreign policy he would have the support of Balfour and Joseph 
Chamberlain, as well as the newly appointed first lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, 
and Secretary of State for War, St. John Brodrick.4 
 The commitment of all of the above to a new course sprang from a growing 
awareness that Britain had at some point in the preceding decade passed into a period of 
relative decline.  They all believed that the increasing strength of other great powers, 
particularly Russia, the United States, and Germany, necessitated an adjustment to 
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Salisbury’s preferred policy of the ‘free hand.’  That policy dictated that Britain should 
remain aloof from the great power groupings that had formed in Europe; the Franco-
Russian alliance—the Dual Alliance—which had been formalized in 1894 was the 
greatest perceived threat to British interests at the time.  Thus at Salisbury’s direction, 
Britain would remain a neutral non-aligned power that awaited events and acted only on 
its interests.  In contrast, the pro-alliance faction in the Cabinet, with Chamberlain very 
much in the lead, maintained that continuing as a non-aligned power that only attached 
itself to allies on a temporary basis was no longer a viable or wise course.  Moreover, 
they concluded that an adjustment in foreign policy was the required remedy for the 
newfound inadequacies in imperial defense because financial strain made military 
expansion impossible to contemplate.  Aaron Friedberg has rightly maintained that “It is, 
in fact, impossible to make much sense of British strategy and diplomacy after the turn 
of the century without reference to the presence of a pervasive feeling of fiscal constraint 
and the widespread fear of financial disaster.”5   
 The British Empire reached the zenith of its relative economic and military 
power in the 1860s.  By one estimate, Britain’s share of world manufacturing output in 
1860 was almost twenty percent, roughly equal to the combined output of the United 
States, Russia, and France.  Britain had also managed to achieve such heights with 
minimal expenditure on its armed forces.  It had secured a fair share of the world’s 
landmass largely through complete naval dominance.  In addition, since this 
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accumulation was uncontested by other powers throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, much of the empire could remain informal.  With a rough balance of power 
existing in Europe for much of the nineteenth century, Britain was largely able to avoid 
messy continental entanglements and costly wars.  By 1900 the British had forged the 
greatest empire the world has ever known, encompassing roughly twelve million square 
miles and close to a quarter of the world’s population.6  Gladstone gave faint praise to 
“this little island” that had “conquered, planted, annexed, and appropriated at all the 
points of the compass, so that at few points on the surface of the earth is there not some 
region or some spot of British dominion at hand.”7  
 Highly profitable British investment overseas, ironically, however, helped give 
rise to industrial and military competitors, and because Britain was the world’s foremost 
economic and naval power, the expansion of rival powers in these areas affected it most.  
By 1900 Britain’s share of the world’s manufacturing output had not fallen much, 
remaining at nearly nineteen percent, but the United States’ share alone was now over 
twenty-three percent, while Germany, a unified nation since only 1871, accounted for 
slightly over thirteen percent.  While British industrial output remained steady and in 
some sectors even increased its production, the nation’s overall lead in the production of 
coal, textiles, steel, and machine tools diminished or evaporated.  Moreover, Britain’s 
commitment to ‘Free Trade,’ which had benefited the country when it was the 
unchallenged leader in manufacturing and commercial transport, slowly began to work 
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against its economic lead.  North American and continental European markets 
increasingly established high tariff walls around their domestic markets, while Britain 
imported more and more foreign goods.  Overall, the British economy although 
weakened remained healthy, but the loss of such an immense economic advantage meant 
that the country could no longer hold on to such a wide naval advantage so easily if it 
were challenged.8   
 With the expanding power of rivals also came greater formality in empire.  The 
drawing of boundaries between colonial possessions of the great powers necessitated 
greater attention to the defense of those borders.  Britain’s army and navy estimates in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century increased at a rate greater than almost all the 
other great powers.  The Boer War only added to the strain and exposed the empire’s 
military deficiencies.  To end the conflict—after three long years—had required most of 
Britain’s available ground forces, leaving other areas of the empire, particularly India, 
extremely vulnerable.  The cost of the war, though great, was but one more addition to 
the nation’s growing defense expenditures.  As Hicks Beach made clear in an October 
1901 memorandum, “it is undoubtedly a very serious matter that even if we were free 
from any extra charge for South Africa our ordinary expenditure would still require the 
continuance at a war rate [i.e. 1s 2d] in time of peace of a tax which has always been 
considered our great reserve in time of war.”  Austen Chamberlain, one of Hicks-
Beach’s successors at the Exchequer, would state even more forcefully in 1904 that 
“however reluctant we may be to face the fact, the time has come when we must frankly 
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admit that the financial resources of the United Kingdom are inadequate to do all that we 
should desire in the matter of imperial defense.”9 
 One solution to the problem would have been to increase taxes on Britain’s still 
enormous national wealth in order to keep pace with the military building of the other 
powers.  Indeed, while overall expenditures had been rising, so were revenues gathered 
on the existing tax scale.  According to Friedberg, by 1904 Britain was running a budget 
surplus, even while maintaining increased expenditure for the Army, Navy, and 
domestic programs.  Perception and retrenchment ruled the day, however, and 
unsurprisingly the Conservatives sought to balance the budget using the traditional 
method of cutting spending.  Balfour, for one, was convinced that there was a real limit 
on the amount of money the government could spend on defense.  Writing to the King in 
December 1903, the then Prime Minister admitted that “the demands of the Navy are so 
great & so inevitable . . . The total cost of Imperial Defence threatens to become 
prohibitive.”10 
 If the Conservative leadership was not quite ready to alter traditional fiscal 
policy, traditional military policy did undergo a concealed adaptation to the strategic 
reality.  The Two-Power Standard, first articulated by Foreign Minister Castlereagh in 
1817, stipulated that Britain should maintain a navy at least equal to the navies of the 
next two greatest powers.  In reality, Britain had always sought to maintain a fleet that 
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was even larger than that.  Formalized by Parliament in 1889, the Standard was seen as a 
sign of defensive preparedness specifically against Russia and France.  Its flaw became 
apparent, however, with the growth of other great power navies which it could not 
account for, like those of the United States, Japan, and later Germany.  In 1897 
Lansdowne argued against increasing Britain’s naval strength at Esquimalt, Canada’s 
main Pacific naval base, because it was clear that if the Royal Navy sought to keep pace 
with the naval building of the United States as well as the other powers, “our Naval 
Estimates are likely to be a curiosity before we are much older.”  In November 1901 
Selborne for the second time circulated a memorandum on naval expenditures 
maintaining that the “formula of 1889” was “no longer applicable to present conditions.”  
He proposed that the Standard be revised to consider only first and second-class 
battleships, and to guarantee only the “reasonable certainty of success in a war with 
France and Russia.”  The revision was necessary in part, he argued, because “if the 
United States were to build such a navy as they can well afford, even the two-Power 
standard would become beyond our strength.”  He advised against stating any of this 
publicly however, “because an avowedly lower standard would be misunderstood and 
denounced.”  With the exclusion of expanding powers like the United States, and allies 
such as Japan, reliance on the Two-Power Standard became more myth than reality.11 
 Notwithstanding the truth behind the Two-Power Standard, the Royal Navy 
could not have adequately defended the empire in its entirety regardless of the amount of 
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funds available for the building of new capital ships.  Those of the “Blue Water” School, 
Balfour chief among them, were forced to recognize that conditions had changed.  When 
in November 1906, Alberto Santos Dumont flew his airplane 722 feet through the air, 
Lord Northcliffe declared to his editor at the Daily Mail that the real news was not the 
number of feet that had been flown, but that “England is no longer an island.”  
Moreover, he warned that it meant “the aerial chariots of a foe descending on British soil 
if war comes.”12  For those concerned with imperial defense, however, Britain had long 
ceased to be an island with its corresponding defensive advantages.  The land border of 
British India stretched for hundreds of miles and every year it moved closer and closer to 
advancing Russian railways. 
 The economic importance of India to the Empire was not in doubt.  By the 1880s 
the subcontinent was the destination of nearly twenty percent of British overseas 
investment, and it consumed roughly twenty percent of British exports.  The defense of 
India, however, was problematic.  In a memorandum sent to Lansdowne in December 
1901, Balfour acknowledged that “The weakest spot in the Empire is probably the Indian 
frontier,” adding that “A quarrel with Russia anywhere, or about anything, means the 
invasion of India.”  Moreover, he maintained that “In a war with Russia our military 
resources would be strained to their utmost to protect it, and, while the progress of 
events strengthens the position of Russia for aggressive purposes in this part of the 
world, no corresponding gain is possible on the side of the defence.”  It was a strategic 
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dilemma without any practical solution.  Two years later Balfour instructed his Foreign 
Secretary that “even if India is too big a mouthful for [Russia] to swallow, her statesmen 
believe that if she could secure a position of strategical superiority along our Indian 
frontier we should be so much afraid of her in Asia as to be her very humble servant in 
Europe.”  He confessed that “the result of this is that Russia’s game in the Far East is a 
very much easier one than that which we have to play.”13   
The perceived threat of a Russian invasion had existed in the popular as well as 
the official mind since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was in many respects 
more important than the reality.  Unfortunately for a century of Britain’s leaders, the 
threat of invasion and its use as a Russian diplomatic weapon was too sensitive a subject 
to be ignored.  Given these seemingly immutable ground rules for the so-called ‘Great 
Game’ that Russia and Britain were playing in Central Asia, Balfour did his best to 
ignore the intractability of the problem and do only what could be done.  One can detect 
the sober shadow of the uncle trailing the nephew in the latter’s reaction to George 
Curzon’s proposal made at the conclusion of the First World War that Britain should 
seek a British mandate in the Caucasus, an alliance with Persia, and a revised Afghan-
Russian border so that India might be adequately protected.  Balfour observed that every 
five years or so he was told that “there is a new sphere which we have got to guard, 
which is supposed to protect the gateways of India,” but “Those gateways are getting 
further and further from India, and I do not know how far west they are going to be 
brought.”  Decades before, when a member of the Lords had declared his fear that a 
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Russian invasion of India might well take place in a week’s time, Salisbury had advised 
him to “use a larger map.”14                  
 The other remedy open to the government in answer to the fiscal strain of 
imperial defense was to abandon Britain’s policy of non-alignment and seek help in 
bearing the burden of the empire’s defense.  Beyond asking for greater assistance from 
the colonies in their own defense, it was believed by the Chamberlain-led faction that an 
alliance with one of the existing great powers might alleviate the empire’s newfound 
vulnerabilities and deter any future combination against Britain.  It was toward this goal 
that a formidable majority formed in the Cabinet in opposition to Salisbury’s seemingly 
outmoded belief that Britain’s permanent interests could be defended without assistance.  
As part of that majority, Lansdowne recognized that Britain’s “S[outh] African 
entanglements make it impossible for us to commit ourselves to a policy which might 
involve us in a war, unless we can assure ourselves that any obligation which we might 
incur would be shared by another Power.”15  Such a statement, however, is misleading in 
that it makes it appear that Lansdowne was willing to act on ‘balance of power’ 
considerations alone.  Lansdowne never initiated talks for the conclusion of an alliance 
during his tenure at the Foreign Office; he was always reacting to the approaches of 
other nations.  With one or two exceptions, the same could be said of lesser ententes.  He 
welcomed the chance to achieve lasting peace when the opportunity presented itself, and 
pursued agreements with the sense—which all too often bordered on conviction—that 
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any future wars contemplated in those agreements could in fact never take place.  Within 
the pro-alliance faction he stood virtually alone in his liberal faith that diplomacy 
itself—the ‘policy of the entente’—might solve outstanding disputes, secure peace, and 
preserve the Empire.  Indeed, the most marked differences between the foreign policies 
of Salisbury and Lansdowne was the latter’s conviction that British power was no longer 
capable of preserving the empire alone, and his belief in the efficacy of diplomacy to 
alleviate that condition by means of enduring settlements of outstanding disputes.16 
 Before the new Foreign Secretary even officially took over his new post he made 
a point of sending a private letter to Sir Frank Lascelles, British Ambassador at Berlin 
since 1895.  Writing from the Prince of Wales’s country house at Sandringham, 
Lansdowne disclosed that he would take up the duties of his new position “without, I 
hope, too many preconceived ideas, but I plead guilty to one = the idea that we should 
use every effort to maintain &, if we can, to strengthen, the good relations which at 
present exist between the Queen’s Govt. & that of the Emperor.”  In the marquis, 
Lascelles was happy to find a fellow “optimist” with regard to Anglo-German relations.  
What would end up most striking in Lansdowne’s self-declared quest for a “complete 
                                                 
16 Paul Kennedy attributes the “assumption” that “diplomacy could solve most problems that arose in 
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different and much more persuasive note when he argued that Salisbury “took a realistic view of what 
could be and what could not be achieved by diplomacy” (Grenville, Lord Salisbury, p. 16).  
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understanding” between the two powers, was his sanguine persistence in the effort years 
after most others had given up.17 
 It is all the more remarkable—or quite possibly the inverse—because Lansdowne 
arrived rather late on the scene in what was an ongoing effort.  He would find, however, 
that the impediments to the conclusion of an Anglo-German understanding would be the 
same that frustrated those who had made the attempt before him.  The three most 
prominent obstacles were Salisbury’s belief that the government of a parliamentary 
democracy could not and so should not commit a future government to war, an ever-
present and escalating antagonism between the two peoples, and the German demand 
that Britain join the Triple Alliance.  When faced with the first obstacle, those in favor of 
a new course were willing to break with tradition, and they readily believed that the 
second could be overcome no matter how frustrating its effect sometimes proved to be.  
The last barrier proved insurmountable to all, and was best symbolized by Salisbury’s 
famous retort during negotiations in 1898 to German Ambassador Count Paul von 
Hatzfeldt; “you ask for too much for your friendship.”18 
Salisbury was not above working with or leaning towards the Triple Alliance 
when it suited British interests, but sensitive to public sentiment, he could not foresee a 
day when Britain would join with Germany on a more permanent level.  In response to a 
                                                 
17 Lansdowne to Lascelles, November 11, 1900 (the index for the file identifies this letter as sent on 
November 12, but the letter itself is clearly dated November 11), PRO FO 800/128; Lascelles to 
Lansdowne, November 17, 1900, PRO FO 800/128; Lansdowne to Lascelles, August 28, 1901, PRO FO 
800/128. 
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German overture in 1890, for example, Salisbury willingly struck a bargain whereby 
Germany relinquished its claims to disputed lands in Africa in exchange for the small 
island of Heligoland in the North Sea.  What the Prime Minister refused to do, however, 
was allow Germany to gain hegemonic power in Europe by securing British adherence 
to the Triple Alliance.  Given such diplomatic and strategic backing the Kaiser would 
have been able to intimidate the French at will.  In order to draw Britain into the Triple 
Alliance, over the next two decades some in Germany’s leadership embarked on the 
seemingly counter-intuitive policy of surreptitiously frustrating and disrupting British 
foreign policy whenever possible in the hope that this would force Britain to come 
calling in search of a powerful ally.  In the recklessness of that policy, approved and 
carried out by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his hand-picked advisors, lay much of the reason 
for the Great War.19 
 For many within Britain’s leadership Germany was indeed the ‘natural ally.’  The 
pro-alliance faction led by Chamberlain doubled as the pro-German alliance group.  
Convinced that the key to Britain’s future economic strength—upon which its military 
power would rest—lay in fair access to the China trade, Chamberlain ranged outside his 
portfolio at the Colonial Office and into foreign affairs.  He fervently believed that an 
alliance with Germany in the Far East would serve British needs both by protecting the 
Open Door in China, and providing a barrier to further Russian encroachment.  In late 
March 1898, with Salisbury ill and convalescing in France and the Foreign Office left in 
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the hands of Balfour, Chamberlain met informally with Hatzfeldt and openly told him 
that Britain had no choice but to abandon its isolation.  He then abruptly put forward the 
idea of an alliance.  With the primary focus of such an alliance being the defense of 
northern China against Russia, the Germans demurred.  They understandably did not 
believe it worth provoking Russia with whom they shared a long European border.  
Though Balfour also favored an Anglo-German agreement of some kind and had not 
stopped his colleague from pursuing it, he informed Salisbury that Chamberlain had 
been “very impulsive” and “went far in the expression of his own personal leaning 
towards a German alliance.”  On first hearing of the event, Salisbury had declared that 
“The one object of the German Emperor since he has been on the throne has been to get 
us into a war with France,” and added that he never could make up his mind however if 
that was indeed Chamberlain’s object too.  The Prime Minister was certain that Germany 
would blackmail Britain heavily for its friendship.  As it turned out he need not have 
worried because Hatzfeldt thought Chamberlain untrustworthy, and even the Kaiser 
understood that an Anglo-German Alliance in the Far East was far from desirable for 
Germany.20                                                 
 After he returned from France, Salisbury gave a speech on May 4 before the 
Conservative Primrose League in which he made clear that in his view Britain was not 
so desperately in need of friends that it should play the role of supplicant seeking aid.  
He declared to those assembled at Albert Hall that “upon the sea we fear no opponent” 
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and that it was known to all in attendance that in defense of the empire “we shall 
maintain against all comers that which we possess, and we know, in spite of the jargon 
about isolation, that we are amply competent to do so.”  He did not dispute that there 
were further trials ahead, but did not put his faith either in alliances or diplomacy to 
secure the peace of the world.21 
 If the premier’s speech was in part meant to put an end to Chamberlain’s efforts 
to establish a new course in foreign policy, then it failed.  A little more than a week later 
at the annual meeting of the grand committee of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist 
Association, and without consulting Salisbury or the Cabinet, Chamberlain openly 
challenged Britain’s policy of isolation.  He declared that “for some time past” there has 
been “a combined assault by the nations of the world upon the commercial supremacy of 
this country, and if that assault were successful our existence would be menaced in a 
way in which it never has been threatened since the time” of Napoleon.  He argued that 
while Britain’s isolation during the preceding fifty years might have proved salutary, a 
“new situation” had now arisen where all the great powers of Europe had made alliances.  
Moreover, as long as Britain remained outside of those alliances and was “envied by all 
and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another 
conflict with the interests of all,” Chamberlain warned that the nation was “liable to be 
confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even 
the most extreme, the most hotheaded politician would be able to contemplate it without 
a certain sense of uneasiness.”  The remedy to such a threat, he asserted, was to be found 
                                                 
21 Salisbury’s speech before the Primrose League on May 4, 1898, The Times, May 5, 1898, p. 7.  
Salisbury was Grand Master of the League. 
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in closer ties within the empire, maintaining “bonds of permanent amity with our 
kinsmen across the Atlantic—he went so far as to suggest a future “Anglo-Saxon 
alliance”—and an end to isolation.  Above all else, Chamberlain believed that a change 
was necessary in order that Britain be allowed a say in the fate of China.  He declared 
that British “interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous, 
and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic that I feel that no more vital question 
has ever been presented for the decision of a Government and the decision of a nation.”  
In order to protect British interests and enforce the Open Door he argued that “we must 
not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most nearly 
approximate to our own.”  It said something of the difficulty of his task that 
Chamberlain felt free to mention America by name as he was assured of loud cheers, but 
neglected specifically to mention Germany.  Salisbury was forced to dodge questions 
concerning Chamberlain’s defiance, and the Kaiser, from whom Chamberlain had hoped 
for a positive response, thought the speech unfortunate.22  
 Nevertheless, Chamberlain persisted in his efforts and in June held a meeting at 
his house in Prince’s Gardens of those Cabinet ministers who favored a German alliance.  
Among those who participated were Selborne and Lascelles, who was on leave from 
Berlin, but there is no evidence that Balfour or Lansdowne were present or were even 
asked to attend.  When Salisbury fell ill in August and once again left for the south of 
France, Lascelles approached the Kaiser with the offer of an Anglo-German alliance 
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which he disclosed had been proposed by Chamberlain and had the support of many in 
the Cabinet.  The alliance proposal he put forward was defensive in nature and would 
have only come into effect if either Britain or Germany were attacked by two powers.  
The Emperor appeared interested, but the possibility of future negotiations on the 
proposal were quickly put paid by Bernhard von Bülow, Germany’s influential Foreign 
Minister and soon to be Chancellor.23   
 The two countries did eventually sign a convention in August of 1898, but it 
concerned the future disposition of Portugal’s African colonies should that country 
default on a joint Anglo-German loan.  After the Germans had insisted on interposing on 
Anglo-Portuguese loan negotiations, the pro-alliance faction within the Cabinet forced 
Salisbury to negotiate.  When he fell ill again, however, it was left to Balfour to 
negotiate the final treaty while the Prime Minister was out of the country.  It was 
presented to Salisbury upon his return as “a fait accompli.”  Among the more interesting 
elements, the Treaty included the fact that by the time it had been signed the Portuguese 
had rescinded their request for a loan.  Nevertheless, the Germans insisted on continuing 
negotiations.  The treaty’s secret clause therefore laid out the lines of partition between 
Germany and Britain of Portugal’s African colonies should the latter default on any 
future joint loan.  Balfour signed the treaty in order to improve Anglo-German relations, 
but at the same time had warned the Germans that Britain had no intention of forcing a 
loan on the Portuguese.  This was reinforced the following year when Britain signed a 
new agreement with the Portuguese that reaffirmed its seventeenth-century pledge to 
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defend Portugal proper and her colonies against all enemies.24  The agreement was kept 
secret at Portugal’s request, but the resentment, even betrayal, that the Germans 
subsequently felt when they finally realized they would not soon be gaining new African 
colonies, though entirely unintended, was certainly predictable. 
 When the German Emperor visited Windsor in November 1899 Chamberlain 
again renewed his quest for an Anglo-German alliance.  During a personal meeting with 
the Emperor—it was the first time they had ever met—the Colonial Secretary proposed a 
three-power understanding between Britain, Germany, and the United States.  This time, 
however, it was the Emperor who reminded Chamberlain of Britain’s diplomatic 
tradition against any permanent alliances.  He added as well that he did not wish to 
antagonize Russia.  Chamberlain refused to let it drop, however, and one day after the 
Emperor’s departure gave a speech at Leicester in which he again challenged the 
advisability of British isolation in Europe.  He declared that he looked forward to the 
conclusion of the self-evident “natural alliance” between Britain and Germany, and 
echoing what he had already proposed to the Kaiser, he called for “a new Triple Alliance 
between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.”  These 
three races, he reminded his audience, shared a system of justice, a literature, as well as a 
language of common origin, and urged them to disregard the antagonism that existed in 
the foreign press.  What he foresaw, he declared, would be more than just an alliance of 
paper, it would be an understanding based upon the “sentiment” that bound these 
respective peoples and existed “in the minds of the statesmen of the respective 
                                                 
24 Ibid., pp. 194-197; “Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration, October 14, 1899”, BD I no.118. 
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countries.”  The speech was not well received in the United States or in Germany.  In 
fact, in order to remain within the mainstream of German public opinion Bülow publicly 
attacked the speech, leaving Chamberlain shocked and resentful.25       
            Although his enthusiasm was dampened for a while, when in September 1900 the 
Emperor let it be known that Germany would back a British initiative to support 
formally the Open Door in China if it chose to make such a policy move, Chamberlain 
pushed Salisbury to action yet again.  In his memorandum of September 10 the Colonial 
Secretary pressed the need to “encourage good relations between ourselves and 
Germany, as well as between ourselves and Japan and the United States.”  With that in 
mind he argued that the clear policy choice was to “endeavor to make use of the present 
opportunity to emphasize the breach between Russia and Germany and Russia and 
Japan.”  On this occasion Chamberlain had also secured the support of Balfour and 
Lansdowne, and they all now hoped to drive a wedge between Germany and Russia over 
the latter’s ambitions in Manchuria.  The whole episode, filled as it was with 
misunderstanding and feelings of betrayal, deserves more scrutiny because of both the 
bitterness it instilled in Chamberlain and the fact that it was not Salisbury but 
Lansdowne—as the newly installed Foreign Secretary—who would be forced to unearth 
and explain the actions of the government to Parliament.26 
The Kaiser’s overture had come in late August by way of Lascelles who had 
accompanied the Prince of Wales on a visit to Germany.  While the King was with the 
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Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe their conversation turned to the idea of cooperation in China.  
According to Lascelles’s initial report of the meeting, the Kaiser expressed that 
Germany, like Britain, feared Russia’s intentions in North China and Manchuria now 
that—as a result of the Boxer Rebellion—there were Russian troops occupying the 
region.  The Emperor suggested that a formal declaration of the Open Door in the 
Yangtze valley, Britain’s sphere of economic interest, would do much to dispel the 
suspicions of other powers that England meant to close the area to outside trade.  These 
suspicions had supposedly been sparked by recent British troop landings in Shanghai.  
Were a formal declaration to be made, the Kaiser assured Lascelles, the British “would 
find the German Government on their side.”  German motivations in this were actually 
two-fold as they also wished in proposing an Anglo-German Far Eastern agreement to 
prevent Britain from concluding an agreement with the Dual Alliance.  What followed, 
however, was a comedy of misunderstandings.27   
The Emperor had apparently failed to offer his suggestion as a definite proposal 
to be forwarded by Lascelles to Salisbury.  In fact, the Ambassador had explicitly 
expressed in his report that he had little faith in the effectiveness of such declarations.  
Inexplicably, a week later Lascelles informed the Prime Minister that the Emperor was 
anxiously awaiting a response to his overtures regarding Chinese affairs, to which 
Salisbury replied that he had received no such proposals.  Two weeks later Lascelles 
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himself denied that “any definitive proposals which could be considered overtures” had 
in fact been made.28   
 When the German ‘non-proposal’ was finally clarified, Francis Bertie, Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in charge of the Far Eastern Department, correctly 
pointed out that the Emperor’s proposal only amounted to a concession by Britain of the 
Open Door in the British Yangtze Valley, but not in German Shantung.  The Prime 
Minister replied that the Emperor’s “observations look very much like an attempt to 
make a quarrel between France and us.”  Salisbury was always skeptical of such vague 
proposals, and what is more, a month after the Chamberlain memorandum he declared to 
Lord Curzon that his faith in Germany was “infinitesimal.”  Pointing out that Germany 
lived in “mortal terror on account of that long undefended frontier of hers on the Russian 
side,” he maintained that they “will therefore never stand by us against Russia.”  As 
always, he argued, they are “rather inclined to curry favour with Russia by throwing us 
over.”  Forced by a majority in the Cabinet, however, Salisbury agreed to hold talks with 
Germany on a possible joint declaration.  Grenville judged the “naïvety” of the pro-
alliance ministers “extraordinary.”29   
Salisbury’s cynicism proved correct.  In his initial talks with Hatzfeldt, one of the 
few treaties that the Prime Minister personally negotiated, Salisbury quickly found, as 
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suspected, that while the German proposal stipulated an Open Door in the Yangtze it 
conspicuously left out the rest of China.  The British counter proposal thus referred to all 
of China, and renounced any territorial ambitions in that country by either country.  
Hatzfeldt informed Salisbury that the German government could not consent to anything 
that would be seen as pressuring Russia, especially concerning Port Arthur and the Amur 
River, which of course was exactly what the British had been hoping for.  Salisbury was 
forced, therefore, to settle for an addition to the first clause of the agreement that 
committed both powers to uphold free and open trade for all nationalities on the rivers 
and ports of China and to “uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can 
exercise influence.”  From this it would appear that all concerned should have known 
that the agreement did not cover Manchuria.  Moreover, shortly before the Anglo-
German Agreement was signed in October 1900, Salisbury openly declared to Hatzfeldt 
that he was “not very much in love with this agreement” because it was “liable to so 
much misunderstanding.”  The facts as presented correspond well with the current 
historical consensus as reflected in Ian Nish’s contention that the “one-sided 
arrangement” left the pro-alliance group “disheartened” and Salisbury unsurprised, but 
both contentions in this assessment require some further consideration.30     
When the Yangtze Agreement—as it was also called—was publicized and other 
powers were invited to adhere to it, the Russians immediately seized on the “exercise of 
influence” clause as evidence that the Open Door feature applied exclusively to the 
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spheres of influence of both powers.  They therefore, under this reading of the text, 
publicly agreed to it in principle.  While perhaps unsurprised but certainly not pleased, 
Salisbury immediately sent a telegram to the British Minister in St. Petersburg, Charles 
Hardinge, to notify him that the Russian translation of the document had “modified the 
sense of it.” The agreement, he maintained, actually extended to the “whole of the 
Chinese Empire so far as the two Powers can exercise influence.”31 
 It was following this apparent diplomatic success that the Emperor made his 
famous and unexpected trip to England in early 1901 to attend the bedside of his ailing 
‘Grandmamma.’  After nearly sixty-four years on the throne, Queen Victoria died in the 
early evening of January 22.  The Emperor’s presence allowed the primary shapers of 
British foreign policy another opportunity to meet personally with His Imperial Majesty.  
Salisbury had been unable to meet with the Kaiser during his previous visit in the fall of 
1899, and had always held a rather negative opinion of the Emperor.  The feeling was 
mutual.  The Emperor blamed Salisbury for the failure of previous attempts to conclude 
an Anglo-German alliance, while the Prime Minister believed the Emperor to be not 
quite “all there.”  There was more than a little truth in the Kaiser’s complaints, as 
Salisbury’s attitude toward the kind of open commitment inherent in any defensive 
alliance had never and would never change.  In December of the previous year the 
premier had noted for Lansdowne’s benefit that when in the past he had received 
complaints from Hatzfeldt over England’s reluctance to commit, his answer “always was 
that England never gives assurances of unconditional support . . . [and] consent in any 
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future war will depend largely on the casus belli.”  Moreover, he added that “As that 
cannot be foreseen—so neither can our attitude be foreseen.”  Regardless, Salisbury’s 
faith in Germany was, as noted earlier, “infinitesimal,” and this made his support of any 
broader alliance unlikely in any circumstance.  His faith in the German Emperor counted 
for even less.32   
Salisbury was so uneasy about the Kaiser’s influence on German foreign policy 
that he maintained that the Franco-Russian alliance actually furthered peace in Europe as 
it was a “decided check” on the Emperor, and the premier was quite happy to see the 
latter “hobbled.”  Still, during the dispute over the partition of the Samoan Islands in 
1899 between the United States, Britain, and Germany, Salisbury was “puzzled” to 
discover by way of the British Military Attaché in Berlin that the Emperor considered 
him “his enemy.”  He complained to Lascelles that it was “a great nuisance that one of 
the main factors in the European calculation should be so ultra-human . . . He is as 
jealous as a woman.”  Chamberlain’s meeting with the Emperor, as recollected by his 
son Austen years later, did not augur well for Anglo-German relations either.  When the 
Kaiser asked for the Colonial Secretary’s opinion of Chancellor Bülow, after making 
sure the Emperor wanted his true opinion, Chamberlain reportedly replied, “I think he is 
not a good man to go tiger-shooting with!”33 
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   All that exists in the British records to brief us on Lansdowne’s meeting with 
the Emperor are the Foreign Secretary’s notes of their conversation, intended only to 
recount the views of His Imperial Majesty.  Grenville adjudged it “an Imperial lecture on 
world history,” and that appears to be well-judged:34   
Antagonism between Europe Germanic v. Asiatic + America. 
 
Don’t talk of the Continent of Europe.  Russia is really Asiatic. 
 
In 1900 there was a Russo+French proposal for intervention.  He 
telegraphed to Bulow to refuse. 
 
(He was) On his way to swear recruits at Wilhelmshaven. 
 
The Russian Emperor fit to live in a country house and rear turnips. 
Only way to deal with him is to be the last to leave the room. 
 
French bitterly disappointed with Russia and with Russian Emperor.  No 
real love between the two countries. 
 
Russian Grand Duke like Paris and a girl on each knee. 
 
Russia bankrupt.  Will get the money she wants in Wall Street. 
 
U.S. hates us and will go in with Russia. 
 
Russia wants to direct U.S. enterprise towards the Yangtse.35   
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The Emperor’s summary of world affairs bordered on the juvenile, veering as it did 
between vulgar gossip and ridiculously transparent attempts to manipulate through fear-
mongering.  If Lansdowne came away from the meeting with any sense of what 
Salisbury had concluded about the Kaiser over a decade before, however, it was barely 
beyond its inception.  The Emperor believed “he had made a visible impression” on the 
Foreign Secretary, while Lansdowne was quite pleased with the “good impression” left 
by the Emperor’s visit.  He felt that His Imperial Majesty’s spontaneous and self-
effacing actions had “appealed to the public mind, which in spite of all our professions 
to the contrary is full of sentiment & easily touched.”36  At that moment, he was not 
entirely wrong.  It has been argued that as a rule Lansdowne ignored—or at least failed 
to take adequate consideration of—public sentiment, but this can be slightly misleading 
as the Foreign Secretary actually often remarked on the state of public opinion in his 
writings.  He never willingly deferred to public opinion, however, or let it drive his 
foreign policy, and in some respects that distinguished him from Salisbury.  When the 
unreasoned opinions of the British public threatened his policies, however, he could 
react with marked exasperation and an incredulousness that can surprise the scholar.   
 Salisbury was right, of course, in his mistrust of German motivations.  Although 
men like Hatzfeldt were unquestionably genuine in their desire for an Anglo-German 
alliance, German Foreign policy since 1897 was under the direction of Bülow, first as 
Foreign Minister (1897-1900) and then Chancellor (1900-1909).  He had been picked by 
his old friend the Emperor to carry out a policy of naval expansion and increased 
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German influence on the world stage.  Like most of Europe’s political elite the Kaiser 
was a great admirer of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and unlike most was in a 
position put them into effect.  Bülow’s foreign policy of imperialist Weltpolitik was 
intimately connected to German internal politics and the need as he put it to “reconcile, 
pacify, rally” and “unite” the German public.  This would be accomplished by exploiting 
the populist nature of the Emperor’s personal rule, and by touting even the smallest 
material, colonial, or diplomatic gain as a glorious victory for the Reich.  The policy also 
required, however, that Germany maintain its own ‘free hand’ in foreign policy and 
avoid moving too close to Britain lest Germany’s destiny be circumscribed by a 
precipitously concluded Anglo-German alliance.  German greatness would of course 
eventually necessitate British diminution, therefore an alliance would be problematic.  
Nevertheless, Bülow did not want to antagonize Britain needlessly either, at least until 
naval expansion was complete.37  Under the Chancellor’s direction Germany would play 
the role of neutral arbiter while awaiting the inevitable Anglo-Russian war, and such a 
war was not unimaginable.                
The First Manchurian Crisis began in January 1901 as it appeared that Russia 
was pressing China to sign a treaty that would have made Manchuria a virtual Russian 
protectorate.  With Japan forcing the matter to the forefront of international attention, the 
Anglo-German Agreement would be put to the test after only three months.  The 
Japanese had openly adhered to the Yangtze Agreement after it was signed, but did so 
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under the same assumptions and with the same intentions that had motivated the British.  
In addition to forestalling Russian ambitions in Manchuria, they also hoped it might with 
fortune succeed in detaching the Germans from Russia in the Far East.  Understandably 
they now looked to Britain and Germany for support over the rumored Sino-Russian 
agreement.  In February the Japanese proposed that Britain guarantee China support if 
Russia attempted to appropriate bits of Manchuria, but Lansdowne thought a guarantee 
to China too risky.  Moreover, he believed the Yangtze Agreement was for the moment 
sufficient.  Improbably, Salisbury put forward the idea of a joint arrangement with the 
Japanese to defend the Chinese coastline against intrusion.  The Prime Minister was 
never above making temporary arrangements to protect or further British interests, but 
Nish goes too far in arguing that Salisbury’s suggestion was “in embryo . . . the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance,” but that it was just not pursued at the time.38  Any agreement would 
have certainly embodied something much less than the eventual Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, and it also seems a significant point that the Prime Minister chose not to pursue 
it. 
In early March, in response to further Japanese enquiries as to where Germany 
and Britain really stood if the dispute over Manchuria should boil over, Lansdowne had 
Bertie draw up a draft declaration to be jointly made by Britain and Germany.  The 
declaration would have committed both nations to neutrality in the event of hostilities 
between Russia and Japan, but have required joint naval intervention if Russia should be 
joined by a second power.  While having more in common with the eventual Anglo-
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Japanese agreement than Salisbury’s earlier proposal, Lansdowne had put forward the 
idea of a joint declaration as an attempt to draw Germany out.  It was also to be kept 
secret.  Circulated and then considered at a March 13 Cabinet, the proposal gained the 
support of several members, but as the Prime Minister explained to the King, no action 
could be taken on “such an alliance” (as Salisbury termed it) with Germany’s likely 
response unknown.39 
 Notwithstanding Britain’s failure to support Japan, Russia dropped its 
negotiations with China in April having achieved nothing.  This was due in large part to 
Japanese resistance and their efforts to rally the other great powers to action.  The other 
major consequence of the crisis was that it had forced Germany to clarify to the world, 
and Russia in particular, their interpretation of the Yangtze Agreement.  On March 15 
Bülow declared in the Reichstag that the agreement, “was in no sense concerned with 
Manchuria,” and that “the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to 
Germany.”  This came as a surprise to Lansdowne who the very next day in a letter to 
Sir Claude MacDonald, British Minister at Tokyo, brought up the previous 
misunderstanding the government had had with the Russians over the exact meaning of 
“exercise influence.”  Lansdowne also wrote to Lascelles asking if Bülow’s speech had 
been correctly reported in the press, and reiterated that Britain did in fact believe the 
agreement pertained to Manchuria.  The Foreign Secretary was afraid of a public 
disagreement over the meaning of the agreement and the damage it potentially could do.  
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Lascelles confirmed Lansdowne’s fears as to Bülow’s speech, and added that he was 
“convinced that [the] German Government always understood that the words ‘as far as 
they can exercise influence’ were inserted for the purpose of excluding Manchuria from 
the agreement.”  Moreover, Lascelles referred back to the original negotiations between 
Salisbury and Hatzfeldt, noting the latter’s objection to Port Arthur and the Amur River 
being included in the agreement.40   
On the March 28 Lansdowne was forced to admit in the Lords that the Germans 
had in fact let it be known during negotiations that Manchuria was not a place where 
they “exercised influence,” needlessly pointing out to his fellow peers that the latter term 
was a “somewhat elastic expression.”  He asked their lordships, however, whether or not 
the dispute was “really a very material one,” because Germany along with the other 
powers had already declared as matter of policy that they desired to maintain Chinese 
territorial integrity.  In conclusion, he argued that “it surely does not very much matter to 
us whether Germany has arrived at the conclusion by a consideration of the Anglo-
German Agreement or whether she has been led to it by considerations of general 
policy.”  This was a rather cleverly turned argument unless one considers that in 
actuality and with sincerity the Foreign Secretary was maintaining that the Yangtze 
Agreement was still to be considered meaningful.  He explained that while the 
government would always “strive to uphold the interests of the country” and “certainly 
be tenacious in matters of principle,” “in matters of detail we recognise that we must not 
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expect always to have our own way.”  Balfour thought the statement “admirable” and 
that it left “nothing to be desired,” except perhaps some added emphasis that Britain 
would not acquiesce to Russia over the Open Door as it might appear she had done over 
other issues in Manchuria.  Unsurprisingly, it also received a favorable response in 
Berlin.  A couple of days later Lansdowne remarked to Lascelles that he had done his 
“best to minimize the importance of our differences, and to show that we were really 
shoulder to shoulder,” but the German Government had not made it easy by its “extreme 
frankness.”  He also admitted that “Lord Salisbury’s illness made it impossible for me to 
obtain final instructions from him, but of course the evidence to show that Germany had 
never regarded [Clause 1] of the A. G. Agreement as applicable to Manchuria was 
overwhelming.”41 
 The Manchurian Crisis has raised many questions concerning Lansdowne’s 
motivations that in turn have suggested to a few that some hidden calculation was at 
work.  Grenville has argued that Lansdowne—along with the rest of the government—
did not really care much about the fate of Manchuria, but he then found himself “at a 
loss to explain such an extraordinary alteration of policy” when in March the Foreign 
Secretary informed the Cabinet that there existed a grave crisis.  He concluded that 
Lansdowne’s policy must have turned on some greater issue or long-term scheme, such 
as fear of a possible Russo-Japanese clash or more probably that he saw in the crisis a 
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chance to bring Britain and Germany together.  More recently, and contributing to the 
sense of calculation, Avner Cohen has argued that Lansdowne had no intention of 
ramming Russia’s “head against the Manchurian wall” because he had recognized that 
the Yangtze Agreement did not cover Manchuria.  Cohen asserted that unlike the rest of 
the Cabinet, Chamberlain in particular, Lansdowne was not surprised or upset at 
Germany’s statement on Manchuria because his chief concern was to avoid upsetting 
closer relations in the future.  As L. K. Young—upon whom Cohen largely relied—
stated, Lansdowne’s “chief concern was not that Russian appropriations in Manchuria 
should be resisted, but that, through the vigorous insistence of Japan, the Anglo-German 
Agreement should not be called to the fore and put to a strain which the alignment could 
not stand.”42  
It is clear from the dispatches, however, that Lansdowne was surprised at the 
German interpretation of the treaty.  Moreover, the records of Salisbury’s negotiations 
were unearthed to reaffirm the government’s position.43  While Lansdowne’s letter to 
Salisbury on January 15, 1901, supports Grenville, Young, and Cohen, in where he 
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noted that his “general feeling” was “that for the present we must show as few signs as 
possible of being ‘fussy’ about small matters in China,” there is a problem in that the 
narrative omits notice of the way in which the perceived danger of the rumored Sino-
Russian convention evolved over the early weeks and months of 1901.  No one had an 
official text of the treaty—all that existed was informed rumor in the newspapers—and 
thus Salisbury replied that “We know little on which we can rely as to the terms of the 
convention.”  As various unofficial versions were published in the press over the next 
month or so Lansdowne’s concerns grew.  In a Cabinet memorandum of March 1, 
Lansdowne warned that despite assurances from St. Petersburg, it appeared that Russia 
now intended to create a protectorate over the whole of Manchuria which went far 
beyond the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1898, which had merely parceled out railway 
concessions.  If force was out of the question, the Foreign Secretary believed a protest 
was in order.  He expressed to Russia’s representatives that what he had seen and heard 
appeared to involve “much more” than the “provisional and temporary arrangement for 
the purpose of preventing the recurrence of the recent disturbances and of protecting the 
railway.”  He said as much in the House of Lords on March 28.44   
In light of this background, Lansdowne’s reaction to Bülow’s speech of March 
15 makes more sense.  Indeed, at the risk of furthering an argument which might appear 
contrary to the central thesis of this essay, it seems more precise to argue that 
Lansdowne did what he could to avoid a public rupture with Germany, but that that aim 
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did not direct his actions above all other concerns.  His was not a single-minded 
pragmatic policy concerned solely with keeping the possibility of an Anglo-German 
alliance alive.  Lansdowne did not push ahead in spite of German betrayal—for he 
abhorred ‘shabby’ dealing—but in fact had concluded that Germany in actuality had not 
betrayed the Yangtze Agreement or Britain, as Chamberlain and others believed.  
Incredibly, Lansdowne on the whole still thought the more limited Yangtze Agreement 
worthwhile both in its stated and symbolic purpose.  What he did regret was the 
vehemence of Bülow’s “extreme frankness” while the latter exculpated the German 
Government from having played any part in an anti-Russian scheme. 
The Japanese were extremely disappointed at the whole turn of events, and went 
so far as to ask Lansdowne if there had been some private agreement concerning 
Manchuria between Germany and Britain of which they had not been informed.  The 
Foreign Secretary assured them that this was not the case.  The overall result was to sour 
the Japanese on ever relying on German support against Russian ambitions in the Far 
East, and to draw her closer to the power that had had similar motives in signing the 
Yangtze Agreement.  Almost by design, the German Government had gone far in 
achieving its objective of encouraging a strictly Anglo-Japanese Alliance that would 
antagonize Russia in the Far East, but without antagonizing her in Europe.  At the time 
the Emperor reportedly referred to the King’s Ministers as “unmitigated noodles” for not 
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taking advantage of the situation to assert Britain’s position in the Far East.”45  Of course 
an Anglo-Russian war would not have upset Germany in the least.         
 It is possible that Salisbury’s declining health played a part in the drafting of the 
poorly worded Yangtze Agreement, but it seems clear that those who pushed for 
negotiations paid little attention to them or the treaty’s final wording.  The American 
Secretary of State, John Hay, thought the agreement “a horrible practical joke on 
England.”  Before it was even concluded Salisbury had declared to Brodrick that it was 
unnecessary, but “seemed consistent with the policy of pleasing Germany to which so 
many of our [Unionist] friends are attached.”  That Salisbury signed the agreement 
anyway suggests he was wise to relinquish the Foreign Office portfolio without too 
much fuss the following month.  Germany was not prepared to alienate Russia for the 
sake of upholding the Open Door in Manchuria.46 
When Lansdowne failed to secure permission from the Cabinet on March 13 to 
propose to Germany a secret joint declaration of common policy, his disappointment was 
real.  Less than a week later he wrote to Lascelles that he well understood the complaints 
of Baron von Richtofen, the new German Foreign Minister, that Britain had hung back 
while simultaneously trying to elicit Germany’s intentions.  He asserted, however, that 
Britain had been justified in its actions because in the first place “we are . . . sincerely 
desirous of keeping step with Germany so far as we are able . . . and our S. African 
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entanglements make it impossible for us to commit ourselves to a policy which might 
involve us in war, unless we can assure ourselves that any obligation which might mean 
war would be shared by another power.”  Nevertheless, he admitted that he “anticipated” 
Germany’s rejection of the offer had it been proposed.  This was not, however, “wisdom 
after the event” or “a reasonable calculation before it” as Monger has contended.  
Lansdowne’s admission was made after Bülow’s declaration before the Reichstag that 
the Yangtze Agreement did not pertain to Manchuria, and specifically he was responding 
to Lascelles’s note of March 17 in which the latter was confirming the accuracy of the 
report of the Chancellor’s declaration.  Lansdowne did complain, however, that 
“Bülow’s speech lays so much stress upon Germany’s indifference towards Manchuria 
that it is difficult to conceive that the German Govt. ever seriously thought of throwing 
its weight into the balance in order to save Manchuria from virtual annexation from 
Russia.”47 
 Thus when Hermann von Eckardstein, First Secretary at the German Embassy in 
London, approached Lansdowne on March 18 with a proposal for a general defensive 
alliance between Germany and England Lansdowne was cautious in his response.  
According to Lansdowne, the First Secretary, acting unofficially of course, informed 
him that the German Government would look favorably on “an understanding of a more 
durable and extended character.”  The offer was for a defensive alliance directed at 
Russia and France that would only come into operation if either contracting party were 
attacked by more than one power.  As is now well known, Eckardstein had decided to 
                                                 
47 Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, PRO FO 800/128; Monger, End of Isolation, p. 27; Lascelles 
to Lansdowne, March 17, 1901, BD II no.35. 
 167
take advantage of Hatzfeldt’s absence from the embassy due to ill-health, and was 
operating well outside his instructions.  His actions were also completely unscrupulous, 
and over the next few months he repeatedly reported to Berlin that it was Lansdowne 
who had approached him with the proposal of an Anglo-German alliance.  Eckardstein’s 
efforts for an alliance may well have been genuine, but they were undermined by his 
pursuit of personal aggrandizement and Hatzfeldt’s job.  His remarkable deception also 
meant that the leadership on both sides would act under a gross misapprehension from 
the very start of negotiations.   
From the beginning, Lansdowne recognized the difficulties inherent in any such 
agreement.  Foremost to his mind was that it would require “the adoption of an identic 
[sic] foreign policy by both powers in all their external relations.”  It would also be 
difficult, he noted, to distinguish “between the case in which a country was acting on the 
defensive and the case in which it was not.”  Lansdowne therefore struck a hesitant tone 
both with Eckardstein and in his official memoranda, acknowledging that the “project 
was a novel and very-far-reaching one, which would require careful examination, and 
which obviously I could not encourage without reference to my colleagues.”  He did not 
doubt, however, that Eckardstein had been instructed to sound him out.48 
 The Foreign Secretary was somewhat more circumspect in a private letter he 
wrote to Lascelles.  He doubted whether much would come of the proposal, specifically 
because it would have meant the creation of an Anglo-German foreign policy; and he 
was also a little less certain as to the true source of the First Secretary’s proposal.  
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Eckardstein had been forthright with the fact that he spoke without authority, but as this 
was a customary and indispensable contrivance of the diplomatic trade, Lansdowne had 
made certain natural assumptions.  Prudently, he asked Lascelles to discover the identity 
of Eckardstein’s inspiration, adding that the First Secretary “evidently wishes me to 
suppose that the Emperor entertains these views.”  That Lansdowne’s interest in the 
proposal was greater than he let on in official correspondence is evident in the telegraph 
he sent to Lascelles a mere four days later asking him once again to find out whether or 
not the alliance proposal was inspired, and if so, by whom.  Though he was unable to 
find out whose hand really lay behind the proposal, Lascelles concurred that he could not 
fathom that Eckardstein would act without authority.49   
 Because of the First Secretary’s deceptions, Bülow and Fredrich von Holstein, 
the influential head of the Political Section at the German Foreign Office, both now 
backed a calculated response to the non-existent British overture.  They instructed 
Eckardstein that he should push Lansdowne to begin negotiations with the Austrians, 
confirming that they still sought British adherence to the Triple Alliance.  The First 
Secretary knew this was a non-starter, but his lies to Berlin had led them to believe that 
Germany could afford to drive a hard bargain and wait for the best deal on their own 
terms.50   
With Salisbury away, there was little Lansdowne could do to advance matters, 
and he knew that the Prime Minister’s attitude would not be favorable.  Even in 
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conversations with those in the Cabinet who favored a German agreement, he found 
scant encouragement.  He wrote to Lascelles that “while on the one hand they cordially 
desired that there should be a good and well-assured understanding between England 
and Germany, directed towards the maintenance of peace and mutual protection against 
aggressive combinations on the part of other Powers, they regarded with a certain 
amount of apprehension the idea of an international arrangement of the somewhat 
indefinite but very far-reaching character” which Eckardstein had proposed.  The First 
Secretary had gone so far as to suggest to Lansdowne that despite Germany’s reluctance 
to enter into an agreement concerning the Far East in support of Japan, once the 
proposed defensive alliance was made “it would virtually involve joint action” in such a 
case anyway.  Regardless, they now both decided that the time was not right for an 
agreement to be attempted, and agreed to let the matter drop until after the Easter 
holiday.  Notably, Eckardstein’s double game had been so effective that when he 
informed Berlin that alliance negotiations had broken down, Holstein was ready to put 
the blame on some inappropriate remark the Emperor may have made and that had been 
reported back to London by Lascelles.51  
Throughout, Lansdowne was always ready to admit that it would “be difficult to 
make anything” of Eckardstein’s proposal, but that “knowing the quarter in which it 
probably originated” he “wished to treat it with all possible deference.”  The impression, 
however, that the Foreign Secretary hereafter was merely trying to end negotiations 
without offending the Emperor is mistaken.  It is certainly true that Lansdowne’s 
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assessment of Wilhelm II was evolving.  On April 1 he confessed to Lascelles that “The 
Emperor’s speeches are certainly rather alarming, and give one the idea that his nerves 
are as you suppose overstrung.”  He added that “No one can live at such constantly 
maintained high pressure with impunity,” and acknowledged that “this is a very serious 
factor in all our calculations.”  Shortly thereafter, however, while conceding that the 
Emperor’s most recent “performance was certainly hard to justify,” he maintained that 
the “‘unmitigated noodles’ [recalling the Emperor’s term for King Edward’s Ministers] 
must not be too quick to resent these singular ebullitions.”  Lansdowne did not follow in 
the footsteps of Chamberlain in his attitude towards Germany because his motivations 
differed fundamentally from the latter.  His efforts also lacked the racial 
sentimentality—which so quickly led to resentment—that marked the Colonial 
Secretary’s endeavor.52     
The hesitancy apparent in much of Lansdowne’s memoranda and letters might 
also have been due to Salisbury’s continued presence as a monitor of foreign affairs.  In 
a March 17 memorandum addressing British military contingencies in case of the 
invasion of Belgium, Holland and other countries, Lansdowne argued that much will 
proceed unknown and unprepared as the circumstances of the next crisis were 
unforeseen.  Although in many respects reaffirming what the Foreign Secretary had 
written, the Prime Minister made a point of declaring in the margin that “it is idle to 
speculate, our treaty obligations will follow our national inclinations & will not precede 
                                                 
52 Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 1, 1901, PRO FO 800/128; Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901, BD 
II no.81. 
 
 171
them.”53  Foremost, any assumption that Lansdowne’s talks with Eckardstein were 
merely diplomatic courtesy is belied by the Foreign Secretary’s continued striving to 
effectuate some sort of agreement. 
 On April 9 Eckardstein returned from a brief trip to Berlin and informed 
Lansdowne that the time was now right to resume discussions, but again the Foreign 
Secretary cited the absence of Salisbury as an obstacle to the advancement of anything 
substantive.  In response, Eckardstein—apparently losing some of his nerve at the 
mention of the Prime Minister—stipulated that no assumption should be made that the 
Emperor was aware of their talks.  For the first time, what had always sounded to 
Lansdowne like the conventions of diplomatic language, struck him as something quite 
different.  He must have been somewhat taken aback by Eckardstein’s remark, as he now 
informed the First Secretary that though he realized their talks were “unofficial” he had 
“on the contrary formed an impression that H[is] M[ajesty’s] Government had been 
sounded upon the subject of the proposed alliance with the unofficial concurrence of the 
Emperor.”  According to Lansdowne, Eckardstein “‘hummed and ha’d’ a good deal” in 
his response.  Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary did not appear to draw any overly 
negative conclusions from this exchange.  Lansdowne still believed that an Anglo-
German defensive alliance was “In principle . . . good enough,” but feared that if it did 
not likely break down over the details, Salisbury would certainly regard “the scheme, to 
say the least, with suspicion.”  After this meeting Eckardstein sought a different avenue 
and approached the Japanese Ambassador to London, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, in an 
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attempt to draw Lansdowne out by way of a possible Anglo-German-Japanese 
Agreement to be proposed by Japan.  The Japanese, however, wanted no part of a 
German alliance.54  
 In the final weeks of May, Eckardstein made one last attempt at an Anglo-
German alliance.  During these renewed talks he promised Lansdowne an official 
German draft memorandum containing the terms of a proposed agreement, which the 
Foreign Secretary indicated he would be more than happy to receive.  Unfortunately for 
Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt suddenly returned from his long absence and called on 
Lansdowne at the Foreign Office proposing that they meet in a few days to discuss the 
proposed alliance.  Despite his illness, Hatzfeldt had been kept abreast of the First 
Secretary’s efforts.  A decidedly nervous Eckardstein offered three times to fill in for the 
Ambassador at the meeting, on account of the recent death of the Hatzfeldt’s daughter, 
but his offers were refused.  When Hatzfeldt met with Lansdowne on May 23—both 
under the impression that the other had originally proposed an alliance—the German 
Ambassador informed Lansdowne that any proposal would require Britain to join the 
Triple Alliance.  After asking Lansdowne if Britain was prepared to continue its “present 
‘isolement’” even knowing “the dangers it invoked,” Hatzfeldt declared that Germany 
was in fact England’s only real choice for an alliance because Russia could not be 
trusted.  Lansdowne promised to lay the matter before the Prime Minister.55   
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The Foreign Secretary later informed Eckardstein that regardless of the Hatzfeldt 
meeting, he would still welcome the memorandum that had been promised.  He vowed 
to treat it as a private communication between the two men alone, and to use it with the 
utmost “discretion.”  Unfortunately for Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt opened the note.  It was 
only then that he realized what his First Secretary had been doing in his absence.  The 
Ambassador’s fury was that much greater as it appeared to him that Eckardstein had 
been treacherously angling for his job.  Hatzfeldt reported Eckardstein’s betrayal and 
blatant disobedience to Holstein, but amazingly, the latter thought the story incredible 
and told his friend that it was better to let the matter drop.56   
While awaiting the promised German proposal—which would never come—and 
with the obstacles to an alliance still unresolved from Eckardstein’s original proposal in 
March, Lansdowne made the extraordinary decision not only to lay the matter before 
Salisbury, but to move matters forward by ordering Sir Thomas Sanderson, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, to draw up a British draft convention of an Anglo-German 
alliance for the Cabinet’s consideration.  Sanderson “sketched the outlines” of a treaty 
based on the unofficial talks of the preceding two months, but offered his own negative 
assessment of the enterprise as well.  Arguing that the Germans would be unscrupulous 
in their reading of any treaty, he observed that any agreement would be a virtual 
guarantee to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine, but would guarantee little or nothing to 
Britain.  Norman Rich has criticized Sanderson’s analysis of the true German offer, 
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arguing in part that the Permanent Under-Secretary along with the Cabinet ignored the 
fact that Germany was prepared to guarantee the entire British Empire.57  In Sanderson’s 
defense, however, he might have argued that upon signing such an alliance Britain’s 
guarantee of Alsace and Lorraine—territories that were still a cause of much resentment 
and acrimony—would be immediate, while a German guarantee of India meant much 
less in all respects.    
 Sanderson actually provided two draft treaties, the second of which anticipated 
British responsibility for Germany’s commitments under the Triple Alliance.  Both 
drafts, however, included the same principal clauses of an Anglo-German defensive 
alliance.  Each declared that both parties sought the maintenance of the status quo and 
peace in Europe, but if either contracting party should find itself at war with more than 
one power “without provocation,” then the other contracting party would be bound to 
“conduct the war in common.”  The alliance would also have a term of five years, with 
the one exception that it would “not apply to questions on the American Continent, nor 
bind either High Contracting Party to join in hostilities against the Unites States of 
America.”  The second amended draft stipulated that if one party went to war “in 
defense of its legitimate interests, or in consequence of a defensive alliance contracted 
by it and previously communicated to the other,” then the other party would engage in 
activity “not less than favourable than that of strict neutrality.”58  Exactly how Britain’s 
commitment would have played out under these terms in the context of one of the more 
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likely war scenarios—that of Germany coming to the aid of an ally which had been 
attacked by Russia, and in return was attacked by France—was not made clear. 
    Lansdowne had been right to fear the Prime Minister’s decided views on such 
an alliance.  In his response to the draft treaties, Salisbury dismissed the vagaries at once 
by declaring that in effect “This is a proposal for including England within the bounds of 
the Triple Alliance,” and that almost certainly Britain would be responsible for the 
security of Italy and Austria as much as Germany.  He argued that the “The liability of 
having to defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of 
having to defend the British Isles against France.”  As for Hatzfeldt’s dig at Britain’s 
“present ‘isolement,’” the Prime Minister scoffed.  “It is impossible for us to judge,” he 
argued, “whether the ‘isolation’ under which we are supposed to suffer, does or does not 
contain in it any elements of peril.”  Moreover, he added that “It would hardly be wise to 
incur novel and most onerous obligations, in order to guard against a danger in whose 
existence we have no historical reason for believing.”  Salisbury did not even consider 
these the “weightiest objections” to such an alliance.  Once again he questioned whether 
a parliamentary democracy could commit itself to aid another power in a conflict with 
“no means whatever of knowing what may be the humour of our people in 
circumstances which cannot be foreseen.”  British public opinion notwithstanding, he 
pointed out that “a promise of defensive alliance with England would excite bitter 
murmurs in every rank of German society.”  Salisbury recalled that for many years 
Hatzfeldt had been trying to elicit from him some prediction of British actions if war 
should break out between Germany and France, but he had always responded that “no 
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English Minister could venture on such a forecast.”  It is unclear whether or not the draft 
treaties were discussed by the Cabinet, or even a subset of its members, but it hardly 
mattered in light of the Prime Minister’s most thorough rejection of the idea.59 
 Grenville argued that the Prime Minister’s response was unfair and an 
overreaction, and that “Perhaps Salisbury had misunderstood Lansdowne’s intentions.”  
He suggested that the Foreign Secretary had merely wanted drafts of an alliance printed 
so that the Cabinet “might have something definite to discuss.”60  Despite the persistent 
doubts and reservations that Lansdowne himself expressed, however, it cannot be 
ignored that he continued to pursue seriously what he so often implied was infeasible.  
More credible is that the Foreign Secretary, who was noted for his diffidence, sometimes 
used it as artifice in his memoranda.  When recounting his talks with Eckardstein and 
Hatzfeldt, he never failed to point out that he comprehended fully the obstacles to any 
agreement.  Moreover, to have then presented convention drafts to the Prime Minister as 
mere discussion pieces seems so highly unlikely as to be preposterous.  What would 
have been the point of formulating discussion pieces for a matter one believed was 
unworkable?  Even Sanderson appears to have been reluctant to draft them in the first 
place.  What is certain is that Salisbury paid no notice to Lansdowne’s circumspection, 
and took him to task for apparently not comprehending well enough the impediments to 
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an alliance.  In marked contrast, when the time came to make the final decision on the 
Japanese Treaty—little more than seven months down the road—the Prime Minister 
proved sufficiently weak within the Cabinet that Lansdowne, acting virtually alone, was 
able to push it through. 
 Both sides now let the matter drop again—or “for the moment” at least, 
according to Lansdowne.  The Foreign Secretary wrote to Lascelles that he was “quite 
content to mark time for a while,” but Salisbury had really left him little choice in the 
matter.  Lansdowne was also under the impression, courtesy of Eckardstein, that 
Hatzfeldt was one of the major obstacles to more successful negotiations, and that after 
the latter’s impending recall, matters “could be more conveniently examined.”  With the 
path towards a defensive alliance blocked, Lansdowne’s attentions turned to the 
consideration of “some alternative form of agreement, perhaps limited to particular 
eventualities.”  Still of the same mind in August, he expressed to Lascelles his devout 
hope “that it is not true that the Emperor is quarrelling with Bülow,” whose “influence” 
Lansdowne believed “on the whole salutary so far as the external relations of Germany 
are concerned.”  While enjoying the “remote” and “delightful” “quiet” of Dereen while 
flat on his back—his sciatica again—Lansdowne declared to Lascelles that “As for a 
‘complete understanding’ between Germany and ourselves . . . no one could have striven 
harder than I have to maintain such an understanding, and I am sure Eckardstein will 
bear witness to this, but as I have already said, such an understanding cannot be fruitful 
of good results unless the conduct of the parties to it proves to the world that they are in 
loyal cooperation.”  With regard to the Emperor’s use of the term “alliance” in recent 
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conversations with Lascelles, Lansdowne conceded that the Ambassador knew 
“probably better than I do what a big fence this is to ride at.”  He added, however, that “I 
should not mind having a try if I knew what was on the other side.”  It would have meant 
a “great deal,” he noted in obvious frustration, “to know what is really in the Emperor’s 
mind.”  Over the summer, Lansdowne’s most reliable source on Anglo-German relations 
was still Eckardstein, and the latter was now confirming that for an alliance to be 
concluded Britain would have to join the Triple Alliance “and openly proclaim the fact.”  
Lansdowne was still unsure of this, but did not dismiss it outright.  It was all a question, 
he noted, “which the Cabinet will have to consider in the autumn.”61 
 On November 9 Bertie issued a memorandum in which he argued that the 
Germans could not be trusted, that treaty or no treaty they would be bound to come to 
Britain’s defense anyway out of concern for the balance of power, and therefore a joint 
declaration of policy in Europe and the Mediterranean would be “safer” than joining the 
Triple Alliance.  Because Lansdowne’s subsequent memorandum of November 22 bore 
a striking resemblance to that of the Assistant Under-Secretary, Grenville maintained 
that Bertie almost from the very beginning had “gained considerable influence over” the 
Foreign Secretary.62  As shown above, however, Lansdowne had already contemplated 
an agreement that might stipulate less than what Berlin wanted, and by November had 
probably already convinced himself that if a new approach were attempted it would have 
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to be on different terms.  In his memorandum Lansdowne felt “bound to admit” that the 
obstacles to a “full-blown defensive alliance” with Germany on the terms expressed by 
Hatzfeldt in May were “at the present moment, virtually insuperable.”  According to the 
Foreign Secretary those obstacles were: 
1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the casus foederis which 
would not be either so rigid as to greatly hamper our freedom of action or 
so vague as to deprive the alliance of all practical value. 
 
2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia. 
3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all approve of the 
idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple Alliance. 
 
4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be hostile to 
America.  With our knowledge of the German Emperor’s views in regard 
to the United States, this is to my mind a formidable obstacle. 
 
5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment when the 
Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is at present.             
 
To these he added an unnumbered sixth obstacle: “the decided views which the Prime 
Minister has expressed.”  Though he now openly conceded that a “full-blown” alliance 
was for the moment unobtainable, Lansdowne delivered a long-delayed riposte to 
Salisbury’s May 29 memorandum which had questioned the dangers of isolation.  He 
admitted the “force” of the premier’s observations, but maintained that “we may push 
too far the argument that, because we have in the past survived in spite of our isolation, 
we need have no misgivings as to the effect of that isolation in the future.”  With regard 
to Salisbury’s famous contention that a parliamentary democracy could not commit a 
future government to war without their consent, Lansdowne argued that this exception 
would not apply as any agreement that was concluded would be public, not a “secret 
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contract.”  This was either a poorly employed straw man or a case of almost willful 
misunderstanding, because the Prime Minister’s dictum had never been reserved as an 
objection to “secret” arrangements only.  Nevertheless, Lansdowne justifiably pointed 
out that the ongoing alliance negotiations with Japan had rendered the Prime Minister’s 
argument over isolation moot, and made the second argument possibly insulting to the 
Germans if employed.  Lastly, with regard to German society’s well-known “suspicion 
and dislike” of Britain, Lansdowne charged that this was “to a great extent, the result of 
the aloofness of our policy, and that an openly declared change in that policy would not 
be without effect upon German sentiment.”  One might be tempted to quibble over 
whether friends and enemies can be made and unmade so easily. 
 Despite the “virtually insuperable” obstacles that Lansdowne so succinctly 
enumerated, he did not believe they applied “to a much more limited understanding with 
Germany as to our policy in regard to certain matters of interest to both Powers.”  
Improbably, he suggested an understanding along the lines of the Anglo-German 
Yangtze Agreement, though he admitted that Germany’s “interpretation of that 
Agreement has not been by any means satisfactory.”  He maintained, however, that “as a 
tentative and provisional step it might not be without value, and the offer would, at any 
rate, place it out of the power of the German Government to say that we had treated 
them inconsiderately or brusquely rejected their overtures.”63  A month later, in a 
memorandum requested by Salisbury that set out the heads of a possible Anglo-German 
understanding, Lansdowne again sought to sell the innocuous nature of the new proposal 
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by pointing out that if Germany were to refuse the offer “no great harm will have been 
done, and we shall have put it out of their power to accuse us of having ‘dropped’ them.”  
Although Salisbury minuted that he still believed the proposal to be “full of risks and to 
carry with it no compensating advantage,” nevertheless, Lansdowne was allowed to 
present his entente proposal to the new German Ambassador, Count Paul von Wolff 
Metternich, two weeks later.64 
  With regard to Lansdowne’s fear of appearing to have “dropped” the Germans, 
it seems significant that he made his decision to approach the new German Ambassador 
in large part because the latter had failed to approach him in the weeks since taking up 
his appointment.  Having informed Metternich that at the moment conditions were not 
suited for a further attempt at a more definitive defensive alliance, Lansdowne put 
forward the idea of a joint understanding with regard to policy in areas where the 
interests of the two powers were similar.  The German Ambassador’s response, 
according to Lansdowne, was unhesitating; Metternich declared that the German 
Government saw the matter as a case of the “whole or none.”  He never even bothered to 
relay to his masters in Berlin Lansdowne’s offer of an entente.65 
 Lansdowne had striven hard to bring about an Anglo-German alliance, but the 
rapprochement he sought was ultimately undermined by the unfounded expectations of 
Germany’s gentlemen diplomats and politicians.  Moreover, some strong and rather 
emotionally driven personalities on both sides actually helped exacerbate tensions and 
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generally worsen Anglo-German relations.  Holstein’s own personal attempt to warm 
relations in late October—and it was a genuine effort—managed only to antagonize.  
Believing that the recent negotiations had failed because of Salisbury’s insidious 
intrigues, as well as the hostility of the British public, he invited Sir Valentine Chirol, 
head of The Times’s foreign department, to meet with him so he could express in candid 
terms his opinion as to exactly why Anglo-German relations had soured over the past 
decade.  He began by disclosing the story that the Prime Minister had planned some six 
years previous to foment a general European war over the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire.  The resulting carnage, he maintained, falling disproportionately as it would on 
the continental powers, would have been to Britain’s advantage.  He assured Chirol, 
however, that he was “one of those who believe that the current of the times will 
eventually bring together those two great and related powers, Germany and England, 
although perhaps only after I am gone,” adding that his views were shared by both the 
Emperor and the Chancellor.  Chirol dutifully reported the conversation to the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary upon his return.  Lansdowne was incredulous, but 
stopped short of accusing the Germans of inventing the story.  He noted simply that 
“nothing could be more unfortunate than that the relations of the two gov[ernmen]ts. 
should be prejudicially affected for so long a time by what I cannot help thinking is a 
misapprehension.”66   
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To make matters even worse, in the same week Chamberlain became engaged in 
a bitter war of words with the Kaiser and Bülow.  Reacting to criticism in the British and 
foreign press, the Colonial Secretary declared before assembled Unionists in Edinburgh 
that if when the time comes the government should find it necessary to conduct the war 
with more vigor and greater severity, “we can find precedents for anything that we may 
do in the action of those nations who now criticize our ‘barbarity’ and ‘cruelty,’ but 
whose example in Poland, . . . in Tongking, in Bosnia, in the Franco-German war . . . we 
have never even approached.”  It is ironic that the spat itself was born in part of the 
failure of these ‘natural’ allies to come to an understanding.  Chamberlain’s dream of a 
Pan-Teutonic alliance had vanished in unending inter-Germanic enmity.  Two months 
later before a crowd in Birmingham, he declared that Britain was simultaneously the 
“most liberal nation the world has ever seen” and the “best hated,” and while the other 
nations of Europe might envy, libel, and misrepresent Britain and “gloat over what they 
think is our approaching downfall,” Chamberlain found consolation in the fact that “the 
opinion of Europe was not an absolute criterion as to the judgment of history.”  He urged 
Britons never to surrender their heritage, and confessed that it was now the “duty of the 
British people to count on themselves alone, as their ancestors did . . . in a splendid 
isolation, surrounded and supported by our kinsfolk.”67   
When Bülow finally responded in the Reichstag to Chamberlain’s original 
October remarks over two months had passed, and he chose to pander to public opinion 
                                                 
67 Chamberlain’s speech at Edinburgh on October 25, 1901, The Times, October 26, 1901, p. 9; 
Chamberlain’s speech at Birmingham on January 6, 1902, The Times, January 7, 1902, p. 4. 
 
 184
as his policy of Weltpolitik demanded rather than to safeguard Anglo-German relations.  
Quoting Frederick the Great, Bülow advised his fellow Germans to “Let the man be and 
don’t get excited, he’s biting on granite.”  Lansdowne responded to the Chancellor’s 
remarks with “surprise,” noting that “if there had ever been occasion for taking notice of 
Mr. Chamberlain’s speech in the Reichstag, that occasion had passed by.”  He found the 
“gratuitous resuscitation of the question” to be “most unfortunate,” and regretted both 
the “tone” and “mischievous” nature of Bülow’s oration.  Holstein was also shocked and 
surprised, and could only conclude that the Chancellor had not wanted an alliance with 
Britain after all.68          
While Lansdowne regretted the press attacks and recriminations on both sides, he 
questioned whether it was really true that the Germans could do nothing to prevent the 
verbal and pictorial assaults on the Royal family and the British Army.  The “disgusting” 
caricatures, as one the King’s private secretaries Francis Knollys called them, had been a 
sore spot for years, and were being published in the French as well as the German press.  
Lansdowne knowingly wondered “would they have been allowed to pass unheeded if 
they had been directed against the Czar, his family, his army?”  No doubt they would 
not.  As was his wont, however, the Foreign Secretary remained cautiously optimistic 
that the “storm may have spent its force before long, and that we may find ourselves in 
smoother waters again.”  His fear, though, was “that these events will leave unpleasant 
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memories.”69  Nevertheless, even Lansdowne’s opinion of certain German officials had 
suffered somewhat.  He now believed Eckardstein “well meaning” in his intentions, but 
regretted always having “to discount his statements considerably.”  As for Bülow’s 
speeches, he observed that there was “always a tone of persifflage [sic] in what he says 
which grates upon me.”70  
Lansdowne rather optimistically ascribed a great deal of the ill-will that the 
German people felt toward Britain to the Boer War, and was in the meantime echoing 
Bertie’s language of realpolitik, asserting in a letter to Lascelles that “apart from 
sentiment I cannot see that it will ever be of advantage to Germany to let us ‘go under’ 
before a great European coalition.”  He maintained, however, that he was still “sanguine 
enough to hope that the bitter feeling which now prevails against us in Germany may not 
last forever.”  This was one area of foreign policy where Lansdowne’s much lauded 
Whiggish detachment worked to his detriment.  When it came to understanding and 
assessing the “sentiment” of a people he was a man adrift.  It strikes one as very similar 
to his dealings over Ireland.  He was nearly Panglossian at times in his belief that 
popular opinion would in the end follow the current of his own reasoning.  Grenville 
maintained that Lansdowne attached “far less importance to the influence of public 
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opinion” than Salisbury, but though that assessment might hold a great deal of truth 
within the specific comparison, Lansdowne certainly did not fail to comment on the 
public’s influence upon foreign affairs.71  He just utterly failed to comprehend that 
opinion when it interfered with his policies, which one may presume he believed to be 
the product of more thoughtful and sober judgment. 
The missed opportunities for an Anglo-German alliance in 1901 and earlier have 
excited the interest of historians for obvious reasons.  The implications of such an 
alliance for the rest of twentieth century European history, and world history for that 
matter, might well have been profound.  Lord Newton maintained that “The failure of 
the negotiations in 1901 may be described as a turning-point in the history of the world,” 
while German Ambassador Metternich himself told Lansdowne during their meeting in 
December 1901 that an agreement between the Triple Alliance and the British Empire 
“would probably have ensured peace for half a century.”  He feared as well that such a 
favorable opportunity was not likely to come again.72   
Such contemporaneous pronouncements notwithstanding, how realistic were the 
chances of an agreement being concluded, especially with Salisbury as Prime Minister?  
Grenville argued in 1954 that the evidence was “increasing for the view that providing 
an alliance with Germany alone could have been obtained on reasonable terms, the 
prime minister would have consented to such an alliance.”  Such qualifications, 
however, could make anything appear to have been possible.  A. J. P. Taylor that same 
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year took the contrary view, concluding that the German condition that Britain must join 
the Triple Alliance was “not meant seriously,” and that Germany’s leaders were playing 
a cynical game hoping in the end for a mutually destructive Anglo-Russian war.73 
There is much to support Taylor’s assertion, and Paul Kennedy has since 
declared that the consensus against success is now “beyond any doubt.”  He argued that 
the German policy of Weltpolitik had been in operation by 1900, so that from the 
beginning Anglo-German relations in this period were complicated by “two 
contradictory trends”: the policy of Weltpolitik being carried out by Bülow and the 
efforts at rapprochement by the pro-alliance faction in the British cabinet, and one might 
add to the latter the efforts of Eckardstein and Holstein.  It is ironic then that Lansdowne 
initially welcomed Bülow’s influence on the Emperor, and thought Holstein “an 
extremely dangerous personage” in the German Foreign Ministry.  On numerous 
occasions in fact the Chancellor sought to prevent the Kaiser from unwittingly agreeing 
to an Anglo-German alliance.  Holstein would write in later years that “One had the 
impression that Bülow clung to all the obstacles which stood in the way of the alliance.74   
Kennedy has further argued that the “rampant and uncontrollable Anglophobia in 
Germany during the Boer War” doomed any hopes of an Anglo-German entente.  British 
newspapers also dutifully and eagerly recorded examples of German anti-British 
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propaganda for their readers.  In January 1902, the Daily Chronicle described an anti-
British cartoon in a German newspaper that depicted Chamberlain and Kitchener as 
naked red devils boiling Boer children in a large cauldron.  While this treatment might 
have been expected from the French or Russians, the Germans were supposed to be a 
friendly power.  It was an enmity that Bülow, more often than not, chose to feed rather 
than prevent.75 
Niall Ferguson has more recently argued that while an agreement was not 
predestined for failure, the predominant focus on the “personalities involved” was a 
“rather unsophisticated” answer as to why an agreement was not reached.  While there 
can be little doubt that individual human agents are indeed pesky intrusions upon 
modern historiography, the balance of Ferguson’s argument also carried some 
troublesome inconsistencies.  Echoing the work of social scientists in the field of 
alliance theory, he maintained that Britain actively appeased only “those powers which 
appeared to pose the greatest threat to her position even at the expense of good relations 
with less important powers.”  Germany, Ferguson argued, was one of the latter.  While 
this theory might explain Britain’s appeasement of the United States, it does not appear 
that it can be entirely reconciled with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  
What is more, it completely and utterly fails to explain why some in Britain would have 
sought an alliance with Germany in the first place if the aim was safeguarding the 
Empire.  What would have been the value of an alliance with such a weak partner?  
Ferguson attempted to account for such dissonance by asserting that British 
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arrangements with Germany over Heligoland, the Portuguese colonies, and the partition 
of Samoa, were not in fact appeasement, but co-operation.  Moreover, he argued that “It 
was, after all, the British who killed off the alliance idea, as much as the Germans.”76  In 
fact, British efforts at rapprochement as carried out by Balfour, Chamberlain, and 
Lansdowne were quite genuine and in many cases unrequited, while Salisbury himself 
referred to the Liberal Unionists being “attached” to a “policy of pleasing Germany.”  
Nearing the end of his tenure as Prime Minister, Salisbury even acquiesced in 
Lansdowne’s last ditch effort in December 1901 to break the German stance of “the 
whole or none.”     
Salisbury’s general suspicions and distrust of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany 
unfortunately proved all too true.  In February 1900, the perceptive Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador to Berlin, Count Ladislaus Szögyeny, reported to his superiors in Vienna 
that the Emperor and leading German statesmen were looking forward to becoming “the 
genial successor to England” as the world’s most dominant power.  He added that 
though “Germany’s far-reaching plans are at present only castles in the air,” the nation 
“was already preparing with speed and vigor for her self-appointed future mission.”77  If 
nothing else Germany’s leaders were guilty of reckless self-defeating envy.   
In late 1901 the rest of Britain’s leadership finally began to perceive and take 
notice of Germany as a more significant military threat, and it came as a direct result of 
state secretary of the Imperial Navy Office Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’ naval building 
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program, which Bülow had wholeheartedly backed.  In his memorandum on the naval 
estimates in November 1901, Selborne noted that Germany’s current naval policy was 
“definite and persistent” and would in time “place Germany in a commanding position if 
ever we find ourselves at war with France and Russia.”  In April of the following year he 
confessed to Balfour that “The question of our naval policy is more pressing now than it 
was when I wrote my memorandum in the autumn . . . I candidly admit that I had not 
then realized the intensity of the hatred of the German nation to this country.”  He added 
that Lansdowne also shared his “anxiety.”  Balfour replied that he found it “extremely 
difficult to believe that we have, as you seem to suppose, much to fear from Germany—
in the immediate future at all events.”  To Balfour’s thinking it seemed “so clear that, 
broadly speaking, [Germany’s] interests and ours are identical.”  In no sense had he or 
would he ever become rabidly anti-German, but he did now “have sorrowfully to admit 
that the world is not always governed by enlightened self-interest.”  With regard to 
Germany’s true intentions it was left to Lansdowne to ponder whether “the Emperor, 
Bülow, Holstein, & others [would] have contemplated as they did an Anglo-German 
alliance, if hatred of G[rea]t. Britain was to be regarded as for all time inherent in the 
sentiments of the German people?”78  That after 1901 Lansdowne continued to strive for 
the answer to improved Anglo-German relations—and with regard to advocating 
continued active cooperation with Germany he was to be almost alone—is sufficient 
                                                 
78 Selborne Memorandum “The Navy Estimates and the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Memorandum on 
the Growth of Expenditure,” November 16, 1901, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 1, 
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Selborne, 1895-1910 (London: The Historian’s Press, 1990), p. 142; Balfour to Selborne, April 5, 1902, 
printed in Boyce, ed., The Crisis of British Power, p. 142; Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 22, 1902, PRO 
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evidence that his foreign policy embraced more than ‘balance of power’ concerns.  In 
light of this, the subsequent turn towards Japan in late 1901—the supposed ‘balance of 
power’ alternative to the failed attempt at a German alliance—must also be reconsidered.                
                    
 192
CHAPTER V  
THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
 
   The Anglo-Japanese relationship was long-standing, and stretched far beyond 
the exigencies of Britain’s strategic position in 1901.  Along with the other great powers, 
Britain engaged Japan soon after it was forcibly thrust into world affairs in 1854.  In 
particular, the British took an active role in the modernization of Japan’s military.  In 
1866, the Royal Navy agreed to train Japanese naval officers, and naval cadets were sent 
to serve on British ships and study in England.  In their eagerness, the Japanese went so 
far as to borrow wholesale from the Royal Navy’s terminology, textbooks, and even 
designs of uniforms.  The first warships built specifically for the new Japanese Navy in 
1878 came from Britain’s shipyards, and though Japan made sure not to depend on a 
single Western nation, it would be predominantly British built battleships that defeated 
the Russian Baltic fleet at Tsushima in 1905.1  Commerce between the two nations was 
also considerable—though dwarfed by Britain’s China trade.  Roughly thirty-eight 
percent of Japan’s imports, used to modernize and industrialize the country, came from 
Great Britain.  Moreover, in 1894 Britain became the first European country to 
relinquish its extra-territorial rights in Japan, putting the latter on the path towards 
equality with the European powers.2 
                                                 
1 John Curtis Perry, “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power” Monumenta Nipponica 
Vol. 21, No. ¾ (1966): 309, 311-312, 316 n.54, 318, 321. 
 
2 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 8-11; Perry, “Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval 
Power,” p. 317. 
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 Events also served to create a convergence of interests.  Britain’s most important 
national interest in the Far East was its China trade—in 1894, British ships carried 
83.5% of China’s maritime trade—and it was the threat to that trade that set some in the 
British leadership in search of an ally in the region.  Ironically, it was the total and 
overwhelming defeat of the Chinese by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 
that led to the imminent possibility that the “China Market” might be carved up and 
distributed among all the great powers.  That would have brought an end to the as yet 
undeclared Open Door.  When France, Russia, and Germany joined forces in an attempt 
to limit Japan’s gains at the end of the war, British and Japanese interests—namely, to 
block Russian territorial ambitions in the Far East—became one.3   
 Combining to form the so-called Far Eastern Triplice, France, Germany and 
Russia confronted Japan over the spoils of her victory as spelled out in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki.  Specifically, they wished to void China’s cession to Japan of Liaotung 
Peninsula, which included the strategically important Port Arthur.  The British 
Government, then under the leadership of the Liberal Lord Rosebery, declined to join the 
protest, but did not back Japan either.  For the present and immediate future, the British 
proved non-responsive to the potential of a Japanese understanding or alliance.  Faced 
with three hostile world powers and having no ally of its own, Japan was forced to yield 
to the Triplice’s demands and abandon Liaotung.  For the Japanese, it was one more 
                                                 
3 Ian H. Nish, “Politics, Trade and Communications in East Asia: Thoughts on Anglo-Russian Relations, 
1861-1907” Modern Asian Studies Vol. 21, No. 4 (1987): 667. 
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ignominy at the hands of the west.4  Thus they turned inward over the next decade, 
doubled the size of their army, and increased their naval strength.  By the close of the 
century, and with the continued help of British naval yards, Japan would hold the naval 
balance in the Far East between the combined Franco-Russian navies and the British.5 
 When the Conservatives returned to power in England in 1895, they also showed 
little interest in making any significant approach to Japan.  Salisbury wrote to Sir Ernest 
Satow, British Minister in Tokyo, that it was his sense that Britain’s “strategic or 
military interest in Japan can easily be over-estimated.”6  Satow was also to learn 
through Bertie that the Prime Minister simply did not trust the Japanese.  While 
Salisbury admitted that Japan might be useful in preventing the Russians from gaining 
an ice-free port, ultimately he believed that there was no need to take advantage and 
draw closer to the recently humiliated Japan.  British power, to his mind, remained 
supreme in the Far East.7 
 In early 1898 Germany took the lead in obtaining compensation for having 
removed Japan from Liaotung, and signed a lease for the port of Kiaochow in Shantung.  
The Chinese had looked to Russia for support during its negotiations with Germany over 
the Kiaochow lease, but within months after that lease had been granted the Russians 
                                                 
4 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 33-35; Inouye Yuichi, “From Unequal Treaty to the Anglo-Japanese 
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secured their own lease to Port Arthur and the surrounding area, the very territory the 
Japanese had been forced to give up a few years before.  Lacking substantive support 
from Britain, an embittered Japan looked instead to gain compensation from the 
Russians in Korea, but without much success.  The British government pressed the 
Chinese to resist the demands of the other powers, and as Balfour noted in an August 
1898 Cabinet memorandum, Britain itself wanted “no more fragments of China,” and in 
no way wanted to precipitate partition.  Finding other more forceful alternatives 
unpalatable, however, the British subsequently secured their own leases to both the New 
Territories in the south, and the port of Weihaiwei in Shantung.8 
 With the foundation of a relationship in place, and an increasing convergence of 
interests, it was the Japanese who took the first active steps to forge an alliance.  In 
March 1898 Japan’s Minister to London, Count Kato Takaaki, initiated talks with Joseph 
Chamberlain.  Kato had been actively seeking an Anglo-Japanese alliance, and thought 
matters quite promising.  Not one to shy away from inserting himself into foreign policy 
areas, during their conversation Chamberlain hinted at the benefits of an Anglo-Japanese 
understanding, or even joint action in the Far East as a primarily anti-Russian bloc.  He 
had already made similar suggestions to Salisbury, but stopped short of advocating an 
alliance between the two powers.  Kato was disappointed when Chamberlain did not do 
more to push the idea of an alliance.  He had hoped for more, from both his own 
                                                 
8 Ibid., pp. 49-53; Inouye, “From Unequal treaty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance” in Nish and Yoichi, eds., 
The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol. I, p. 151; Balfour memorandum, August 15, 1898, quoted 
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government and the Colonial Secretary, believing the latter had in fact proposed more 
than he really had.9 
 Britain turned to Russia instead, and in April 1899 made an effort to settle the 
outstanding dispute over railway interests in Manchuria.  With the signing of the Scott-
Mouravieff Agreement, Britain conceded Russia’s predominance in constructing 
railroads in Manchuria, with the notable exception of the Peking-Mukden line.  In return, 
Russia recognized British dominance in the Yangtze region.  The Boxer Rebellion in 
China in the summer of 1900 increased tensions once again, however, as Russia’s 
military presence in Manchuria expanded.  In violation of the recently signed agreement, 
Russian forces occupied the Peking-Mukden line, and continued to do so even after the 
Rebellion was put down.  Continuing Russian efforts to prevent Japan from exercising 
its right to build railways in Korea meant that the primary concern in the Far East for 
both future allies was further Russian encroachment to the south.10 
 While the Boxer Rebellion fostered friendlier relations between Britain and 
Japan, it also revealed British military deficiencies in the Far East.  Indeed, Britain’s 
Minister to Peking during the rebellion, Sir Claude MacDonald, credited the crucial role 
played by Japanese forces in relieving the Legations as having “sowed the seeds of that 
formal Alliance between the Island Empires of the East and the West.”11  The 22,000 
troops that Japan provided had been vital to the Allied effort to take Peking, but they 
                                                 
9 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 63-66. 
 
10 Inouye, “From Unequal treaty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance” in Nish and Yoichi, eds., The History of 
Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol. I, pp. 152-153. 
 
11 MacDonald quoted in Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 91. 
  
 197
also made Britain’s dependency on Japan manifest.12  Following the Rebellion, 
Chamberlain expressed to the Cabinet that now more than ever Britain would require 
assistance in containing Russia.  In addition to the need for retaining good relations with 
Germany and the United States, the Colonial Secretary specifically added Japan to the 
list of priority relationships.  He received no support from Salisbury, however, for any 
further action.13   
 When Chamberlain did force a policy move in September 1900, this time with 
the backing of Lansdowne, Balfour, and others in the Cabinet, it was in the direction of 
Germany.  The Germans had let it be known that they would back a British initiative 
formally to support the Open Door in China.14  The result was the Anglo-German 
(Yangtze) Agreement of 1900.  As noted in the preceding chapter, it was Salisbury who 
was responsible for the details of the agreement, but when the ground beneath it 
appeared to collapse in March 1901 Lansdowne was at the Foreign Office.  The Japanese 
had adhered to the agreement under the same assumption, and with the same intentions, 
that had motivated the Chamberlain group: that the agreement was essentially an anti-
Russian measure, and that it might eventually succeed in detaching Germany from 
Russia.  It marked the first time that Britain and Japan had entered into a treaty that went 
beyond mere trade concerns.15 
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 The First Manchurian Crisis that began in January 1901 brought matters to a 
head.  Over the next three months Lansdowne’s concerns grew that Russia was pressing 
the Chinese to sign an agreement that would have made Manchuria a virtual Russian 
protectorate.16  When in April Russia dropped its negotiations with China having 
achieved nothing, however, Lansdowne credited the withdrawal of the “obnoxious” 
agreement to the “plain speaking” of the Japanese, as well as British pressure on China.  
In addition, he did not doubt that the Russians would “continue to make themselves as 
disagreeable as possible,” though he thought it significant that they had been “prevented 
from making a ‘backstairs’ arrangement with China to our detriment.”  Lansdowne did 
not believe that the incident had “by any means” disposed of the question 
“satisfactorily,” but it is important to note that he did not dismiss the idea of a future 
settlement with Russia.  He wrote to the British Minister in St. Petersburg that “With a 
little bonne volonté & mutual confidence the whole affair ought to be capable of 
settlement.”  Lansdowne did not, however, then turn to the Japanese for support.  He 
instead looked to continued support of the Yangtze viceroys in their indispensable role 
as a moderating and stabilizing force in China.  His effort to procure an additional 
£75,000 loan for the viceroys, however, was met with a rather terse rebuff from Hicks-
Beach.17             
                                                 
16 See Lansdowne to Lascelles, January 22, 1901, BD II no.28; Lansdowne to Scott, March 4, 1901, BD II 
no.45; Lansdowne memorandum, March 1, 1901, excerpted in Grenville, “Lansdowne’s abortive project,” 
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17 Lansdowne to Hicks-Beach, April 7, 1901, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 6, 
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 The Japanese Alliance has been consistently portrayed as a response to the 
failure of the approach to Germany.  Indeed, the chronology of events almost compels 
this conclusion—post hoc ergo propter hoc.  With Britain still in need of a partner in the 
Far East in order to preserve the status quo and maintain peace, the seemingly obvious 
alternative to Germany was Japan.  Monger argued that Lansdowne was in fact “forced 
to make an alliance with Japan” to avoid isolation.  With very little explanation, 
however, he also maintained that the choice between Germany and Japan that 
Lansdowne was obliged to make “was not made consciously.”18  Although not the 
author’s intended argument, this qualification correctly marks the point of divergence 
between the Foreign Secretary and his Cabinet colleagues in their foreign policy 
motivations.  While it might well have been the case that a German alliance formulated 
in the spring of 1901 would have put paid any military alliance with Japan, Lansdowne’s 
foreign policy would not have precluded a lesser Anglo-Japanese understanding.  
Moreover, in December 1901 after the Japanese negotiations had progressed beyond that 
point where the Foreign Secretary would have been comfortable unceremoniously 
ending them—for fear of appearing to be engaged in duplicitous and shabby 
diplomacy—he continued to hold out hope for a lesser Anglo-German understanding. 
 Once again it was Japan that took the first step towards an alliance, and again it 
was on the efforts of a Japanese diplomat working largely on his own initiative.  Baron 
Hayashi Tadasu, who in 1900 had been appointed Japanese Minister in London, had 
been approached by Eckardstein in March 1901 and told that the time was ripe for an 
                                                 
18 Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 62-63, 66; See also Grenville, Lord Salisbury, p. 391.  
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approach to Britain concerning a three-power agreement.  Hayashi, however, was a 
devoted anglophile and had embarked for London the previous year already with the 
idea of pushing for a strictly Anglo-Japanese alliance.19  As Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in 1895, Hayashi had experienced the shame of the western powers’ intervention 
after the Sino-Japanese War, but in a newspaper article written that same year he argued 
that Japan had to “contain” its “temporary indignation, conserve energy by building up a 
strong navy, and cultivate the friendship of the country which has common interests with 
us for the future.”20   
 Hayahsi approached Lansdowne on April 17, 1901 and suggested in rather vague 
terms the creation of a permanent Anglo-Japanese agreement that would protect the Far 
East interests of both nations.  Judging by the suggested starting points of negotiation 
that Hayashi sent his superiors after his conversation with the Foreign Secretary, almost 
all of his initial objectives found their way in some form or another into the final treaty 
signed ten months later.  Hayashi sought support for Chinese territorial integrity, British 
recognition of Japan’s free hand in Korea, and military support if either party was 
engaged in conflict by more than one other power.  By all accounts Lansdowne 
expressed interest and was friendly to Hayashi’s proposal, but would not comment 
further without having seen anything substantive.  At this stage, Lansdowne also 
apparently insisted on talking in terms of an agreement that would necessarily include 
Germany.  In this it seems likely that he was operating on the information that had 
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reached the Foreign Office through Eckardstein.  The First Secretary revealed to 
Sanderson that in a recent conversation he had had with Hayashi, the latter had put 
forward a personal proposal of a three power agreement based on the Yangtze 
Agreement, but it would go further in pledging the powers to support the integrity of 
China and the Open Door.  At any event, Lansdowne informed Hayashi that he could not 
be expected to express an opinion on an unofficial proposal, and that with Lord 
Salisbury out of the country, the Cabinet could go no further in considering the matter 
until his return.21 
 Still lacking the official commitment of his government, Hayashi approached 
Lansdowne again in May and on this occasion handed over the points of a possible 
agreement that he had also sent off to Tokyo.  In The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi, 
still accepted as a credible source in many respects, the minister related that “Lansdowne 
replied that the discussion of the main lines of an agreement was easy, but the difficulty 
would arise when details came to be settled.”  He also noted that the Foreign Secretary 
again made a point of suggesting that this would not necessarily have to be a two-party 
agreement.  Lansdowne did subsequently recall MacDonald from Tokyo—where he was 
now stationed—ostensibly for discussions relating to recent Chinese matters, but little 
evidence survives to suggest what, if anything, was said about the Japanese proposal.  
Clearly, the Japanese Government was not as yet paying very close attention to 
Hayashi’s initiative, and Lansdowne still viewed the matter as one of engaging the 
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Germans in some sort of more binding treaty in the Far East.  This last conversation of 
course came less than two weeks before Lansdowne presented Salisbury with the 
detailed points of an Anglo-German alliance.22  
 Despite the apparently receptive demeanor Lansdowne displayed in conversation 
with Hayashi, he did not at this time favor concluding such an extensive alliance.  That 
nothing came of these early contacts, and the fact that Lansdowne made no effort to 
approach Japan for some time, is persuasive evidence for this conclusion.  In early July, 
Lansdowne did suggest to Hayashi the possibility of a multilateral treaty protecting the 
Open Door in Manchuria, while noting Russia’s special interests in the region, but this in 
no way presaged a defensive alliance.  Nothing came of the proposal.23 
 Unofficial contacts continued through July, but it was not until the last day of 
that month that Lansdowne met with Hayashi on his own initiative and responsibility to 
ask whether the two powers might come to an “understanding” as to “what line of 
conduct we might follow, supposing the balance of power in the waters of the Far East to 
be threatened with serious disturbance.”24  This was the first real British initiative 
towards a formal understanding, but was it due largely to the failure of Anglo-German 
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negotiations?  Moreover, was Lansdowne’s sole overriding interest the “balance of 
power in the waters of the Far East”?  One cannot deny that the failure of negotiations 
with Germany must have had a tremendous effect on the direction of British foreign 
policy, but in the strictest terms of the above hypotheses, one would have to accept that 
the Foreign Secretary had definitely given up on a German alliance in June or July 1901, 
and that because of this saw a Japanese alliance as the only, and necessary, alternative.  
Even when narrowly confined to matters in the Far East, such a simplified conclusion 
should be avoided because it tends to mask the significant influence of Lansdowne’s 
overall ‘policy of the entente.’  His overriding motivation in foreign policy was not to 
conclude military alliances so that the balance of power might be righted, but to remove 
areas of conflict with other powers through lasting understandings.  In pursuit of such 
understandings, however, Lansdowne sometimes slowly progressed to a point where he 
was in fact openly contemplating firm alliances.      
 In the Secret Memoirs, Hayashi asserted that during their conversation on July 
31, Lansdowne suggested the creation of a “permanent treaty” with Japan, but nowhere 
was it suggested that Lansdowne at this stage offered a defensive alliance.25  Ian H. 
Nish, whose study of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance still stands as the definitive account, 
credited Bertie’s memorandum of July 22, entitled “Anglo-Japanese Agreement: reasons 
why one is desirable and why Germany should not be included”, as having “lifted the 
issue to a new diplomatic level.”26  Bertie argued that notwithstanding Germany’s 
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“cynical policy” to foster an understanding between Britain and Japan to be directed at 
France and Russia, Britain would “certainly gain more than lose by an understanding 
with Japan, for to have no understanding with any one would be dangerous.”  He 
maintained that an agreement with Germany could not be had, while one with Russia 
would not be adhered to, so Japan was both the obvious and strategically advantageous 
choice.  Japanese interests in Manchuria, and especially Korea, he argued, made her an 
inevitable obstacle to Russian ambitions.  Furthermore, Bertie pointed out that Japan 
would fight to prevent the absorption of Korea “with or without allies.”  For Bertie, the 
question that had to be asked was could Britain “afford to see Russia in occupation of 
Corea.”  He concluded that a Russia in possession of Korea, and dominant in Manchuria 
and Peking, would be “such a danger to our interests as to render it necessary for us to 
resist,” and that “it would be better to come to an understanding with Japan now than to 
wait till the contingency arises and to trust to being able to make arrangements with 
Japan at the last moment when we might not get much in return.”  Arguing that the issue 
could not be left to sit, Bertie contended that “unless we attach Japan to us by something 
more substantial than general expressions of goodwill we shall run a risk of her making 
some arrangement which might be injurious to our interests.”  As to the terms of such an 
arrangement, he suggested that Britain offer naval assistance to Japan if necessary to 
prevent any foreign occupation of Korea, and in exchange Japan might provide naval 
and military support at British request to aid in resisting any foreign aggression on the 
Yangtze or in Southern China.  In addition, both powers would pledge to make no other 
agreement concerning the Far East with any other power without mutual consultation.  
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Bertie rested the safety of such a commitment on the knowledge that “The policy of 
Russia is a bluff,” and that “She is in reality quite as much afraid of our strength as we 
are of the largeness of her forces.”  Moreover, he was confident that when Russia 
“realises that her adversary is in earnest as well as strong She generally gives way.”27  
 Nish established the significance of Bertie’s memorandum on the fact that many 
of the suggestions the latter put forward were later to be found in the proposals the 
Foreign Secretary put before the Japanese, such as naval co-operation and a Japanese 
free hand in Korea.  While Lansdowne made no minute on the memorandum, and was 
not prepared to push forward with any of Bertie’s ideas until the Cabinet had been 
consulted, Nish argued that the Foreign Secretary “had at least been presented with the 
issues.”  Thus, he believed it deserved “a special place in the growth of the alliance in so 
far as it convinced Lansdowne.”28  Among Lansdowne’s papers, however, there is a 
copy of Bertie’s memorandum that does include a notation by the Foreign Secretary 
added presumably before he forwarded it to Salisbury.  While overall he was amenable 
to some sort of understanding with Japan, Lansdowne thought that his Assistant Under-
Secretary’s proposals constituted a “very far reaching pledge” for the Japanese, and that 
the terms defining “what constituted an act of foreign aggression within this enormous 
area” of the Yangtze and South China would be difficult to draft.  Of Britain’s 
obligations to Japan, Lansdowne believed them actually to be “more precise and less 
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extensive,” but worried that Britain might find itself “obliged to go to war at an 
inconvenient moment and upon an issue that might not be of first rate importance.”  He 
noted, however, that he wished “to keep well with the Japanese” and fancied that this 
could be done “without going so far as Mr. Bertie proposes.”  In pointed opposition to 
Bertie’s express desire for a commitment that constituted more than an exchange of 
friendly intentions, the Foreign Secretary proposed a “joint declaration of policy in 
which it would be recorded that it was the object of both Powers to prevent any other 
Power from acquiring a dominant position in Korea” or gain “preferential rights in the 
Yangtse Valley.”29  Lansdowne’s commentary does not suggest that when presented 
with the issues he was persuaded to favor a defensive alliance even of the limited nature 
that Bertie put forward.  Nor does it suggest that the Foreign Secretary was quite 
prepared as yet to grant Japan a dominant position in Korea as he would later claim after 
the fact.  Even if it were true that early on Bertie had acquired some inordinate influence 
over the new Foreign Secretary, as Nish has argued—and this despite the fact that they 
apparently disliked each other—in this particular case Lansdowne made clear that he 
wished for a lesser understanding than that put forward by his Assistant Under-
Secretary.30  Strictly by the evidence, one could reasonably argue that there was a point 
in July, August or even September at which Lansdowne was consciously pondering the 
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conclusion of an understanding with both Germany and Japan, and a permanent alliance 
with neither.     
 At this stage the idea of a “defensive alliance” with Japan was not a settled 
notion in Lansdowne’s thinking.  Hayashi reported to his government that Lansdowne 
had used the word “alliance” several times in their negotiations through August, but that 
appears to have been an exaggeration on the minister’s part.  Salisbury’s report of 
August 16 to the King concerning the Japanese negotiations only stated that the matter 
would “be pursued,” while in his official correspondence Lansdowne consistently 
referred to a possible “understanding” between the two powers.31  This was a matter of 
semantics no doubt, but in the realm of diplomacy and the mind of a professional 
diplomatist—which Lansdowne had become—these were and still are important 
distinctions.   
 How in September and October the matter made that metaphorical crossing from 
“understanding” to “alliance” in Lansdowne’s mind remains unclear, although such an 
evolution would become a necessity in order for negotiations to continue.  Lansdowne 
hoped the Japanese would make the next diplomatic move, and in mid-August left for a 
seven week holiday in Ireland.  The beautiful scenery and refreshing atmosphere of 
County Kerry, however, did not provide a respite from pressing Foreign Office business 
or a boost to the Foreign Secretary’s health.  He re-aggravated his sciatica and was 
unable to “shake it off.”  Late in September, having resorted to “being pummeled by a 
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little Swedish Masseuse” in order to ease his physical ailment, he complained to Lord 
George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, that with regard to Japan he was still 
“puzzled to know what to do next.”32   
 Lansdowne did write to MacDonald on September 4 from Derreen telling him 
“By all means encourage the Japanese Ministers to tell us frankly what they want.”  He 
advised that “if the undertaking is even to take shape we shall have to clothe it in more 
precise language,” including agreement as “to the form in which assistance might be 
given” to one party from the other.  It was still far from certain though that active 
“assistance” would necessarily include direct military support.  Even with matters in 
such an imprecise state, however, Lansdowne was “sincerely desirous to make 
something of the idea.”33  This came only a week after he had written Lascelles that a 
possible German agreement remained a question “which the Cabinet will have to 
consider in the autumn.”34  As it happened, the Japanese were just as hesitant to make 
that first jump to official negotiations, and though Hayashi met with Bertie at the 
Foreign Office during September to discuss matters nothing concrete was to be advanced 
until October.35 
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 In early September, and with most of the Cabinet still absent from London, Lord 
Selborne produced an important memorandum on the state of British naval power in the 
Far East.  In it he argued that the Two-Power Standard could no longer hold up in a 
confrontation with both France and Russia—this was not the first time he had stated this 
belief—and that an alliance with Japan would suit Britain’s strategic needs by allowing a 
greater concentration of forces in European waters.36  With Selborne’s memorandum 
now in hand, and as it complemented Bertie’s conclusions, Lansdowne—now back in 
London—finally moved in a similar direction and requested a re-drafting of the Bertie 
memorandum of July 22.  In the margins of this new draft Lansdowne contemplated a 
“Japanese Entente” where both powers would co-ordinate their policies respecting China 
and Korea, including a commitment by Britain of ships and money to resist the 
occupation—presumably by Russia—of the latter.37   While it would appear that the 
combined Selborne and Bertie memoranda had a significant effect on policy, it cannot be 
said that the idea of a Japanese alliance was ever an entirely original one, and that 
Lansdowne had never contemplated such thoughts before.38  Lansdowne persisted in 
couching his foreign policy initiatives in terms of forging ententes, but as of September 
he was open to pledging military support to Japan with regard to a clash over Korea for 
the sake of seeing negotiations move forward. 
                                                 
36 Selborne memorandum, “Balance of Naval Power in the Far East,” September 4, 1901, enclosed in 
Selborne to Lansdowne, September 7, 1901, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 1, Private 
Letters: Admiralty and Colonial Office, f4.  The memorandum also is reprinted in Boyce, ed., The Crisis 
of British Power, pp. 123-126. 
  
37 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 177.  
 
38 Steiner asserted, “Lansdowne gave far more consideration to the opinions of the service chiefs than Lord 
Salisbury had done” (Steiner, “Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,” p. 31).  
 210
 On October 16 Hayashi and Lansdowne met and laid down the essentials of 
future discussions, and in general these would become the main elements of the final 
treaty.  Put forward by Hayashi, they included the protection of Japan’s special interests 
in Korea against Russian encroachment, a joint declaration that both powers guaranteed 
Chinese territorial integrity, independence, and the Open Door, and that both powers 
would be bound to the other’s defense if attacked by two other powers.  Lansdowne 
agreed that these points were a “useful basis for discussion,” and added that it might 
prove beneficial if their two navies agreed to work together in peace time, allowing each 
other access to port facilities and coaling stations.  Interestingly, on this occasion it was 
Lansdowne who resisted any idea of including Germany in the talks.  According to 
Lansdowne, Hayashi thought that German participation would make the agreement 
“look much more formidable,” but the Foreign Secretary had come to the conclusion that 
the Germans would never really contemplate joining such an agreement.39  Lansdowne 
was now committed to concluding a strictly Anglo-Japanese alliance, and would push—
at times almost completely alone—for its conclusion in the face of all opposition. 
 Lansdowne had a draft agreement prepared and sent it, along with the Selborne 
memorandum and the notes on his conversation with Hayashi, to the Prime Minister for 
his approval prior to bringing it before the Cabinet.  Salisbury gave his approval, and 
Lansdowne was “extremely hopeful” of success.40  Placed before the Cabinet on 
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November 5, the main criticisms came from those who believed the treaty to be too one-
sided in favor of Japanese interests.  Specifically, some hoped the treaty could be 
expanded to include India.41  Balfour, however, was quite nervous over the possibility 
that Britain might be drawn into a war with Russia and thereby France as well.  He was 
also not pleased that the Cabinet rather speedily authorized Lansdowne to proceed.  
Irritated and surprised, he wrote to Lansdowne a month later complaining that he had 
arrived but “a few minutes late, and found the brief debate already in full swing, and the 
Cabinet not very anxious to hear any views on the general aspects of a problem, which 
they were treating in the main as one confined to the Far East.”  At the time, however, 
Balfour did not press his views.42   
 At the very same Cabinet meeting, Lansdowne also presented the outlines of an 
agreement to settle outstanding disputes with Russia.  In part an effort to deflect both 
public and Cabinet criticism of the Japanese treaty proposal, he put forward the plan of a 
direct approach to Russia to discuss “with absolute frankness” disagreements over 
Manchuria and Persia.  He argued that this would be better than dealing indirectly with 
“the two weak and dishonest Governments which in each case stand between us and that 
of Russia.”  He did not expect the Russians to accept, however, and did not think a 
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“refusal on the part of Russia” would do Britain “much harm.”43  Believing their position 
in the region superior, the Russians refused the offer.  Because of the simultaneous 
approach to Russia, David Steeds has charged Lansdowne with diplomatic “duplicity,” 
but this mistakenly frames his foreign policy solely in terms of competing alternatives as 
if Britain were deciding whether it would eventually join with France and Russia or the 
Triple Alliance.44  While this framework might have reflected the thinking of 
Chamberlain or Bertie, it was not true of the current Foreign Secretary.  The approach to 
Russia did not mean that Lansdowne contemplated a Russian agreement as a possible 
alternative to a Japanese alliance.  He continued to hope and push for an agreement with 
Russia in the future and had these sentiments relayed to the Russian Government 
through the British Minister in St. Petersburg.  It was in a similar vein that he did not 
object to Marquis Ito’s suggestion in early January 1902 that Japan might still seek their 
own agreement with Russia in order to protect Japanese interests in Korea.  Lansdowne 
assured Ito that an agreement made “in the interests of peace” would not meet with 
Britain’s disapproval as long as it did not conflict with the terms of the eventual Anglo-
Japanese Treaty.45     
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 The Foreign Secretary’s differing views would be displayed throughout the 
negotiations, especially in how he dealt with the concerns of the Cabinet.  The British 
draft treaty was handed to Hayashi on November 6, and according to the Japanese 
Minister, Lansdowne informed him that due to the concerns of two or three members of 
the Cabinet he found it necessary to ask if Japan might consider expanding their 
commitment to include British interests in India.46  Personally, the Foreign Secretary did 
not feel “justified in expanding the scope of the draft” beyond the understanding at 
which he and Hayashi had already arrived, and it is hard to believe that he expected 
much from this request.  Under pressure though, he again repeated the concerns of his 
Cabinet colleagues in mid-December during discussions of Japan’s amendments to the 
initial draft.  In the two meetings he had with Marquis Ito the following January, the first 
at Bowood and the second at the Foreign Office, Lansdowne again showed some 
concern over the issue of expanding the treaty, but not nearly as much as his colleagues.  
He certainly did not press the matter particularly hard, and never intimated that it might 
sink the agreement.47 
 Balfour did not put forward his strongest opposition to the Japanese alliance until 
mid-December, after Japan had submitted its counter-draft.  Recounting his surprise that 
there had been no warning that the alliance was to be discussed at the November 5 
Cabinet, that no papers were circulated, and that very little in depth discussion had taken 
place concerning its wider effects, Balfour put forward what he thought were the most 
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salient arguments against the treaty.  The greatest flaw in this “offensive and defensive 
alliance,” he argued, could be seen in juxtaposition to Britain joining the Triple Alliance.  
Balfour pointed out that “if war should arise out of either a German or a Japanese 
Alliance, the forces you have got to fight are exactly the same, namely, Russia and 
France; while our ally in the one case would be Japan, and in the other case the Triple 
Alliance.”  He considered the former “a much weaker partner.”  Noting as well that the 
field of combat for Britain in either case would be in European waters and on the Indian 
Frontier, neither of which would be covered by the treaty, he asserted that, “Japan will 
have a right, in certain contingencies, to call upon us to go to war with France and 
Russia in a matter which may & though indifferent to us be a matter of life and death to 
her.”  Britain, Balfour observed, had “no corresponding privileges.”  In contrast, he 
argued that in fighting for the Triple Alliance “we should be fighting for our own 
interests, and for those of civilization.”  With regard to deterrence, he also maintained 
that an alliance with Germany was the more likely to prevent war in that it “would 
probably prevent France throwing in her lot with Russia,” thus the “dangers are less and 
the gains are greater.”   
 Of lesser importance, but argued with equal intellectual force, was Balfour’s fear 
of the effect that the departure from the policy of isolation would have on both domestic 
politics and future diplomatic relations with Germany.  He pointed out that if “Hitherto 
we have always fought shy of any such engagements,” regardless if it was the right or 
wrong course, “we could at least say that we were carrying out a traditional policy of 
isolation which had proved successful in the past.”  Concluding the proposed Japanese 
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treaty would leave Britain without its traditional reasons for rejecting German advances, 
namely Britain’s traditional policy against long-term alliances and the inability of any 
parliamentary democracy to bind future governments to war.  Only six months before, 
Salisbury had vetoed the idea of Britain joining the Triple Alliance on these very bases.  
The only two excuses that would be left to the government, Balfour observed, would be 
the hostile attitude of the German and English peoples towards one another (though he 
thought this was an “argument of transitory value”), and the untrustworthy nature of the 
leaders of the Triple Alliance.  He believed the first to be inadequate, and the second 
unutterable in public.  Throughout the memorandum, however, Balfour did not explicitly 
counsel against a departure from isolation, or press wholeheartedly for a German 
alliance.  On the whole it was an argument for caution, faced with two such problematic 
choices.48   
 In his defense of the treaty, Lansdowne simply shifted the focus away from the 
consequences of the treaty if war were to break out.  Having been persuaded in 
November that a strong German agreement was not possible at present because 
Germany’s terms would bind British foreign policy and create too many permanent 
enemies among the other great powers, Lansdowne argued that the primary benefit of 
the proposed Japanese alliance was that its terms would never have to be invoked.49  He 
reasoned that “the chances of the ‘casus fodeoris’ arising are much fewer in the case of 
the Anglo Japanese agreement than they would be in that of an Anglo German 
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agreement.”  Furthermore, in answer to complaints that the treaty offered Britain too 
little in return for its guarantees to Japan, he argued that precisely because the area 
covered by the treaty was so limited, this “diminished the difficulty of explaining to the 
Germans why we are prepared to face the one but not the other liability.”  Ultimately, 
Lansdowne contended that if Britain was in any case not prepared to see Japan crushed 
by Russia and France, “may we not as well tell her so beforehand and get what we can 
out of the bargain.”50  This last point was less of a concession by the Foreign Secretary 
to realpolitik than it sounded however.  Without implying willful dissimulation, it is 
difficult to believe that Lansdowne ever expected—or even seriously sought—to secure 
much from the Japanese in support of wider British interests, or that he ever thought the 
terms of the alliance would have to be invoked.  For him, the Japanese Treaty was an 
expression of goodwill set down on paper, and termed an alliance.        
 In late December, Lansdowne asked members of the Cabinet for their comments 
on the new Japanese amendments to both the treaty, and the secret diplomatic note 
which was to cover Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation in peacetime.  Those proffered by 
Home Secretary C. T. Ritchie, Hicks-Beach, and Chamberlain again centered on the 
treaty’s one-sided appearance.  Selborne was particularly troubled by Japan’s insistence 
that each power maintain a naval force superior to the largest force of any other power in 
the region.51  The commitment of such forces by Britain, he believed, would essentially 
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undercut the treaty’s financial and strategic benefits.  All four, however, signified that 
they were prepared to accept the treaty if the rest of the Cabinet went along and, most 
importantly, if Lansdowne pressed the matter.52   
 The final decision was the Prime Minister’s, and it was of him that Lansdowne 
asked permission to “close with the Japanese” and “avoid further delay.”53  In his last 
major Cabinet memorandum, Salisbury focused his reservations on Britain’s right to be 
consulted on any actions that Japan might feel necessary to take with regard to 
protecting its interests in Korea.  If this right was not preserved, he argued, Britain 
would be “pledged to war” with “no limit: and no escape.”  He found Lansdowne’s 
admission just days before that Japan would “never accept a stipulation that she is not to 
be allowed to take without our permission measures which we might regard as 
provocative but which she would defend upon the ground that they were forced upon her 
by the conduct of Russia,” to be “somewhat disquieting.”  The Prime Minister believed 
that such a “pledge” to a foreign power would “not be sanctioned by Parliament,” and 
that “in the interests of the Empire it ought not to be taken.”  Now in the final months of 
his premiership however, and with but a year and half to live, Salisbury refrained from 
quashing the Japanese Treaty, as he had the proposed Anglo-German alliance eight 
months earlier.  While warning that Britain could not, and should not, “rely on the 
goodwill, or the prudence, or the wise policy of the present Government of Japan, 
however conspicuous at present those qualities may be,” he admitted there was “room 
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for negotiation.”54  Lord Salisbury’s direction of British foreign policy had come to an 
end.    
 Lansdowne pushed ahead despite the “very stiff” negotiating of the Japanese and 
the reservations of the Cabinet.  In order to alleviate the fears expressed by his 
colleagues, but without removing the most enticing part of the treaty for the Japanese, 
the agreement was amended to read that neither power had “any aggressive tendencies” 
in China or Korea, and that necessary measures to safeguard interests would only be 
taken if those interests should be threatened by the “aggressive action of any other 
power.”55  While the Prime Minister believed that this alteration still offered Britain “no 
security,” Lansdowne—fearful of a complete breakdown of negotiations over these 
points—argued that the new language was “nevertheless . . . worth something” in that it 
would “enable either Power to disavow the other in a case where the quarrel was a 
wanton or gratuitous one.”56  As for the naval agreement, the new British draft was 
precisely and vaguely worded to read that “Great Britain has no intention of relaxing her 
efforts to maintain, so far as may be possible, available for concentration in the waters of 
the Extreme East a naval force superior to that of any third Power.”57  These revisions 
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were handed to the Japanese on January 14 and accepted into the final draft of the treaty.  
Through the use of well-crafted vagaries that allowed for varying interpretations, the 
treaty was accepted by both governments, and Britain was now “pledged to war” over 
Korea if Japan was confronted by the combined forces of Russia and France.  
 The Anglo-Japanese Treaty signed on January 30, 1902, was in Lansdowne’s 
estimation “an entirely new departure” for British foreign policy.58  Indeed, well before 
its completion, Lansdowne had admitted that the government was “naturally a little 
nervous as to the manner in which this new departure may be regarded in Parliament & 
by the public.”59  Defending the treaty in the Lords, Lansdowne asked therefore that 
their lordships judge the treaty “strictly on its merits, and not to allow your judgment to 
be swayed by any musty formulas or old-fashioned superstitions as to the desirability of 
pursuing a policy of isolation for this country.”60  The treaty did mark a true departure 
for British foreign policy—a leap from traditional “isolation”—in as much as it was a 
long-term defensive treaty signed in peacetime.  It was something quite different from 
other British guarantees granted in the nineteenth century, such as those to Belgium 
(1839), Luxemburg (1867), or the Ottoman Empire (1878).  Britain did not rely on, or 
expect, military aid from the Belgians or the Turks in defense of the British Empire.  
Under Lansdowne’s direction, Britain signaled that it was now prepared to accept such 
assistance, and despite Lord Cranborne’s statement in the Commons that the British did 
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not “ask for treaties: we grant them,” British leadership increasingly saw such friendly 
assistance as a necessity.61   
 Most of Lansdowne’s political contemporaries also considered the Japanese 
alliance a significant departure, as affirmed by the statements of both those in the 
government as well as those in opposition.  Standing before the Commons, Balfour was 
willing to “admit” that this was “at all events in recent years, a new departure,” and he 
declared, moreover, that he would make no effort to “pretend that it is one of the 
ordinary, everyday diplomatic transactions between Power and Power.”  The reasons for 
the treaty, he argued, lay not in the “secret archives” of the Foreign Office, “but upon the 
broad facts and the large necessities of our interests and our policy in the Far East.”  He 
further stated that “It is admitted on all hands there can be no greater blow to the policy 
which not only Japan and Great Britain, but also America, Germany, all the commercial 
nations, I believe, have—their interest is also the status quo—there can be no greater 
blow to the status quo in the Far East than that two Powers should coalesce to crush 
either us or Japan.” 62  In this, Balfour both echoed Lansdowne’s defense of the treaty 
from December, and simultaneously moved beyond it in referring to Germany and 
America.63   
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 Liberal reaction was mixed, thus preventing any concerted opposition to the 
alliance, but most concurred in the belief that something momentous had occurred.  Lord 
Rosebery, a former foreign secretary as well as prime minister, welcomed the treaty and 
perhaps rendered its true significance best when he declared that its signing “would be 
felt in every part of Europe and the civilized world,” and “that is why it is so large and 
pregnant a departure.”64  Unsurprisingly, it also received the public approval of 
Lansdowne’s Liberal successor at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey.  The King 
responded to the treaty’s signing by endeavoring to make certain that Lascelles informed 
the Kaiser personally so that the minister “would be able to point out that H[is] 
M[ajesty’s] Government no longer merited the appellation of ‘unmitigated noodles,’” a 
name the Emperor had bestowed upon them the previous year.65  The German 
Government was on the whole pleased at the news, and the Kaiser “deigned” to remark 
to Lascelles that, “The noodles seem to have had a lucid interval.”66  The French and 
Russians, with understandably less enthusiasm, responded in March with their own 
declarations of mutual support for the independence of China and Korea.67     
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 Whether in public or in private, Lansdowne’s stated motivations for concluding 
the treaty remained largely the same.  In a letter to MacDonald on the day the treaty was 
signed, and later published along with it, Lansdowne pledged that the alliance was made 
strictly “for the preservation of peace, and that, should peace unfortunately be broken, it 
will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities.”68  In the House of Lords, he 
declared that the “objects” of the alliance were obvious; maintenance of the status quo in 
the Far East, maintenance of the Open Door, and the maintenance of peace.  A shift in 
foreign policy was deemed necessary, he argued, due to a changed world that now saw 
“a tendency on the part of the great Powers to form groups, . . . increasing naval and 
military armaments involving ever-increasing burdens upon the people for the defence of 
whose countries these armaments were accumulated,” and wars that could come with 
such suddenness that nations now found it necessary to be “armed to the teeth and ready 
to enter on hostilities at any moment.”  Of course, by concluding this particular treaty 
Britain was rather conspicuously not joining one of the two established great power 
groupings.  In a blatant exercise in public salesmanship, Lansdowne justified the 
decision to forge a long-term defensive alliance by arguing that “there is much greater 
danger in leaving important questions of international policy of this kind to vague and 
hazy understandings than there is in embodying them explicitly in an Agreement, the 
purport of which cannot possibly be misunderstood by those concerned.”  It was not so 
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much a call for an end to “vague and hazy understandings,” however, as it was a call for 
an end to misunderstandings.69     
 Lansdowne was quite pleased at the generally “feeble” attacks on his adjustment 
to British foreign policy, noting to Lord Curzon that the treaty had “been very well 
taken: better than I had ventured to hope.”  He confessed that he had been “prepared for 
a more widespread reluctance to abandon our old policy of isolation.”70  He had the 
support even of the old guard at the Foreign Office as well as the new, although some of 
these officials were no doubt moving at cross-purposes.  Sanderson let it be known that 
he had “always thought” and still did, that the alliance would “have a steadying effect on 
Japan,” restraining her from going after the Russians.71  Lansdowne as well dismissed 
those who believed that Britain would be dragged into a war “all over the world over 
some trivial incident . . . because the Japanese want, or may want, to have it out with 
Russia.”  He wrote to MacDonald that he did “not believe a word of it.”  “I don’t 
believe,” he wrote, that “the Japanese will allow their Jingoes to run them into a war 
with Russia.”  This assessment was based on information he had gathered from 
MacDonald, as well as on his own recent conversations with Ito and Hayashi within 
whose comments he had “detected a desire to come to an understanding with Russia as 
well as with us, &, so to speak, to insure in both offices.”72  That Lansdowne fully 
                                                 
69 Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Lords, CII, February 13, 1902, columns 1175-1177. 
 
70 Lansdowne to Curzon, February 16, 1902, FO 800/145 (Miscellaneous). 
  
71 Sanderson to Satow, May 9, 1902, BD II no.148. 
  
72 Lansdowne to MacDonald, March 31, 1902, PRO FO 800/134. 
 
 224
expected an eventual Russo-Japanese understanding to be in the offing provides us with 
a better idea of how large a part ‘balance of power’ concerns played in his foreign policy 
as compared with the idea that detached gentlemen’s diplomacy might eventually 
eliminate the world’s danger spots without resort to war.  With regard to the aggregate 
power of an alliance Lansdowne would focus almost single-mindedly on its deterrence 
value.  As it happened, the Japanese and Russians would go to war with each other twice 
over the next fifty years, with Britain allied to the latter the second time around.   
 John LeDonne has called the Anglo-Japanese Alliance “a striking victory in the 
history of containment,” and unquestionably one of its chief motives and effects was to 
blunt the Russian advance on northern China and Korea.  For Lansdowne, however, as 
opposed to the rest of the Cabinet, it was also part and parcel of his overall ‘policy of the 
entente.’  Although the Japanese Treaty went further than the partial agreements that 
Lansdowne preferred, it still conformed to the appearance that the agreements he sought 
during his time as Foreign Secretary “were not means but ends in themselves.”  This 
distinguished him clearly from Chamberlain, who sought agreements primarily to further 
a future grand Anglo-Saxon or Pan-Teutonic alliance.73  In the opinion of Paul Kennedy, 
Lansdowne belongs to the category of those in the government “whose intention was 
simply to reduce the pressures upon Britain’s global position.”  In this, however, he 
grouped Balfour and Lansdowne together in their policy of “diplomatic 
rapprochements,” while there was actually a qualitative difference between the two.74  
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While Balfour had sympathy for an Anglo-German alliance and Anglo-American 
cooperation, he retained some appreciation for his uncle’s cynically minded “free-hand.”  
Lansdowne’s pursuit of ententes with any, and preferably all, the great powers—which 
Steiner attributed to his “patience and tact” as well as “his very lack of brilliance and 
bellicosity”—was something quite different.75  His most significant adjustment to 
Salisbury’s foreign policy of the ‘free hand’ was the addition of a belief in the efficacy 
of gentlemen’s diplomacy, conducted by the elite members of Western civilization and 
carried out for the betterment of all nations and peoples.  It is therefore ironic, or tragic if 
one wishes to be generous, that in Kennedy’s considered opinion the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance—as one of the causes of the Anglo-French Entente in that it created an 
incentive for both France and Britain to avoid being entangled in a Russo-Japanese 
War—marked the beginnings of the so-called ‘encirclement’ of Germany.  Lansdowne 
anticipated none of this.76 
 In late March 1902, with the Japanese alliance successfully concluded and 
defended, Lansdowne retreated to the “Kerry wilderness” for a week’s holiday.  There 
he planted some new Japanese bulbs sent to him by MacDonald, a fellow in the “great 
clan of gardeners,” and they were to produce a fine complement to his “splendid jungle 
of bamboos.”77              
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CHAPTER VI  
 
NATURAL ALLIES AND INVETERATE ENEMIES:  
 
AMERICA AND GERMANY 
 
 
 Four months after Lansdowne put an end, rather dramatically, to Britain’s 
‘splendid isolation,’ in South Africa the remaining Boer holdouts finally agreed to lay 
down their arms.  With the war finally concluded and the coronation of the new 
sovereign set to take place in late June, Lord Salisbury decided the time had come to 
relinquish the premiership.  He intended to step down after the coronation, but with its 
postponement due to the new King’s sudden illness, Salisbury’s declining health 
permitted no further wait and he resigned office on July 11, 1902.  Hicks-Beach took the 
opportunity to retire as well, now that his biggest supporter in Cabinet was gone.  The 
‘Hotel Cecil’ continued, however, as Balfour, as fully expected, succeeded his uncle as 
leader of the Unionists and Prime Minister.  Although now free to give his full attention 
to Hatfield House and other pursuits, Salisbury’s remaining time was short, and he died 
the following summer.1  Lansdowne was already well ensconced at Derreen when word 
reached him of his former chief’s passing, so he wrote to Balfour that while it was 
“painful” to him to “seem wanting in respect” for a man he “revered,” he declined to 
attend the memorial service as he simply dreaded “another long journey to England” and 
had “been feeling the strain of office a good deal of late.”2  There was much truth in the 
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Foreign Secretary’s claim of overwhelming stress, as the prior twelve months had been 
among the most trying of his tenure at the Foreign Office, and for the ‘policy of the 
entente.’ 
 Salisbury’s resignation caused no sudden alteration in British foreign policy as 
the Cabinet had already largely detached itself from his direction.  He still on occasion 
made his views known, as he did when he unceremoniously put paid to any more 
discussion of a proposed German alliance a year earlier, but foreign policy initiatives 
were no longer of his making.  His opinions seemed never to lose their innate force, 
wisdom, or prescience, but the authority behind them had dissipated.  In replacing one of 
the Victorian era’s most eminent statesmen, Lansdowne must surely have feared being 
overwhelmed in his post as he had been at the War Office, and especially now that after 
seventeen months probation he was to be all but unsupervised.  If we are to trust in the 
recollections of J. S. Sandars, “In office,” Lansdowne “. . . w[oul]d hardly send off a 
dispatch of minor significance without getting approval,” and “w[oul]d never accept a 
public engagement (political) without referring it for observations & guidance.”3  Even 
Selborne, who liked and respected Lansdowne, believing him to possess “great 
experience [,] ability & good sense,” thought him “ridiculously diffident, & by nature 
too cautious, almost timid.”4   Five months before Salisbury resigned, the Foreign 
Secretary wrote to Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, that lately he had been “rather 
swamped by work & the number of people whom one has to see seems to increase 
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constantly,” while admitting that “Lord S[alisbury] used to intimidate his visitors & 
curtail their stay by waggling his foot at them, but I am such a light weight that I could 
not make Olympus tremble as he did if I were to attempt such demonstrations & my 
interviews are consequently prolonged.”5 
 While Salisbury’s departure might not have unleashed the joys of emancipation, 
the simultaneous resignation of Hicks-Beach must have given him some sense of relief.  
‘Black Michael’ was briefly succeeded at the exchequer by Charles Thomson Ritchie—
who was soon to resign over the issue of tariff reform—and thereafter was replaced by 
Austen Chamberlain.  Although the latter was eighteen years his junior, the Foreign 
Secretary’s correspondence with Chamberlain exhibits a palpable difference in level of 
comfort as compared to his with Hicks-Beach.  In an ongoing dispute in early 1905 over 
the proper compensation for British gendarmerie officers serving in Macedonia—
Lansdowne was requesting an additional £100 a year—the Foreign Secretary dismissed 
the friendly accusation that he was “attempting to ‘bully’ the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.”  To the contrary, he claimed he was attempting “to make an impression on 
his head or his heart by a gentle trickle of arguments.”6  Although Chamberlain refused 
to admit either that the officers were unfairly treated or underpaid, he eventually 
succumbed and approved the salary increase.7 
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 Six months later, however, after reluctantly authorizing further expenditure for 
an increase in the Foreign Office staff, Chamberlain sharply criticized his elder 
colleague’s ability effectively to manage his department.  After claiming that “the F.O. 
clerks of the Higher Division have more holidays & are less hard worked” than in his 
own office, the Chancellor informed Lansdowne that “in assenting to the increase for 
which you have asked,” 
I desire to impose upon you, if I may, that there will in future be no excuse 
for your office if they fail to do the work thoroughly & well.  And I hope 
that you will take the opportunity of stating to them what it is that you 
require & that you will insist that they give it to you.  Unless this is done, I 
have no defence for the increased expenditure. 
There is no office in the public service which has been treated more 
generously than the F.O.  Even now they retain privileges which no other 
office shares, & you have a right to demand & receive from them the best 
that men can give.8 
   
 Although pleased that the request had been granted, Lansdowne took exception 
to one or two of Chamberlain’s bold assertions.  He responded: 
No one could I venture to think read these words without inferring 
that in the past the half of my office have been indolent or indifferent, and 
that they have failed in its duty not merely because they are shorthanded but 
because they are in the habit of shirking systematically. 
Let me assure you that nothing is farther from the truth.  Many 
people believe that the FO Clerk of these days does not differ from the type 
which Thackery was so fond of describing in his novels.  I think they would 
be surprised if they knew how much hard grind and how little recreation fall 
to the lot of the modern FO Clerk. 
 
In fact, Lansdowne believed his team had been rather “overworked,” and that their work 
schedule of seven hours a day through the week, plus five or six hours on Saturday, 
compared favorably to other departments.  Moreover, he claimed that during his tenure 
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 230
he had seen several of his men “broken down from over work,” and this included 
Sanderson who had recently recovered from a serious illness.  Having also noticed that 
Chamberlain had purposely crossed out the word “private” on his letter—thus implying 
that the missive was to be relayed to the Foreign Office staff—Lansdowne informed the 
Chancellor that he himself would provide the necessary incentives for the production of 
satisfactory work to his own staff, as “The team will . . . pull more vigorously without 
such a crack of the Treasury whip as you would apparently like to administer.”9  Despite 
such a blunt exchange between the two, it does not appear to have affected their 
friendship adversely.  It does tend, however, to reinforce somewhat the negative 
elements contained in the assessments made by Sandars and Selborne.          
 Perhaps it provides a useful background as well for a better understanding of how 
Salisbury’s successor at the Foreign Office was nearly brought down over a muddled 
affair involving the Shah of Persia and the Order of the Garter.10  In mid-August of 
1902, instead of enjoying the peace of Derreen as might be expected, Lansdowne found 
himself “dancing attendance on the Shah.”11  The Persian ruler’s visit to Britain had been 
urged by Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, in an effort to improve Anglo-
Persian relations.  Persian independence and stability were essential to the security of 
India, and as a buffer zone between the possessions of the Russian and British empires 
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the country was second only in importance to Afghanistan.  Britain was losing the 
ongoing competition with Russia, however, for influence at Tehran.  Thanks to the 
Shah’s profligacy, over the preceding year Russia was threatening, through a loan of £1 
million, to become the Persian Government’s sole creditor.  Aside from paying for the 
expense of the Persian ruler’s upcoming trip to Europe, it was feared that the loan would 
also be used to repay the existing loans of British banking institutions.12 
 Lansdowne’s attention had been drawn to Persian affairs early in his tenure at the 
Foreign Office, and specifically by the “rather querulous language” employed by the 
Viceroy of India in his letters on the subject.13  Responding to Curzon’s concerns in May 
1901, Lansdowne assured him that he was equally “conscious” of the fact “that things 
have not been going well for us in Persia of late.”  Indeed, before Lansdowne had even 
read the Viceroy’s initial dispatch, he had confessed to Hardinge that he was “rather 
despondent” in the knowledge that Britain was “competing on such unequal terms with 
Russia in this part of the world.”  Nevertheless, he promised Curzon a “vigilant and not 
inactive” policy.  He eschewed the Viceroy’s ideas on the establishment of official 
Russian and British spheres of influence—in the north and south of Persia 
respectively—and he also saw “great difficulty” in Curzon’s notion of drawing a virtual 
line across the country beyond which Russian encroachment would constitute an 
automatic casus belli.  With regard to the Persian Gulf, however, Lansdowne was more 
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willing to accept an aggressive stance.  He admitted that Britain could not “expect to 
enjoy for ever the predominance we held for so long in these waters,” but he “would not 
allow Russia to acquire a footing for naval or military purposes in the Gulf.”14        
The action Lansdowne ultimately favored was to assemble the principles of 
British policy in Persia, heretofore contained in “warnings hints & intimations . . . 
scattered here & there over a number of documents from which they have to be 
disinterred,” in a comprehensive dispatch to be sent to Hardinge, who would then at the 
appropriate moment, pass it on to the Persian Government.15  It was, in effect, a warning 
to the Persian Government against ceding too much power over their country to the 
Russians, especially with regard to the ports and revenues of southern Persia and Seistan.  
The warning was drawn up that summer, but its dispatch was delayed as the Prime 
Minister wished to exhaust all avenues available in securing a British backed loan to 
Persia.  As Lansdowne had suspected, however, “the fountains of Beach’s charity” were 
“completely dry,” while the terms offered by the Government of India were 
prohibitive.16  Salisbury soon found the whole situation “sufficiently hopeless,” 
recognizing that “if the money is not found Russia will establish a practical protectorate 
[over Persia], & we can only by force save the Gulf Ports from falling into it.”  He was 
also, however, firmly against any friendly arrangement with Russia for a joint Anglo-
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Russian loan to Persia as contemplated by Lansdowne and Hardinge, as he predicted that 
Russia would merely “pretend to consider it—will waste time in colourable negotiations 
& when she has arranged matters to her liking will decline any cooperation with us.”17  
As noted in the previous chapter, Lansdowne’s subsequent proposal to Russia, which he 
expanded to include a settlement of Anglo-Russian differences in both Persia and 
Manchuria, met with predictable failure.  When after further consideration, the Indian 
Exchequer in December did offer a loan of half million pounds, having been led to 
believe by the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, that this would be 
acceptable, the Persian Government was ordered by the Russians not to accept.18  
Lansdowne did have some, albeit slight, hopes of achieving an Anglo-Russian 
agreement.  Monger was correct in arguing that “there is nothing to show that the only 
virtue of the scheme for him lay in its likely rejection.”19  Angry at shabby Russian 
dealing, however, Lansdowne wrote to Curzon in February 1902, that he “hope[d] some 
day or other to bring out the fact that we offered the Russian Gov[ernmen]t to play 
cartes sur table with them about China & Persia, & that they refused.”20  The Viceroy 
responded that there was “no greater fallacy in contemporaneous politics than the idea 
that England can come to an agreement with Russia over Asia,” without paying too high 
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a price.21  Although the Foreign Secretary wished he could disagree “as to the 
impossibility of an agreement with Russia over Asiatic questions,” as matters stood in 
April 1902, he feared such a conclusion was “irresistible.”22          
A dispatch containing the principles of British policy in Persia was finally sent to 
Hardinge in early January 1902.  Notwithstanding the delay, from the beginning 
Salisbury had been quite content to accept Lansdowne’s judgment, but his “own prima 
facie apprehension” was that Persia would “certainly choose Russia rather than England 
to follow because Russia can do her the greatest amount of harm.”23  Following the 
initial failure to secure money for a loan to Persia, Salisbury was in fact “in favour of a 
more definite statement” than the Foreign Secretary originally proposed; one that would 
maintain that “under all the circumstances of the case G[rea]t Britain cannot acquiesce in 
the establishment by any other Power of a fiscal control over the Gulf Ports.”24  The 
dispatch stated as much and warned the Persian Government that Russian acquisition of 
a military or naval station on the Persian Gulf would be “regarded as a challenge to 
Great Britain and a menace to her Indian Empire.”  Moreover, it stated that if, “in the 
face of our warnings, the Persian Government should elect to encourage the advance of 
Russian political influence and intervention” in southern Persia, where His Majesty’s 
Government held a recognized superior interest to any other power, “it might no longer 
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be possible to make the integrity and independence of Persia their first object as 
hitherto.”25  Nearly a year and a half later, Lansdowne told the House of Lords that while 
Britain did not wish to exclude the legitimate commercial trade of other powers in the 
Gulf, “we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the 
Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we 
should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.” He made this declaration, 
however, “in no minatory spirit.”26          
In the meantime, the Shah was set to visit Britain in the summer of 1902.  The 
idea for the visit was first broached by Hardinge in early March 1901, and had been 
greeted immediately with disfavor by King Edward due to Queen Victoria’s recent 
passing.  Moreover, the royal schedule for the following year was due to be rather full, 
not least of all because of the planned coronation in late June.27  In addition to the visit, 
Hardinge also had sought to confirm that the Shah would receive the Order of the Garter 
while in England, but Lansdowne warned him that it would be “most difficult,” or more 
likely “impossible,” for the Persian ruler to become a member of the traditionally 
Christian order.28  Most importantly, it was the King himself who believed that the 
statutes of the Order excluded all non-Christians, and from this conclusion he refused to 
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budge.  In fact, Victoria had bestowed the Garter on the Sultan of Turkey, as well as the 
Shah’s own father, but subsequently changed the rules.29   
With the renewed sense of crisis in Anglo-Persian relations, Hardinge again 
suggested that the Shah be invited to visit, specifically so that His Majesty might witness 
for himself Britain’s power.  He argued that “The sight of London, of our resources, etc., 
and a cordial reception by the King and British Government would,” he was sure, “have 
an excellent effect.”30  The visit was arranged eventually for August 1902 following the 
coronation, and Lansdowne now took the lead in attempting to obtain the Garter for the 
Shah.  In June he asked the King to consider altering the statutes, and there was now 
some added urgency as Hardinge was now reporting from Tehran that the Shah still 
expected to receive the Garter on his visit.  The British Minister had chosen not to 
disabuse him of this notion.31  Indeed, Hardinge reported that the Garter was one of the 
Persian ruler’s “chief incentives in visiting England.32  When finally the Shah arrived in 
England it was a mere nine days after the King’s postponed coronation (due to illness—
an “acute peritonitis”), and His Majesty still had no intention of giving in.33  
According to Lansdowne’s account of events, when the Shah discovered he was 
not going receive the Garter it produced in him “a very marked depression.”  It then 
“became clear” to the Foreign Secretary “that if this decision was to hold the field, all 
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our hospitalities would be overshadowed by this rebuff.”  He prepared to make one last 
attempt to change that decision at a luncheon held for the Shah on the Royal yacht at 
Portsmouth on August 20.  Lansdowne wrote to Balfour two days after the event that he 
was authorized by the King to draw up a memorandum stating that the Garter statutes 
were to be altered soon, and the Persian ruler would eventually obtain his prize.  
According to the Foreign Secretary, the hastily drafted memorandum was read by the 
King during the luncheon and approved, and subsequent to this seemingly with the 
King’s permission, the Shah’s aids were informed.34 
When the King heard a few days later that the Garter was to be granted to the 
Shah, he reportedly exploded with anger.  The dispatch His Majesty sent to Lansdowne 
on August 23 rescinding the Garter maintained that the King merely “consented the 
other day to consider any proposal to alter the statutes,” but he “never intended that these 
alterations should be rushed through in order to meet present difficulty, or that the Shah 
should know anything about it.”  With a tone of finality, he added: “I cannot have my 
hand forced.”35  Upon receipt of the King’s angry retraction, Lansdowne turned to 
Balfour for assistance and undoubtedly some form of intervention, sending him the 
King’s dispatch, and the following more detailed account of what transpired on the royal 
yacht: 
I am not surprised that the King should have negatived my proposal, 
but there is a suggestion which I must resent, in his telegram .viz. that I 
exceeded my instructions when I made known to the Shah through the grand 
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Vizier that the King intended to revise the statutes, and that the new (non-
Christian) Garter would be given the Shah. 
The fact is that the King wishes to change his mind again, and would 
like to throw me over.  That is a position which I could not possibly accept.  
My face, and for matter of that, the King’s face too, would be blackened for 
ever, if I did. 
The King’s instructions were unequivocal.  He authorized me to 
draw the mem[orand]um.  He gave me an audience before I left the yacht, 
and approved what I had written, and I distinctly told him that, although I 
did not contemplate giving the mem[orand]um to the Persians, I could speak 
to them in the sense of it.  It is moreover obvious that there was no occasion 
for saying anything in much of a hurry, unless for the purpose of reassuring 
the Shah. 
Meanwhile an unknown situation is now to arise when the Press here 
and on the continent ask, and endeavor to answer the question “why were no 
decorations given and received on the occasion of the Shah’s visit?” 
 
With this the Foreign Secretary escorted the Shah to Dover, and thereafter took himself 
to Ireland to begin his delayed holiday.36 
 Although it is impossible to know for sure whose version of events was the more 
accurate, the King’s or that of his Foreign Secretary, Simon Heffer has concluded that: 
“For Lansdowne, in his advanced distress, the wish appears to have been the father to the 
thought.”37  While this accords rather intriguingly with Sandars’s appraisal that the 
marquis was “the most scrupulous—if not meticulous—of all the Ministers” he knew, 
Lansdowne’s immediate and detailed recollection of events, and contention that such a 
hurried proceeding could have only one purpose, are quite compelling.38  If indeed there 
were misunderstandings on both sides, more likely than not the King was responsible for 
the greater portion.   
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The King did not respond kindly to the Foreign Secretary’s further attempts to 
rectify the situation.  In a letter apparently softened by Ponsonby, he informed 
Lansdowne that “If the Shah leaves this country in the sulks like a spoilt child because 
he cannot get what he wants, it cannot be helped.39  On August 26, His Majesty 
requested that Lansdowne “allow the matter to drop.”40  The Foreign Secretary thus 
continued to appeal to Balfour, who had yet to intervene.  Writing from Derreen, he 
advised the Prime Minister that “If the King remains obdurate there is so far as I can see 
only one way out for me, and that will be ‘out’ in the most literal sense of the word.”41  
A week later, Lansdowne appeared relatively more optimistic about his situation, 
informing Hardinge that he wanted “to allow a little time for the Garter tempest to 
subside,” but was “not without hopes that before you reach Tehran the outlook will have 
altered considerably.”42  Balfour hesitated to act, however, so on September 16, and 
while still in Ireland, Lansdowne wrote to the Prime Minister asking when he might be 
back in London as “it will be necessary to approach the King soon about the Garter,” and 
suggested that he “could probably do more by talking than by writing to him.”43 
 When Balfour did finally intervene, visiting Balmoral in mid-September, he did 
not talk to the King directly about the Garter, but instead had a long conversation with 
Knollys.  The Prime Minister reported to Lansdowne that unfortunately the King still felt 
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“very strongly” about the matter, and refused to “admit apparently that he gave any 
assent to the memorandum which you shewed him, and thinks he has been ‘rushed.’”  
For his part, Balfour informed his friend that it was “all very unfortunate,” but that he 
was “very unwilling to bring matters to a deadlock by any incautious step at the present 
moment.”44 
 At the beginning of October Lansdowne was back in London, though not at 
Lansdowne House as it was “in the hands of the sanitary engineers.”  Rather wanly, he 
wrote to Balfour: “heaven knows when I shall get into it again, or whether I shall not be 
a ruined man when I do.”45  Despite his Foreign Secretary’s mounting anxiety, however, 
the Prime Minister did not push the issue until November.  When he did, he threatened 
the King with the resignation of the whole government if His Majesty did not back 
down.  The ‘Christian’ Garter was bestowed finally on the Shah in January 1903 by a 
special mission to Tehran, upon the condition that the King would never again have to 
grant it to a non-Christian.46  Lansdowne’s Garter “nightmare” was over, and the King 
complained that “no sovereign had ever before been so treated or so insulted.”47  Three 
years later when the issue arose of the Garter being bestowed on the Emperor of Japan, 
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Lansdowne again asked Balfour to broach the matter with the King, and despite His 
Majesty’s previous stipulation on this occasion he consented without incident.48 
 The working relationship between Lansdowne and Balfour was without doubt an 
intimate one and largely informal.  In their correspondence Lansdowne was addressed 
invariably as ‘Clan’, while Balfour was ‘Arthur.’  Their reputation as a near synchronous 
pair with regard to the direction of British foreign policy lasted long after their brief 
three years together as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.  Labour premier Harold 
Wilson, who had four foreign secretaries in eight years in the 1960s and 70s, cited 
Lansdowne and Balfour as an example of an ideal ministerial partnership, although 
admittedly he did so largely as a justification for his own interference in foreign affairs.49  
Balfour remarked to his niece, Blanche Dugdale, in 1923 that indeed, “it’s the rarest 
thing when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister don’t clash,” and “you can’t expect 
the P.M. not to interfere with Foreign Office business.”  Moreover, noting that “It’s only 
when you get a combination of two men who see absolutely eye to eye and work in 
perfect harmony that you can avoid it,” he added that Lansdowne and he undoubtedly 
“were one of those rare cases.”50  On one of the rare occasions the marquis infringed on 
the Prime Minister’s prerogative by submitting directly some diplomatic appointments, 
Sandars informed the Foreign Secretary that, “As long as two ministers like Mr. Balfour 
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& L[or]d Lansdowne are in office nothing matters with regard to their respective spheres 
of influence & authority.”51  Lansdowne appeared to show as little concern for the 
premier’s interest in his department, for eight months later, before the Junior 
Constitutional Club, he proudly declared to his audience that “there has been no Prime 
Minister who has given a closer and more unremitting attention to the foreign affairs of 
this country than Mr. Balfour.”52  These various statements have, however, taken on 
some unjustified negative connotations over the years, none more so than the assessment 
given by Austen Chamberlain, who in his political memoir echoed Sandars when he 
asserted that it was “safe to say that Lansdowne took no important step and sent no 
important despatch without consulting” Balfour, and added that the latter played an 
indispensable role “in conceiving and shaping” the marquis’s foreign policy.53   
 It is more difficult to discern the exact nature of Balfour and Lansdowne’s 
personal relationship.  In 1929, two years after the marquis’s death, Balfour told his 
niece that he was “always very fond” of Lansdowne; they had known each other since 
their days at Eton where Balfour was Lansdowne’s fag.54  In 1895, before the marquis 
had entered the Cabinet, it was he who was appointed to sound out Balfour privately 
about being nominated to join “the club,” the famous dinner club founded by Dr. 
                                                 
51 Sandars to Eric Barrington, March 3, 1905, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 5, Private 
Letters: Prime Minister, f142. 
 
52 Lansdowne’s speech on November 6, 1905, The Times, November 7, 1905, p. 6. 
 
53 Chamberlain, Down the Years, pp. 209-210. 
 
54 Balfour quoted in Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, Vol. I, pp. 335-336. 
 
 243
Johnson of which Lansdowne himself was only recently made a member.55  Lord 
Newton informs us, however, that while among Conservatives Lansdowne probably had 
more in common with Balfour “than with anyone else,” he “probably felt more affinity 
with [Liberal] men like Lord Crewe and Sir Edward Grey.”56  Moreover, while it is 
certain that Balfour paid visits to Bowood over the years, as of August 1904 he had yet 
to travel out to see Derreen, which the marquis longed to show him.  Lansdowne 
acknowledged good-naturedly that this was no doubt due to the fact that “there is no golf 
course.”57  In addition, no matter how “fond” of the marquis he truly was, or how many 
times he made a point of noting how well they worked together, it is difficult to ignore 
that Balfour found his friend wanting intellectually, remarking to his niece that he would 
not have called Lansdowne “very clever,” but rather, “better than competent.”58  
Certainly in their political relationship Balfour had occasion to find his Foreign 
Secretary a distinct liability, and if Balfour was initially hesitant to back his friend 
energetically over the Garter episode, there is little evidence that he maintained even 
friendly or trivial contact with Lansdowne in the ten-year period between the publication 
of the ‘Peace Letter’ in November 1917, and the marquis’s death in 1927.   
 However close and harmonious the working relationship might have been, as we 
have already seen, their foreign policies were in fact more disparate in nature than has 
been heretofore acknowledged.  Although these differences in policy were often quite 
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subtle and centered on the motivation behind their rhetoric more than the actual words, 
they are all the more easily understood as witnessed in the near identical speeches both 
gave on foreign affairs in final months of 1902.  In mid-November at the annual Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet at the Guildhall, the Prime Minister told those assembled that the 
extant dangers that menaced “the peace of mankind” could “be found almost entirely at 
those points where the higher civilization come into contact with the less high 
civilization,” and it was the “great task of European and international statesmanship to 
take care that when these dangers occur they do not menace the peace of the world.”  
Moreover he called for an end to “those international prejudices and jealousies” still 
harbored by the great powers.  Lastly, and with great rhetorical flourish, he encouraged 
European statesmen above all “to continue that great policy of the European concert,” 
and to “cultivate . . . that spirit of international tolerance, international comprehension, 
and, if it may be, international friendship and international love.”59  Impressive rhetoric 
to be sure, but in Paris, the liberal Journal des Débats felt obliged to “hope that this 
pacific peroration was not inspired by mere rhetorical considerations.”60  There is no 
reason to doubt that the peaceful sentiments Balfour expressed were sincere, but he 
never would have applied them liberally, without a fair amount of skepticism, to the 
world in which he lived.  Little more than a year later when Japan and Russia were on 
the verge of war—a war Lansdowne refused to believe would actually take place—
Balfour declared to Selborne that he detested all war, and “on general principles [he] 
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would always try to stop it,” but added, “that if any war could be conceived as being 
advantageous to us, this is one.”61  Another year after this, with an offer of mediation 
having been put forward by the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, the Prime 
Minister informed Lansdowne that while he was “on broad moral grounds, very anxious 
that we should do everything we can to put an end to the war,” he had admit that “from a 
narrowly national point of view, the balance of advantage, I suspect, is on the side of 
continued hostilities.”62   
 A month after Balfour’s speech, before the members of the United Club, 
Lansdowne echoed his premier in identifying those few points of danger that threatened 
the peace of the world as existing primarily where “higher civilization[s]” allowed 
themselves to be played off against each another by the “less well-governed” “inferior 
civilization.”  Lacking the lofty sentiments and grandiloquence of his chief, he expressed 
the hope that in any future dispute the western powers involved would deal with one 
another squarely, fairly and frankly, and “endeavor to settle the business upon business 
like principles.”  Having with sincerity turned the liberal theory on international relations 
of Cobden and Bright somewhat on its head, he acknowledged, however, that these 
“elementary and crude ideas” might prove after further experience to have been the “dry 
dream of a novice” and might need modification or outright rejection.63  His “elementary 
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and crude” diplomatic ideals were thus to be applied both actively and liberally, but were 
also to be sorely tested. 
 Turning to international prejudices and jealousies, Lansdowne pointed to a recent 
article by Captain Mahan in the National Review in which the author reiterated George 
Washington’s warning against “permanent inveterate antipathies against particular 
nations.”64  The Foreign Secretary, an avid admirer of Mahan, found it “excellent 
advice,” but believed strongly that Britain was not “in the habit of cherishing any 
antipathies of that kind.”  He proudly noted that at that very moment British and German 
warships were acting in concert off the coast of Venezuela to enforce the repayment of 
defaulted debts.65  In his essay, Mahan specifically deplored the poisoning effect that 
“impassioned feeling,” “misplaced emotion,” and “bitter temper” had on Anglo-German 
relations.  Such ill-sentiment, he admitted, continued to “prevent a co-operation among 
the three Teutonic states,” which he believed inevitable.  Mahan maintained that 
geography alone made Britain and Germany natural allies with common national 
interests.  If by chance the antipathy that currently existed unfortunately should endure, 
however, he was gratified to note that “the permanent facts are too strong for it to do 
more than dash harmlessly against them.”66  He could not have been more wrong; the 
immutable elements of man’s nature were not so easily cowed by geography.   
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As to how many of Mahan’s assertions Lansdowne subscribed one can only 
speculate, but he was quite pleased to declare the fact that Britain held no inveterate 
antipathies toward any of the great powers, or even Venezuela.  He welcomed the extant 
rumors that Britain and France were on the verge of a settlement of all outstanding 
disputes between the two nations, and regretted that he was forced to deny them.  The 
Foreign Secretary also cautioned that he was not suggesting that they were “on the eve 
of a sort of international millennium, but . . . the more the Great Powers knew each 
other, the more they acted together, the more they trusted one another, the better it would 
be for the interests of all for the peace of the world.”67   
Having found no inveterate antipathies, Lansdowne asked if there was in fact a 
nation to whom Britain was “united by feelings of inveterate sympathy.”  Indeed there 
was one, he declared, Britain’s “kinsmen across the sea”: the United States.68  If any 
alliance might truly have seemed inevitable and natural it was the burgeoning, although 
informal, Anglo-American ‘special relationship.’  Its foundations were equally the fears 
of the British for the security of their empire, outstanding disputes between the two 
countries which were solvable, and the lack of any perceived threat from America due to 
a cultural and personal affinity between the two peoples. 
Salisbury never showed much concern for American feelings with regard to 
British foreign policy, and American military weakness only reinforced this stance.  He 
never contemplated a special relationship with a country, it is fair to say, he actively 
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disliked.  Following the failure of a Joint High Commission appointed in 1898 to settle 
outstanding Anglo-American disputes—the US was unwilling to link concessions with 
regard to the Alaskan Boundary to more favorable terms in other disputes—Salisbury 
was even less inclined to be accommodating toward the United States.69  Chamberlain 
and Balfour, however, were once again advocates of charting a new course.  The 
Colonial Secretary, whose third wife was American, famously exclaimed in May 1898 
that “terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and 
noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an 
Anglo-Saxon alliance.”70  As for Balfour, Jason Tomes tells us that “Anglo-American 
co-operation” was one of the few topics that moved him to “hyperbole.”71  According to 
Sandars, his boss would not allow Americans to be referred to as foreigners, or America 
as a foreign state.72  Balfour was certain that the “co-heirs of Anglo-Saxon freedom and 
civilisation” were “pre-destined to pray and work together for the great aim of 
civilisation and progress.”73  At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in early 1904, 
the Prime Minister was certain that “If the Americans would so far violate their tradition 
as to make a suggestion of an alliance for the purpose of preserving by arms, if 
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necessary, the integrity of China, it w[oul]d open a new era in the history of the 
world.”74  
There were numerous other lower level British Government officials also 
working for Anglo-American rapprochement.  The most significant of these were the 
English friends and correspondents of Theodore Roosevelt, who was destined to become 
President of the great American republic in September 1901 with the assassination of 
William McKinley.  The future president had met Sir Cecil Spring-Rice on shipboard 
heading to England in 1886, and not long afterward the British diplomat served as 
Roosevelt’s best man.75  Spring-Rice became a close family friend of the Roosevelts, 
and the President would later break convention and lobby for his friend’s appointment as 
British Ambassador to Washington.  Spring-Rice eventually did fill that post, but not 
until after Roosevelt had left office.  In the meantime, however, the two exchanged 
numerous letters which touched on major international issues of the day, and this 
correspondence informally made its way into the hands of Lansdowne and Balfour.  
Another of these human conduits of Anglo-American friendship was Arthur Hamilton 
Lee who served as British military attaché to the American army in Cuba during the 
Spanish-American War.  It was there in 1898 that he met Roosevelt and they became 
fast friends.  Indeed, it was the war itself that altered Roosevelt’s overall attitude toward 
Britain.  He wrote to Lee in July 1900 that Britain’s attitude and benign neutrality during 
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the war had “worked a complete revolution in my feelings.”76  In spite of his own Dutch 
heritage, six months earlier Roosevelt had all but committed himself to the success of 
Anglo-Saxon civilization worldwide when he wrote to St. Loe Strachey that he felt “very 
strongly . . . that it is the interest of the English-speaking peoples, and therefore of 
civilization, that English should be the tongue South of the Zambesi, and the peaceful 
fusion of the races and the development of South African civilization can best go on 
under the British flag.”77 
It is difficult to ignore the expressions of insecurity in the letters of Spring-Rice 
and Lee as both gave voice to their perceptions of Britain’s relative decline.  Their 
missives were in many ways pleas to the savior of Anglo-Saxon civilization—Teddy 
Roosevelt’s America.  In November 1897, Spring-Rice confessed to Roosevelt: “I 
daresay the British part of the common inheritance is going down hill; all the more 
reason to look after the other.”78  When Lee stood for Parliament as a Conservative in 
1900 he informed Roosevelt that “One of the chief planks in my platform was ‘Friendly 
with America’ and you will be glad to hear that it was perhaps the most popular of all 
my planks—a fact which was no doubt largely due to the striking object lesson I was 
able to show in my American wife.”79  Lee also considered it a point of pride that his 
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nickname in the House of Commons was “The member for America,” although he was 
not the first to hold that title.80  One of the primary motivations for Lee’s political career 
in fact was his belief that “the future relations between England and America are going 
to form the joint upon which the whole future of the Anglo-Saxon race will hinge,” and 
he asked “nothing better than to essay the part of a drop of oil to lubricate that joint.”81  
In accordance with this performance, Lee did indeed have what he referred to as a 
“useful talk” with Lansdowne, and judged that he was able to “correct . . . a certain 
number of curious misapprehensions” the Foreign Secretary held with regard to 
President Roosevelt’s personality and policy.82 
Lee’s sanguine assessment with regard to his ability to influence important 
personages notwithstanding, the talk appears to have been rather less than persuasive.  
Lansdowne, like Salisbury, was never drawn to America on an emotional or cultural 
level like some of his Cabinet colleagues.  It was Balfour who pointed out to his niece 
that the marquis “wasn’t quite an Englishman,” as “His mother was French.”83  
Lansdowne became cognizant in 1901 of Lee’s unique insight with regard to American 
matters in part on the recommendation of Moreton Frewen.  Although he admitted that 
the latter was something of a “wild cat,” the Foreign Secretary believed Frewen—who 
was married to Jennie Jerome’s sister Clara—had lived a great deal among Americans 
                                                 
80 Lee to Roosevelt, November 22, 1903, Theodore Roosevelt Papers.  Richard Cobden had been known 
by the same title. 
 
81 Lee to Roosevelt, July 19, 1900, quoted in Burton, “Theodore Roosevelt and his English 
Correspondents,” pp. 31-32. 
 
82 Lee to Roosevelt, December 17, 1901, Theodore Roosevelt Papers. 
 
83 Balfour quoted in Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, Vol. I, pp. 335-336. 
 
 252
and therefore “knows more than most people about them & their ways.”  When he 
informed Balfour of Lee’s potential usefulness in Anglo-American relations, Lansdowne 
had to admit, however, to being a little behind the curve as he had met Lee already at 
Balfour’s house.84  The Foreign Secretary never did shake off his cautious view of 
Roosevelt.  Frewen informed him that it was believed by some in America that 
Roosevelt, like the German Emperor, was afflicted with “scrofulous activity.”85  Nearly 
four years later Lansdowne confessed to Balfour that he found the American President to 
be “a very attractive personality, but he is the kind of person who might be very 
awkward to handle in certain circumstances.”86  Not long after this, he famously wrote to 
the Prime Minister: “Roosevelt terrifies me almost as much as the German Emperor.”87  
That the American President failed to measure up was likely due to the Foreign 
Secretary’s suspicion that one was more likely to fall under the influence of the other.88  
Although Lansdowne had been informed that while Roosevelt “really liked the 
Emperor,” he too “thought him very dangerous,” this revelation had seemingly little 
impact on his opinion of the President.89 
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When Lansdowne assumed control of the Foreign Office in the fall of 1900, 
unsurprisingly he was anxious to foster better relations with America.  Already before 
the Cabinet at the time was the First Hay-Pauncefote Treaty which had been signed in 
February, and which would have allowed the United States to construct and manage a 
neutral, unfortified, isthmian canal.  In reality, the treaty was a revision of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty of 1850, whose terms required that any future canal be subject to joint 
Anglo-American control.  As the canal treaty passed through the US Senate, however, it 
acquired three significant amendments of its own which fundamentally altered the 
original terms to which the Cabinet had agreed.  Clayton-Bulwer was now to be 
completely superseded by Hay-Pauncefote, the clause that allowed other nations to 
adhere to the treaty’s provisions was omitted, and notwithstanding the retention of the 
clause forbidding fortifications, the soon to be passed ‘Davis amendment’ would allow 
the United States to take necessary measures to defend and police the canal, virtually 
abrogating the spirit of the original and recently signed treaties.90 
Lord Pauncefote, Britain’s Minister and later Ambassador in Washington since 
1889, expressed that in his opinion “it would be wiser to accept it [the Davis 
amendment] than lose the Treaty by its rejection.”  Moreover, he warned that if the 
amendment was not accepted by the Cabinet, the Senate would likely push forward with 
the more extreme Hepburn Bill which would completely abrogate Clayton-Bulwer 
without any consultation.91  Lansdowne first consulted Salisbury, who was now inclined 
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to reject the amended treaty, but in a Cabinet memorandum drafted for a meeting on 
December 14, the new Foreign Secretary put forward “that public opinion in the United 
States runs so high in favour of an American canal, defended by whatever measures of 
precaution may seem good to the United States, that we shall be unable to stem the tide.”  
While recognizing that Britain might not be able in the end to stop America from 
building its canal, Lansdowne was nevertheless determined not to acquiesce “without 
raising difficulties.”92  The motivation behind Lansdowne’s subsequent policy decisions 
can be found in his private letter to Pauncefote written shortly after the Cabinet had 
decided that it would not accept the amended treaty.  He admitted to the ambassador that 
“Whether the [Davis] Amendment will have any practical effects injurious to our 
interests” he did “not feel at all sure, but we have, it seems to me to consider the moral 
as well as the material results which would follow from the virtual abrogation of the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty without our consent.”  Lansdowne had not decided to ‘bluff’ for 
better terms, as Grenville’s standard interpretation of events maintains, so much as hold 
out for more gentlemanly conduct from the Americans.  He had no intention of cutting 
off further negotiations, but as he informed Pauncefote, “Much it seems to me will 
                                                                                                                                                
document no.142.  Pauncefote’s attitude can be explained in part by his conviction that the Nicaraguan 
canal would in fact never be built (See Pauncefote to Lansdowne, December 21, 1900, PRO FO 800/144, 
and Pauncefote to Lansdowne, December 25, 1900, PRO FO 800/144). 
 
92 Lansdowne memorandum, December 13, 1900, excerpted in J. A. S. Grenville, “Great Britain and the 
Isthmian Canal, 1898-1901,” The American Historical Review Vol. 61, Issue 1, (October, 1955): 64. 
 
 255
depend upon the manner in which we are approached by the U.S. Gov[ernmen]t., 
whenever it considers that the time has come for eliciting our views.”93 
Notwithstanding the private attempts of the US Secretary of State, John Hay, to 
alleviate British sensibilities, Lansdowne believed the United States Government had 
behaved “in a singular fashion over the amendments question,” publicly throwing them 
“on to the table of the F[oreign]. O[ffice]. . . . without a word of apology or 
explanation.”94  Responding to the news from Pauncefote that Hay had tendered his 
resignation over the matter and only with great difficulty was convinced to remain in 
office, the Foreign Secretary was only “very sorry that Hay has shown so little courage.”  
Moreover, he maintained that if the Secretary of State “had persevered with his 
resignation he would have stood in a very dignified position.”95 
Lansdowne set the course of British policy more firmly in his Cabinet 
memorandum of January 15, 1901, in which he argued that the amended treaty, if put 
forward by the United States for British approval, should be rejected.96  This decision 
came after the Admiralty had produced its own analysis of the US amendments, but 
although the Admiralty noted firmly in its conclusions that it was “not in the interests of 
Great Britain that it [the canal] should be constructed,” it conceded that “control of the 
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canal would rest with the Power which was able to place a superior naval force in 
position to command the approaches to either entrance, quite independently of Treaties 
or Agreements with the United States alone.”  Moreover, it was admitted that “the 
amendments inserted by the United States’ Senate appear to be comparatively 
immaterial, and introduce no new principle into the question.”97  When Lansdowne 
maintained in his January 15 memorandum, therefore, that the Admiralty’s views meant 
that “while the Davis amendment would strengthen the hold of the United States upon 
the canal, it would probably not do so very materially,” he was not “skillfully turning 
upside down the conclusions reached by the Admiralty” as Grenville famously argued, 
but merely echoing what was longstanding British naval analysis of the situation.98  
Moreover, as noted in his letter to Pauncefote a month earlier, the Foreign Secretary was 
doubtful from the first as to whether the Davis amendment would have any practical 
effect on British interests.  It was agreed by the Cabinet, therefore, to await an 
alternative proposal from the US Government containing better terms, and offered in a 
more courteous manner. 
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The official British rejection of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was dispatched to the 
British Ambassador in February, but at Hay’s suggestion it was held until the end of the 
congressional session in mid-March in order to prevent the Senate from passing the 
Hepburn Bill which would in turn have forced the Secretary of State’s resignation.99  
Hand delivered by Pauncefote on March 11, 1902, the rejection was as conciliatory as 
possible, according to Lansdowne, without Britain incurring any undue “loss of self 
respect.”100  Vice-President Roosevelt, who did not favor the treaty, believed 
Lansdowne’s position “both mischievous and ridiculous.”101  The Foreign Secretary had 
left the door open to further negotiations and hopefully more advantageous terms, 
however, and was rewarded with a new canal treaty proposal from Hay on April 24, 
along with a proposal for the arbitration of the Alaskan boundary dispute by an arbitral 
tribunal consisting of “six impartial jurists of repute.”102  In his Cabinet memorandum of 
July 6, Lansdowne argued that the government should “be glad to find an amicable 
solution of this troublesome question” of the isthmian canal, and this was now possible 
as the conditions offered were more favorable than before, and “it is open to us, now that 
we are approached in a very different spirit by Mr. Hay, to deal somewhat less strictly 
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with him so far as matters of form are concerned.”103  The Second Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty, which was eventually signed on November 11, 1901, completely superseded 
Clayton-Bulwer, recognized the Unites States’ rights to “police” the canal, while 
omitting the clause that forbid fortification, and guaranteed neutralization of the canal 
for all nations adhering to the rules of the treaty.104   
These hardly appeared to be the better conditions that Lansdowne and the British 
Government delayed nine months to achieve, but Kenneth Bourne credited the Foreign 
Secretary with pointing out that “foreign policy must be adapted to power as much as 
power to foreign policy.”  In a rather short period following the Second Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty, the waters of the Caribbean and soon the Western Hemisphere were turned over 
to the younger great Anglo-Saxon world power.105  Moreover, less than a week after the 
canal treaty was signed the Admiralty made it clear that the United States Navy should 
not, and could not, be factored into calculations on which the Two-Power Standard was 
based.106  It does not appear, however, that Lansdowne was simply recognizing rising 
American power in his policy decisions, as in these very months he had also approached, 
or been open to approaches by, Germany, Russia, and Japan.  Appeasement of America 
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was certainly practical politics within his overall scheme of the ‘policy of the entente,’ 
but the special nature of Anglo-American rapprochement was an unintended by-product 
as far as the Foreign Secretary was concerned.  It was even to prove problematic for him 
in the near future.   
Anglo-American rapprochement was delayed in fact by the importance 
Lansdowne attached to diplomatic form.  In some regard Grenville was closer to the real 
truth in his conclusions when he argued that “In resisting the pressure for one-sided 
abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, he [the Foreign Secretary] preserved the good 
name of the United States and ensured that the adhesion of the United States to an 
international compact was sufficient guarantee of its observance in the future by her.”107  
Proper form meant a great deal to Lansdowne, but in reality he had ensured nothing by 
the delay.  The unique ‘special relationship’ that developed between Britain and the 
United States—which significantly did not develop between Britain and any other major 
European or Asian power—was not then the product of gentlemen’s diplomacy, liberal 
theory, or simple imperial necessity.  Anglo-American antagonism dissipated in the end 
due to the draw of dormant—or seemingly endlessly resurrected—racial, cultural, and 
tribal affinities.  Thus Balfour was pleased with the agreement in a way the Foreign 
Secretary never fully comprehended, for the former recognized that “with England at 
Suez and the US at Panama we should hold the world in a pretty strong grip.”108   
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With the canal treaty now out of the way, and relations between Britain and the 
United States the best they had been in a great while, both Lansdowne and Pauncefote 
believed it would be a mistake to delay any longer in tackling the last great menace to 
Anglo-American friendship.  Resolving the dispute over the Alaskan boundary would 
“give us that clean slate,” wrote Lansdowne, “which we all so much desire.”109  Less 
than a week after the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed, Lansdowne directed 
Pauncefote to approach Hay with regard to his arbitration proposal of the previous April, 
only to find that the situation had changed radically with the succession of Roosevelt to 
the American presidency.  Pauncefote reported back in late March that “the President 
considers the claim of the United States is so manifestly clear and unanswerable that he 
is not disposed to run the risk of sacrificing American territory under a compromise 
which is the almost certain result of an Arbitration.”110 
The existing boundary of the Alaskan panhandle, as vague as it was, had been set 
by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1825.  By the terms of the treaty the boundary 
between Russian and British territory would follow the summit of the mountains that ran 
roughly parallel to the coast, but where the summit ran at a distance further than ten 
marine leagues (35 miles) from the shore, the demarcation line would follow the 
coastline at a distance no further than ten marine leagues.  Demarcation of a more 
precise boundary concerned few until gold was found in the Canadian Yukon in 1897, 
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after which even the establishment of a temporary line became impossible.  As the inlets 
and ports of the Alaskan panhandle, especially the Lynn Canal, offered the best access to 
the gold fields and thereby controlled the trade of the whole region, Canada argued that 
the boundary line should in fact be drawn across the headwaters of the canal and other 
river inlets.  Such a line of course would place the existing port settlements and inlets 
themselves under Canadian jurisdiction.  The United States had exercised de facto 
control over the areas in question and port settlements therein for some time, however, 
and had encountered little or no Canadian protest.111  Canada persisted in its claim, but 
with the failure of the Joint High Commission as well as efforts to link the dispute to the 
nascent canal treaty negotiations, further delay appeared harmful to Canadian interests 
and so a modus vivendi was reached on October 20, 1899.  The issue was then dropped 
for a time.112   
Although the enquiry into Hay’s April 1901 arbitration proposal was rebuffed in 
the first months of 1902, Lansdowne remained “deeply impressed with gravity of the 
Alaska problem” and wrote to Spring-Rice that he “would give a great deal to get it 
amicably disposed of.”113  Ironically, the next opportunity for action came as the result 
of the new young President’s impulse to threaten and engage in ‘big stick’ diplomacy.  
The British Chargé d’Affairs in Washington, Arthur Stewart Raikes, who was in charge 
temporarily at the embassy with Pauncefote on his death bed, relayed to the Foreign 
Secretary in late May the details of his recent interview with the President.  Roosevelt 
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had informed Raikes that as long as the Boer War dragged on he would not raise the 
Alaskan question, but after that he was “going to be ugly.”  Moreover, Raikes had 
learned from Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald Kitson, British military attaché at Washington, 
who heard the story by way of senior Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, that the 
President had also “recently declared in the presence of two Senators that if any trouble 
arose in the territory in dispute he would occupy it with United States troops.”  
Supposedly, one of the Senators in attendance replied that if the President were to make 
that declaration “from the steps of the White House” he would be assured of the next 
Republican nomination for president.114  The anecdote made its way quickly through 
highest levels of government on both sides of the Atlantic.  Kitson reported essentially 
the same story to Lord Minto, Governor General of Canada, and apparently also 
contacted Arthur Lee and Spring-Rice.115  The effect of the story was greatest, however, 
on Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, who learned of it from his own 
sources, and subsequently proposed to Minto that they should meet with Lansdowne and 
the American Ambassador, Joseph Choate, while they were all in England for the King’s 
coronation.  According to the Governor General, Laurier appeared quite anxious to come 
to a settlement of some sort on the frontier before gold was discovered somewhere in the 
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disputed territories and the new American president got his chance to send in the 
marines.116 
At the London meeting, which took place at Lansdowne House on June 23, 1902, 
the Canadian Prime Minister conceded two major points that eventually facilitated the 
conclusion of an arbitration treaty.  Canada no longer expected to gain a port on the 
Lynn Canal, and would now also accept a six-person tribunal, which it had previously 
resisted, to decide the frontier.  A few days later, Choate was informed of the volte-
face.117  Final negotiations with regard to the actual machinery of arbitration continued 
into January 1903, with the Canadians returning to their usual plaintiveness and 
intransigence after having given way.  According to Hay, however, Roosevelt only 
agreed in the end to a tribunal “experiment, to enable the British Government to get out 
of an absolutely untenable position, with dignity and honour.”118  Hay and Sir Michael 
Herbert, appointed to replace Pauncefote as British Ambassador in Washington in 
October, signed the arbitration treaty on January 23, 1903.  It called for “six impartial 
jurists of repute” to meet and make a final determination and interpretation of the 1825 
Anglo-Russian Convention.119 
With the last great menace to Anglo-American rapprochement moving towards 
peaceful arbitration, the last real obstacle to better relations turned out to be 
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Lansdowne’s ‘policy of the entente.’  In early November 1902, the Foreign Secretary 
forged a temporary “iron-clad” alliance with Germany to coerce the Venezuelan dictator 
Cipriano Castro to pay his country’s debts.120  Castro seized power in the South 
American country in 1899, and there followed several years of disorder, causing damage 
to foreign business interests, and the seizure of British owned ships accused of 
smuggling and aiding revolutionaries.  In August 1901, Venezuela also defaulted on its 
foreign debt, the majority of which was held by British and German investors.121  It was 
for these reasons that Lansdowne contemplated the use of force to bring Castro to heel.  
In a speech before the United Club in December 1902, the Foreign Secretary declared, to 
the laughter of those assembled, that Britain did not hold any inveterate antipathy against 
Venezuela, but he asserted that there would be no quarrel at all if that nation refrained 
from abusing British subjects and property, paid its debts, and replied to diplomatic 
representations “in perfectly courteous language.”  He hoped in future Venezuelans 
might perhaps be content to put themselves “on a moderate allowance in the matter of 
revolutions,” having “indulged,” he believed, in no fewer than one hundred and four in 
the last seventy years.122   
It is still debated among historians as to who approached whom to suggest a joint 
Anglo-German naval operation to coerce Venezuela.  On January 2, 1902, Eckardstein 
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reported to Berlin that he had been approached by Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
Francis Villiers, who informed him that the Cabinet was contemplating action, and 
might approach Germany in the near future with regard to joint action.123  Independently 
of this, on January 14 Lansdowne directed Lascelles to enquire as to “what steps” 
Germany was contemplating, but officials in Berlin did not respond.124  Lacking 
definitive evidence either way, the consensus is that the idea of using force against 
Venezuela germinated in both London and Berlin roughly simultaneously, and when 
Metternich initiated more substantial discussions with Lansdowne in July both countries 
were well aware they had a common interest as well as similar thoughts as to a future 
course of action.125  When the Foreign Secretary laid the whole project before the Prime 
Minister on October 12, emphasizing that British subjects had been “outrageously 
treated” for some time, he argued that a final decision for coercion could not wait for the 
next Cabinet.  Although a special Cabinet did meet five days later, there is no question 
that the project was pushed through by Lansdowne, and he alone bore primary 
responsibility for its success or failure.126  Notwithstanding its shadowy beginnings, the 
“iron-clad” alliance was cemented in early November with both nations pledging their 
support for the other’s demands and agreeing to terminate their concerted action only 
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upon mutual agreement.127  On November 13 Herbert informed Hay of Anglo-German 
plans, and while the American Secretary of State was only mildly fearful of troublesome 
resolutions from the House of Representatives, the British Ambassador was quite 
anxious and confessed: “I wish we were going to punish Venezuela without the aid of 
Germany, for I am not sure that joint action will be very palatable here.”128  Lansdowne 
responded by pointing out that the Germans were working well with Britain with regard 
to Venezuela, and would only admit that it was “perhaps unlucky that we should be 
harnessed to them but it was quite inevitable.”129  Although he had been at his post for 
only a few weeks, Herbert’s fear proved well-founded. 
The reasons behind Lansdowne’s controversial decision to act in concert with 
Germany in a military operation in America’s backyard are not difficult to discern.  
Anglo-American rapprochement did not preclude the Foreign Secretary’s overall ‘policy 
of the entente.’  The Venezuela crisis offered a further opportunity to draw closer to 
Germany, and this goal remained an important part of Lansdowne’s foreign policy.  The 
Foreign Secretary was not blind, however, to American sensibilities, and nor was he “for 
once caught napping” as Lord George Hamilton concluded and George Monger later 
echoed.130  A year earlier in the midst of his quest for an Anglo-German understanding 
Lansdowne felt “bound to admit” that prominent among the obstacles to a “full-blown 
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defensive alliance” was “The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be 
hostile to America.”  Moreover, he stated that “With our knowledge of the German 
Emperor’s views in regard to the United States, this is to my mind a formidable 
obstacle.”  Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary had proceeded.131  Explaining his 
Venezuela policy in the House of Lords in March 1903, Lansdowne argued that “With 
so plain an indication as that of the policy of the United States Government, there was no 
reason why we should have had any misgiving on the ground that objection might be 
anticipated in that quarter to measures of coercion.”  In fact, Lansdowne claimed that the 
Foreign Office had sought “to make assurance doubly sure” that nothing was done to 
“give offence to the susceptibilities of the Unites States, or to indicate to them that we 
have any desire to impugn the Monroe Doctrine.”132  Although Chamberlain would later 
claim that he had “warned” the Foreign Secretary that “joint action with Germany would 
be unpopular,” Lansdowne had every reason to believe that the Foreign Office had 
prepared the ground thoroughly and that the United States had no objection to the 
Anglo-German operation.133   
The Germans too had been cautious, and as early as December 1901 they had let 
the United States know that coercive action might prove necessary to settle its claims, 
and conveyed specifically that they had “no purpose or intention to make even the 
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smallest acquisition of territory.”134  Bülow reported to the Kaiser that the American 
response indicated that they had “no objection.”135  This American response was 
subsequently relayed to Lansdowne by Metternich on the very day in November 1902 
the “iron-clad” alliance was formed.136   
 When the Foreign Secretary put the whole project before a special Cabinet on 
October 17, 1902, he maintained that Britain could “assume the acquiescence of the 
United States.”137  Among the more prominent of these indications of acquiescence were 
statements from senior members of the American administration, to which Lansdowne 
would refer in the defense of his policy in March 1903.  For example, in July 1901, 
Vice-President Roosevelt wrote to the German Ambassador in Washington, Speck von 
Sternberg: “If any South American State misbehaves towards any European country, let 
the European country spank it.”  He hastened to add, however, that he did “not wish the 
United States or any other country to get additional territory in South America.”138  It 
was fear of the latter, along with the sight of Britain conducting a military operation in 
partnership with the Germans, which drove public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic 
into opposition.  Warren Kneer argued that the Foreign Office underestimated “the 
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dangers of public opinion in the United States,” while being “primarily interested in the 
probable reaction of the Roosevelt administration.”139  In their defense, however, it is 
evident that American officials also failed to judge correctly the adverse reaction of their 
own populace. 
 After issuing their final warnings to Castro—that went unanswered—Britain and 
Germany delivered their ultimata on December 7, 1902, and suspended diplomatic 
relations.  On December 9 the intervening powers began to seize Venezuelan gunboats, 
the dictator’s only warships.  Two seized by German forces proved only partially 
operational and thus a hindrance to their captor, and so were sunk unceremoniously.140  
Their destruction, unfortunately, only gave fuel to newspapers in the United States to 
attack the intervention as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.  The New York Times 
characterized the sinking as “fairly comparable to acts of wanton devastation in warfare, 
which have long been discountenanced by civilized nations,” and called for arbitration.  
The gunboat incident was followed quickly on December 13 by a joint Anglo-German 
bombardment of the forts at Puerto Cabello, and the London Daily Mail felt compelled 
to conclude that it was “now too painfully clear that in this miserable Venezuela 
business the British nation has fallen into a trap laid by Germany.”141  This was far from 
the truth, of course; the Germans from nearly the beginning had committed themselves 
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entirely, with the purpose of avoiding blame, to the British program.142  As the blockade 
was firmly being established, however, opposition in the United States and at home in 
Britain mounted.   
 When Castro offered, via Washington, to settle the dispute through arbitration the 
same day Puerto Cabello was bombarded, the Cabinet accepted the proposal gladly at 
their next meeting on December 16.  Lansdowne informed Henry White, the First 
Secretary at the American Embassy in London, however, that the blockade would have 
to remain in place until a final settlement was reached.143  The same day the Cabinet 
grasped what it could in order to salvage what increasingly looked like a foreign policy 
disaster, Metternich, who also had correctly judged the situation, informed Berlin that 
the British cabinet was “in the long run, too weak to stick to its guns,” adding that the 
sooner they could “honorably withdraw from this business in concert with England, the 
better it will be.”144  On December 18, the German Ambassador informed Lansdowne 
that his country accepted the proposal of arbitration.145  Although the principle of 
arbitration had been accepted by the intervening powers, it was now up to Castro to 
accept their minimal prior demands, which were that the first rank claims of the powers 
would not be subject to arbitration, and that before any arbitration of secondary claims 
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was to begin, Venezuela would have to accept that it was liable for any damages that had 
occurred during the years of disorder.146   
 In the interval, Anglo-American relations continued to suffer.  Herbert reported 
that the negative impression still existed in the United States that “we are making war to 
collect debts.”  He could not help but feel some “malevolent satisfaction,” however, that 
the intensity of the public expressions against Germany outstripped those directed 
against Britain, but he was warned by one Congressman that Britain could “spank” 
Venezuela is she wished, “but don’t take too long about it.”147  The Foreign Secretary 
understood perfectly the need for a quick resolution but anticipated difficulties in getting 
Castro to accept the prior stipulations of the intervening powers.  He was growing 
concerned as well over the “furious & unreasoning” anti-German feeling that was 
spreading throughout Britain.  On December 22, Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The Rowers” 
appeared in The Times, the fourth stanza of which stated bluntly: “And ye tell us now of 
a secret vow, ye have made with an open foe!”  The last stanza declared, moreover, that 
Britain had leagued itself anew “With the Goth and the shameless Hun!”148  The identity 
of Britain’s “open foe” was hardly a mystery.  Lansdowne thought the poem “an 
outrage,” and that matters had “been allowed to go much too far.”  By the last week of 
December, he would have gladly accepted Roosevelt as arbiter of the whole Venezuela 
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affair, if only for the sake of concluding the matter quickly “with a minimum of pedantry 
and red tape,” but unfortunately the President declined the offer.149   
 With the Venezuela crisis escalating, the heavy pressure of Foreign Office work 
began to adversely affect Lansdowne both physically and mentally.150  When New 
Year’s Day arrived and there was still no word with regard to Venezuela’s acceptance of 
the arbitration stipulations, the Foreign Secretary despaired of ever getting away for his 
holiday before Parliament returned.151  He wrote to Devonshire rather sullenly that as 
things stood, he did not see “any traces of happiness” at the outset of this New Year.152  
Later that day, however, word came that all the terms of the intervening powers were 
finally accepted by Castro.  Nevertheless, Lansdowne was forced to remain in 
London.153   
 Instead of turning the whole matter over to The Hague Tribunal—to 
Lansdowne’s mind it was “a cumbrous piece of machinery to set going”—the Foreign 
Secretary accepted for the sake of expediency the unconventional procedure of direct 
negotiations at Washington.154  Separate talks between Venezuela and each intervening 
                                                 
149 Lansdowne to Herbert, January 2, 1903, PRO FO 800/144; Lansdowne to Herbert, December 27, 1902, 
PRO FO 800/144. 
 
150 Lansdowne to Herbert, January 2, 1903, PRO FO 800/144. 
 
151 Lansdowne to Balfour, January 1, 1903, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 5, Private 
Letters: Prime Minister, f42. 
  
152 Lansdowne to Devonshire, January 1, 1903, LP, Papers as Foreign Secretary 1900-1905, File 6, Private 
Letters: Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 
153 Lansdowne to Balfour, January 1, 1903, BP, Add 49728, ff5-8. 
 
154 Lansdowne to Herbert, January 2, 1903, PRO FO 800/144; Lansdowne to Herbert, January 13, 1903, 
PRO FO 800/144. 
 
 273
power began on January 21, 1903, but negotiations refused to pass quickly or quietly.  
On the day negotiations began, the Germans bombarded the fort of San Carlos at 
Maracaibo, claiming of course that the Venezuelans had fired first.155  Moreover, after 
the British secured a payment in cash of £5,500 for their first rank claims, the Germans 
demanded a similar cash payout for their first rank claim of £66,000.  Even after 
Lansdowne arranged a Venezuelan counter offer of an immediate cash payment equal to 
that being paid to Britain, as well as precedence for Germany over all other powers in 
the payout of the balance of their claims, it still failed to satisfy the Germans who were 
now standing firm as a point of honor.156  The “hard bargaining” of the Germans sent 
Lansdowne’s “brain . . . reeling,” and this unfortunately coincided with his nearly annual 
bout with influenza.  At the end of January he informed Balfour, who was also on the 
sick list, that his doctor had virtually ordered him to leave London for the fresher air of 
Bowood.157  The news from Washington was so unsatisfactory, however, that the 
Foreign Secretary had all but given up leaving the capital.  There was even the fear now 
that nothing at all would be settled at Washington.158    
 It was at this stage of the negotiations that the Foreign Office received a telegram 
from Herbert stating that since December “a great change” in American feeling toward 
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Britain had taken place, and “if this German alliance continues much longer it will 
seriously impair our good relations with this country.”  He added ominously that “In 
American opinion the time has almost come for us to choose between the friendship of 
the United States & that of Germany.”159  When the Germans refused next a half 
payment of their first rank claims within thirty days, Lansdowne was forced to pressure 
his alliance partner to back down.160  He relayed to Herbert that he had spoken frankly 
with Metternich on the “gravity of the situation and importance of immediate 
settlement,” and had hinted that he did “not think [the] position of Germany would be 
enviable if negotiations fell through under such circumstances.”161  The Germans were 
slow to take the hint, but fortunately for Lansdowne the Venezuelan negotiators soon 
afterward agreed to a plan that would pay Germany its full first rank claim in 
installments over the following five months.  The final protocol was signed on February 
13, 1903, and the remaining secondary claims were referred to The Hague.162  The 
British blockade was lifted the next day, and the Prime Minister made a point of praising 
publicly the Monroe Doctrine before a gathering of Liverpool Conservatives.  He 
declared that that great American document had “no enemies” in Britain that he knew of, 
and to the approval of those assembled he pronounced that Britain “welcome[d] any 
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increase of the influence of the United States of America upon the great Western 
Hemisphere.”163  
 C. S. Campbell concluded that if the purpose of joint action with Germany was to 
foster better relations, Lansdowne “displayed a serious lack of imagination,” for “the 
intervention aroused such an outcry against Germany as virtually to end hopes of an 
alliance.”164  Since no other member of the Cabinet, other than the Foreign Secretary, 
likely gave more than a passing thought to such hopes any longer, the damage involved 
was minimal and confined to exposing the ill-founded premises of Lansdowne’s ‘policy 
of the entente.’  The further charge that the Foreign Secretary showed “a want of 
imagination,” or required more “depth of mind,” was longstanding, however, and dated 
back to the assessments given by his childhood tutors.  Those like Lansdowne who 
considered themselves at times business-minded, pragmatic, and liberal realists, too 
easily forgot that the concept of the “invisible hand” was itself laid upon a foundation of 
faith.   
 Nancy Mitchell maintained that while Lansdowne was indeed “caught napping,” 
his miscalculation of American reaction was “completely understandable” for “He 
would have had to have been a psychic—one who could see into the future as well as 
read other people’s minds—to have predicted the uproar in the United States.”165  While 
there is much to support such a sympathetic reading of the evidence, Lansdowne was 
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still all too ready to discount the minds of those who might not operate upon that higher 
plane where gentleman diplomats ruminate.  Although the Foreign Secretary thought it:  
quite possible that there may have been a section of public opinion in the 
United States, not, perhaps, sufficiently informed as to the facts of the case, 
which at one time took a different and somewhat excited view of the 
question; but now that matters have advanced as far as they have towards a 
settlement I shall remain sanguine that no one whose opinion is worth 
having in the United States will hold any other view with regard to the action 
and conduct of His Majesty’s Government except that throughout the whole 
of these negotiations that conduct has been perfectly sincere and entirely 
above suspicion.166 
 
Following the signing of the protocol, Lansdowne wrote to Herbert that he had 
known from the beginning that if there was to be trouble it would not be due to the 
conduct of the United States Government, “but to ebullitions of ill-informed 
popular feeling.”167  A year later, when The Hague Tribunal delivered its judgment 
on the remaining claims in favor of the intervening powers, the Foreign Secretary 
pronounced it “A great triumph for common sense.”168   
 With regard to the conduct of their “iron-clad” ally, Lansdowne believed 
that the Germans had “on the whole behaved well, although they have been fussy 
& fond of raising unnecessary points, but they have almost invariably given way to 
us.”169  Writing to Lascelles two days later, the Foreign Secretary confirmed that 
the two governments had indeed “pulled together over the Venezuelan affair,” but 
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he could also well understand that the “German Ministers are taken aback at the 
violence of the anti-German feeling which is being exhibited here.”170  Despite 
what Metternich characterized as Britain’s “American fetish,” combined as it was 
with a seemingly natural dislike of Germany, he informed the Foreign Ministry in 
Berlin that Lansdowne was “a man of honour, who sticks to the promises he has 
made.”171   
 This personal bridge of understanding and trust, however, was the extent of 
the success for the Foreign Secretary’s efforts to forge an Anglo-German entente.  
While Anglo-Saxonism triumphed, Pan-Teutonism proved unfortunately to be a 
chimera.  Lansdowne’s efforts to secure British participation in the primarily 
German financed Baghdad Railway scheme met defeat in April 1903.  The 
Anatolian Railway was to be extended to Baghdad and Basra, and Germany 
invited other powers to participate and help defray the enormous cost in exchange 
for a share of the railway.  In January 1901, Lansdowne had argued in favor of 
British investment in great part because it would “please Germany,” and he 
continued his support for the next two years in the face of opposition from Russia, 
the press, and Joe Chamberlain.172  Because he believed that this “most important 
highway to the East”—with an eventual terminus on the Persian Gulf—would 
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eventually be built with or without British involvement, the Foreign Secretary 
believed the lack of British participation would be a “national misfortune.”  
Moreover, he maintained that the internationalization of such an important rail line 
would have found unanimous support in the Cabinet, “but for the anti-German 
fever from which the country is suffering.”173  Lansdowne would later recount to 
Curzon that such a “howl arose”—a “Jihad” even—against British participation 
that the government was forced to draw in its horns.174   
 Lansdowne willingly admitted that Germany had “behaved shabbily” 
toward Britain on a good many occasions, but he insisted it was “not quite true to 
say that they have never made any attempt to cultivate good relations with us.”  He 
attributed at least some of the divergence between himself and his colleagues with 
regard to their attitudes toward Germany to the fact that he had “perhaps become 
so much used to the querulous tone of the German Government” that it produced 
less of an effect on him.  He was, at any rate, “more inclined to meet it with 
ridicule than with violent indignation.”175 
 Anglo-American rapprochement had yet to reach its denouement, and 
following on the heels of the Venezuelan episode it was increasingly apparent that 
Britain had little alternative but to appease.  On the day that British warships in the 
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Caribbean lifted their blockade, Hay informed Herbert of the names of the three 
American members of the Alaskan tribunal appointed by the President.  They were 
Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, Henry Cabot Lodge, senior Republican Senator 
from Massachusetts, and George Turner, retired Senator from the state of 
Washington.  All three had attended law school, but none was an “impartial jurist 
of repute.”  Both Lodge and Turner had in fact already taken very public stances 
against the Canadian position.  Herbert was naturally “very sore” over the 
President’s appointment of three politicians instead of three judges, and believed 
he had been previously misled by Hay.  Nevertheless, he advised the Foreign 
Office that Britain should still appoint the best men possible.176  Lansdowne 
minuted his concurrence, arguing that although the US selection was 
“unfortunate,” to his mind “it would be most unwise either to protest or to reply by 
selecting mediocrities.”177  It was true that Hay had been overruled in the choice of 
the American jurists, but he later defended them arguing that there was “not a man 
in the United States out of an idiot asylum, who has not an opinion on the subject,” 
while at the same time there was “not an intelligent Englishman who does not 
know they have no case.”178   
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 The Foreign Secretary was “grievously disappointed” at Roosevelt’s 
appointments, but rebuffed suggestions that Britain appoint three County Court 
Judges as its representatives.179  As always, shabby dealings, however disquieting, 
never completely overwhelmed Lansdowne’s commitment and desire for the quick 
settlement of outstanding disputes.  Indeed, when Herbert had asked at the 
beginning of the year whether any Canadians need be appointed to the tribunal, the 
Foreign Secretary had admitted that they should “never be allowed to exclude the 
Canadian element altogether,” for the Colonial Office was being “very Colonial” 
about matters, but that one Canadian “w[oul]d be enough.”180  When all was said 
and done, Britain appointed two Canadians, Sir Louis A. Jetté, Lieutenant-
Governor of Quebec and formerly a Justice on the Supreme Court of Quebec, and 
J. D. Armour, Chief Justice of Ontario (who later died and was replaced by A. B. 
Aylesworth).  The single British member was Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice 
of England, and when negotiations convened in London in early September, his 
role soon became that of arbiter between the two North American factions.181  
When the tribunal’s decision came down on October 20 it was largely in favor of 
the United States, and the Lord Chief Justice had voted with the Americans.  The 
final award, which the Canadian commissioners refused to sign, gave the inlets, 
ports, and settlements to the United States, split the difference between the 
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American and Canadian claims with regard to the line of the border between the 
Lynn Canal and the Portland Canal (which marked the southern border of the 
Alaskan panhandle), and decided largely in favor of Canada’s claim as to the exact 
location and course of the Portland Canal.   
 It remains difficult to prove one way or the other whether British leaders, 
responding to private warnings from Roosevelt, exerted pressure on Alverstone to 
come to the proper judgment, but Balfour, more than Lansdowne, has always been 
the leading suspect.  Lansdowne did meet privately with Choate at the Foreign 
Office on October 14, and the American Ambassador stressed that this was the last 
opportunity for a settlement and if the tribunal failed the President would consider 
the American claim proven and act accordingly.  Choate then reported to Hay that 
if it had not already been done, Alverstone would soon be informed privately of 
the necessity for a definite conclusion to the matter.182  Lansdowne’s version of the 
meeting differed somewhat.  The Foreign Secretary wrote to Balfour that Choate 
spoke solemnly as to the consequences if the tribunal failed to settle the dispute, 
and “appeared surprised when I told him that Alverstone was not ‘riding to 
orders,’ and would certainly resent a suggestion that he should decide the question 
referred to him otherwise than according to the evidence.”  Although Lansdowne 
agreed roughly with Choate’s lines of an acceptable compromise—which 
coincidentally happened to correspond with the eventual settlement—the Foreign 
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Secretary insisted that it would be improper for him to pressure the British 
commissioners.  Lansdowne afterward relayed the conversation to Alverstone, 
who was somewhat indignant at American conduct, but according to the Foreign 
Secretary the Lord Chief Justice was amenable to compromise, and the former 
“made no secret” of the government’s “great desire for a settlement.”183  It is 
difficult to gauge whether or not Lansdowne’s ‘hint’ to Alverstone reflected the 
influence of American threats, or merely a recapitulation of his own long-held 
views.  There also is no evidence in the Lansdowne and Balfour correspondence 
that suggests an organized conspiracy to influence the Lord Chief Justice.  
Alverstone’s immediate post-award letter to the Prime Minister, however, in which 
he complained of the intransigence of his Canadian colleagues, concludes with the 
line: “I have much to tell you when you come to town which I cannot put in a 
letter.”184   
 Lansdowne’s public defense of the tribunal’s decision as a satisfactory one, 
if mixed, with some gains and some losses, has been characterized by A. E. 
Campbell as “sheer dishonesty.”185  Even privately, however, the Foreign 
Secretary argued as much.  On receiving news of the award he informed Balfour 
that on the main point of the inlets, the “American contention was perfectly good,” 
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while there had been a compromise with regard to the position of the mountains, 
and the issue of the Portland Channel was “virtually decided in favour of Canada” 
except for “the surrender of two tiny little islands west of Wales Island, the value 
of which they [the Canadians] have somewhat tardily discovered.”  The Canadians 
might feel themselves betrayed—and Lansdowne soon found their many 
complaints “very undignified”—but the Foreign Secretary was sanguine that their 
indignation would soon evaporate.186 
 The Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ had its beginnings in the 
opening years of the twentieth century, but it was not the conscious, or even 
unconscious, product of Lansdowne’s foreign policy.  Notwithstanding the 
progress made, one could argue that on the whole the Foreign Secretary’s 
ultimately unsuccessful ‘policy of the entente’ acted as a negative force in as much 
as it often appeared self-defeating.  Monger was correct in maintaining that 
throughout 1903 Lansdowne “continued to be borne along by events he could not 
control.”187  His policies were inhibited by public opinion he considered 
unreasoned, and which at times took an “almost morbid interest” in subjects it did 
not fully grasp, such as the “insensate outcry” against his Baghdad Railway 
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scheme.188  The Foreign Secretary found the situation both “ridiculous” and 
“humiliating.”189  He was forced to make the ‘irrational’ choice between America 
and Germany, and compelled to acknowledge that in future he would “have to be 
extremely careful in dealing with a subject which is imperfectly understood by the 
public.”190                      
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CHAPTER VII  
 
ENTENTE AND ESTRANGEMENT:  
 
THE TRIUMPH AND FAILURE OF THE ‘POLICY OF THE ENTENTE’ 
 
 
The Anglo-French Entente 
 
 The Anglo-French Entente, signed on April 8, 1904, arguably was Lansdowne’s 
greatest accomplishment while at the Foreign Office.  Perhaps it is remembered now, 
however, equally for what it was not, than for what it became.  It was not an alliance, it 
did not contain a military guarantee to France, and it was not intended to be the 
foundation of an anti-German coalition.  In the words of Thomas Otte, it was the result 
of “a sensible policy of rational and comprehensive compromise in an effort to safeguard 
vital British imperial interests in the periphery of European politics without, it was 
thought, incurring major European obligations.”1  The Entente was initially praised, in 
fact, by radical Liberal opponents of ‘balance of power’ diplomacy.  While they had 
been wary of the consequences of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, most radicals, according 
to Howard Weinroth, believed that the Entente Cordiale “heralded the rejuvenation of 
European Liberalism,” and was a “first step toward a greater union of nations.”2  It is 
well-known that Lansdowne, for the remainder of his life, maintained that he never 
intended a military alliance with France, much less the isolation of Germany, and there 
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is little evidence that he approved the Anglo-French staff talks that began shortly before 
he left office in December 1905.3  The Anglo-French Entente negotiated by the Foreign 
Secretary was a colonial agreement meant to settle outstanding imperial disputes, and 
foster international peace.   
 Although the Entente was to become the foundation of one of the so-called 
‘entangling alliances’ that encouraged the ‘slide’ to war in August 1914—and as a 
selling point Lansdowne had noted specifically to the Cabinet and others that he believed 
in time France would endeavor to bring Britain and Russia together—the agreement 
accorded with the ‘policy of the entente’ the Foreign Secretary had been employing for 
nearly four years.  Two weeks prior to the signing, Lansdowne informed Lascelles that 
he would continue to “welcome any evidence shewing that Germany wishes to keep well 
with us.”  Lansdowne realized, to a limited extent, the danger the Entente might hold for 
Anglo-German relations, and the diplomatic hornet’s nest that Morocco represented 
explained in part his initial reluctance to take up early French approaches.  He was more 
inclined, however, to regard it as “a test case, so far as German good will is concerned,” 
and he urged Lascelles to convince his German friends, if possible, “that they have a 
golden opportunity of burying the hatchet and securing our lasting gratitude.”4  
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Germany’s leaders followed a different path however, one which marked the utter failure 
of Lansdowne’s ‘policy of the entente.’ 
 Even with Lansdowne at the helm at the Foreign Office, a settlement of 
outstanding Anglo-French disputes first required a change in both French policy and 
public opinion.  As noted by the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, the 
British Foreign Secretary “never takes the initiative and it is necessary to force his hand 
a little in order to make him more communicative,” so it was going to be up to France to 
recognize the benefits of rapprochement.5  As recently as 1898, however, British and 
French forces had faced each other at Fashoda in the Sudan, the direct result of a 
challenge by France to the sixteen-year British occupation of Egypt.  That famed 
standoff ended in a French retreat, but one year later the Boer War provided the French 
Foreign Minister, Théophile Declassé, a fresh opportunity to dislodge the British from 
Egypt through international intervention.  He was to be disappointed, however, by 
Germany.  Declassé came to understand somewhat belatedly that Franco-German 
cooperation against Britain, much less agreement over French interests in northwest 
Africa, would only ever come at the cost of a renunciation by France to any future 
claims on Alsace and Lorraine.  This was an unacceptable bargain for any French 
politician, and thus, for Declassé, any realistic hope of ending British occupation of 
Egypt faded.6 
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 Notwithstanding his particular grievance with regard to Egypt, Declassé had 
never opposed outright the settlement of other contentious issues between France and 
Britain.  Since 1898, the more Anglophile Cambon had been instructed to seek a 
settlement over, inter alia, African frontiers and France’s special fishing rights in 
Newfoundland.7  His efforts had been for naught, however, as Salisbury was inclined to 
the view that while Britain’s “policy is not to presume the hostility of the Government of 
France,” he also believed that “anything like hearty good will between the two nations 
will not be possible.”  At most, he hoped that “a mutual temper of apathetic tolerance 
may be cultivated on both sides, without sacrificing the interests of others.”8  A change 
at the Foreign Office and the evolution in Declassé’s strategic thinking—the result of 
Germany’s hard bargaining—brought about the necessary circumstances for Anglo-
French rapprochement.                     
 It was Cambon, working independently, who made the first approaches to the 
new British Foreign Secretary in 1901, offering to relinquish France’s fishing rights in 
Newfoundland in exchange for British consent to French predominance in Morocco.  
Lansdowne offered seemingly a unique opportunity for future settlement, for in his own 
words, written to the British Ambassador to Paris, Sir Edmund Monson, upon assuming 
his post, he was “united with [France] by many ties.”9  With regard to those family 
connections, Monson reported that Declassé and other members of the French 
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Government were also “much interested.”10  No doubt Cambon was especially pleased, 
because although he would eventually spend twenty-two years as France’s Ambassador 
in London, he never learned to speak English.11  Despite such promising signs, however, 
Lansdowne was not open to Cambon’s early proposals which he characterized as 
needlessly “provoking an international controversy” by “dealing prematurely with the 
‘liquidation’ of Morocco,” which he was sure would “lead to serious complications.”12  
In addition to the Foreign Secretary’s wish to preserve the status quo in Morocco, there 
also was some apprehension that the French Ambassador was acting without 
instructions.  Moreover, Monson was increasingly disenchanted with Declassé, and in 
November 1902 he informed his chief that the French Foreign Minister could not be 
trusted, and was “not only a liar, but a clumsy liar also.”13   
 The subsequent change in Lansdowne’s attitude can be attributed to two primary 
causes.  The first was the outbreak in late December 1902 of a new rebellion in Morocco 
which this time appeared to be a significant threat to the Sultan’s authority.  In the midst 
of the Venezuelan Crisis, and having been able to return briefly to Bowood for the 
holiday, the Foreign Secretary was most “perturbed” by latest news of the Sultan’s 
reverses, for he was sure, he informed Monson, that if there was “a catastrophe, the 
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French will certainly take advantage of it, & renew the overtures which, as you will 
recollect, Cambon has more than once made to me for an ‘arrangement’ between us & 
which would certainly not be to the advantage of Morocco.”14   
 The second cause of Lansdowne’s turnabout was that the anticipated new 
overture from the French Ambassador—which came three days later—was made, 
according to Lansdowne’s own account of the meeting, without reference to 
“liquidation,” and “represented the French Government as the leading advocate of non-
intervention and of the maintenance of the status quo.”  If intervention by outside forces 
proved necessary, however, the Ambassador expressed the wish that participation be 
restricted to those powers with a paramount interest in Morocco, these being France, 
Britain and Spain.  When questioned by the Foreign Secretary on this point, Cambon 
admitted that the country France wished specifically to exclude was Germany.15  Despite 
reports from Monson and Durand, who was Ambassador to Spain at the time, which cast 
doubt as to the veracity of this newfound French support for the status quo in Morocco, 
Lansdowne judged the French government to be sincere.16  Indeed, the Foreign Secretary 
had already informed the Prime Minister that he was prepared to work with France and 
Spain if necessary.  Balfour sympathized with Lansdowne’s decision, but was skeptical 
as to whether existing French policy would remain unchanged for too long.  In general, 
however, the premier was “rather inclined to think that the more intervention in the 
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affairs of these semi-barbarous states (when it becomes inevitable) is made a matter of 
European concern, the better.”17  With regard to Germany’s proposed exclusion, and 
notwithstanding Lansdowne’s pointed questioning of Cambon, neither the Prime 
Minister nor his Foreign Secretary appeared overly concerned.  In light of the public 
outcry against Anglo-German joint action against Venezuela at the time this is 
understandable, and it was not a decision influenced by any personal Germanophobia on 
the part of either minister.   
 The Foreign Secretary does not appear to have been hurried by external events.  
Although Monger argued that “What finally brought Lansdowne, after so much 
hesitation, to broach the subject of an entente was the serious news from the Far East,” 
this conclusion deserves some reconsideration.18  The “serious news” to which he 
referred was the start of Russo-Japanese negotiations over Manchuria and Korea, but 
Monger’s assertion makes sense only if the Foreign Secretary believed war between the 
two powers to be inevitable in July 1903, and he did not.  Moreover, Lansdowne was 
prepared to meet Cambon’s approaches more favorably some six months prior to the 
commencement of these talks, but was willing to await the next French initiative rather 
than assume the role of the pursuer.  He later declared to Durand, with some pride, that it 
was his attitude of refusing to discuss “schemes of partition or premature attempts at 
liquidation” that showed the French Government that they would have to be “moderate 
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in their demands & also that they must be prepared to pay us handsomely at other points 
for being complaisant.”19 
 In the interval, the King made his famous state visit to France in May 1903.  
Although he was wrongly credited by many as the architect of the Entente, Edward’s 
role was not entirely inconsequential.  Balfour objected vehemently some years later to 
serious historians relying on “a foolish piece of gossip” in attributing the ‘policy of the 
entente’ to the King.  He declared to Lansdowne that he could not remember the King 
ever making “an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy.”20  
Nevertheless, Edward’s visit to Paris—which was his idea—did help to alter for the 
better public and press sentiment in both countries.21  There would be no “insensate 
outcry” eleven months later when it was learned that Britain and France had buried their 
differences.  The King might even deserve some further credit, for though having first 
deprecated an immediate return visit by the President of France, Émile Loubet, to 
England, he changed course, believing a delayed visit might affect negatively the good 
feelings so recently generated.22  Edward’s well-known pro-French attitude and 
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advocacy for rapprochement also had great effect as the French leadership mistakenly 
believed that the King had the greatest influence on British foreign policy, followed in 
order thereafter by Chamberlain, and then Lansdowne.23  With the ground thus made 
favorable for Anglo-French rapprochement, Declassé decided to accompany Loubet to 
London in early July.24  It was Cambon, however, who stressed the need for such a 
unique visit also to be meaningful in results.  Knowing Lansdowne’s natural reserve and 
reluctance to take the initiative, he made arrangements for a private meeting between 
both foreign ministers to take place at the Foreign Office to discuss what Monson 
characterized as “the idea of a general and comprehensive settlement.”25 
 Prior to that meeting Lansdowne was paid a visit by another recent convert to 
Anglo-French rapprochement, Eugéne Étienne, Vice-President of the French Chamber of 
Deputies.  Their conversation presaged the future Entente negotiations.  According to 
Lansdowne’s account of the meeting, Étienne emphasized the need to come to terms 
over Morocco, arguing that the French position in Algeria made it “absolutely necessary 
that she should have a preponderating influence” in that country.  He also made sure to 
deprecate the idea of outright annexation, and assured the Foreign Secretary that the 
commercial interests of other powers would not be restricted.  Lansdowne replied that 
Britain had never failed to recognize France’s “special interests” in Morocco, but 
reiterated his warning against “the idea of bringing on a premature partition,” as this was 
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likely to “arouse the susceptibilities” of other powers with interests in the country, 
specifically Spain, whose interests the Foreign Secretary was always careful to protect.  
With regard to the questions of Newfoundland and Siam, Étienne thought the first was 
capable of settlement if the colonial government could be brought around, while the 
spheres of influence both countries had established in the latter in 1896 might be more 
definitely fixed.  In Africa, Étienne looked for a territorial rearrangement in the Sokoto 
region along the Niger River to ease French communications.  Lansdowne stressed, 
however, that such a readjustment would require compensation for Britain elsewhere.26   
 Lansdowne declined to put forward any definite proposals of his own, but 
assured Étienne that “if the French Government would put their cards upon the table and 
say what they wished to obtain, and what they were prepared to concede with that 
object,” Britain would be “ready to meet them in a similar spirit.”  The Foreign Secretary 
noted that at the conclusion of their conversation his guest asserted that Germany was 
“the most serious menace to the peace of Europe,” and that an Anglo-French 
understanding “was the only means of holding German designs in check.”  He did not 
record his response to this declaration, if any, but it is likely that he absorbed it with the 
same equanimity he practiced with regard to the ‘querulous’ assertions of the Germans.  
Perhaps, as Rolo has suggested, his attention was drawn instead to Étienne’s suggestion 
that if an agreement could be reached France was capable of exercising “a salutary 
influence” over Russia, and aid in reducing friction between the two countries.27 
                                                 
26 Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, BD II no.356. 
 
27 Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, BD II no.356; Rolo, Entente Cordiale, p. 177. 
 295
 President Loubet arrived in England on July 6, and the two foreign ministers met 
at the Foreign Office the next morning as arranged.  Lansdowne expressed first that he 
was confident that the disputes between the two countries were few and could be 
resolved amicably, while each minister declared that his nation was a satiated power and 
did not desire a great expansion of their colonial possessions.  The Foreign Secretary 
broached next the subject of Newfoundland, and suggested that French attachment to its 
special fishing rights, the establishment of which dated back to the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1713, were largely sentimental considering that recent catches had been in decline.  He 
proposed monetary compensation to French fishermen, but to his surprise Declassé 
called for both monetary and territorial compensation.  Lansdowne did not dismiss 
entirely the latter demand, but was adamant that the French desire for the cession of 
Gambia could not be met.  He chose, however, not to offer a specific territorial 
alternative. 
 After that less than satisfactory exchange, Declassé emphasized that a settlement 
over Morocco would allow matters like Newfoundland to be resolved all the more 
easily.  He once again declared that the French Government had no desire to annex the 
country or remove the Sultan from power, and although Lansdowne was now willing to 
discuss the details of a settlement over Morocco, he reminded the French Foreign 
Minister that Britain was by no means disinterested as to the country’s eventual fate.  
The Foreign Secretary stipulated that if and when Morocco should face partition the 
section of its coastline opposite Gibraltar would have to be neutralized, Spain would 
need to be consulted and compensated, and the ‘Open Door’ would have to be 
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maintained.  Declassé readily consented to all of these points.  With regard to Siam, it 
was generally agreed that negotiations would center on reinforcing previous agreements 
as to respective spheres of influence, while continuing to adhere to the guarantee that the 
central region of that country would remain independent.  The Foreign Secretary 
deprecated, however, the French suggestion to partition the New Hebrides island group 
as the Australian colonies would most certainly object.  He also insisted, as he had done 
with Étienne, that any readjustment of the Sokoto frontier in France’s favor would 
necessitate territorial compensation.28 
 It was toward the end of their conversation that Lansdowne spoke of Egypt, 
putting forward that “No one . . . for a moment believed that we were likely to retire 
from that country,” while acknowledging that France, if it wished, could still cause 
trouble for the British occupation.  He asserted, therefore, that the question of Egypt 
would have to be part of any larger settlement.  According to the Foreign Secretary’s 
account, Declassé agreed that it could be “disposed of satisfactorily” as “part of the 
larger African question,” contingent on an agreement over Morocco.  After some 
reflection, Lansdowne informed Monson that it was his belief that he was meant to be 
left with the impression that France would agree to British stipulations over Morocco, 
and with that issue settled, the French “would at other points go very far indeed to 
comply with our requirements.”29  Lord Cromer, British Consul-general in Egypt, was 
not as sanguine after reading Lansdowne’s account of the meeting however.  Although 
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he was all for a bargain exchanging Morocco for Egypt, he wrote to Lansdowne that he 
could not help thinking that Declassé “went further than he intended” when agreeing so 
easily to Egypt forming part of the comprehensive settlement.  Moreover, seeing clearly 
the long-term eventualities of such a deal, Cromer believed there was really only one 
question to be answered: “have we any objection to Morocco becoming a French 
province?”30 
 Cromer’s caution proved correct for at the next meeting between Lansdowne and 
Cambon in late July, the French Ambassador’s reiteration of the issues discussed 
between the two foreign ministers made no mention of Egypt.  When the Foreign 
Secretary pointed out this significant omission, Cambon confessed he had received no 
instructions on the matter from Declassé, and asked if it were possible to “leave Egypt 
alone for the present,” to which Lansdowne refused.  Cambon also made no reference to 
the readjustment of the Sokoto frontier, but despite this second omission the Foreign 
Secretary continued to believe that a border adjustment would eventually serve as 
compensation for the surrender of French fishing rights in Newfoundland.31 
 When the two met again one week later, Cambon informed Lansdowne that 
Declassé had misunderstood the full meaning of their discussion of Egypt, thinking it 
centered only on the removal of some troublesome financial restrictions, not the 
regularization of the heretofore ‘temporary’ British occupation.  He warned Lansdowne 
that the latter “could have no idea of the extent to which ‘l’esprit Francais’ was moved 
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by the Egyptian question.”  Nevertheless, he announced that the French Foreign Minister 
had the courage to negotiate the matter, but by removing such a “big thorn from the foot 
of Great Britain” France would expect “une grosse compensation.”  On this occasion, it 
was Lansdowne who initiated the subject of probable German reaction to an Anglo-
French agreement, but again it would appear that this was not of foremost concern in the 
Foreign Secretary’s mind.  With the French having given way on the inclusion of Egypt 
in any comprehensive settlement, Lansdowne informed Cambon that he would spend the 
summer holiday preparing a memorandum on British terms.32 
 In the interval, Lansdowne received the opinions of the Intelligence Departments 
of the Services.  The Admiralty argued that as long as there was a mechanism put in 
place that guaranteed the permanent neutralization for a considerable section of the 
Moroccan coastline, the British naval position in the Mediterranean “would neither be 
worse nor better than it is now.”  This was hardly an endorsement, however, as they 
seriously doubted whether such a mechanism existed.  The only real benefit they could 
point to was their confidence that if and when the French sought to conquer the 
Moroccans it would cost them “many men and much treasure and many years of 
struggle.”  The War Office was no less critical, and asserted that “no reliable 
arrangement can be made for preventing France from eventually establishing herself 
throughout the whole of Morocco, not excepting that portion of the coast-line from 
which we are especially desirous on excluding her, if we consent to her having that 
political predominance in the country which she wishes us to concede.”  They concluded 
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that such a concession should not be “granted unless we receive a very substantial quid 
pro quo in other parts of the world.”33  Lansdowne expected such compensation, and so 
with the approval of the Cabinet he sent his terms to Cambon on October 1.34 
 After first reiterating Britain’s three major stipulations with regard to French 
predominance in Morocco, Lansdowne moved on to Egypt where Britain asked that 
France recognize that the British occupation of Egypt had, “under the force of 
circumstances, acquired a character of permanency.”  In addition, Britain asked for the 
abolition of the international Caisse de la Dette publique—which oversaw the 
distribution of tax money that serviced Egypt’s foreign debts—and the ability to carry 
out reforms of the Egyptian government as needed with a similar right to be granted to 
the French in Morocco.  With regard to Newfoundland, the Foreign Secretary called for 
an end to France’s special fishing rights, which again he characterized as having a 
“sentimental rather than a substantial importance.”  In compensation, a readjustment of 
the Sokoto frontier was offered.  A new declaration on Siam would also be promulgated, 
and Lansdowne went so far as to include the request that France close the post-office it 
still operated on the island of Zanzibar, and offered the withdrawal of past British 
protests against the French annexation of Madagascar.35 
 Less than pleased with British terms, at their next meeting Cambon complained 
that the principal bargain proposed by Lansdowne was fundamentally unfair because in 
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exchange for immediate concessions in Egypt, France received only the “hope” of 
corresponding future benefits in Morocco.36  In a letter to Declassé, the French 
Ambassador maintained that “In a word England, who possess nothing in Morocco, 
gives us what she has not got and France, who has sure and tangible advantages in 
Egypt, is begged to abandon them.”37  Lansdowne countered, however, that as Britain 
was already in Egypt and had no intention of withdrawing, he was “only asking the 
French Government to recognize the facts as they exist.”  With that in mind he simply 
dismissed Cambon’s suggestion that concessions be granted to Britain in Egypt pari 
passu with any future French advance in Morocco.38 
 Cambon and Declassé both agreed that France should continue to hold out for the 
best possible terms, but they also recognized that their position in Egypt was lost.  The 
official French response to Lansdowne’s letter came on October 26, and while there was 
a general agreement on most issues, they argued for the retention of the Caisse de la 
Dette, continued to ask for a gradual implementation of concessions in Egypt, and once 
again, in return for their Newfoundland fishing rights, they asked for Gambia, noting 
that it was “surtout une valeur sentimentale” for Britain.39  Lansdowne’s mid-November 
response, as Cambon had expected, moved very little toward the French position.40  The 
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former accepted the continuation of the Caisse de la Dette, although with its powers 
curtailed, but was determined to stand firm against the “whittling down” of French 
concessions in Egypt.  He also now added the condition that the French should be 
required to provide diplomatic support in getting the other powers to accept the final 
terms of the agreement.  Moreover, if other powers refused to consent, France would be 
required to refrain from opposing any steps Britain took thereafter to give effect to the 
agreement.  With regard to Newfoundland, Lansdowne declared that objections to the 
ceding of Gambia as compensation were “insuperable,” and again he offered a 
readjustment of the border along the Niger.41 
 By late December 1903, the outlines of a final agreement was nearly in place, 
and “in order to avoid the possibility of future misunderstandings,” Lansdowne secured 
the addition of a Khedivial Decree detailing the new arrangements agreed to in Egypt, 
which would form an annex to the final Anglo-French agreement.42  Negotiations were 
now at the “critical moment,” in the words of the Foreign Secretary, with the last major 
outstanding issue being territorial compensation for Newfoundland, and it proved a 
difficult matter to resolve.43  Lansdowne believed that French demands on this matter 
were both “substantial” and “quite unreasonable,” and he had never conceded the idea 
that the relinquishing of fishing rights should result in a demand for territorial 
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compensation.  Moreover, in accordance with promises made to the natives of the area, 
he refused pointedly to allow any readjustment of the Sokoto frontier to “affect any 
territory in which British administration has been definitely established.”44  It was surely 
“admirable,” Cambon declared deridingly, that his British counterparts would “only 
concede to us territory that does not belong to England!”45   
 The French, in fact, were still hoping to acquire Gambia, and negotiations soon 
deadlocked.  Cambon resorted to having the nature of the breakdown leaked to Cromer, 
believing the British Consul would press the Foreign Secretary to give way.46  As 
anticipated, Cromer warned Lansdowne that failure of the negotiations at their present 
stage would be “little short of a calamity,” and he “urge[d] most strongly the necessity 
either of making concessions which will enable [the] Newfoundland question to be 
settled or of dealing with Morocco and Egypt separately.”47  Balfour also wrote to the 
Foreign Secretary expressing his belief that an agreement without Newfoundland would 
be better “than that we sign nothing at all,’ and that a break down in talks would be “an 
international misfortune.”48  Adding to these pressures, through the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Lansdowne learned that Joe Chamberlain was “quite horrified” at the 
suggestion that a large cession along the Niger be handed over in exchange for 
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Newfoundland, and would rather have the latter question left “unsettled than pay such a 
price.”49  The Foreign Secretary did not like the idea of Newfoundland being left out of 
the bargain, however, believing it would leave the agreement “very incomplete,” and 
that the government would be “less liable to attacks if we are able to show that we have 
succeeded in clearing the French, bag & baggage, out of a British Colony.”50  Despite 
such urgings then, plus new complications caused by the start of the Russo-Japanese 
War in early February, Lansdowne held firm.   
 Although it would appear that Cambon did actively attempt to speed up 
negotiations in order to avoid the two nations becoming entangled in the conflict 
between their respective allies, there is no evidence that Lansdowne did the same.51  A 
final settlement was not concluded until March, when finally the French accepted some 
16,000 square miles of African territory bordering the Niger and Lake Chad, and the Los 
Islands which sat opposite the port of Conakry in French Guinea, in exchange for 
surrendering their special fishing rights in Newfoundland.52  A week before the Entente 
was to be signed, the French made some last minute maneuvers in order to force 
additional concessions on Newfoundland, but this struck Lansdowne as thoroughly 
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unscrupulous and he was prepared to break off negotiations rather than give way.  
Fortunately, Declassé backed down.53    
 The Convention between the United Kingdom and France respecting 
Newfoundland, and West and Central Africa, the Declaration between the United 
Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, and the Declaration between the 
United Kingdom and France concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides, were 
signed in London by Lansdowne and Cambon on April 8, 1904.  The most significant 
terms were to be found in the Declaration on Egypt and Morocco, which contained a 
total of nine published and five secret articles.  In Article I, France declared it would not 
obstruct Britain’s actions in Egypt “by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British 
occupation,” while in Article IX both governments agreed “to afford one another their 
diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present 
Declaration.”  Lansdowne had insisted that the latter clause be part of the published 
agreement, but the article did not commit either country to oppose actively other powers 
who might object.  Clarifying French obligations somewhat, the Foreign Secretary also 
proposed what became Secret Article V, which pledged France to accept unilateral 
British actions in Egypt after July 15, 1910 even if other powers objected.54  In response 
to Cromer’s urging for even greater support from France against other powers who 
might refuse to adhere to the Khedivial Decree, Lansdowne argued that such an “open 
announcement that we had gone over to the side of the international law-breakers would 
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strike a fatal blow at our reputation.”55  In truth, however, Lansdowne had pledged 
Britain to breaking international law after a six year period, if necessary, in order to 
secure Egypt, and preserve the Anglo-French Entente. 
 In a letter to Monson the day the Entente was signed, and which was later 
published, Lansdowne pronounced the agreement advantageous to both contracting 
parties as well as the lesser peoples involved.  He wrote: 
In each of these countries [i.e. Egypt and Morocco] it is obviously 
desirable to put an end to a system under which the Ruler has had to 
shape his course in deference to the divided counsels of two great 
European Powers.  Such a system, leading, as it must, to intrigue, to 
attempts to play one Power off against the other, and to undignified 
competition, can scarcely fail to sow the seeds of international discord, 
and to bring about a state of things disadvantageous and demoralizing 
alike to the tutelary Powers, and to the weaker State which forms the 
object of their solicitude.  Something will have been gained if the 
understanding happily arrived at between Great Britain and France should 
have the effect of bringing this condition of things to an end in regions 
where the interests of those two Powers are specially involved.  And it 
may, perhaps, be permitted to them to hope that, in thus basing the 
composition of longstanding differences upon mutual concessions, and in 
the frank recognition of each other’s legitimate wants and aspirations, 
they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to 
the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the 
general peace.56 
 
 The expressions of paternalism and dedication to international peace were, of course, 
sincere, but Lansdowne was not blind to baser ‘balance of power’ considerations.  In his 
memorandum to the Cabinet in September 1903, he had argued in favor of an “all-round 
settlement” with France because it would allow Britain “to ‘clinch’ the friendly feelings 
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towards us which are at this moment prevalent upon the other side of the channel,” and 
added that he “need not insist upon the improvement which would result in our 
international position, which, in view of our present relations with Germany as well as 
Russia, I cannot regard with satisfaction.”57  No doubt, he saw the Anglo-French Entente 
as a springboard toward improved relations with Russia, but as noted above, with regard 
to Germany the agreement was not meant to be a message conveying a realignment of 
European forces, as much as it was “a test case, so far as German good will is 
concerned.”  Unlike Declassé, who foresaw such a new European alignment through the 
completion of the Entente, the Foreign Secretary noted to Lascelles merely that it would 
be “interesting” to see how Germany reacted.  “Will she put a spoke in our wheel,” he 
wondered, or would she “be amiable and facilitate matters?”58  The last year and a half 
of his tenure at the Foreign Office very nearly disabused Lansdowne finally of the notion 
that friendlier relations with Germany was possible on his terms. 
 As for the Moroccan people, Lansdowne feared that Britain’s “Moorish friends 
may think we have handed them over to the French rather ignominiously,” but he did not 
believe a better solution could be had.  If Britain had not come to terms now, in ten years 
she would have had nothing to offer the French.  He simply did not believe the 
Moroccans could take care of themselves, and felt Britain was in no position to “assume 
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the parental role in competition with France.”  Instead, he advised the British Minister in 
Tangier, Sir Arthur Nicolson, to “take as much credit as we can with the Moors for 
having insisted on maintaining the Sultan,” whom he did not believe the French had any 
intention of overthrowing.59  At the end of the year when events in Morocco again 
turned ugly for the Sultan, and the French were on the verge of more substantial 
intervention, the Foreign Secretary confessed to Monson: “We may in our secret hearts 
congratulate ourselves on having left to another Power the responsibility for dealing with 
so helpless and hopeless a country, but we need not proclaim our feelings.”60  
Unfortunately, the new year was destined to bring new and more dangerous Moroccan 
difficulties. 
 With regard to public acceptance of the Entente, Lansdowne had warned Balfour 
the previous December that he was determined not to have “another Bagdad Railway 
fiasco.”61  It was this fear that in great part lay behind his insistence on holding firm with 
regard to Newfoundland, and going to the British public with an agreement that removed 
a foreign power “bag & baggage, out of a British Colony.”62  When the news of the soon 
to be concluded Anglo-French agreement inevitably leaked to the British press, Cambon 
reported to Declassé: “Opinion is unanimous in hoping that all the causes of 
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misunderstanding between the two countries will be removed.”63  Most Liberals and the 
Liberal press greeted the Entente with approval.  There was some contrary comment of 
course, but perhaps none so impassioned as that of Lord Rosebery who reportedly told 
David Lloyd George—the latter being among those “delighted” at the news—that they 
were all wrong, and it really meant “war with Germany in the End!”64   
 Lansdowne was pleased overall with the public’s reaction as well as that of the 
political opposition, although he hesitated to disclose to them the contents of the secret 
articles.65  The Prime Minister also was quite satisfied with the agreement, and this 
despite his assertion five years before that France was “the incalculable quantity and the 
most obvious danger to European peace.”66  Speaking before the Primrose League at the 
Albert Hall, he declared that unlike most other arrangements that were “admirably fitted 
to tide over a period of difficulty,” but eventually “come to a natural end” and never 
carried “any guarantee of stability of permanence,” the newly signed Entente was “going 
to be permanent because it is based upon the best of all principles, that the party that 
gives—and both parties give—gives little, and that the party that receives—and both 
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parties receive—receives much.”67  With the work completed, the Foreign Secretary was 
able to escape for a week’s stay in Ireland at the end of May.  
 Although the Entente had been signed and published, it still had to be approved 
by the French Chamber of Deputies, as well as accepted by the other major powers.  
Presented to the Chamber in early June, criticism focused primarily on the compensation 
received for Newfoundland.  Lansdowne was forced to refuse numerous requests by 
Cambon for alterations to assure its passage.68  Final passage did not come until 
November, and although in the end approval was overwhelming, the Deputies also 
approved nearly unanimously a motion that called on Declassé to reopen negotiations 
with regard to Newfoundland “as early as possible.”69 
 
Russia 
 Russian adherence to the Khedivial Decree appeared to be infinitely more 
complicated after the start of hostilities between Russia and Japan in early February 
1904, a war which just two years before the Foreign Secretary did not think likely.  
Sandars would observe many years later that the marquis had a “constitutional dislike of 
violence in all its forms,” and Lansdowne’s public statements at the time only reinforce 
that perception.70  Speaking at the Guildhall Banquet in early November 1904, some 
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nine months into the war, the Foreign Secretary pronounced: “I say that with this 
spectacle before us we can conceive no more terrible, no more lifelong punishment than 
that remorse which would be felt by any Minister or body of Ministers who, either from 
a fault of temper or from a love of passing popularity, or because they were unable to put 
themselves in the place of their opponents, brought upon their country the scourge and 
the calamity of a needless war.”  Whether anything good was likely to emerge from the 
present conflict, he was “sanguine enough” to believe that “the spectacle of this terrible 
war may do something to give a stimulus to the existing desire for the discovery of some 
less clumsy and brutal method of adjusting international differences.”  Addressing that 
question further, Lansdowne pointed to the recent fashion of referring disputed matters 
to arbitration, and noted proudly that in the last three years the Unionist Government had 
resorted to it some eight or nine times, and that he had had the honor of signing five such 
treaties.  In order to prevent disputes from ever arising at all, however, he pointed to the 
recently signed Entente, which he hoped would not only improve relations between the 
two countries involved, “but that it will create a better political atmosphere, and enable 
those two countries to exercise upon other Powers a useful and a pacific influence.”71  If 
the detached gentleman diplomatist was passionate about anything it was the near 
certainty of peace and prosperity through enlightened diplomacy; here was dogma 
voiced with the subdued fervor of the business-minded faithful. 
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 The months leading up to the outbreak of war had been a perilous time for British 
diplomacy.  Russo-Japanese negotiations began in July 1903, but while Russia was 
unwilling to end its occupation of Manchuria or guarantee the territorial integrity of that 
region within China, it refused also to grant Japan a similarly privileged position 
throughout the whole of Korea.72  As both countries slowly slid toward war, Britain 
could not afford to provoke Russia, alienate Japan, nor get pulled into a pointless 
conflict with France.  One historian has credited Lansdowne’s “diplomatic equipoise” at 
the Foreign Office for handling successfully all three of these imperatives.73  On closer 
examination, however, his actions could just as easily be characterized as hopelessly 
muddled and confused; the result of the tension between the obligation he felt to support 
an ally, his unceasing pursuit of the ‘policy of the entente,’ and his aversion to war itself.  
It was to the benefit of Britain that Balfour kept an active hand in foreign affairs, and 
greatly to his credit that during these crucial months Britain did not suffer that terrible 
scourge that Lansdowne so feared. 
   Even as Britain’s ally was nearing war with Russia in last months of 1903, the 
Foreign Secretary was pursuing an Anglo-Russian agreement.  In October, Lansdowne 
approached Cambon unofficially to request that during the impending visit to Paris of 
the Russian Foreign Minster, Count Nicholas Lamsdorff, it might be conveyed to him 
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that Britain wished for greater openness in its relations with Russia.74  Declassé 
reportedly advised Lamsdorff that more frank exchanges might lead to the smoothing of 
existing difficulties, and the latter promised to so instruct Count Benckendorff, the 
Russian Ambassador in London.75  Several informal meetings with Benckendorff took 
place in November and resulted in a sketch by Lansdowne of the heads of a possible 
comprehensive Anglo-Russian settlement.  Centered on Afghanistan, Persia, and China, 
the Foreign Secretary outlined the main points in a letter at the end of November to 
Spring-Rice, then First Secretary at the British Embassy in St. Petersburg.  While 
Afghanistan and Tibet, including control over their external affairs, would fall within 
Britain’s sphere of interest, Russia would retain the right to maintain relations with these 
countries on matters of a non-political or purely local nature.  Manchuria, on the other 
hand, would fall within the Russian sphere, although the ‘Open Door’ would be 
guaranteed.  Moreover, Persia would be split into two spheres, Russia in the north of the 
country with commercial access in the south, while the southeastern province of Seistan, 
a traditional invasion route to India, would fall to Britain.76  With the exception of 
Manchuria, this proposal essentially was the basis of the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention.   
 During these same months, Lansdowne also was actively supporting Japan in her 
preparations for possible war with Russia.  In the famous case of the Chilean warships, 
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Lansdowne had urged the Japanese in February 1903 to purchase two British built 
warships originally built for the Chilean navy before the Russians acquired them, but 
Japan delayed and then bid low.  The British then took the extraordinary step of 
outbidding the Russians themselves, even though they had no use for the ships.  One of 
the express purposes for the purchase, according to Lansdowne, was to prevent the 
balance of naval power in the Far East turning against Japan.77      
 Throughout, however, Lansdowne continually sought out signs of peace.  In late 
October, based on the information he was receiving, he believed that the Russo-Japanese 
negotiations were progressing and “should be capable of satisfactory arrangement,” 
although there were, he admitted, some “disquieting symptoms” such as Hayashi’s 
“anxious and worried looks,” and reports that the Japanese were buying up all the 
shipping they could lay their hands on.  Japan also was attempting to secure a loan in 
London, and the banking firm Samuel Samuels asked the government for a guarantee.  
Arguing that Japan was pressed for money and could not hope at the moment to secure a 
loan without help, the Foreign Secretary asked Balfour if he might consider the proposal.  
Moreover, Lansdowne asserted that a loan “guarantee would enable them to strengthen 
themselves and would ‘clinch’ their friendship to us.”  He was not blind to the fact that 
such an action “would be regarded by Russia as openly hostile, but she is behaving so 
badly to us that I should not much mind that.”  After years of discussion, the Russians 
had recently indicated that their policy with regard to Afghanistan was simply that they 
would send agents into the country when they pleased.  Amazingly, the Foreign 
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Secretary now advocated the benefits of fostering further antagonism for “The result 
might be to convince her that she could not safely continue to flout us, and to bring 
about, what I have always hoped to see, a frank understanding between us as to 
Manchuria, Tibet, Afghanistan, Persia, &c.”78  With regard to the loan, however, 
Lansdowne was sorry to find that the Chancellor of the Exchequer “could not see his 
way to help the Japanese.”79 
 It is uncertain how Balfour reacted to Lansdowne’s unique strategy for 
generating an Anglo-Russian entente, but two months later, following his November 
discussions with the Russian Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary sent the Prime Minister 
a fresh draft of his proposed heads of an agreement with Russia.  He realized fully that 
with the situation in the Far East heating up, Lamsdorff’s “extremely plausible” 
language on Afghanistan might very well be an effort to keep Britain “quiet,” but he was 
pushing on regardless and wished for the Prime Minister’s views on the matter.  That 
same day Hayashi enquired whether or not Japan might now purchase from Britain those 
same Chilean ships they had previously passed on.  Circumstances had changed since 
February, however, and Lansdowne was perturbed somewhat with the request.  
Hayashi’s explanation that Japan’s prior inability to buy the ships was due to the fear of 
domestic political reaction did not hold much water with the Foreign Secretary, who 
noted that when he challenged it the Japanese Minister “maintained an air of childlike 
innocence.”  Lansdowne feared that letting the ships go at this stage would “be regarded 
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by Russia as a distinct declaration of hostility on our part, and I am inclined to think that 
we can exert our influence more usefully in other and more pacific directions.”80  His 
focus was now centered on preserving peace and forging a comprehensive Anglo-
Russian settlement, and in any event Balfour, Selborne, and Chamberlain, all agreed that 
the ships could not now be sold to Japan.81       
 Lansdowne actually had already begun a week earlier his effort to use Britain’s 
growing relationship with France to prevent war by sounding out Cambon on possible 
French support for mediation.  Both agreed that they ought to “‘pour as much cold water 
as possible’ on the embers.”82  On December 22, Lansdowne requested permission from 
the Prime Minister to attempt international mediation to prevent the coming war, and his 
missive contained all the elements of his seemingly contradictory overall policy.  He 
warned Balfour that the situation in the Far East had become “precarious,” and with 
French and American assistance Britain had to do what it could to prevent war, leaving 
“no stone unturned.”  Notwithstanding the Exchequer’s pronouncement that the cost of 
going to war would be “ruinous” for Britain, Lansdowne emphasized that “public 
opinion here would probably not permit us to allow Japan to be smashed,” and surely the 
government would not allow her to be invaded.  His solution was for Britain to “tell the 
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Japanese distinctly that they must be content with the best bargain they can get as to 
Korea” for the most recent offer from the Russians in negotiations was “upon the whole 
not unsatisfactory.”  In addition to his own letter, he enclosed letters containing the 
views of Selborne and Chamberlain, each of which contained elements that advanced in 
part his overall policy.83 
 Selborne began with the premise that Britain would not allow Japan to be 
“smashed,” but that intervention would assuredly lead to war with France.  He 
suggested, therefore, that Britain take France into their “fullest confidence and get her to 
join with us in exerting such pressure that there shall not be war.”  With regard to 
Selborne’s letter, Lansdowne deviated only on the suggestion that the government “go 
the length of telling the French categorically that we shall go to war to save Japan.”  
Chamberlain’s proposal was something different altogether.  He suggested that Britain 
“take a leaf out of the notebook of German diplomacy, and for once play a selfish but 
national game.”  He asked further: “If war breaks out, is not that the proper time for us to 
secure, and secure promptly, whatever we want in places where Russia is our rival?”  
Chamberlain was certain that once Japan was out of the way, Russia’s “inclination to 
negotiate a settlement with us will evaporate.”84  By this time Lansdowne most likely 
was disinclined to favor anything that could be characterized as German diplomacy, but 
these three assessments he sent to the Prime Minister, as a whole, embodied his policy.  
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Moreover, that policy marked a significant divergence between Balfour and his Foreign 
Secretary.     
 Ill and confined to his room, it was Balfour who set the government’s state of 
equilibrium, first by advising that they must be “most careful not give any advice to the 
Japs to which, in case of war, they might point and say ‘you must help us, for it was 
through following your lead that we find ourselves in this mess’!”85  To this the Foreign 
Secretary readily agreed.86  With regard to Lansdowne’s call for Britain to play the role 
of mediator, Balfour was almost sanguine over the likely consequences of a war.  
Although still awaiting a forecast of military operations from the intelligence 
departments, the premier’s December 22 memorandum on “Japan and Russia” 
maintained that while Japan could not safely send an expedition to Korea, he thought a 
Russian invasion of the Japanese islands “impossible.”  In his opinion, a war “would not 
‘smash’ Japan in the sense of wiping it out as a military force: nor need it greatly 
damage her fleet.”  Moreover, he argued that a war would not seriously affect Japan 
except in Korea, which was of little concern to Britain, and “there could be nothing 
better for us than that Russia should involve herself in the expense & trouble of” its 
occupation.  With these circumstances in mind, Balfour counseled against offering the 
Japanese advice, or offending her by pressing for the moderating of demands, and 
instead suggested that they “let her work out her own situation in her own way.”  In the 
end he was “disposed to think it would be better to come in as a deliverer at a later stage, 
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than to thrust unpalatable advice upon a reluctant ally in a matter with which we have no 
immediate concern.”87 
 In his reply to Selborne, the Prime Minister declared that he would not intervene 
in a quarrel not his own, in which he was “expected to aid an unfriendly Power, and to 
put pressure on an ally, especially as I believe that if any war could be conceived as 
being advantageous to us, this is one.”88  In their subsequent correspondence, both the 
First Lord of the Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer clarified their 
respective positions.  Selborne found Balfour’s views on the matter “very ingenious,” 
and while still not sanguine with regard to Japan’s fate in a war, he wanted it made clear 
that in his opinion Britain “ought not to attempt to induce Japan to abate her moderate 
terms.”89  Chamberlain, on the other hand, made it known that he in fact favored the idea 
of the Japanese striking quickly while they still had superiority in the region.90 
 In his response to the Prime Minister, Lansdowne agreed that “at present,” a 
Russian invasion of Japan was “out of the question,” but he worried that “by next 
autumn Russia might be mistress of the situation, and might impose terms on Japan 
which would wipe the latter out as a military power, and obliterate her fleet.”  If this 
occurred, he noted, “a war would not only affect Japan ‘through Corea’ but might render 
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her an almost negligible factor in Far eastern politics instead of at present a potential ally 
of great importance to us.”  The risks involved, he believed, certainly outweighed the 
benefits of a Russia stuck in a Korean quagmire.  Although Lansdowne concurred with 
Balfour that caution against giving Japan advice was wise, he thought Japanese 
diplomacy not very “adroit” and in need of outside assistance and considered the current 
Russian counter-proposals with regard to Korea very favorable to Japan.  Despite the 
Prime Minister’s views to the contrary, the Foreign Secretary was still inclined to 
believe that the best option for peace was an arrangement involving all interested 
powers, and confessed to his chief: “I attach I think more importance to averting war 
than you do.”  In sum, Lansdowne pointed to three unacceptable risks for Britain if war 
broke out:  
(i) the possibility that our ally may be crushed:  
(ii) the possibility that we may ourselves become implicated, not on 
account of our Treaty engagement to Japan, but because the British public 
will not sit still while the crushing is being done: 
(iii) the aggravation of our present financial difficulties, already grave 
enough.                 
 
He preferred, therefore, that Britain “try its hand as a mediator, or at all events as 
a friendly counselor, rather than wait until it can appear on the scene in the role 
of a ‘deliverer.’”91 
 Balfour responded simply that if Japan was unlikely to be invaded at any 
point in the war, and Russia could not then impose terms, then the former 
“cannot be crushed,” and therefore “British public opinion is not likely to drive 
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us into war.”92  Two days later he wrote to the King that, “The interest of this 
country is now and always—Peace,” but not all war was “an unmixed curse.”93  
Lansdowne, on the other hand, held to his belief that it was in Britain’s interest to 
“make every effort to avert war,” and be ready to mediate if called upon, but he 
agreed to move forward only if the Japanese were favorable to the idea.94  
Defending his policy to Chamberlain, Lansdowne maintained that he had “no 
idea of applying pressure to the Japanese,” but he was “not at all sure that they 
are not, so far as Manchuria is concerned, attaching too much importance to the 
question of form.”  If given the “chance of building a bridge for them, or for the 
Russians,” he was going to “take it.”95   
 Even before he received Lansdowne’s letter of December 22, Balfour had 
written down his thoughts on the possibility of any comprehensive agreement 
with Russia.  Declaring that he believed there was “no British Government that 
would not gladly make a permanent arrangement with Russia in Central-Asia and 
the Far East, and Russian statesmen and diplomatists have from time to time 
expressed a desire to see some such arrangement carried into effect,” he felt 
compelled to ask, “Why then, with this good-will, or at least appearance of good-
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will, on both sides, has no such arrangement yet been found practicable?”  
Notwithstanding certain present barriers, he pointed to two causes “of a 
permanent character” that made such an agreement difficult to forge.  The first of 
these was the worthlessness of Russian assurances, which he noted “may be 
sincere at the moment, but they are purely temporary in their operation.”  On the 
rare occasion that Russia agreed to a more formal treaty, he argued that she was 
no more scrupulous in its observance.96   
 The second and more significant difficulty standing in the way of a useful 
agreement, according to the premier, was that if Russia broke its word and 
advanced into a forbidden territory, Britain had no means of retaliation.  Balfour 
pointed out that, “There is really nothing in the way of territory which Russia 
possesses and we desire.”  Moreover, he noted that such “Petty acts of bad faith 
[committed by Russia], taken each by themselves, supply very poor reasons for 
plunging the world into war, yet if they are condoned they mount up to what is, 
in its cumulative effect, a serious menace to the British Empire, and in the 
meanwhile it seems extremely difficult to erect any diplomatic barrier in front of 
this slowly-creeping tide.”  In the Prime Minister’s opinion, such circumstances 
hardly supplied “the elements of a bargain.”  Nevertheless, he admitted that 
“Temporary arrangements” were “better than nothing,” and might serve to 
postpone the “evil day” if it was to come.  The permanent security of the British 
Empire, however, could only be found in laying down “certain well-defined 
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principles (e.g. the integrity of Afghanistan) which, if broken, we should regard 
as a casus belli.”  These principles, he confessed, were “not easy to formulate,” 
and it was also: 
not easy—perhaps it is not possible—to find some definite ground of 
understanding at once so clear in itself, and of such obvious importance to 
our Imperial interests, that the British people would consent to make its 
attempted infraction at once regarded as a sufficient ground for putting 
forth their whole strength in its defence.97 
 
 Balfour’s objection to Lansdowne’s specific proposal for Anglo-Russian 
agreement was much more present-minded, and even more pointed.  Although he 
conceded that the proposal “might afford the basis of a satisfactory settlement,” 
and that there were good arguments as to its advantageous timing, he believed 
there was “a certain feeling of incongruity in making an arrangement with a 
power at the very moment when a war may be on the point of breaking out 
between it and our Eastern ally.”98  The Prime Minister asked Lansdowne to 
circulate his proposal for observations, but for all intents and purposes it was a 
dead letter for the duration of the war.  It was sent around to the Cabinet, but on 
the disingenuous basis that it was meant only to keep Benckendorff happy, for it 
was “difficult to refuse some indication of our views.”99            
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 On December 29, Hayashi asked if Japan might expect Britain to exercise 
“benevolent neutrality” in case of war with Russia, and as instructed by Balfour, 
Lansdowne replied that Britain’s “obligations . . . under [the] the Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement would be fulfilled according to the spirit as well as the letter.”  The Japanese 
Ambassador’s request for the use of British coaling facilities, communications 
assistance, and once again a loan guarantee—up to £20 million—faced “serious 
difficulties,” however, and the Foreign Secretary responded that he would have to 
consult his Cabinet colleagues.100  Most important to the Japanese was the request for 
money, and Lansdowne asked the Prime Minister if his “mind was open upon this 
subject,” but Balfour argued that “morally such a loan in present circumstances would be 
‘an act of war.’”  The Chancellor of the Exchequer also saw no difference between the 
proposed loan, and the proposed sale of the Chilean warships.101  Contrary to the views 
of his Cabinet colleagues Lansdowne had hoped it was still possible to ease Japan’s 
financial difficulties.  It is difficult, however, to understand how he intended to reconcile 
his effort to fund the Japanese war machine—which could possibly draw Britain into the 
war—and his determination to take every opportunity to build for the Japanese an 
undesired, and most certainly resented, bridge to peace with Russia.  Acceding to the 
views of the Cabinet, he was forced to tell Hayashi that Britain must refuse the loan 
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request due to “political as well as financial considerations.”  If a large sum backed by 
the government was lent to Japan “at the present moment,” the Foreign Secretary 
informed the Ambassador, “the impression would be created that we were departing 
from our neutrality, and, in effect, giving active encouragement to Japan.”102 
 Lansdowne’s efforts at mediation were equally unsuccessful.  Hayashi repeatedly 
rebuffed the Foreign Secretary’s enquiries as to whether Japan might be receptive to 
some sort of multi-power intervention, or even diplomatic assistance.103  On January 13, 
1904, Declassé also offered to mediate, but Japan again refused.104  As Lansdowne had 
anticipated, he was subsequently approached by Cambon who asked if Britain might use 
its “influence to bear on Japan,” but knowing well Japan’s stance the Foreign Secretary 
declined, although he was not without hope that something might come of continued 
efforts for peace.105  As the month of January slipped away, however, such hopes faded.  
Cambon again brought up the matter of multi-power mediation on January 27, but 
Lansdowne could only observe that it was pointless if neither Russia nor Japan really 
desired it.106  Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary approached Hayashi again with the 
proposal two days later, only to be told by the Ambassador that in Japan “There was no 
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peace party now,” and if even Russia were to issue an assurance with regard to the 
territorial integrity of Manchuria in China, such declarations were no longer trusted.107  
Lansdowne was forced to concede the truth of the Japanese complaint, and the next day 
minuted wryly: “I wish someone would guarantee the integrity of the Russian 
Government.”108  A last minute request by Benckendorff on February 7 for British 
intervention, following the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Japan, proved 
fruitless.109  
 In the end, Britain did not intervene for mediation, prod Japan into war, or get 
drawn into the fight, but this was thanks largely to Balfour’s equipoise rather than that of 
Lansdowne.  The Foreign Secretary’s diplomatic skills were more evident during the war 
than prior to hostilities, and there is little question that Britain maintained its neutrality 
more scrupulously than the French.  The Japanese eventually did secure a large portion 
of their war expenditures from British banks, but these were private loans.110  
Lansdowne did not see any reason to object to this, or to interfere with them acquiring 
arms and ammunition in Britain, and though he knew the Russians would “of course be 
cross,” he also knew that they would be borrowing a great deal of money in Paris.111  
Even relatively minor matters drew his attention as exemplified by his request that the 
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King take any opportunity that might present itself to pay more attention to Hayahsi, as 
Benckendorff at the time was much more popular in higher social circles.112  It was a 
difficult task to remain uninvolved in “this wretched war,” the Foreign Secretary wrote 
to Durand in December 1904: “Scarcely a day passes without some more or less 
awkward question arising, and we shall be lucky if we don’t get into trouble both with 
our own people and the belligerents.”113  He was inclined to believe, however, “that the 
closeness of our relations with France, and of her relations with Russia, may prove 
useful to all concerned when the time comes for bringing the war to a close.”114  
 This certainly proved to be the case in gaining Russian adherence to the 
Khedivial Decree.  One day before the Entente was signed, Lansdowne learned from 
Cambon that the French were confident that they could “persuade the Russians to accept 
the Khedivial decree,” and less than two weeks later, he learned again from the French 
Ambassador that Russian adherence could be had in exchange for “something 
reassuring” with regard to British intentions in Tibet.115  Both sides agreed that any 
comprehensive Anglo-Russian agreement was not possible while the war continued, but 
since such assurances with regard to Tibet had in fact already been given on numerous 
occasions, the Foreign Secretary reaffirmed gladly in a memorandum given to 
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Benckendorff on May 10 that as long as no other power intervened in Tibetan affairs, 
Britain would “not attempt either to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any 
way to control its internal administration.”116  The following day Russia announced its 
adherence to the Khedivial Decree.117 
 In the last weeks of August 1904, Lansdowne was enjoying the first spell of 
“comparative idleness” in his heavy workload in a long time, and he assured Sir Charles 
Hardinge, British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, that he “need have no uneasiness as to 
Lhassa [sic],” the Tibetan capital.118  Unfortunately, the issue of Tibet did not recede 
quietly.  In September of the previous year the Cabinet reluctantly had authorized a 
mission under Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband to advance into the country to 
negotiate with Tibetan and Chinese representatives.  The mission was launched at the 
behest of the Viceroy who was fearful that the Chinese, who claimed suzerainty over 
Tibet, secretly had granted Russia a protectorate over the region.119  The Tibetans also 
were refusing to uphold treaty obligations or negotiate, and allegedly had killed British 
subjects and stolen property.120  At the very least, the British were determined that the 
country should remain a buffer state within Britain’s sphere of influence.  Although he 
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disliked “entangling” Britain in such regions, Lansdowne wrote to Knollys that he had 
come to the conclusion that there was little choice but to back Curzon and the Indian 
Government.121  The Cabinet, however, issued specific restrictions on the mission; 
foremost of these was that there was to be no permanent occupation of Tibet.  In late 
March 1904, the two-hundred man mission wiped out a contingent of Tibetan soldiers 
resisting the British advance, and Younghusband reached Gyantse in mid-April.122  
Apprehensive over likely negative foreign comment Lansdowne observed: “I wonder 
what we should have said if it had been a Russian instead of a British ‘political 
mission’!”  Although he was not happy about the clash, he concluded, however, that it 
might in the end do good and was probably unavoidable.123  It was one month later that 
Lansdowne gave his assurance with regard to Tibet to Benckendorff.  Finding no one 
with which to negotiate at Gyantse, Younghusband was authorized to advance to Lhasa 
in May.  Once again, however, the Cabinet issued specific restrictions.  The Colonel was 
not to place a British resident at Lhasa, or occupy the Chumbi Valley for longer than 
three years, during which an indemnity for commercial damages was to be paid by the 
Tibetans.  Younghusband disobeyed his orders, however, and on September 7 concluded 
a treaty which called for the payment of £500,000, to be paid in seventy-five annual 
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installments, and during which time the Chumbi Valley would remain occupied.124  To 
the Russians the treaty appeared to be the creation of a “virtual protectorate,” and at odds 
with British assurances.125 
 The Cabinet was aghast and unanimous in its disapproval.  Lansdowne knew 
Britain had been “placed in a very embarrassing position,” and suggested that the 
government immediately and publicly announce that with regard to the indemnity and 
occupation that the treaty would be amended and its terms reduced severely. Most 
importantly, he required something to tell Benckendorff as the Russian adherence to the 
Khedivial Decree was contingent on British assurances with regard to Tibetan 
independence.126  Balfour was disturbed especially, observing that by his conduct 
Younghusband had placed Britain “in the position of either disavowing him, or 
appearing to modify our Tibetan policy in consequence of Russian pressure.”  Moreover, 
by allowing critics through his disobedience to say that Britain had “taken a leaf out of 
Russia’s book,” he had “touched the honour of his country.”127  The Prime Minister 
disliked the idea of disavowing Younghusband and the treaty publicly, however, and 
without anyone having yet had the opportunity to question the Colonel suggested that the 
Foreign Secretary tell the Russian Ambassador that the extended period of occupation 
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was settled on at the request of the Tibetans themselves in order to ease the level of their 
annual indemnity payment.128  Recognizing that any perceived deviation from the 
assurance he had given the Russians in May would blacken his own face more than any 
other, Lansdowne relayed this trumped up story to Benckendorff, anxious that 
Lamsdorff, who favored rapprochement with England, did not lose face either.129  The 
final Anglo-Tibetan Convention, ratified on November 11, was a modified version of 
Younghusband’s treaty and stipulated an indemnity only a third of that originally agreed, 
and an occupation to last only three years.  In addition, it was greed that there would be 
no need for a British agent with the right of access to Lhasa.130       
 Not long after Younghusband’s misstep in Tibet, the Russians made an even 
more egregious blunder.  In the early morning of October 22 the Russian Baltic fleet, on 
its long fateful voyage to the Far East, mistakenly fired on a fleet of British fishing 
trawlers off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea thinking they were Japanese torpedo 
boats.  The King called the unprovoked attack, “A most dastardly outrage,” and the 
Cabinet and the country were soon in a profoundly warlike mood.131  Since the war 
began Lansdowne had done his best to prevent an Anglo-Russian rift over the illegal 
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search and seizure of British merchant ships on the high seas by Russian warships 
looking for contraband.  While he had managed largely to keep “the hotheads who want 
us to bluster and bounce” at bay, and “blacken” the faces of Benckendorff and 
Lamsdorff “as little as possible,” this incident would require the Foreign Secretary to be 
skillful and swift.  Monger was not wrong to suggest that “all depended on 
Lansdowne.”132  The Foreign Secretary deserved much credit for calming inflamed 
feelings and suppressing incautious words that might have provoked an Anglo-Russian 
war.   
 Immediately upon hearing of the attack, Lansdowne informed Benckendorff that 
it was “impossible to exaggerate the indignation which has been provoked,” and that the 
incident was only “aggravated by the callousness of the Russian commanding officer, 
who must have known before resuming the voyage that his fleet had fired upon and 
seriously injured innocent and defenceless people.”133  That same day, Balfour 
telegraphed the Foreign Secretary asking what he proposed to do “about [the] outrage in 
the North Sea.”  The Prime Minister’s first impulse was “to stop the Russian Fleet at the 
first convenient place and exact [an] explanation.”  Moreover, he declared that he 
“should be sorry to see so gross and gratuitous a blunder left to the slow methods of 
diplomacy.”134  With the rest of Cabinet in an equally aggressive mood, Lansdowne 
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suggested immediately to M. Serge Sazonov, Russian Chargé d’Affairs at the London 
embassy, that a spontaneous and prompt offer of reparations would be wise lest public 
feeling on the matter become “uncontrollable.”135  The next day he informed 
Benckendorff that besides an “ample apology and disclaimer from the Russian 
Government,” Britain would expect and insist on referring the whole matter to an 
independent international court to assess and assign blame and punishment of those 
responsible.136   
 The Foreign Secretary hoped the Russians would have “the good sense to say all 
that is necessary at once,” and it would appear that Lansdowne was isolated in the 
Cabinet in pressing for caution and diplomacy.137  Anticipating his speech at 
Southampton on October 26, the Prime Minister told the Cabinet that he was prepared to 
say “either that all our demands have been accepted, or, if I am not in position to say 
this, then to hint—politely but not obscurely—that we cannot allow the criminals to 
vanish into the Far East without immediate trial.”  He was well aware that the latter 
statement would be “very like a declaration of war and bring the country perilously near 
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to overt hostilities,” but he saw no other possible course of action.138  Fortunately, 
emotions were soon calmed, with Russia agreeing to British demands, and their Baltic 
fleet was delayed at Vigo in Spain so a proper enquiry could be made.  The British fleet 
that was being assembled quickly at Gibraltar in case the Russian fleet had to be forcibly 
stopped went unused.139  Four months later, an investigative commission awarded 
Britain’s fishermen £65,000 but found that Russian Vice-Admiral Zinovii 
Rozhdestvensky had not acted intentionally so his actions did not warrant punishment.140   
 Just how close the two countries came to war can be judged by Lansdowne’s 
admission to Hardinge that some three days into the crisis it looked to him “as if the 
betting was about even as between peace and war.”  While he observed that the 
Ambassador and he had managed to get “the Russians out of the scrape this time,” he 
could not rid his mind of “the apprehension that they, [the Russians], will through 
stupidity or perversity or both tumble into another.”141  Sir Valentine Chirol’s well-
informed opinion was that the Foreign Secretary had indeed “kept a very cool head,” 
even though at first it seemed to him that Lansdowne went “too far in the direction of 
minimizing the whole business.”142     
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 The Foreign Office remained largely passive throughout the rest of the war for 
fear of alienating or offending Japan by offering unwanted mediation.  In late January 
1905, acting on information from Tokyo that Japan might at least be open to such an 
offer, Lansdowne did approach Theodore Roosevelt informally with an outline of 
provisional Japanese terms, but the American President declined this opportunity to 
intervene.143  Once again, Lansdowne’s efforts were not entirely in line with the views of 
the Prime Minister, who only the day before informed his Foreign Secretary that while 
he too was anxious that Britain should do everything it could to end the war, he had to 
admit that “from a narrowly national point of view, the balance of advantage, I suspect, 
is on the side of continued hostilities.”144  British inaction with regard to mediation 
actually led Roosevelt at one point to conclude that Britain was actively encouraging the 
Japanese to continue fighting.  Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s stated views above, 
Lansdowne protested to Durand that Britain “should be glad to see peace concluded, first 
of all for reasons of humanity, which after all must be allowed to count for something, 
and in the next place because the war, with all reactions in other parts of the world, is a 
bad thing for us all.”145  By the time the Russo-Japanese War ended in September 1905 
with Japan victorious, however, Lansdowne was convinced that it would have been “a 
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great mistake” to have pressured Japan to moderate her demands, even to end the war 
more quickly.146 
 Lansdowne’s one great accomplishment in the name of peace during the war was 
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which he thought would make it easier for 
the Japanese to come to terms with Russia.147  Although the alliance was not due to 
expire until 1907, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Percy, 
suggested to Lansdowne and Balfour in mid-January 1905 that Britain’s friendship for 
Japan might be shown effectively by renewing the existing alliance immediately for 
additional five-year term.148  Doubting the wisdom of granting the Japanese Emperor the 
Garter, or elevating the British legation in Tokyo to an Embassy while the war 
continued, Lansdowne agreed that if anything was to be done “to show the Japanese that 
our affection is unabated,” he was “inclined to offer them now an extension of the 
A[nglo] J[apanese] Agreement for another term of 5 years.”149  The Cabinet decided, 
however, to wait for a sign of Japanese receptiveness.150   
 Upon receiving reports of encouraging language from Japan’s Foreign Minister 
and Japanese newspapers, Lansdowne approached Hayashi in late March about renewing 
and possibly expanding the treaty.  The Ambassador responded positively, but asked if 
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the United States might be asked to join.  While the Foreign Secretary believed the 
United States would undoubtedly move along “parallel lines” with Britain and Japan, he 
did not think they would abandon their tradition against entangling alliances.151  After 
consulting his superiors, Hayashi informed Lansdowne that his country desired to extend 
the term of the alliance, but not its scope.152  In early May, the Japanese presented their 
draft for a straight renewal of the treaty, although it also recognized the greater 
predominance Japan now had in Korea due to its recent military victories.153   
 In order to avoid the appearance this time of a one-sided treaty, however, the 
Cabinet decided to hold out for an “amplification of its scope.”  When asked by Hayashi 
a week later what exactly Britain had in mind, Lansdowne noted that two of the more 
“obvious” amplifications that came to mind would be to require each nation to provide 
military support to the other on the unprovoked attack of a single power, instead of two, 
and an expansion of the area covered by the treaty to include India.  The Ambassador 
believed initially that it was unlikely his government would agree to the inclusion of 
India, but Japan’s leaders in a unanimous decision in fact decided that an expanded 
treaty would provide ample protection against any future Russian war of revenge.154  
The essentials of the treaty were therefore accepted by Japan in late May leaving only 
the particulars of the military assistance each power would provide the other in case of 
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war to be hammered out later.  Significantly, this all transpired before, not after, the 
Japanese Navy sent the greater portion of the Russian Baltic fleet to the bottom of the 
sea.   
 Although characterized as a renewal of the 1902 alliance, at its heart the new 
treaty was an exchange of military support for the defense of each power’s most 
vulnerable imperial possession; India for Korea.  From the beginning of the negotiations 
the British had accepted as inevitable that the latter country would become a Japanese 
protectorate.  The other major alteration to the original treaty was that, as proposed, an 
unprovoked attack by a single power, not two, with regard to the regions covered would 
now constitute a casus foederis.155  Lansdowne considered this alteration in particular a 
significant improvement on the first treaty with regard to its deterrent effect on future 
wars.  Speaking at a dinner on June 1, and before the new treaty had even taken its final 
form, he declared that if the Anglo-Japanese alliance—that “potent influence for 
peace”—proved possible to modify and strengthen, “it would not only prevent the spread 
of the conflagration, when the conflagration had begun, but prevent a conflagration from 
taking place at all.”156 
 The new alliance was signed on August 12, 1905, and contained no secret articles 
or exchange of diplomatic notes.  It was to run for a term of ten years, and the details 
concerning the level of military support each power would provide the other were left to 
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be settled at a later date.  Unlike three years before, on this occasion there was no 
Franco-Russian counter-declaration.157  Lansdowne did his best to reassure the Russians 
that true to the stated objectives of the new treaty, it was not intended to be provocative, 
and he wrote to Hardinge on September 4 with this purpose in mind.  He wrote: 
You will receive simultaneously with this letter, or soon after it, a 
despatch briefly setting forth the objects of the Alliance, which you will 
communicate to Count Lamsdorff.  I earnestly trust that you will be able 
to convince him that it contains nothing to which the Russian 
Government can reasonably take exception.  I do not of course mean to 
say that the new Agreement is not, from the force of circumstances, 
aimed at Russia more than at any other power, but this is inevitable.  All 
measures of precaution, whether they take the shape of military and naval 
preparations or, as in this case, of Alliances, must be directed at 
somebody, and no country has, it seems to me, the right to take offence 
because another country raises the wall of its back garden high enough to 
prevent an over-adventurous neighbor, or that neighbor’s unruly or over-
zealous agents, from attempting to climb over it. 
 I can at any rate say with absolute conviction that this new 
arrangement must not be taken as an indication of unfriendliness on our 
part.  I have, as you know, always desired and still desire that we should 
live on neighborly terms with Russia, and this view, which Benckendorff 
has often expressed to me, represents, I believe, the feelings of his Chief.  
So far as we are concerned, there can be no reason why, in the new 
chapter of history which is now beginning for Russia, we should not work 
with her for the good of the civilised world.158            
 
For the time being, however, Lansdowne was prepared to “mark time,” believing no 
Anglo-Russian agreement could presently be had, “partly on account of difficulties 
which are inherent, partly because the Russian statesmen would, I believe, not be 
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allowed to accept the conditions upon which we should have to insist, e.g. in regard to 
Afghanistan and Persia.”159  
 
Germany 
 With the failure to forge an Anglo-German alliance in 1901, German policy 
toward Britain shifted, temporarily at least, to ensuring that the British did not come to 
terms with any of Germany’s enemies.  Initially, Germany’s leaders had little fear that 
Britain would be able to settle its differences with France, much less Russia.  The first 
sign of worry came from Eckardstein, whose May 1903 report to the German Foreign 
Office warned of an impending Anglo-French agreement which could lead eventually to 
the formation of a new British-French-Russian alliance.  This warning was not taken 
seriously, however, either by Holstein or Chancellor Bülow.160  Writing to the Emperor 
just a couple of weeks after the visit of Edward VII to Paris, the German Chancellor 
dismissed Eckardstein’s concerns.161  He believed, in fact, that the purpose behind the 
King’s visit was a British attempt to break up the Dual Alliance.162  
 When more definite news of the Entente began to leak out it was worrisome.  It 
merely reaffirmed the Kaiser’s suspicions that Britain was “underhandedly” trying to 
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isolate Germany.163  Although throughout the Anglo-French negotiations Lansdowne 
consistently played down the effect the Entente would have in Germany, surprisingly 
more so than even Entente advocates like Lord Cromer, there is no evidence that he ever 
contemplated purposely isolating Germany.164  He did believe that Germany’s reaction 
would be “interesting to see,” and among the potentially dissenting powers, it would be 
“the most formidable.”  Moreover, in March, a few weeks before the Entente was 
signed, it remained an open question for the Foreign Secretary whether the Germans 
would “put a spoke in our wheel and stand out for all her privileges even if France, 
which has an infinitely larger stake in Egypt, consents to abdicate hers,” or “be amiable 
and facilitate matters?”165  This was hardly antagonism, however, and having obtained 
the adherence of all the other interested powers to the Khedivial Decree he predicted that 
the Germans would “scarcely venture to stand out.”166 
 The German response came quickly with Lascelles reporting on April 23 that 
Richthofen had suggested that compensation for German sacrifices in Egypt should take 
the form of an all-round understanding between the two countries.167  Germany’s policy, 
as formulated by Bülow and Holstein, was intended to diminish the importance of the 
Entente by following in French footsteps and securing compensation from England for 
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Germany’s rights in Egypt, as well as collecting indemnity claims for past incidents in 
Samoa and the Transvaal.  The Chancellor confidently informed Richthofen on April 19 
that Egypt was “the best nail to hang all the rest on.”168  While the Germans might have 
had legitimate cause to seek some compensation with regard to Egypt, Lansdowne 
showed considerable exacerbation, and this was in direct contrast to his apparent 
willingness to offer additional, if undeserved, inducements to Italy—underserved 
because he believed that Britain had “behaved like gentlemen to them about Tripoli”169   
 It was at this stage, in his final year and a half at the Foreign Office, that there 
appeared a distinct change in Lansdowne’s attitude toward Germany.  The 
comprehensive settlement the Germans attempted to force as compensation for the 
“perfectly innocuous arrangement in Egypt,” he believed would look “to an ordinary 
observer like a great piece of effrontery.”  Moreover, he resented the additional implied 
threat that Germany was as yet undecided on whether they would “turn to the East or to 
the West.”170  A year later, in a letter to Lascelles, the Foreign Secretary noted that 
although he was sure the Emperor was “much annoyed” with the Anglo-French Entente, 
he was not willing to let the Germans use it as “the pretext for a showy understanding 
which they might have put in their shop window.”171  After contemplating exactly how 
far Britain might go in settling the claims on Germany’s list, he confessed to Balfour that 
                                                 
168 Bülow to Richthofen, April 19, 1904, GDD III, p. 192. 
 
169 Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 18, 1904, PRO FO 800/129. 
 
170 Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 6, 1904, PRO FO 800/129.  
 
171 Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 9, 1905, PRO FO 800/130. 
 
 342
he could “see no particular object in gratifying her, or at any rate in shewing much 
eagerness to do so.”172     
 Telling Bertie that “the only thing to do was to hold Germany at arm’s length,” 
Lansdowne rebuffed German claims, and emphasis was to be given to the fact that all 
the other interested powers had adhered to the Decree except Germany.  The Foreign 
Secretary still believed that it would “not be easy for Germany to obstruct what is 
admittedly a good arrangement for all concerned.”  Metternich was of the opinion, 
however, that Lansdowne was demanding of Germany “a policy altogether too 
altruistic.”  Nevertheless, the Germans drew back from their request for an all-round 
settlement claiming it was all a misunderstanding, and declared that they had no 
intention of obstructing British actions in Egypt.  They simply wanted corresponding 
commercial equality in Egypt as had been granted to France for thirty years.173  The 
Foreign Secretary at first was reluctant to agree to commercial equality on the terms 
given to France because to his mind Germany wanted “all that Great Britain has given to 
French commerce, but to give nothing to British commerce in exchange,” as France had 
done in Morocco.174  He soon relented, however, and agreed to grant them “most-
favoured-nation treatment” in Egypt for thirty years.175  Germany’s adherence to the 
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Khedivial Decree came on June 19, 1904, and they agreed, moreover, not to ask for a 
time-limit for British occupation.176  
 What Lansdowne had referred to as “a test case, so far as German good will is 
concerned,” Holstein characterized now as “a test of strength,” arguing that “a German 
retreat in the face of Anglo-French resistance would in no way be conducive to bringing 
about better German-English relations, but would on the contrary give the English, the 
French, and the rest of the world practical proof that one gets most from Germany by 
treating her badly.”  In his view, to follow such a course would “only be preparing the 
way for future conflicts.”177  Notwithstanding the failure to force Britain to make a 
comprehensive settlement over Egypt, Holstein had formulated already Germany’s next 
move to demonstrate the worthlessness of the Entente.  Germany would become the 
champion of international law and the upholder of the legitimate rights of other powers 
by challenging French designs on Morocco.  After all, the Madrid Convention of July 
1880 committed all the European powers and the United States to support the Open 
Door in Morocco.  Holstein also assumed that the diplomatic support the Entente 
required Britain to provide France would “remain platonic.”178  Richthofen concurred, 
asserting that “England is now out of it, for it no longer has any interest in how Germany 
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deals with France over Morocco.”179  Once again, German complaints had some 
legitimacy, but for the time being they laid low. 
 The Dogger Bank incident in October 1904 presented the Kaiser with a perfect 
opportunity to attempt a Russo-German alliance, but when the danger to Russia had 
receded Germany was informed that before negotiations could continue France would 
first have to be consulted.  This of course signaled the end of the venture, and the Anglo-
Russian crisis was soon followed by an Anglo-German war scare beginning in late 
November.  Germany’s leaders became alarmed at the prospect of an imminent British 
attack, as the suspicions of many in Britain that the Germans were secretly behind the 
Russian attack in the North Sea helped ignite the usual Germanophobia.  This included 
the appearance of articles in Vanity Fair and the Army and Navy Gazette that called for 
the German fleet to be ‘Copenhagen-ed.’180  Although perhaps not as apprehensive as 
the rest, even Bülow advised the Emperor that the “attitude of the big English papers 
was in fact a fine indication of how British policy was going, for the final decision lay 
with public opinion.”181   
 Lansdowne was mildly incredulous at the whole affair, and informed Lascelles 
that he did “not believe that it would be possible to find a sane individual in these islands 
who thinks that it would be for our interest, or was likely to become our duty to fasten a 
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quarrel upon Germany.”182  Moreover, with regard to the fears and complaints expressed 
officially by Bülow and Holstein, he confessed that it was “a little difficult to follow the 
working of these great minds,” and wondered that they could “seriously believe that we 
are meditating a coup against them.”  In jest, he asked Lascelles, “Are they perchance 
meditating one against us & are they seeking to justify it in advance?”183  While 
Lansdowne might have been inclined to agree that the “tone” of the British press could 
be “quite needlessly exasperating,” he found it immensely “irritating to find serious 
diplomatic complaints founded upon articles in the ‘Army and Navy Gazette’ and 
‘Vanity Fair.’”184      
 As noted already, the crumbling of the Sultan’s authority in Morocco in the last 
months of 1904 forced the French to act on their plans much sooner than anticipated.  On 
January 25, 1905, they began talks with the Sultan, and thereafter Germany’s leaders 
made their decision to come to the aid of the Moroccan ruler.  In search of a dramatic 
demonstration of their backing, Bülow and Holstein decided that during his planned 
Mediterranean cruise the Kaiser would land personally at Tangier, ignore French 
pretensions in the country, and declare Germany’s support for the Sultan’s independence 
and the Open Door in Morocco.  Indeed, Bülow believed the latter to be Germany’s 
“trump card” as all the European powers and the United States had signed treaties to 
uphold commercial equality in the country.  The reluctant and fearful Emperor’s visit to 
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Tangier on March 31 provoked the first Moroccan Crisis and Germany’s strong legal 
position prompted Holstein to insist on forcing on the French an international 
conference.  He was convinced that Germany would have the support of the other 
European powers like Spain and Italy, as well as America.  Inexplicably, he continued to 
believe this despite prior intimations from Roosevelt that the United States did not wish 
to become entangled in the Morocco affair.185 
 Lansdowne hoped initially that Wilhelm’s rather short excursion would not do 
much harm, but within the week he recognized the Emperor’s “Tangier escapade as an 
extraordinarily clumsy bit of diplomacy,” and suspected that it was not likely to be an 
isolated incident.  He even suggested to Salisbury (the fourth marquis) that His Imperial 
Majesty deserved a “judicious spanking,” but what he could not fully explain was the 
Emperor’s displeasure at the Moroccan agreement, unless it was, he theorized, to force 
the Sultan to purchase more German guns.  If this was his object, Lansdowne believed it 
would “certainly not add to the reputation and popularity of his country.”186        
 Hoping to avoid the humiliation of an international conference, Declassé tried to 
tempt the Germans with a bilateral deal on Morocco—never intending, however, to go 
further than to guarantee Germany commercial freedom in the country—but again 
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Holstein wanted to force an international conference on France to put them in the wrong.  
Under the cover of a conference Germany would then be able to wriggle out of its 
commitments to the Sultan and its pronouncements in support of international law and 
possibly acquire a slice of Morocco.187  Declassé was able to remain strong in his 
resistance to German demands during the crisis in part because he received British 
diplomatic support early on.  Lansdowne thought Germany’s attitude completely 
“unreasonable,” and on April 22 authorized Bertie, now Ambassador in Paris, to inform 
the French Foreign Minister that Britain was prepared to give its support in opposing any 
German request for a Moroccan port.188  Declassé’s anti-German policies were 
increasingly under attack at home, however, and receiving little support from his 
political colleagues he tendered his resignation.  He managed to survive for the time-
being, and Lansdowne, for one, was pleased the “cabal against him” had failed.189   
 Lansdowne recognized fully now that the French were “thoroughly frightened,” 
as they had little hope of Russian help and were still somewhat unsure of British 
assistance.  The Foreign Secretary, however, was unsure himself that Britain should 
support France “except in certain eventualities.”  His request for the opinion of the 
Admiralty on the strategic impact for Britain if Germany were to gain a port on the 
Moroccan coast resulted in what he characterized as a “characteristic effusion” from the 
new First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher.  Fisher argued that events had provided a “golden 
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opportunity” to go to war with Germany, and maintained that Britain “could have the 
German Fleet, the Kiel Canal, and Schleswig-Holstein within a fortnight.”  Lansdowne 
did not take the suggestion seriously, believing it to be more than a little ahead of the 
extant crisis, and despite the Admiral’s views and the efforts of the anti-German faction 
in the Foreign Office, his ‘guarantee’ of support to France fell well short of the offer of 
military assistance.  Citing Lansdowne’s unfinished letter to the Prime Minister of April 
23, 1905, quoted above, Monger argued that Lansdowne was in fact prepared and 
willing to go to war with Germany, but only in “certain eventualities,” but there is no 
additional evidence to suggest that this is the level of support he actually meant.190   
 In mid-May, Lansdowne emphasized again, this time to Cambon, that both 
governments “should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, 
should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, 
and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might 
in the course of events find themselves confronted.”191  As far as Lansdowne was 
concerned this was the extent of Britain’s so-called ‘guarantee’ to France during the 
crisis.  Others went further however.  On receiving the Foreign Secretary’s instructions 
of April 22, Bertie gave Declassé, purposely or not, a selectively edited version of 
Lansdowne’s instructions, stating that Britain offered “all the support in its power,” and 
on his own initiative might have later promised even more.192  Moreover, Cambon told 
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Declassé that he believed Lansdowne’s assurances given in May, “constitute, in reality, 
an alliance.”193   
 Germany’s leaders, based on the reports of their own secret informants, became 
convinced that an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded between France 
and Britain, and no amount of denials would shake them from that belief.194  In the midst 
of these multiple denials Lansdowne did amplify, somewhat indirectly, his support of 
France, warning Metternich twice, first on June 28 and later on July 19, that “although 
there was no alliance, pubic opinion here might become uncontrollable if Germany were 
to fasten a quarrel upon France merely because the latter had come to a friendly 
arrangement with us.”  Afterward in a letter to Lascelles, he noted that the German 
Ambassador “made a good deal” of the observation, but the French were not told.195  By 
late October, it was clear to the Foreign Secretary that the agreement with France had 
“no doubt been interpreted in a perverse fashion by a certain section of German opinion 
& I am afraid the German Gov[ernmen]t.”196  Some six years later he was still of the 
same mind.  When publication of Entente’s secret clauses was forced by a leak to the 
press, Lansdowne confessed to his successor at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, his 
relief that he would “at any rate hear no more of the confident statements which are still 
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being made to the effect that we had bound ourselves by these Articles to afford one 
another material assistance of a definite kind in certain eventualities.”197           
 Unable to secure a deal with Germany, on June 6, 1905, Declassé was forced 
finally by his political colleagues and an apprehensive and fearful public to resign.  
Lansdowne found the unseating of Declassé—a man he referred to as a personal “ally” 
and friend—“disgusting,” and was sure it had “sent the ‘entente’ down any number of 
points in the market.”198  This was especially so as Declassé’s replacement, Maurice 
Rouvier, now Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister, was an advocate of 
conciliating Germany.  Rouvier was of the opinion that British support meant little when 
facing a German land invasion, the threat of which he took more seriously than his 
predecessor.199  On finding, however, that he too was unable to construct a Franco-
German deal over Morocco, he stiffened in his resistance to a conference.  After less 
than two months as Foreign Minister, he was forced to admit that the actions of the 
German Emperor threatened to make him “as Germanophobe as Declassé.”200   
 Rouvier still had Britain’s diplomatic support, and Lansdowne was pleased to 
hear that the new Foreign Minister at least for the time being would not accept a 
conference.  If it turned out, however, that the French were “really on the run,” 
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Lansdowne had come to the rather naïve conclusion that a conference might still produce 
a satisfactory settlement as Germany’s stated aim was to uphold “the legal status of 
Morocco, an attitude which would scarcely be reconcilable with a proposal to steal 
territory from the Sultan.”201  In addition to British support, the United States had 
informed the French that it would decline to attend a conference if asked.  Moreover, 
anxious to keep his hope of a Russo-German alliance alive, the Kaiser was urging his 
own government to be conciliatory, and might even have let slip to a French general that 
Germany had no intention of going to war over Morocco.202 
 Nevertheless, the French succumbed to external and internal pressures and on 
July 8 agreed to the German demand for an international conference.  As a sign of how 
much the German position had been undermined, however, they did so only on the 
conditions that Germany recognize their “legitimate interests” in Morocco, and that there 
be joint approval of the agenda.  Moreover, the French now knew that when the 
conference took place early the following year they would have the majority support of 
the participating powers.203  The German scheme had failed, and Lansdowne observed 
that if French conditions for the conference held true, the conferees would have little to 
do but occupy themselves “with the whitewashing of the prisons and such-like domestic 
questions.”204  He also believed, however, that the French had “played their cards badly 
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in Morocco” and dismissed an appeal by Reginald Lister, the Second Secretary at the 
British Embassy at Paris, for a more definitive ‘guarantee’ to France.  Arguing that the 
moment would not “be a very opportune one for suggesting either to the Cabinet or to 
the country an extension of the understanding already arrived at,” he pointed out that 
“Recent events [had] . . . undoubtedly shaken people’s confidence in the steadfastness of 
the French nation.”205  Lansdowne’s own confidence in the Entente was not shaken, but 
he did have to admit to Bertie that the “instability of French gov[ernmen]ts is much to be 
regretted, & affords an argument to those who do not believe in the possibility of an 
enduring understanding with France.”206  
 Paul Kennedy argued that Lansdowne never really showed “resentment” toward 
German actions—merely critiquing the Emperor in “schoolmasterly fashion”—because 
he was overly preoccupied with imperial concerns and this due to an overwhelming fear 
of Russian encroachments in Asia which he shared with Balfour.  While Balfour never 
really considered the episode a true ‘crisis’ for Britain, as shown above there indeed was 
a change in the Foreign Secretary’s attitude toward Germany which was the result of the 
latter’s reaction to the Anglo-French Entente, even if that attitude remained tinged with 
Whiggish detachment and liberal optimism.  The Foreign Secretary’s reaction to the 
Emperor’s Tangier “escapade” appeared mild to Kennedy, but it was not indicative of 
distraction or lack of due interest, it was more a reflection of Lansdowne’s nature.207  If, 
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in Lansdowne’s opinion, France had played its cards “badly,” he believed Germany had 
“shown herself inconceivably stupid about Morocco.”208  Their policy having failed 
utterly, Germany’s leaders had managed finally to antagonize their last great defender in 
the British Cabinet, and their perceived bullying methods only served to drive Britain 
and France closer together.209  What Lansdowne might have only unconsciously 
perceived at the time, however, was that his own ‘policy of the entente’ also was 
wrecked by German imperial ambition and diplomatic stupidity.   
 With the first Moroccan Crisis on the path to settlement, the Kaiser convinced 
the Czar to meet him on his yacht in the Bay of Björkö (Primorsk).  On July 24, 1905, 
the Czar signed a Russo-German defensive alliance on the belief, as attested to by the 
Emperor, that Germany and France soon would be friends.210  A description of the 
meeting that Lansdowne received in August from Reginald Tower, British Minister 
Resident at Munich and Stuttgart, and which he thought was the only account so far that 
had “any pretence to authenticity,” filled him with “disquiet” with regard to the 
“Emperor’s language and demeanor.”  In addition to the Foreign Secretary’s desire that 
Russia and Germany not come to terms with one another, according to Tower, when the 
Emperor chose to speak at all, he talked “vehemently,” and then mostly of “alliances and 
political combinations,” such as his dream of forging a Germany-France-Russia coalition 
against Britain.  Lansdowne could only wonder: “What may not a man in such a frame 
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of mind not do next?”211  Notwithstanding his own “disquiet,” a month later Lansdowne 
was compelled to attribute at least some of the Emperor’s ill-feeling to the actions of 
Edward VII, who continued, the Foreign Secretary noted, to talk and write “about his 
Royal Brother in terms which make one’s flesh creep.”212           
 With a Russo-German alliance now signed, the Kaiser and Bülow pushed for 
conciliation with France over Morocco believing it to be the perfect bait for gaining 
French adherence to the new alignment.  Holstein dissented arguing, correctly as it 
turned out, that conciliation would only serve to increase French resistance and 
strengthen the Entente.  Germany compromised on the conference agenda in late 
September, and less than two weeks later in a repetition of what had occurred the year 
before, the Czar informed the Kaiser that ratification of the recently signed Russo-
German alliance would need to be postponed until the exact views of France were 
known.213  At the Moroccan conference convened at Algeciras in Spain in January 1906, 
France and Britain relied on each other’s support more than ever, while Germany found 
out quickly that it could only count on the support of Austria and Morocco.214 
 Nearing the end of his term at the Foreign Office, Lansdowne, ever the liberal 
optimist, considered Anglo-German relations still not nearly “so deplorable” as others 
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believed, “considering that the two Governments have (so far as I am aware) absolutely 
no outstanding questions by which those relations might be embarrassed.”215  Five days 
earlier, he had written along the same lines to Randall Thomas Davidson, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury.  In response to the Archbishop’s request for advice on 
associating himself with the Anglo-German Conciliation Committee, the Foreign 
Secretary had no doubt that the movement was “well meant,” but he was not sure it 
would have much effect.  He was confident, however, that there was “no 
misunderstanding & certainly no quarrel between the British & German 
Gov[ernmen]ts.”  Moreover, there was “No question as to which we could fall out” so 
far as he was aware.216  It is ironic that many modern historians have since pointed to 
this very lack of outstanding disputes between the two countries as the primary obstacle 
to an Anglo-German understanding.217 
 
A Brief Assessment 
 In early December 1905, the Balfour Ministry finally fell, having outlasted most 
political prognosticators.  In the subsequent elections held in January and February 1906 
the Unionists suffered one of the greatest parliamentary defeats in British history.  It was 
a defeat at the hands of tariff reform, however, not foreign policy.  Lord Newton 
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maintained that Lansdowne was “the only one who had emerged from the débâcle with 
an enhanced reputation.”218  Party officials, however, had to plead with their popular, but 
largely unseen, Foreign Secretary just to get him to give a speech sometime before the 
election.  They were forced to turn to Balfour, who pressed Lansdowne to address a 
mass meeting in Manchester in December arguing there was “no member of the 
Government whom the country more desires to hear than yourself.”219   
 Lansdowne relented and spoke on January 8 before a mass meeting of 
Conservatives and Unionists at Manchester’s Free Trade hall.  Proud of his 
achievements as Foreign Secretary, he told the crowd that he could not hope to find a 
more fitting epitaph to be engraved upon his “political tombstone” than a declaration 
recently given by the Liberal caretaker government’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Herbert Henry Asquith, that, “he did not know where the enemies of England were to be 
found.”  Lansdowne also was more than a little amused to note a recent pronouncement 
by the Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, that Britain’s Foreign 
Policy over the last five years was in fact Liberal foreign policy.  He certainly did not 
hesitate to deprecate Campbell-Bannerman’s plans for general disarmament and the 
formation of a “league of peace” under the direction of Britain.220      
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 Throughout the months leading up to the election, the Liberals stressed 
continuously that they wished for continuity in foreign policy, which prompted 
Lansdowne to ask publicly why a government so successful in foreign affairs should 
then be turned out by the electorate.221  Sir Edward Grey, who had nothing but praise for 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Anglo-French Entente, as well as the general understanding 
with America, was forced to observe, however, that there was “a naīveté about that 
question of Lord Lansdowne’s which has the charm of engaging simplicity, but it is not 
creditable to his appreciation of political issues at home.”  The coming election, he 
pointed out, was going to be fought “not about something about which we are agreed, 
but about something about which we differ.”222  There were important differences, 
however, in the ‘policy of the entente’ as conceived by Lansdowne and that to be carried 
out by Grey.  The latter was much closer in his thinking to the anti-German faction in the 
Foreign Office, who for five years had largely backed their chief’s foreign policy, but 
with motivations and predispositions wholly at odds with his.     
 Germany’s leaders looked forward with pleasure to the succession of the party of 
Gladstone, anticipating perhaps a “Cobdenite foreign policy.” 223  They might have 
reconsidered, however, if they had known that none other than the old radical Liberal, 
John Morley—who in August 1914 would resign his place in the government rather than 
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go to war with Germany—had a year earlier told President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay 
that when his party took power again they would have only one regret, that there would 
have to be change at the Foreign Office.  Hearing of this from Ambassador Durand, 
Lansdowne recalled that Morley had “curiously enough” once said the same thing to 
him, but then had to admit that “it was not practical politics.”224  In July 1905, Campbell-
Bannerman made to the new American Ambassador, Whitelaw Reid a similar remark of 
regret at the loss of the Unionist Foreign Secretary.225    
 Once again Germany’s leaders had severely misjudged the situation, as Grey was 
much more concerned with the balance of power in Europe than Lansdowne, and would 
eventually take the ‘policy of the entente’ farther than his predecessor ever intended.226  
As early as 1895, Grey had formulated a clear conception of Britain’s position in the 
world.  He wrote: 
The fact is that the success of the British race has upset the tempers of the 
rest of the world and now that they have ceased quarreling about 
provinces in Europe and have turned their eyes to distant places, they find 
us in the way everywhere.  Hence a general tendency to vote us a 
nuisance and combine against us.  I am afraid we shall have to fight 
sooner or later, unless some European apple of discord falls amongst the 
Continental Powers, but we have a good card on hand to play and I think 
a bold and skilful Foreign Secretary might detach Russia from the number 
of our active enemies without sacrificing any very material British 
interests.227 
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Lansdowne had done much of the work already, and Grey would continue it by 
restarting Anglo-Russian negotiations in the spring of 1906, but the new Foreign 
Secretary saw clearly that Germany was Britain’s most active enemy.  In 
Steiner’s words, Grey “fully grasped what Lansdowne had only glimpsed,” and 
even if this is accepted, he “glimpsed” it only in the latter part of his tenure as 
Foreign Secretary.228 
 Highlighting Lansdowne’s emphasis on securing imperial interests over 
the balance of power in Europe, Steiner noted that “What is most curious about 
Lansdowne’s diplomacy is the degree to which events rather than a conscious 
choice of alternatives determined the direction of his policy.”  Moreover, she 
asserted that if the Foreign Secretary “was reacting to pressures on his imperial 
borders, his responses were not based on any deep perception of the 
consequences involved.”229  In this assessment, and in the work of nearly all 
diplomatic historians of Edwardian Britain, one can detect the influence of 
George Monger’s seminal work, The End of Isolation.  Although now over four 
decades old, it remains one of the most important works covering the period, 
along with the major studies by J. A. S. Grenville and Ian H. Nish. 
 Throughout Monger’s study there is the sense that Lansdowne was 
continuously “borne along by events he could not control.”  If true, it is 
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understandable that Lansdowne would have benefited more from having “stood 
apart” from his colleagues, because, as Monger noted, “he adopted a less 
dogmatic, more empirical, approach to diplomacy.”230  A picture is therefore 
drawn of an enlightened gentleman diplomat collecting and accumulating data 
from which he drew reasoned conclusions, and only then did he formulate his 
policy.  Indeed, in reading Monger one is given the impression that Lansdowne 
faced endless alternatives on every issue, every day, and his decisions, although 
reasoned, were not part of conscious deeply thought-out policy, but calculated on 
the moment.  Founded on similar bases was Grenville’s conclusion that the 
marquis had no perceivable “master plan.”231   
 Many of the impressions one draws from reading Monger, however, are 
in fact the product of the ambitious structure of his book.  More than any other 
historian, before or since, he attempted to place all the countless foreign policy 
questions Lansdowne dealt with in his five years at the Foreign Office in 
chronological order.  It was a near monumental, if not impossible, task if one 
wished to present the reader with an elegant and flowing story of the past, but 
important in order to provide the most perfect context for the daily decisions the 
Foreign Secretary had to make.  No matter how useful the structure, however, the 
very approach too often does not allow the mind to encompass influencing 
factors beyond the limited horizons of a few months or a few days in the 
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chronology.  In fact, it is all the more likely to lead one inexorably down the path 
of ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc.’    
   It is true that as Foreign Secretary Lansdowne was inclined to show 
greater concern for imperial security than the balance of power in Europe, 
although it should never be asserted that he neglected the latter completely.  
Moreover, more often than not he did find himself “borne along by events he 
could not control.”  His diffident nature should not be denied as part of this 
either, as it was noted by such disparate persons such as Sandars, Selborne, and 
Cambon, and borne out in the fact that neither of his greatest accomplishments, 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French Entente, were in their origins 
the product of his own initiative.232  Indeed, one of the more unusual aspects of 
his foreign policy is that it was almost entirely reactive.   
 These now widely accepted conclusions do not, however, explain fully 
Lansdowne’s foreign policy, and Monger went too far in concluding that 
Lansdowne “never regarded any feature of his policy as fundamental or 
unalterable,” and “never expected too much, either from himself or from 
others.”233  Notwithstanding his somewhat passive nature, Lansdowne did make 
conscious policy decisions as Foreign Secretary founded in principles and beliefs 
that existed in his mind prior to the last telegram or memorandum he received.  
He reacted and fought against those forces that dragged him in directions he did 
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not want to go, and that ran counter to his foreign policy beliefs.  The foremost of 
these forces were public opinion—of which he always expected more—shabby 
diplomacy, and irrational thought in general.  He simply lost on all accounts.  
Beyond the preeminence that imperial security held in his thinking, the other 
important constant in Lansdowne’s foreign policy, and the least emphasized, was 
his gentlemanly nature, his liberal devotion to peace, his abhorrence of war, and 
the often unnoticed drawbacks associated with his famed ‘Whiggish 
detachment.’  With regard to that latter seemingly beneficial trait—that famed 
freedom from foolish emotion and ill-considered prejudice when conducting 
foreign affairs—no one demonstrated more than the marquis himself that he was 
nearly incapable of truly putting himself in the place of his opponents.  These 
aspects of the man and his character help explain more fully his ‘policy of the 
entente,’ and make sense of his so-called ‘Peace Letter’ of November 1917. 
 In his last major speech as Foreign Secretary in early November 1905 
presented at a congratulatory banquet given in his honor by the Junior 
Constitutional Club on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Lansdowne 
laid out those beliefs that guided his foreign policy.  He told those assembled that 
the time for holding a “prejudice” against so-called ‘entangling alliances’ had 
“passed by.”  Pointing to the grouping of other nations, to countries “arming 
themselves to the teeth,” and to the breathtaking suddenness of modern war, he 
asserted that “no nation which intends to take its part in the affairs of the 
civilized world can venture to stand entirely alone.”  For those who were inclined 
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to follow still a “solitary and aloof” foreign policy as Britain had once practiced, 
he asked to consult the most recent Army and Navy estimates.   
 Lansdowne suggested further that the question was no longer whether 
alliances were inherently good or bad, but what was the character of the people 
of the country with which one might potentially ally.  With regard to Japan, he 
noted that Britain was “attracted by the straightforwardness and sincerity of their 
diplomacy,” and even more importantly, the first object of their alliance was the 
“maintenance of peace, the greatest of all British interests.”  In response to those 
who regarded the renewed alliance as provocative in character, he asked if they 
would similarly argue that taking out fire insurance actually provoked 
conflagrations.  Moreover, he rejected absolutely the suggestion that Britain’s 
alliance with Japan and friendly agreement with France must necessarily cause 
estrangement from other powers.  The very suggestion seemed to him “to 
proceed upon the altogether untenable theory that the stock of international good 
will and international good manners is so limited that if a certain amount of it has 
been served out there is none left for any of those who may afterwards apply for 
it.”234   
 Underlying these words was Lansdowne’s desire to deny the immutability 
of the operation of ‘balance of power’ among nation-states, and although he 
criticized Campbell-Bannerman’s ‘league of peace,’ his own ‘policy of the 
entente’ was not very far removed in its conception.  If he was to be judged a 
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success as Foreign Secretary, Monger was right in the qualification that it was in 
great part because “he was extremely lucky.”235  It was luck, however, in the 
sense that his foreign policy, far from being successfully carried out, actually 
failed, but fortunately was rendered more sensible by Salisbury and Balfour, and 
was readily adaptable to the slightly less detached and marginally more 
impassioned worldview of his successor.    
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CHAPTER VIII  
 
OPPOSITION, WAR AND DISSENT, 1906-1927 
 
 
Opposition 
 Lansdowne spent the next ten years in Opposition, and although much of his 
energy was expended on the great and increasingly divisive political and constitutional 
questions of the age, he retained a keen interest in foreign affairs.  Fortunately, it was 
thought by the majority of both parties that Britain’s foreign policy should remain above 
the unpleasant nature of Edwardian politics; and after all, Grey proclaimed throughout 
that his was merely a continuation of predecessor’s policy.  One of the newly elected 
Labour MPs, J. Ramsay MacDonald, however, contended that the government was 
carrying out the marquis’s foreign policy “to extremes.”1  
 Lansdowne welcomed the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, which was 
unsurprising as it followed roughly the outlines of the proposed agreement he put 
forward in late 1903, even if Grey’s was a little more favorable to Russia with regard to 
the Persian Gulf.  He assured the Lords, however, that like most he was “willing to pay a 
liberal price and to make sacrifices on points of secondary importance, and most of us 
will be ready to regard an arrangement of this kind as a whole and not merely in respect 
of its effect upon those particular regions in which the contracting Powers are brought 
into immediate contact.”  He also was overly sanguine, at least publicly, in expressing 
confidence that Russian assurances would prove more trustworthy now that Britain had 
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“a contract recorded in a formal document founded upon reciprocal concessions and 
reciprocal obligations.”2   
 It was his suspicions with regard to German policy that increased greatly during 
his years out of office.  In October 1908, the Austrians annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina 
which led many in Serbia and Russia to call for war, but while the Entente powers 
backed the Russian government’s proposal for an international conference to settle the 
dispute, Germany gave the Austrians their complete support against making any 
concessions.  The Asquith Government could not come to any other conclusion than that 
Germany wanted war.  An “extremely perturbed” Prime Minister consulted with Balfour 
in early November about the very grave situation in Europe, and the latter “observed that 
the almost incredible frivolity of the excuse for hostilities which the Germans had 
devised would shock the civilized world beyond expression, and that it was difficult to 
see what Germany expected to gain by a war in which she must lose so much morally; 
and was by no means certain to gain anything materially.”  Both men feared that in a 
general war, “the temptation [for the Germans] to invade Belgium might prove 
irresistible.”  Especially struck by Asquith’s “pessimistic tone,” Balfour informed 
Lansdowne that he had promised the Prime Minister the support of the Opposition in any 
“national difficulty.”3 
 Lansdowne admitted that such speculation as to Germany’s true intentions was 
“not pleasant reading,” and that it was “almost inconceivable that they should provoke a 
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European War, but the Emperor is becoming more irresponsible with every year that 
passes.”  He agreed fully with Balfour’s promise of support to Asquith, and speaking in 
Manchester less than two weeks later, the marquis was glad to be able to declare that “so 
far as foreign affairs are concerned this country speaks with an undivided voice,” but he 
also had to confess that “Recent events have shown how little dependence can be placed 
upon paper securities for the maintenance of international compacts.”4  Nevertheless, 
Lansdowne continued to believe that much good could be done by the cultivation of 
amicable understandings with one’s neighbors, declaring that: 
If we can get rid of points of friction; if we can keep our tempers, and not 
pay too much attention to irritating episodes, it should not be beyond our 
power to create a serener international atmosphere, the environment of 
which would enable us and other nations to diminish our insensate 
expenditure upon armaments, which is at once a threat to the peace of the 
civilized world and a serious drain upon its resources.5  
  
Significantly, however, Unionist Party campaign literature which in prior years had 
referred exclusively to the Entente as a “colonial agreement,” now declared that it had in 
fact “restored the balance of European power.”6 
 During the second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, the Unionist Party and the marquis 
both had come to the conclusion that for peace of the world, ‘balance of power’ concerns 
required that Britain not allow France to be crushed by Germany.  The second crisis, 
sparked by the dispatch of a German warship to the Moroccan port of Agadir in response 
                                                          
4 Lansdowne to Balfour, November 11, 1908, LP, Named Correspondence, A. J. Balfour, August 1895-
January 1915. 
 
5 Lansdowne’s speech in Manchester on November 20, 1908, The Times, November 21, 1908, p. 9. 
 
6 McDonough, “The Conservative Party and the Anglo-French entente, 1905-1914” in Sharp and Stone, 
eds., Anglo-French Relations, p. 43. 
 368
to France’s decision to militarily occupy the country, moved Lansdowne to call on the 
party to give Grey its “unqualified support.”7  Although the crisis was settled by a 
Franco-German Treaty in November 1911, in answer to the King’s speech in February 
of the next year the marquis told the House of Lords that it was “impossible for any one 
to look at the general situation of international politics without a feeling of very 
considerable uneasiness.”  It was not the fault of the diplomats, however, and 
Lansdowne came to their defense in the form of his presenting a diplomatist’s advice.  
Observing that “Great changes” were in progress, and that “great problems” were 
presenting themselves, he proposed that the solution to these problems depended “upon 
the temper in which they are approached.”  Not so many months ago, he reminded them, 
“this country was on the eve of a serious quarrel—a serious quarrel with a Power with 
which every right-thinking Englishman desires not only to live at peace, but to co-
operate in the discharge of the great obligations which belong to two great progressive 
and civilizing Powers.”  He found it lamentable, as he always had, that “these 
misunderstandings and apprehensions should exist” between Britain and Germany, and 
sought to remind his countrymen that it was “the duty of all right-thinking people to 
endeavour to dispel them.”8  It was not to be. 
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War 
 When the First World War began some two and one half years later, Lansdowne 
was sixty-nine years old, an elderly “grand seigneur,” frail but still vigorous in mind.  
He had gone prematurely bald in his youth and was never to be seen without a rather 
large but well-groomed mustache, which had whitened in old age.  His overall presence 
had not diminished however.  In late 1917, after meeting the marquis for the first time, 
Colonel Edward House, Woodrow Wilson’s personal advisor and envoy, observed that 
Lansdowne was “a great gentleman . . . not merely in intellect and character, nor from 
having for a background an ancient and distinguished lineage, but in manner and in that 
intangible and indefinable air which comes as a gift from the gods.”9   
As war approached in the summer of 1914, the marquis—like the rest of 
Britain—was deeply enmeshed in the Irish Crisis.  For over a year the focus of Unionist 
activity had been “‘Ulster, Ulster’ all the time,” and many talked of possible civil war.10  
In mid-July, Lansdowne attended the four-day Buckingham Palace Conference initiated 
by the King, but the attempt to define the boundary of an excluded Ulster proved 
incapable of compromise.  Lansdowne took little part in the discussions, never thinking 
Home Rule inevitable, and according to Charles Hobhouse, he offered “no helping hand 
towards settlement.”11  The Conference was unsuccessful, but only a few short weeks 
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later on August 1, 1914, Unionist Party leaders were meeting late at Lansdowne House, 
and talk was not of domestic revolt but of a new European war.  It was decided to send a 
message to the Prime Minister offering to meet with him to discuss what should be done 
about the crisis in the Balkans.  The next morning Lansdowne and Austen Chamberlain 
drafted a letter urging the Asquith Government to aid France and Russia while promising 
unequivocal Unionist support.  They then both went to see Andrew Bonar Law, who 
along with Lansdowne had replaced Balfour as Unionist Party co-leaders in 1911.  
Bonar Law initially was hesitant to proceed further, but having had no reply from the 
premier to their first message, he agreed to send a further note stating that his party 
would give the government its full support in the event of war.12   
The Asquith Government at this time was vacillating and split as to what action it 
should take.  The Prime Minister decided eventually that calculated uncertainty was the 
best policy, not wishing to commit to France and Russia and thereby destroy Britain’s 
mediating influence with Germany, and fearful as well that such support might even 
encourage Britain’s friends to instigate war.13  The Unionist missive he now received 
read:  
Dear Mr. Asquith,--Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you 
that in our opinion, as well as that of all the colleagues whom we have 
been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the 
United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the 
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present juncture, and we offer our unhesitating support to the government 
in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.14 
   
While Unionist support, most likely, did not constitute the determining influence on the 
government’s final decision for war, it has been argued persuasively by R. J. Q. 
Adams—Bonar Law’s most recent biographer—that “Perhaps, however, [Unionist 
support] served in some small way to ease the minds of those in the Cabinet who 
favoured intervention in Europe, as it did those of the Unionists.”  On August 3, Grey 
explained to the House of Commons that Britain was on the brink of war, and Bonar 
Law followed, committing his fellow Unionists to the role of “patriotic opposition.”15  
By the end of the next day Britain was at war, and British Army divisions were 
dispatched across the Channel a week later.      
In a conversation with Lord Haldane on August 4, Lansdowne expressed 
Unionist opinion that it would have been “desirable, if possible to send out the 
Expeditionary Force, or a portion of it, to the seat of war at the very outset.”16  Once 
hostilities had begun, in fact, Lansdowne favored prosecuting it with the utmost vigor, 
and according to Lloyd George, the marquis was “in favour of waging war on Germany 
if she attacked France, whether Belgium were invaded or not.”17  The government, 
however, feared leaving Britain undefended or on the other hand having an insufficiently 
                                                          
14 Bonar Law to Asquith, August 2, 1914, printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 440. 
 
15 Adams, Bonar Law, p. 171. 
 
16 Lansdowne’s “Note of conversation with Lord Haldane,” printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 440-
441. 
 
17 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 1205-1206. 
 
 372
small force easily surrounded and annihilated.18  Years later, Lansdowne observed that 
even before hostilities had begun, “War might have been avoided if Grey had been in a 
position to make a perfectly explicit statement [to Germany] as to our conduct in certain 
eventualities,” and he placed blame on the Liberal Cabinet for not giving the Foreign 
Secretary the support he required.19  Britain’s diplomatic mistakes notwithstanding, in 
the first months of the war Lansdowne stated publicly that “but for the sinister influence 
of German diplomacy,” Austria and Russia might have settled their dispute amicably.20   
From the war’s outset both Lansdowne and Bonar Law, although leaders of the 
Opposition, were provided with copies of some War Office and Foreign Office 
telegrams enabling them to follow its progress, and they then relayed this information to 
their senior colleagues.  The marquis, in fact, made a daily summary of the more 
important telegrams he received and was consulted by the government with regard to 
relations with Allies and neutrals based on his prior Foreign Office experience.  The 
Lansdowne family also did their bit for the war effort.  The marchioness headed the 
Officers’ Families’ Fund, and the marquis served as Chairman of the Council of the 
British Red Cross Society, while Bowood was given over to a soldiers’ encampment.  
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Moreover, both sons rejoined their regiments, while a greater part of the Bowood 
establishment joined the army.21 
 On October 30, 1914, Lansdowne’s second son, Lord Charles Mercer Nairne, 
was killed south of Ypres by a spent shell.  In answer to a letter of condolence from 
Balfour, the marquis wrote: “you knew Charlie I think just enough to have some idea of 
the place he filled in our lives. . . . His last letters were full of high hopes & 
confidence—He could not have died better.”  The blow to Lansdowne was very great 
indeed, and he could not help but confess that he had “suffered a good deal of pain.”22  
Newton wrote that it was in fact a blow from which the marquis never entirely 
recovered, and despite his determination to carry on his public duties Lansdowne’s 
health declined at the end of 1914.  By late December he was getting stronger but 
recognized that he would “have to keep very quiet for a time,” so he was forced to 
delegate some of his duties as leader of the House of Lords to Curzon.23   
 Although his ill-health persisted into the early months of 1915 he continued to 
stay abreast of affairs, and the correspondence he received contained many complaints 
from Unionist politicians over the conduct of the war.  Patriotic opposition did not stop 
Curzon from complaining privately that while they were “expected to give a mute and 
almost unquestioning support to everything done by the government: to maintain a 
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patriotic silence about the various blunders that have been committed in connection with 
the War . . . They tell us nothing or next to nothing of their plans, and yet they pretend 
our leaders share both their knowledge and their responsibility.”  Curzon did not believe 
that the situation could continue indefinitely, but neither was he in favor of a coalition 
government, even if the Liberals offered, because “a Coalition would tie our hands and 
close our lips even more effectively than at present.”24  Lansdowne agreed with the 
assessment that the party could “scarcely leave matters where they are,” but patriotism 
prevented them from raising many important points in Parliament.  Moreover, as Curzon 
had pointed out, Lansdowne believed that being brought into the government’s 
confidence carried with it similar difficulties.  As for a possible solution to the Unionist 
predicament, he was not entirely confident one could be found.  Interestingly enough, 
considering later events, the marquis argued firmly “against making use of the 
newspapers when Parliament is sitting.”25 
 Asquith’s government was weakening already, however, and in early March 
1915, the two Unionist leaders were invited to attend a meeting of the War Council 
which turned into its first discussion of British war aims.  In a discussion on the eventual 
disposition after the war of the Kiel Canal and the German Fleet, Lansdowne could still 
be counted on to take a firm line, and maintained that Russia as much as Britain would 
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favor the first being removed from German control, with the latter being destroyed 
completely.26  Overall, however, the general reticence of both Unionist leaders to offer 
their opinions due to the possible political consequences led Asquith to feel afterward 
that the two had been unhelpful.27  Churchill, the minister who had prompted the 
invitation, concluded that the experiment in co-operation had resulted in inviting “a lot 
of ignorant people to meddle in our business.”28  Lansdowne and Bonar Law both also 
believed the meeting had been a failure and would have declined any further invitation 
for fear of angering Unionist backbenchers and involving themselves in the poor 
progress of the war.  Asquith did order that from that point they should receive the War 
Council’s papers, but they received only four between March 17 and the formation of the 
coalition two months later.29 
 Most Liberal Party members failed to perceive the signs of crisis in the 
government, however, and A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Liberal Daily News, went so far 
as to comment in May that, “the efficiency of the government remains a matter of 
universal agreement . . . and there is in no quarter any disposition to refuse to the 
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government the main credit for the satisfactory course of the campaign.”30  But things 
were not proceeding as well as they appeared.  The difficulties facing the government 
were in fact many, including the Munitions Crisis, the failure of the Dardanelles 
Campaign, and the resignation of Lord Fisher, and all have been cited as precipitating 
events that led to the formation of the Coalition Government in May 1915.31  On May 
17, Bonar Law and Lansdowne informed Asquith that unless the Unionists were brought 
into the government they would be forced to become a vocal Opposition.  Wishing to 
avoid a direct confrontation that might have led to a general election, Asquith and Bonar 
Law agreed to the quick formation of a coalition government.32   
 Lansdowne only reluctantly consented to join the new government as Minister 
Without Portfolio, the assumption being that he “could not take on much work.”33  
Attempting to excuse himself from membership on the War Committee, he wrote to 
Asquith in November that he had in fact only entered the government because his 
absence might have created a poor impression, and for some months he had been in 
“rather indifferent health” and was dreading the upcoming winter.34  With the 
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encouragement of his doctor, and some “gentle pressure” from Balfour, however, he 
agreed to serve but was “quite content without portfolio or emoluments.”35   
Now part of the government, the Unionists were determined to end the 
Dardanelles expedition and force the adoption of military conscription.36  Along with 
Bonar Law, Balfour and Curzon, Lansdowne was appointed to the War Council, which 
was soon renamed the Dardanelles Committee, a sign of how concerned the government 
had become with this uncertain campaign.  The Committee’s stated duty was to report on 
the advisability of winding down the Dardanelles operation, but it never made a formal 
report and a decision was made on June 7 to approve the sending of more troops.  The 
three-week delay, however, between the request for more troops by the local 
commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, and the Committee’s decision was probably fatal 
for any last hope of success.37  A little less than a month later, Lansdowne, along with 
Balfour and Curzon, agreed to yet even more reinforcements, and in the view of John 
Turner, the Unionists had secured their own “complicity in the most public blunder of 
the war.”38 
 As the greatest exponent of the Dardanelles Campaign, Churchill had been so 
forceful in his support, in part, because he disagreed with the wasteful mass assaults the 
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Army were employing on the Western Front.39  With the campaign’s failure, he was 
forced to resign the Admiralty and joined his regiment in France.  No doubt still 
suffering from the loss of his son, Lansdowne maintained in a letter to Churchill in 
November that if he had had a regiment to rejoin he would “very likely” have followed 
Churchill’s example, “but having none I suppose I must remain where I am.”  He was 
confident, however, that when Churchill returned to political life he would find the 
marquis “if still in any sense alive—beyond all doubt politically extinct.”40  Churchill 
dismissed such self-pitying nonsense, however, and observed that many of those 
presently in the field would find it regrettable if Lansdowne were to stand aside.  
Moreover, he reminded him that “The only thing that really matters is to persevere 
obstinately in the war,” and in that cause he maintained that the marquis stood “as the 
representative of the Conservative party more than any one else.”41 
 Churchill’s assessment was not entirely wrong, as that same month Lansdowne, 
Selborne and Lord Crewe, led by Curzon, precipitated a potential political crisis by 
forcing Asquith to postpone for a week any decision on the abandonment of the 
Dardanelles in the hopes of changing Cabinet opinion.  They fought the decision as long 
as possible, but in mid-December they finally gave up after having lost the support of 
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every senior military advisor, including Kitchener, and having been told that the weather 
would no longer permit the evacuation of Salonika to reinforce the Dardanelles.42      
 The other signal issue weighing on the shoulders of the government in 1915 and 
into 1916 was the matter of conscription, and in political terms it dwarfed the difficulties 
over the Dardanelles.43  Most Liberals, with the important exceptions of Lloyd George 
and Churchill, had been fighting conscription with all their might, and in the past 
Lansdowne had always stood against it as well.44  In January 1915, while still in 
Opposition, he had seen its inevitability, but knew his party would never take on the 
government over such a controversial topic.45  Shortly after the Coalition was formed, 
however, the Unionist leadership drafted a letter to the Prime Minister recognizing that it 
might become necessary to introduce some manner of compulsion, and they promised 
their party’s support.46   
 Lansdowne also now faced the issue squarely and sent Asquith a personal note 
offering his views on recruitment.  He questioned Kitchener’s confidence on 
recruitment, and asked “ought we not to consider betimes the steps which we may have 
to take if we should be driven to compulsion?”  Most importantly, the marquis believed 
major issues in the war effort were being avoided by the government, and he observed 
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that, “We shall never get to close quarters with the subject unless we get away from 
generalities and come to concrete proposals.”47  He believed, however, that the idea for 
the preparation of a Compulsory Service Bill should in the end come from the Prime 
Minister, and not from his Conservative colleagues.  Unfortunately, according to 
Lansdowne, Asquith disliked the idea, believing it would be difficult to convince the 
Cabinet, but did not deny that sooner or later the question might have to be faced.48  The 
Prime Minister, as was his wont, adopted delay as his wisest political course, and as 
stated in his memoirs, he decided to sit back and await the “general consent” of the 
nation.49   
Lansdowne was already convinced, however, that the country was in favor of 
compulsion, and wrote to Walter Long, the Conservative head of the Local Government 
Board, “that we shall have great difficulty in Parliament if we are not prepared to make 
the announcement at once.”  The marquis’s familiarity with War Office methods of 
recruitment due to his work with the National Register had convinced him that their 
measures were “most unsatisfactory,” with his greatest complaint reserved for the 
enormous sums in separation allowances being paid because it was impossible to prevent 
married men from joining up.  He declared to Long that Asquith carried his “policy of 
‘wait and see’ to a most dangerous extent, and I cannot satisfy myself that we ought to 
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leave the matter in his hands.”  Moreover, he could “answer for it that among our 
soldiers at the front there is not only a profound desire for Compulsion, but a feeling of 
amazement that it has not long ago been adopted.”50  Asquith continued to delay, 
however, and in the end several Unionists in the Cabinet, including Lansdowne, were 
forced to threaten resignation if concrete action was not taken, which it subsequently 
was, and not with the dire consequences predicted.51  The National Service Bill became 
law on January 27, 1916, but was only a partial victory for pro-conscriptionists, as the 
bill’s focus lay in the enlistment of unmarried men and did not apply to Ireland.  It 
merely guaranteed the inevitability of future struggles over the issue, but to Asquith’s 
relief the nation accepted the move.52      
 The war did not improve substantially for the Allies in 1916, and its character as 
a war of attrition continued.  British public opinion was shaken first by the withdrawal 
from the Dardanelles at the beginning of the year, while in April nearly ten thousand 
men of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force surrendered at Kut Al Amara.  On the 
home front, inflation and rising food prices contributed to widespread strikes and there 
were few signs that conditions would soon improve.53  On the Western Front, the French 
suffered over 300,000 casualties defending Verdun from February through July, while in 
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the five-month Battle of the Somme which ended in November, Britain added another 
420,000 men to the casualty lists with little to nothing gained strategically.  The 
Germans lost even more men, however, so the British were victorious.  
 Although the Battle of the Somme was long portrayed to the British public as a 
victory, some in the government knew the extent of the failure and the brutality of the 
war.  Lloyd George, the Secretary of State for War, confessed that “the thing is 
horrible,” and if the people only knew the reality they would demand it be stopped “but 
of course they don’t—and can’t know,” adding, “The correspondents don’t write and the 
censorship wouldn’t pass the truth.”54  After nearly two and one half years of murderous 
stalemate, it is not surprising that the question of war aims became increasingly more 
pronounced.  In August 1914, Britain’s primary war aims were the restoration of 
Belgium and the prevention of German domination of Europe, while officials at the 
Foreign Office were looking forward to the destruction of German power.55  In the midst 
of the early searches for peace and minimum war aims conducted by Colonel House in 
early 1915, Sir Arthur Nicolson, now the Permanent Secretary, argued that it was “no 
use our talking terms of peace until . . . [Germany] will be forced to accept any terms 
that we may offer, and it will be a long time before we are able to bring her into that 
position.”56  Grey was of the same mind, and at the outset of the war had informed 
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Washington that he was not interested in any peace initiatives by the United States 
unless they proposed a plan “that would bring this war to an end and prevent another 
such war being forced on Europe.”57  Along with the restoration of Belgium, Grey 
wanted “a peace that would be free from the shadow of Prussian militarism under which 
Europe had been for so long.”58 
 From the start of the war the British had put little trust in any of the various 
German peace initiatives, surmising correctly that such moves were designed primarily 
to create friction between Britain and the United States by making the former appear like 
recalcitrant warmongers.  The Germans encouraged Colonel House to take on peace 
missions, and at one stage he believed he could convince the German Chancellor, 
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, to renounce militarism.  When House returned from 
his mission to Berlin in March 1915, however, he had come to the conclusion that the 
Germans did not place “the general good of mankind” into their calculations.59  
Continued American pressure coupled with less than successful results on the field of 
battle, however, kept the war aims debate on the British agenda well into 1916.  On May 
28, 1916, President Wilson gave his famous speech on the need for the creation of a 
League to Enforce Peace, but Spring-Rice advised Grey that the United States would 
never live up to the collective security commitment required by such a league.60  
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Moreover, any enthusiasm Grey might have shown had been chilled by the speech itself, 
in which to his dismay the President had “emphasised the point of indifference to the 
causes and objects of the war.”61   
In an attempt to forestall any proposal of mediation by the United States, on 
September 28 Lloyd George gave an interview to an American newspaper and stated that 
Britain intended to deliver Germany a “knock-out” blow.  In his War Memoirs, the War 
Secretary professed truthfully that he “was no friend to war,”—his volte-face in August 
1914 was due to Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality—“But once having entered 
on the War,” he declared: “I was no less resolute to pursue it until at least the object of 
our sacrifice had been achieved.”62  Two years further into the war he told the reporter 
that he remained convinced that, “The fight must be to a finish—to a knockout,” and that 
“The whole world, including neutrals of the highest purposes and humanitarians with the 
best of motives, must know that there can be no outside interference at this stage.”63  The 
War Secretary’s interview upset many in the Cabinet, none more so than Grey, who 
informed Lloyd George by letter that not only was the warning to the American 
President unnecessary and possibly alienating, but that it had always been his view “that 
until the Allies were sure of victory the door should be kept open for Wilson’s 
mediation.”  Lloyd George replied that he had done what the Foreign Secretary was 
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unable to do without fear of greater consequences, and if he was sorry it was only so far 
as his “callous impenitence” allowed him to be.64 
It was Lloyd George’s call for a “knockout” blow that, in part, moved 
Lansdowne to express those doubts with regard to the progress of the war that must have 
been weighing on his mind for some time.  Some four months before, in a letter to the 
radical Liberal peer and ex-Minister, Lord Loreburn, he had argued against the 
contention that the war was being prolonged so that Russia might gain certain 
advantages at Constantinople, and insisted that the war was “being carried on in order 
that the Germans may be beaten” and that this was “common ground to us all.”  
Moreover, he observed that until Germany was prepared “to make certain concessions 
which all would agree are reasonable & indispensable could it be said that the war is 
being prolonged to secure special advantages for any one of the Allies.”  So far as 
Lansdowne was concerned, Germany was “not by any means yet prepared to meet even 
the minimum requirements upon which every one of us would insist.”  In the same letter, 
however, he expressed some doubt as to whether Germany could actually be beaten, and 
the memoranda from various government departments that allowed him to gauge 
Britain’s true circumstances did not leave him sanguine about the future.65  To at least 
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one of his correspondents in the latter half of October, he noted offhandedly that indeed, 
“the war drags on.”66   
When at the end of October 1916 Asquith asked members of the War Committee 
to submit their views regarding the terms on which peace might be concluded, 
Lansdowne put his worries to paper in his memorandum of November 13, 1916.  Little 
more than a month later, Lord Crewe was compelled to cite it as “Possibly the veritable 
causa causans of the final breakup” of the Coalition Government.67  Lansdowne began 
his memorandum by questioning the assumptions made in a memorandum produced a 
month earlier by Balfour, in which the latter dealt “at some length with the problems 
which might have to be discussed at any peace conference”: 
 …Mr. Balfour observes truly that these questions cannot be 
profitably examined except upon an agreed hypothesis as to the military 
position of the combatants at the end of the war, and he proceeds to 
assume, though merely for the sake of argument, that the Central Powers, 
either through defeat or exhaustion, have to accept the terms imposed 
upon them by the Allies. 
 I venture to suggest that the attention of the War Committee might 
with advantage be directed to a somewhat different problem, and that 
they should be invited to give us their opinion as to our present prospects 
of being able to “dictate” the kind of terms which we should all like to 
impose upon our enemies if we were in a position to do so. 
 We are agreed as to the goal, but we do not know how far we have 
really travelled towards it, or how much nearer to it we are likely to find 
ourselves even if the War be prolonged for, say, another year.  What will 
that year have cost us?  How much better will our position be at the end 
of it?  Shall we even then be strong enough to “dictate” terms? 
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 It seems to me almost impossible to overrate the importance of 
these considerations, because it is clear that our diplomacy must be 
governed by an accurate appreciation of them. 
 We have obtained within the last few days from the different 
departments of the Government a good deal of information as to the 
situation, naval, military, and economic.  It is far from reassuring.68 
 
The departmental reports were quite alarming indeed.  From Walter Runciman, 
the President of the Board of Trade, the Cabinet received a memorandum showing that 
shipbuilding was not keeping pace with losses, and on the advice of his experts 
Runciman anticipated “a complete breakdown in shipping . . . much sooner than June, 
1917.”  The President of the Board of Agriculture’s report on Food Prospects for 1917 
stated, inter alia, that the price of bread was likely to increase, that there had been “a 
general failure of the potato crop, that the supply of fish was expected be below the 
normal, that agricultural land yield’s was likely to decline, and that the number of 
livestock would be greatly diminished.  Moreover, Lansdowne noted that in a 
subsequent report it was stated that in some parts of the country, due to the recruitment 
demands of the Army, it was “no longer a question of maintaining a moderate standard 
of cultivation, but whether cultivation will cease.” 
Military resource reports provided an equally dim picture.  Lansdowne restated 
the Admiralty’s concern that the Home Fleets were still insufficient with immediate 
production having reached its limit, and that the submarine threat was becoming ever 
more acute.  With regard to the latter difficulty, he admitted that “in spite of all our 
efforts, it seems impossible to provide an effectual rejoinder to it,” while in respect to 
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manpower, he declared that reports “prove that . . . we are nearing the end of our tether.”  
Although Lansdowne accepted the criticism that the Central Powers were assuredly 
suffering to the same or even greater degree than the Allies, he retorted: 
…but even if this be so, it is none the less our duty to consider, after a 
careful review of the facts, what our plight, and the plight of the civilized 
world, will be after another year, or, as we are sometimes told, two or 
three more years of a struggle as exhausting as that in which we are 
engaged.  No one for a moment believes that we are going to lose the 
War; but what is our chance of winning it in such a manner, and within 
such limits of time, as will enable us to beat our enemy to the ground and 
impose upon him the kind of terms which we so freely discuss? 
 I do not suppose for an instant that there is any weakening in the 
spirit of the people of this country, and I should hope, although I do not 
feel absolute confidence on the subject, that the same might be said of our 
Allies; but neither in their interests nor in ours can it be desirable that the 
War should be prolonged, unless it can be shown that we can bring it to 
an effectual conclusion within a reasonable space of time. 
 What does the prolongation of the War mean? 
 
Lansdowne saw only a mass of debt, and mass slaughter.  Observing that Britain’s 
casualties already amounted to over a million men with no sign of abatement in the 
future, he declared: “We are slowly but surely killing off the best of the male population 
of these islands.”  Lacking a concrete number for Allied casualties overall, he noted 
merely that “The total must be appalling.”  As matters stood, he predicted that, 
“Generations will have to come and go before the country recovers from the loss which 
it has sustained in human beings, and from the financial ruin and the destruction of the 
means of production which are taking place.”  Moreover, German culpability also had 
now taken a backseat for Lansdowne, and he solemnly noted that, “the responsibility of 
those who needlessly prolong such a war is not less than that of those who needlessly 
provoked it.” 
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In response to such a sad state of affairs he had so eloquently laid out, 
Lansdowne called for a more definitive decision on war aims in preparation for possible 
peace overtures from the Central Powers, and an inquiry as to whether the Allies “might 
not be prepared to accept less than 20s. [shillings] in the pound in consideration of 
prompt payment.”  He confessed that, “To many of us it seems as if the prospect of a 
‘knock out’ was, to say the least of it, remote,” and while he acknowledged the “splendid 
gallantry” of British and French forces on the Western Front and the advances they had 
made, he questioned whether any more of the battles, “accompanied by not less cruel 
losses,” would really end in a break-through.  Moreover, he asked: “Can we afford to go 
on paying the same sort of price for the same sort of gains?”  Even if eventually such a 
“knock out” blow was delivered, he wondered what would then be left of civilization. 
In sum, Lansdowne believed Lloyd George’s recent statements to be a “very 
momentous limitation,” and asked whether the government “ought at any rate not 
to discourage any movement, no matter where originating, in favour of an 
interchange of views as to the possibility of a settlement?”  He suggested an 
investigation of, and action taken on, the many peace feelers that constantly 
filtered in to the Government.  What Lansdowne wanted were peace aims that 
would reach out to the groups within the Central Powers that yearned for peace, 
noting that it was “unfortunate that . . . it should be possible to represent us and our 
allies as committed to a policy partly vindictive and partly selfish, and so 
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irreconcilably committed to that policy that we should regard as unfriendly any 
attempt, however sincere, to extricate us from the impasse.”69 
Surprisingly, Lloyd George agreed with much of Lansdowne’s assessment, and 
even professed admiration for the marquis’s courage in putting his thoughts down on 
paper, he had just come to opposite conclusions.70  His own estimation of Britain’s 
situation was not much less pessimistic, but he had much different fears than did the 
marquis.  In his War Memoirs, the War Secretary wrote that Lansdowne’s memorandum 
“startled the Cabinet,” but a less than a week before Lloyd George himself had warned 
Maurice Hankey, secretary to the Cabinet, that unless the Allies altered their conduct of 
the war, “We are going to lose this war.”  Moreover, in a draft speech he wrote for 
Asquith around the same time, he argued that “As the war drags along its weary and 
bloodstained path . . . the gloom cast by the appalling losses over the homes of the 
country will become darker and deeper,” and warned that “Efforts will be made perhaps 
by powerful neutrals to patch up a peace on what would appear to be specious terms, and 
there is a real danger that large masses of people, worn out by constant strain, may listen 
to well intentioned but mistaken pacificators.”71  His fears must have seemed all of 
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sudden to have come to fruition, and it was not an outside force tempting the people with 
peace, but rather a member of the War Committee.72 
Asquith invited the Admiralty and General Staff to submit reports as per 
Lansdowne’s suggestions, and in response, General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, issued a report which Paul Guinn has called “the most bellicose 
and offensive document ever inflicted on a British Cabinet.”73  Encouraged by Lloyd 
George not to hold back in his views, Robertson wrote that the peace the marquis 
proposed would be an “insult to the fighting services,” if it allowed the military to 
remain dominant in Germany.  Moreover, he asserted that, “There are amongst us . . . a 
certain number of cranks, cowards, and philosophers, some of whom are afraid of their 
own skins being hurt, whilst others are capable of proving to those sufficiently 
weakminded to listen to them that we stand to gain more by losing the war than by 
winning it.”  He ended his most singular memorandum by stating that they “need pay no 
attention to those miserable members of society,” and that for his part, he was quite 
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“satisfied that the knock-out blow can and will be delivered if only we take the necessary 
measures to give us success.”74    
That the general’s memorandum was excessively bellicose in nature was 
confirmed by the letter of apology he felt compelled to send Lansdowne a few days later, 
but it was sent only after Lansdowne had submitted a subsequent memorandum taking 
issue with the Sir William’s attack.  No doubt with purposeful understatement, he 
observed first that the general’s memorandum was “surely not a very helpful 
contribution to the investigation which the Cabinet authorised at its last meeting,” and “I 
hope he will forgive me for adding that those who ask questions which the Cabinet think 
worthy of a respectful answer will not consider that they are answered when they are 
told that such questions are an ‘insult’ to the fighting services.”75  Impossibly, 
Lansdowne had managed, however sarcastically, to apologize before Robertson, and the 
general’s apology, when it came, managed to appear much less genuine.  “I am most 
anxious,” Robertson wrote, “to disabuse you of any idea that the expression ‘cranks, 
cowards, and philosophers’ had the least reference to you.”  Indeed, he noted, “How 
could it have, seeing the great contribution you have made to the war, to say nothing of 
the respect due from me to you personally.”  The general asserted that he had considered 
it his duty “to point out, what is common knowledge, that the Nation is not really at war 
                                                          
74 Robertson memorandum, November 24, 1916, quoted in Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, p. 175.  
Guinn noted that Robertson’s reference to “philosophers” was a “hit at Balfour”; Robertson memorandum, 
November 24, 1916, excerpted in David R. Woodward, ed., The Military Correspondence of Field 
Marshall Sir William Robertson (London: Published by the Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, 
1989), p. 320 no.45.  Hereafter cited as Robertson Correspondence.   
 
75 Lansdowne memorandum, November 27, 1916, LP, Working Files: Miscellaneous, Box 2, no.7, “Lord 
Lansdowne’s Memorandum to the Cabinet, November 1916.”  Formerly in Lansdowne MSS, Box (5) 85. 
 
 393
as yet and that until it is we cannot expect to win.”  He was not without hope, however, 
that the conduct of “business as usual” in Britain would shortly be put to an end.76   
Grey defended Lansdowne’s memorandum as “a faithful and courageous act,” 
although he did not agree completely with its conclusions.  He did not wish to rule out 
possible mediation down the line, but was more inclined than Lansdowne to believe the 
optimistic reports of the military.  Furthermore, he deprecated the usefulness of 
diplomacy in wartime and in his own memorandum argued that, in his “own judgment, 
for what it is worth,” in view of the current military opinion “peace is premature, and to 
contemplate it is to betray the interests of this country and of the Allies.”77  It is 
interesting to find that in his War Memoirs, Lloyd George had nothing but praise 
Lansdowne’s courage, but for Grey he had only scorn.  He accused the Foreign 
Secretary of strategically giving no opinion on Lansdowne’s memorandum, writing that, 
Grey “neither approved nor disapproved,” and that “In the discussion bearing on the 
most effective methods of prosecuting the War he had little to say or suggest.”78  In a 
letter to Lansdowne less than a month later, however, Grey claimed that he had intended 
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to ask for a secret session of the House of Lords in order to discuss the memorandum, 
but the fall of the Government had prevented him acting on his plan.79        
Few now would assert that Lansdowne’s memorandum caused the fall of 
Asquith’s Government, and John Turner has noted that while Lloyd George made much 
of the memorandum in his memoirs its importance should not be overestimated.  Lloyd 
George’s discussion of the memorandum, however, was invaluable to his explanation 
and justification for the need for more vigorous leadership in order to put Britain on a 
total war footing.80  It also affected significantly the actions of Bonar Law, who now 
sensed defeatism in some ministers and resolved to act for a change in the direction of 
the conduct of the War.81  Indeed, the greatest political effect the memorandum had, 
according to Bentley Gilbert, was to detach the Unionist leader from Asquith.  Bonar 
Law’s command of the Tory organization could have prevented Lloyd George from 
coming to power, but instead he joined with him to prevent a premature peace.82  So 
while perhaps it was not the primary cause, indirectly Lansdowne’s memorandum likely 
helped drive Bonar Law, Lloyd George, and Edward Carson into concerted action and 
moved events along faster than they might have done otherwise.83   
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It was Lord Robert Cecil’s memorandum of November 27 that set the 
government’s new course.  Cecil, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Foreign 
Office, argued that, “Whether we agree with Lord Lansdowne’s conclusions or not,” it 
was clear above all that Britain’s situation was “grave.”  He accepted the word of the 
government’s military advisors, however, that “next year we have a prospect of a great 
military success,” and if the country could carry on for another year there was “a 
reasonable prospect of victory.”  Therefore, he concluded, “A peace now could only be 
disastrous.”  Cecil proposed that Britain engage in total war using every resource the 
nation could provide.  This meant a complete government takeover of the economy and 
industry, as well as the creation of a cabinet committee, consisting of no more than three 
members and separate from the War Committee, to direct the domestic war effort.84  
Such a drastic reorganization of the war effort to improve efficiency, however, brought 
Lloyd George and Asquith to an impasse at the beginning of December. 
While Lloyd George agreed with the idea of a smaller War Committee, he 
presented a plan for a committee consisting of three members that would conduct and 
direct the whole war.  The proposed membership of this new all-powerful committee 
included himself, Carson and Bonar Law, a configuration that Crawford labeled 
derogatorily, “the Triumvirate.”85  Its significance, of course, was that it meant the 
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virtual removal of the Prime Minister from anything to do with the War, and Asquith, 
understandably, found this unacceptable.86  
This essay is not directly concerned with the machinations that finished off the 
Asquith Government in the early days of December 1916.  Lansdowne himself believed 
that the fall of the government would forever “puzzle the historians who have to account 
for it.”87  From his own perspective, the marquis believed he was fortunate to have 
escaped greater involvement in the “red-hot conspiracy.”  He was present at the Unionist 
meeting on November 30 when Bonar Law revealed his covert actions, but when 
summoned to a second meeting on December 3 he was shooting with Grey at Bowood, 
and after making inquiries found to his delight that there were no more trains that would 
get him to London in time.88   
Bonar Law’s scheming with Lloyd George left a “nasty taste” in Lansdowne’s 
mouth, and that of many other Unionists.  The marquis thought they “owe[d] it to 
Asquith to avoid any action which might be regarded by him as a concerted attempt to 
oust him from his position as leader,” while Austen Chamberlain reputedly accused 
Bonar Law of “selling his colleagues.”89  Judging by other such negative reactions, when 
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subsequently Unionist Ministers threatened to resign from the Cabinet unless there was a 
change in the organization of the government, it is questionable as to whether they 
contemplated this move in favor or to the detriment of Asquith.  The Prime Minister 
resigned eventually in hopes that Lloyd George would be unable to form a government, 
and that the King would have to ask him to return.90  Asquith was mistaken, however, in 
thinking that the Unionists would refuse to serve under Lloyd George.  However much 
they might have disliked the War Secretary personally, they knew that a change had to 
be made, for in Crawford’s words, Asquith’s “somnolence” and “invincible indecision” 
could no longer be endured.91  Britain was now in the hands of Lloyd George, a man 
whose attitude towards the war can be best described in his own words:  
The inhumanity and pitilessness of the fighting that must come before a 
lasting peace is [sic] possible is not comparable with the cruelty that 
would be involved in stopping the War while there remains the possibility 
of civilisation again being menaced from the same quarter.  Peace now or 
at any time before the final and complete elimination of this menace is 
unthinkable.  No man and no nation with the slightest understanding of 
the temper of the citizen army of Britons, which took its terrible 
hammering without a whine, or a grumble, will attempt to call a halt 
now.92 
  
John Turner has suggested that Lansdowne might have been the one who 
convinced Asquith that he had the support of the Unionists.  From Lord Crawford’s 
papers it can be gleaned that Lansdowne was the only Unionist minister to call on 
                                                          
90 Ibid., p. 131, entry of December 2, 1916.  Cecil’s reaction was to rage: “This means that George is 
practically dictator!”; See also Turner, British Politics, pp. 117-151. 
 
91 Curzon to Lansdowne, December 3, 1916, printed in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 452-453.  Curzon’s 
letter describing the Unionist meeting of this day that Lansdowne did not attend reveals the anger of most 
Unionists at Bonar Law and Lloyd George, but contains the recognition of the only realistic construction 
of any new government; Crawford Papers, pp. 365, 370, entries of November 18 and December 3, 1916. 
 
92 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 509-510. 
 398
Asquith on December 4 when a power sharing agreement between the latter and Lloyd 
George was in place, while the following day the Prime Minister made a complete 
reversal and resigned.93  Turner suggested that “If Lansdowne was the source of 
Asquith’s information, his own firm prejudices against Lloyd George might well have 
led him to paint a favourable picture of his colleagues’ intentions.”94  Lord Crawford’s 
papers also show, however, that after meeting with Asquith, the marquis informed the 
Agriculture Minister that he “rather gathered that he [Asquith] would come to terms with 
Ll[oyd] G[eorge]”95  Moreover, in a letter to his daughter on December 5, Lansdowne 
mentioned his meeting with Asquith the previous evening, but stated merely that he 
found the Prime Minister “very friendly, but hurt and anxious,” but his overall 
impression was that the two would be able to “find a modus.”96 
Lansdowne believed the collapse of the government to be “catastrophic,” for 
although he believed changes were “inevitable,” he did not expect “this particular 
dénouement.”  He believed the government had been “hardly judged by its critics,” and 
that Asquith had been poorly treated “so far as Lloyd George is concerned.”97  The 
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marquis would not join the new government, and the circumstances surrounding his 
removal from office are important especially with regard to his possible motivations for 
writing the ‘Peace Letter’ a year later.  Crawford’s judgment in December 1917 that it 
was “well known that Lansdowne has long been a nerve-wrecked wobbler,” and that the 
“explanation [behind the Peace Letter] must to some extent be sought in the vexation 
and annoyance he feels at being out of office,” has exerted much influence in the 
historiography.98   
In the formation of his new cabinet, Lloyd George years later wrote that he was 
of the opinion that the marquis had become more respected than followed, and that in 
view of the need for a more “vigorous and effective prosecution of the War,” he felt 
there was much to be said for leaving men like Lansdowne out of the new government.99  
At the time, however, Lloyd George’s mistress observed perhaps more truthfully that 
“You cannot have a man in a War Cabinet who thinks we ought to make peace.”100  The 
feeling most likely was mutual, however, with Lansdowne’s declining health no doubt 
playing some part in his own decision not to accept office in the new government.  In 
August 1916, Crawford had described the marquis, who had “recently underwent an 
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operation on his hand,” as “delicate and frail.”101  Moreover, on December 5, in the 
midst of the crisis, Lansdowne confessed to his daughter: “I am quite sure I want to be 
combed out and that I ought to be combed out.”  He was in full agreement that the 
Cabinet was too big, and that “in a War Cabinet no septuagenarian ought to find a 
place.”  Not thinking that Balfour would remain in the government either, he expressed 
his long wish to be released, although he regretted that “this is not the kind of last act to 
which I looked forward for my poor play.”102   
With his withdrawal from the government, Lansdowne gave way to Lord Curzon 
as leader of the Unionists in the House of Lords and entered into a sort of semi-
retirement.  Although he wished also to relinquish the responsibility of any residual 
leadership role in the party, he informed Bonar Law that he would “like to avoid any 
action which might give rise to controversy or to newspaper comments.”  Hoping to 
avoid the same, the Unionist leader asked him to hold off on making any definite 
decision for the time being.  Lansdowne continued to attend the Lords regularly and 
speak out occasionally, but at nearly seventy-three years of age his long and 
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distinguished career in government was over.103  This was not to be his last act on the 
national political stage however.   
 
The Peace Letter 
Nearly a whole year passed before Lansdowne published his famous ‘Peace 
Letter’ in the Daily Telegraph, and the primary reason behind his decision to go to the 
press also was the most obvious: little had changed with regard to the war, except that 
much appeared to have gotten worse.  The failed Nivelle offensive in the spring of 1917 
ended with widespread mutinies in the French Army nearly eliminating its offensive 
capabilities.  To relieve pressure on the French, Field Marshal Douglas Haig continued 
his mass frontal assaults through Flanders, and the Third Battle of Ypres (better known 
as Passchendaele), which began on the last day of July, killed or wounded well over 
300,000 men in only three and a half months for the purchase of a few miles.  The 
United States entered the war on the side of the Allies in April, but its influence, at least 
militarily, was not really felt until 1918; meanwhile the Empire of the Romanovs had 
collapsed into chaos.  The Bolsheviks took power in an October coup, began 
negotiations for a separate peace with Germany, and published the embarrassing secret 
treaties of the Allies.  Initial British success at Cambrai in November, effected by the use 
of nearly five-hundred tanks, was soon checked and came to nothing in the end.  Toward 
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end of 1917, the mounting costs of the war in men and wealth were becoming 
increasingly difficult for the Lloyd George government to justify to the British public.104 
Lansdowne initially had contemplated sparking a war aims debate in the House 
of Lords or the Commons.  Following up a previous conversation on the matter he had 
with Balfour, who had accepted the post of Foreign Secretary under Lloyd George, he 
sent his proposal and asked for his former chief’s views.  Balfour responded with a 
detailed critique of the questions Lansdowne intended to ask the government, but overall 
he believed that it was not a “very suitable time for discussing peace matters.”105  With 
his original idea of a debate in the Lords deflated by Balfour, the marquis decided to 
publish his views in the form of a letter in the press, and according to his own version of 
events, at his final consultation with the Foreign Secretary on November 26—a hurried 
affair as Balfour was on his way to Paris for an Allied Conference—the latter “did not 
dissuade” him from his new project.   
Although Lansdowne had wished to have Balfour read the final draft of his letter, 
“anxious” not to publish anything “misleading” or that which might seem “unfair” to the 
Foreign Office, the Foreign Secretary was short for time.  As a result, the marquis 
suggested that he might show it to Hardinge, once again the Permanent Secretary, in 
order that he might catch any “inaccuracies.”  Balfour apparently did not object, and 
moreover, according to Lansdowne, remarked: “Hardinge knows my thoughts.”  
Lansdowne showed the letter to Hardinge, who, again according to the marquis’s own 
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recollection, made “one or two suggestions not touching questions of principle,” and 
even went so far as to observe that the letter was “statesmanlike” and would “do good.”  
After being refused at The Times, where the editor, Geoffrey Dawson, believed that such 
a letter written by a man of the marquis’s public stature would imply a weakening in 
Britain’s war effort, Lansdowne immediately turned to Lord Burnham, owner of the 
Daily Telegraph.  The Telegraph published Lansdowne’s Peace Letter, but did not 
endorse it.106   
Lansdowne’s so-called ‘Peace Letter’ was published on November 29, 1917, in 
the fortieth month of the war.  It appeared in the form of a ‘letter to the editor’ entitled 
“Co-ordination of Allies’ War Aims,” but became widely known as a letter that 
advocated peace at any price.  It was an attempt by the author, however, to prompt a 
return to sensible statesmanlike diplomacy and its importance to this story warrants a 
lengthy excerpt:  
 Sir—We are now in the fourth year of the most dreadful war the 
world has known; a war in which, as Sir W. Robertson has lately 
informed us, “the killed alone can be counted by the million, while the 
total amount of men engaged amounts to nearly twenty-four millions.”  
Ministers continue to tell us that they scan the horizon in vain for the 
prospect of a lasting peace.  And without a lasting peace we all feel that 
the task we have set ourselves will remain unaccomplished. 
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 But those who look forward with horror to the prolongation of the 
war, who believe that its wanton prolongation would be a crime, differing 
only in degree from that of the criminals who provoked it, may be 
excused if they too scan the horizon anxiously in the hope of discovering 
there indications that the outlook may after all not be so hopeless as is 
supposed. 
 The obstacles are indeed formidable enough.  We are constantly 
reminded of one of them.  It is pointed out with force that, while we have 
not hesitated to put forward a general description of our war aims, the 
enemy have, though repeatedly challenged, refused to formulate theirs, 
and have limited themselves to vague and apparently insincere 
professions of readiness to negotiate with us. 
 The force of the argument cannot be gainsaid, but it is directed 
mainly to show that we are still far from agreement as to the territorial 
questions which must come up for settlement in connection with the 
terms of peace.  These are, however, by no means the only questions 
which will arise, and it is worthwhile to consider whether there are not 
others, also of first-rate importance, with regard to which the prospects of 
agreement are less remote. 
 Let me examine one or two of these.  What are we fighting for?  
To beat the Germans?  Certainly.  But that is not an end in itself.  We 
want to inflict signal defeat upon the Central Powers, not out of mere 
vindictiveness, but in the hope of saving the world from a recurrence of 
the calamity which has befallen this generation. 
 What, then, is it we want when the war is over?  I know of no 
better formula than that more than once made use of, with universal 
approval, by Mr. Asquith in the speeches which he has from time to time 
delivered.  He has repeatedly told his hearers that we are waging war in 
order to obtain reparation and security.  Both are essential, but of the two 
security is perhaps the more indispensable.  In the way of reparation 
much can no doubt be accomplished, but the utmost effort to make good 
all the ravages of this war must fall short of completeness, and will fail to 
undo the grievous wrong which has been done to humanity.  It may, 
however, be possible to make some amends for the inevitable 
incompleteness of the reparation if the security afforded is, humanly 
speaking, complete.  To end the war honourably would be a great 
achievement; to prevent the same curse falling upon our children would 
be a greater achievement still. 
 This is our avowed aim, and the magnitude of the issue cannot be 
exaggerated for, just as this war has been more dreadful than any war in 
history so we may be sure would the next war be even more dreadful than 
this.  The prostitution of science for the purposes of pure destruction is 
not likely to stop short.  Most of us, however, believe that it should be 
possible to secure posterity against the repetition of such an outrage as 
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that of 1914.  If the Powers will, under a solemn pact bind themselves to 
submit future disputes to arbitration; if they will undertake to outlaw, 
politically and economically, any one of their number which refuses to 
enter into such a pact, or to use their joint military and naval forces for 
the purpose of coercing a Power which breaks away from the rest, they 
will, indeed, have travelled far along the road which leads to security. 
 We are, at any rate, right to put security in the front line of our 
peace demands, and it is not unsatisfactory to note that in principle there 
seems to be complete unanimity upon this point… 
 
 …In his dispatch covering the Allied Note of Jan. 10, 1917, Mr. 
Balfour mentions as one of the three conditions essential to a durable 
peace the condition that  
 “behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for 
preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction 
might be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.” 
 Such sanction would probably take the form of coercion applied 
in one of two modes.  The “aggressor” would be disciplined either by the 
pressure of superior naval and military strength, or by the denial of 
commercial access and facilities. 
 The proceedings of the Paris Conference show that we should not 
shrink from such a denial, if we were compelled to use the weapon for 
purposes of self-defense.  But while a commercial “boycott” would be 
justifiable as a war measure, and while the threat of a “boycott,” in case 
Germany should show herself utterly unreasonable, would be a legitimate 
threat no reasonable man would, surely, desire to destroy the trade of the 
Central Powers, if they will, so to speak, enter into recognisances to keep 
the peace, and do not force us into a conflict by a hostile combination.  
Commercial war is less ghastly in its immediate results than the war of 
armed forces, but it would certainly be deplorable if after three or four 
years of sanguinary conflict in the field, a conflict which has destroyed a 
great part of the wealth of the world, and permanently crippled its 
resources, the Powers were to embark upon commercial hostilities certain 
to retard the economic recovery of all the nations involved. 
 That we shall have to secure ourselves against the fiscal hostility 
of others, that we shall have to prevent the recurrence of the conditions 
under which, when the war broke out, we found ourselves short of 
essential commodities, because we had allowed certain industries, and 
certain sources of supply, to pass entirely under the control of our 
enemies, no one will doubt, subject however to this reservation, that it 
will surely be for our interest that the stream of trade should, so far as our 
own fiscal interests permit, be allowed to flow strong and uninterrupted in 
its natural channels. 
 There remains the question of territorial claims… 
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 …Some of our original desiderata have probably become 
unobtainable.  Others would probably now be given a less prominent 
place than when they were first put forward.  Others again, notably the 
reparation due to Belgium, remain, and must always remain in the front 
rank, but when it comes to the wholesale rearrangement of the map of 
South-Eastern Europe we may well ask for a suspension of judgment and 
for the elucidation which a frank exchange of views between the Allied 
Powers can alone afford. 
 For all these questions concern our Allies as well as ourselves, 
and if we are to have an Allied Council for the purpose of adapting our 
strategy in the field to the ever-shifting developments of the war it is fair 
to assume that, in the matter of peace terms, the Allies will make it their 
business to examine, and if necessary to revise, the territorial 
requirements. 
 Let me end by explaining why I attach so much importance to 
these considerations.  We are not going to lose this war, but its 
prolongation will spell ruin for the civilised world, and an infinite 
addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it.  
Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, 
but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so 
exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp 
them? 
 In my belief, if the war is to be brought to a close in time to avert 
a world-wide catastrophe, it will be brought to a close because on both 
sides the peoples of the countries involved realised that it has already 
lasted too long. 
 There can be no question that this feeling prevails extensively in 
Germany, Austria, and Turkey.  We know beyond doubt that the 
economic pressure in those countries far exceeds any to which we are 
subject here.  Ministers inform us in their speeches of “constant efforts” 
on the part of the Central Powers “to initiate peace talk.”  (Sir E. Geddes 
at the Mansion House, Nov. 9.) 
 If the peace talk is not more articulate, and has not been so precise 
as to enable his Majesty’s Government to treat it seriously, the 
explanation is probably to be found in the fact, first, that German 
despotism does not tolerate independent expression of opinion, and 
second, that the German Government has contrived, probably with 
success, to misrepresent the aims of the Allies, which are supposed to 
include the destruction of Germany, the imposition upon her of a form of 
government decided by her enemies, her destruction as a great 
commercial community, and her exclusion from the free use of the seas. 
 An immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party 
in Germany if it were understood:   
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(1)  That we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great 
power; 
(2)  That we do not seek to impose upon her people any form of 
government other than that of their own choice; 
(3)  That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no desire to 
deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of 
the world; 
(4)  That we are prepared, when the war is over, to examine in 
concert with other powers the group of international problems, some of 
them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of “the 
freedom of the seas”; 
(5)  That we are prepared to enter into an international pact under 
which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of 
international disputes by peaceful means. 
 I am under the impression that authority could be found for most 
of these propositions in Ministerial speeches.  Since the above lines were 
written, (1), (2), and (3) have been dealt with by our own Foreign 
Minister at the public meeting held in honour of M. Venizelos at the 
Mansion House. 
 The question of “the freedom of the seas” was amongst those 
raised at the outset by out American Allies.  The formula is an ambiguous 
one, capable of many inconsistent interpretations, and I doubt whether it 
will be seriously contended that there is no room for profitable 
discussion.   
 That an attempt should be made to bring about the kind of pact 
suggested in (5) is, I believe, common ground to all the belligerents, and 
probably to all the neutral Powers. 
 If it be once established that there are no insurmountable 
difficulties in the way of agreement upon these points, the political 
horizon might perhaps be scanned with better hope by those who pray, 
but can at this moment hardly venture to expect, that the New Year may 
bring us a lasting and honourable peace.—I am, Sir, your obedient 
servant, 
 Lansdowne.107 
 
 
 Much energy has been expended, both at the time, and in the decades since, 
attempting to explain fully Lansdowne’s motivation for publishing his ‘Peace Letter.’  
As has been shown, his views on the war did not change over night, and therefore the 
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letter was not the product of, in Crawford’s words, a “nerve-wrecked wobbler” who had 
taken leave of his senses.  Nor does it appear likely that Crawford was correct in 
asserting that “the explanation must to some extent be sought in the vexation and 
annoyance” the former Foreign Secretary felt at being out of office.108  J. S. Sandars, 
Balfour’s private secretary, reported many years later that he met Lansdowne on Bond 
Street a day or two before the letter’s publication, and described the elderly statesman as 
feeling, in Gladstone’s words, “in a position of greater freedom and less 
responsibility.”109  He certainly had less reason to hold back his views out of loyalty to 
the government, although he did wait through an entire year of continued military 
stalemate, and in the end consulted with Balfour prior to publication.  Writing to his 
daughter in early December, fearing her displeasure with what he had written, the 
marquis asserted simply that he believed it to be “somebody’s duty to put this view of 
the case before the public.”110  Moreover, a couple of weeks prior to publication he told 
Colonel House that in order to avoid what increasingly looked to become a Pyrrhic 
Allied victory, he hoped to “set out--aims that are moderate and will appeal to moderate 
minds in all countries.”111  This noble, if possibly naïve, diplomatic objective ultimately 
dictated the substance of the letter’s final draft.  
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 Lansdowne perhaps made his greatest mistake by the negative manner in which 
he began his letter, citing what he characterized as a “dreadful” unending war, with 
millions of casualties, and with the government’s ministers clueless as how to put things 
right.  Moreover, he declared that Britain’s war aims were not realistically obtainable, 
and through both conciliatory and vague proposals, he attempted to mitigate British 
demands for security from future war and reparations owed for the extant conflict.  
While arguing that the two sides might go far in determining fair reparations, in 
particular for Belgium, he warned that the utmost efforts would not fail to fall short of 
completeness in making good “all the ravages of this war.”  The balm for this 
incompleteness would be complete security, or as complete, he noted, as humanly 
possible. 
Shifting the focus as quickly as possible from victory in the present war, he called 
on all the powers to work for an even greater achievement, the prevention of future war; 
and so that they might tackle that superior achievement of future peace all the more 
quickly, he argued that peace in the present should not have to be preceded by a detailed 
treaty that had to be immediately accepted “chapter and verse.”  There were many 
issues, he advised, “which must as necessity be left over for discussion and negotiation, 
for accommodation and adjustment, at a later stage.”  Moreover, other expectations, such 
as territorial gain, he argued, had now “probably become unattainable,” and that plans 
for the “wholesale rearrangement of the map of South-eastern Europe” might well be 
suspended. 
 410
His lone attempt to deflect any misrepresentation of his ideas and to attest to his 
patriotism and loyalty came only in the twenty-first paragraph when he asserted, as he 
had in his November 1916 Cabinet memorandum: “We are not going to lose this war, 
but its prolongation will spell the ruination of the civilized world.”  He hoped, therefore, 
that his five stipulated war aims would give “immense stimulus” to the peace minded 
groups in the Central Powers.  It was for this carefully crafted collection of sensible 
vagaries, this ludicrous attempt at diplomatic sleight of hand in the midst of the greatest 
war the world had ever known, that George Bernard Shaw proclaimed that Lansdowne 
had given “the order to Cease Firing . . . It was disregarded; and he died, as fools 
thought, in disgrace.”  Shaw was undoubtedly correct, however, in noting that 
Lansdowne’s “only reward” for such courage “was a howl of execration from his own 
people.”112 
The Peace Letter dominated the British and worldwide press for days after its 
publication.  It elicited immediate condemnation from the Northcliffe Press.  The Times, 
which had refused to print the letter, reported that the marquis would “find himself the 
most popular man in ‘Central Europe’ next week,” and that he “could not have taken any 
step better calculated to hearten Germany and prolong the War.”113  Northcliffe himself 
was interviewed by the Paris newspaper Le Matin, and described the letter as “The 
stupid and senile demonstration of an old man who has lost control of himself.”114  The 
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press lord’s assertion that had he been in London he would have printed the letter 
alongside a direct rejoinder, however, is undermined somewhat by Shaw’s claim that his 
letter to the editor in support of Lansdowne was refused as well.115 
Those who reacted against the letter came from all political stripes.  Lloyd 
George reportedly told Lord Riddell, owner of the News of the World, that it was “really 
a pacifist letter,” written at an “ill-advised and inopportune time.”  It was published, 
perhaps purposely by Lansdowne, to coincide with the meeting of the Allied War 
Conference in Paris.  Despite declaring that there was no “half-way house between 
victory and defeat,” however, Lloyd George agreed that the brutal and personal attack on 
Lansdowne by The Times was in bad taste.116  It appeared to many that President 
Woodrow Wilson’s state of the union address given less than week later, in which the 
American President appealed to the Austrians by denying that the Allies had any desire, 
“to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire,” differed little in substance 
from Lansdowne’s letter and might yet justify its publication.117  The Manchester 
Guardian went so far as to print both statements side by side to show how little they 
differed.  Although Lansdowne welcomed such comparisons, Lloyd George observed to 
C. P. Scott, proprietor and editor of the Guardian, that the difference between the two 
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was that, “Wilson postulated victory and Lansdowne did not.”118  Of course, Lansdowne 
had stated specifically that Britain would not lose the war, but it was an indefinable 
“inspiration of leadership” that the Peace Letter lacked, according to Lord Cecil, who 
was now the Minister for Blockade.119  While Wilson had attempted to assure the 
peoples of Germany and Austria that the Allies intended “no wrong” against their 
empires, or interference with their internal affairs, this was preceded in his address by 
the assertion that the war had to be won first, and the masters of Germany “crushed” and 
“defeated.”120  
Most of Lansdowne’s fellow Unionists were shocked and dismayed at the letter.  
His eldest son, Lieutenant Colonel the Earl of Kerry, a Unionist MP for West 
Derbyshire, admitted that upon a first reading his father’s views “did not commend 
themselves to him.”  Both he and Cecil, however, believed that the letter had been 
misconstrued and misinterpreted, and the former called for a “reprobation” of the 
personal attacks and “scurrilous abuse” that had been heaped upon his father.121  For his 
part, Austen Chamberlain was genuinely pained at Lansdowne’s “gaffe,” and could not 
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understand how his friend had “failed to see what an encouragement his letter would be 
to the Germans, and Britain’s own pacifists.”122 
Perhaps some Unionist Party members were sympathetic to Lansdowne’s views, 
and might even have given thought to speaking out publicly, but Bonar Law put an end 
to any such ideas at a Tory Party meeting shortly before the Unionist Party annual 
convention on November 30.  A resolution condemning the letter was passed 
unanimously, and in his speech that same evening Bonar Law called the letter a 
“national misfortune,” and said that such a peace as Lansdowne hoped for would be 
“really a defeat for us and nothing else.”123  Regardless, most of Lansdowne’s political 
colleagues would have been forced to speak out in opposition to the letter, if for no other 
reason than its susceptibility to misinterpretation by friends and enemies, both domestic 
and foreign.  Privately, Bonar Law wrote to Lansdowne that it was “a strange thing” and 
“very distressing” that they “should differ in a matter so vital,” and he hoped that his 
speech was not taken by the marquis as “less friendly than it might have been.”124  The 
marquis considered himself, however, to have been “officially excommunicated.”125  
Lansdowne’s letter managed to elicit a negative reaction even from the likes of 
William Jennings Bryan and Beatrice Webb.  Although Bryan admitted to being a 
pacifist in times past—in 1915 he had resigned as American Secretary of State in 
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response to President Wilson’s protests against German submarine warfare—he declared 
that he preferred a “lasting peace” to a premature one.126  Mrs. Webb, a co-founder of 
the Fabian Society, wished to believe that the war could be a progressive vehicle.  More 
to the point, she considered Lansdowne a “cynical” pacifist, “on account of the injury to 
property by war.”127  Confirming Burke’s assertion that such professorial theorists care 
only for the furtherance of their speculative designs and nothing else, Webb believed 
that the chaos and upheaval brought on by the war would offer “the greatest opportunity 
for a big step forward the world has ever seen.”128  While Lansdowne may have believed 
he was attempting to preserve civilization and humanity as he knew it, it is doubtful, 
however, that he understood himself to be actively holding back a burgeoning utopia.       
Some Opposition Liberal leaders, led by ex-Cabinet Minister Reginald 
McKenna, believed the moment and the issue propitious for reuniting the Liberal Party, 
but their leader, Asquith, remained unsure.129  In his first speech on the matter, the 
former Prime Minister questioned the viciousness of the attacks upon Lansdowne, 
extending his sympathies through a personal note, but would go no further in direct 
support.  Asquith believed that much of the criticism that had been showered on the 
letter arose from reading into it “meanings and intentions” which he did not believe it to 
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convey, but while he denied as well any desire to see the German nation crushed, he 
made it clear that peace could only come with the destruction of Prussian militarism.130 
Lansdowne, who must have expected a certain amount of controversy over his 
missive, was taken aback somewhat by the level of abuse he did receive, declaring to 
Hardinge that “the newspaper attacks are past all belief.”131  He was confident, however, 
that time and more sober contemplation of the letter would reveal a more “reasonable” 
response to his views.132  One such more reasonable response came from the Liberal 
newspaper, the Manchester Guardian, which took up Lansdowne’s defense by attacking 
what it considered Bonar Law’s purposeful misrepresentation of the letter, and asserted 
that “any time” was a “good time for rational action and for the clearing up of error.”133  
The marquis’s greatest solace, however, must have come from the many letters he 
claimed to have received from the front.  Lansdowne was surprised, but wondered if he 
should be, at the numerous letters from officers who had written “to say they welcomed 
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the letter.”134  Victor Cazalet, a twenty-one year old captain serving in France, wrote to 
his family as well as to family friend Austen Chamberlain to explain how much the 
Peace Letter was appreciated by the troops.  He observed that the letter’s author had said 
nothing of “peace at once,” and that most of the soldiers he knew considered Lansdowne 
“a national hero.”135  In his war memoir published in 1933, Guy Chapman related the 
reaction of the disillusioned intellectual set, writing that “the army shrugged its 
shoulders and said: ‘poor old buffer; decent of him, but what did he expect with this 
gang in charge . . .?’”136 
The greatest organized support for the letter came from the Union for Democratic 
Control (the UDC), which advocated, inter alia, for democratic control over foreign 
policy and an end to secret diplomacy as the sure remedies to averting future wars.  The 
meaning behind this unlikely alliance was revealed quickly at the first meeting of the 
Lansdowne Committee, which was composed largely from members of the UDC.  J. 
Ramsay McDonald, the future Labour Prime Minister, proposed an interim Lansdowne 
government, but only to serve long enough to attain peace.137  Lansdowne’s personal 
involvement with the group never amounted to more than a couple of letters addressed to 
                                                          
134 Lansdowne to his daughter, the Duchess of Devonshire, December 10, 1917, excerpted in Newton, 
Lansdowne, p. 472. 
 
135 Cazalet to Chamberlain, December 31, 1917, Turner, British Politics, p. 266; Cazalet to his mother, 
December 2, 1917, Robert Rhodes James, Victor Cazalet: A Portrait (London: Hamilton, 1976), p. 18. 
 
136 Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality: Fragments of Autobiography (New York: Holt, Reinhart and 
Winston, 1933), p. 207. 
 
137 Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union for Democratic Control, 1914-1918 
(Hull, U.K.: University of Hull press, 1996), pp. 46, 202. 
 
 
 417
the Committee.  He respectfully refused a request by H. W. Massingham, editor of The 
Nation and Labour sympathizer, that he actively support the group, and, at times, even 
acted to restrain the Committee’s chairman, Lord Beauchamp.  In October 1918, he 
argued that it would be unwise to hold a meeting of the Committee during the current 
negotiations for an armistice for fear of stepping on the government’s toes.138  This, 
however, did not signal that Lansdowne had changed his views in any way.  Neither did 
he appear terribly “bewildered,” as A.J.P. Taylor has suggested, by the fact that his letter 
was “taken up by Radicals.”  He refused calls for further action suggested by the likes of 
Arthur Ponsonby, a leader of the UDC, but reassured the latter that he did not regard his 
support as “embarrassing.”139              
In large measure historians have continued to view the Peace Letter as the 
product of the old aristocracy desperate to hold on to its privileges.  Trevor Wilson has 
referred to the letter as a “plea for autocracy,” and “the most noteworthy attempt to save 
the young men of the British upper classes.”140  Gerard DeGroot has argued correctly 
that Lansdowne was “not a pacifist, but an elitist,” but a trifle less persuasively that the 
marquis “feared that, with the best men slaughtered, England would drift rudderless into 
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democracy, republicanism socialism and decline.”141  Arguing along similar lines, David 
Cannadine linked Lansdowne’s so-called “regrettable aberration” and fear of the 
“disintegration” of the “traditional social order,” to both his legacy as an “incorrigible” 
Whig appeaser, and the death of his second son in the third month of the war.142  It is far 
from certain, however, that these concerns were foremost in Lansdowne’s mind, or for 
that matter, whether he was ever blessed with that much political vision.  Nevertheless, 
such conclusions are not unexpected as Lansdowne appeared the most unlikely pacifist, 
and his pedigree practically impels many to employ him as a proxy for his class. 
One of the most generous conclusions in recent historiography comes from John 
Turner.  He contended that the Peace Letter “amounted to high-minded defeatism,” and 
that the “most likely explanation of his intentions is the most obvious one: that he 
wished to express a direction in which foreign policy could move.”  Beyond this, Turner 
assessed the marquis’s motivations as “impenetrable, and in the absence of any evidence 
from his own papers they seem likely to remain so.”143  It bears repeating that the 
purpose of this essay is to make such matters less opaque by searching out motivation in 
the character and life experiences of the man, especially with regard to foreign policy, 
but often general sequences of events remain most helpful.  The Peace Letter was 
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published over a year after Lansdowne’s Cabinet memorandum of November 1916, and 
that memorandum was produced more than two years after the death of his youngest son.  
Moreover, in the interval, he backed the sending of reinforcements to the Dardanelles, 
and spoke out in favor of conscription, and a more vigorous prosecution of the war. 
 
The Questions of Formulation and Approval 
In 1934, Lansdowne’s son, familiarly known as Lord Kerry, wrote an article for 
the journal The Nineteenth Century in an effort to rehabilitate his father’s reputation.  He 
wrote that the Peace Letter’s “terms are by now almost wholly forgotten, and, perhaps 
were not very carefully scrutinised at the time, for it is notorious that much was read into 
it which was not there.”  After an interval of seventeen years, he believed that “A cooler 
and perhaps saner judgement of its contents” would now be possible.144  Kerry scoured 
the family archives and in the process revealed much with regard to the formulation of 
the Peace Letter, and reignited the controversy over whether it had been in fact approved 
by the government. 
What is most readily apparent from the draft proposals that Lansdowne presented 
to Balfour in early November 1916 is that they were in many ways much more specific 
and detailed compared with the Peace Letter.  The proposed war aims contained in the 
first draft he sent to Balfour, and which he believed might be “publicly affirmed with 
advantage” in order to engage the peace minded groups of Germany, included the 
declaration that the Allies did “not desire to crush either of the Central Powers, or to 
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dismember them in order that they may be more effectually crushed.”145  In his follow-
up letter to the Foreign Secretary on November 16, this phrase was altered to state that 
His Majesty’s Government did “not seek to bring about the destruction or 
dismemberment of either of the Central Powers.”146  Both earlier versions, however, 
differed substantively from the Peace Letter in which he suggested that the Allies declare 
that they did “not desire the annihilation of Germany as a Great Power.”147  There were 
two reasons for the adjustments Lansdowne made over the first four weeks of November 
1916; the first was that it was a response to the critiques of the letter he received from 
Balfour, and the second was his desire to craft a letter both concise and vague enough to 
spark a genuine peace discussion between the belligerents.   
Contrary to J. S. MacArthur’s assertion that Balfour “was in general agreement” 
on most of the points in Lansdowne’s memorandum, the Foreign Secretary’s comments 
did hold substantial reservations, and they affected the final version of the Peace 
Letter.148  In his letter of critique sent to Lansdowne on November 22, Balfour agreed 
that Britain did not desire “the destruction or dismemberment of Germany, if by 
‘Germany’ is meant that part of Central Europe which properly belongs to the German 
People.”  Moreover, he considered “the transference of Alsace-Lorraine to France,” and 
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the re-creation of “historic” Poland not in opposition to his own definition of 
dismemberment.  As a result of Balfour’s objections, and his own wish to promote 
peaceful dialogue, Lansdowne deemphasized specifics in his letter and moved in the 
direction of more obscure proposals.  The Peace Letter, therefore, declared that the 
Allies did “not desire the annihilation of Germany as a Great Power,” whatever it was 
the latter term was supposed to mean.  Another instance of Balfour’s direct impact on 
the letter’s final form was in Lansdowne’s proposal that the Allies assure the German 
people that they did not intend to employ a commercial boycott against them after the 
War.  The marquis’s addition of the qualification that “the threat of a ‘boycott,’ in case 
Germany should show herself utterly unreasonable, would be a legitimate threat,” was 
again in reaction to an objection made by the Foreign Secretary, with the words, “utterly 
unreasonable,” a direct transcription from the latter’s November 22 comments.149   
One of the more politic changes Lansdowne made was with regard to the 
territorial issue of Alsace-Lorraine.  While his initial draft called for the “restoration to 
France of the territory taken from her in Alsace and Lorraine in 1871,” he subsequently 
crossed this line out for which he substituted a call for the, “restoration to France of so 
much of the territory taken from her in Alsace and Lorraine as she considers 
indispensable.”150  The Peace Letter, however, again in a possible reaction to Balfour’s 
comments, pointedly neglected to mention Alsace-Lorraine at all.   
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Unfortunately for Lansdowne, the sensible and diplomatic approach he employed 
with regard to revisions led easily to the wide interpretations and misinterpretations that 
greeted the published letter.  Far from operating with ‘cartes sur table,’ he practiced 
some pragmatic muddying of the waters.  His desire to reach out to the peace-yearning 
people of Germany was understandable, but in the end his efforts to do so did not help 
his cause.  In the Peace Letter, the marquis suggested that the Allies state publicly that 
they did not seek to “impose” upon Germany “any form of government other than that of 
her own choice,” and this caused many to consider him soft on the Prussian menace.  In 
his first draft, however, he had written: “We regard the Hohenzollern regime as 
responsible for this war, and we believe that with its disappearance would disappear the 
principle obstacle to peace; but this matter must be for the decision of the German 
people.”  Moreover, in the Peace Letter Lansdowne called for a “suspension of 
judgment” on the “wholesale re-arrangement of the map of South-Eastern Europe,” 
while in the first draft he suggested that the “wishes” of the subject peoples of Austria-
Hungary would indeed have to be taken into consideration.151  No doubt he decided to 
place sensible diplomacy above counterproductive condemnation, and penned a letter 
well suited to achieve its purpose.  In truth, in many ways the letter was formulated by 
design to invite multiple interpretations. 
The other major goal of Kerry’s filial mission, which actually went public in 
1933, was to exonerate his father from the accusation that he had published his letter 
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without the knowledge and approval of the Foreign Office.152  Of all the criticisms 
leveled at his father, it was this allegation that had “shocked” Kerry the most, even 
“more than the contents of the letter itself.”153  Lansdowne had not discussed his project 
with friends or family, and at the time of publication his own son described it as a “bolt 
from the blue.”154  The government, of course, immediately issued a statement denying 
any knowledge or responsibility for the letter.155  While this denial was for the most part 
truthful, the marquis’s former political colleagues could hardly do more than feign 
surprise at the views he expressed in light of his November 1916 Cabinet memorandum. 
It was the publication of Lord Riddell’s War Diary in 1933 that first made it 
known, according to Kerry, that his father “had not acted, as was generally thought, 
alone.”156  Riddell’s diary revealed that at the time of publication, Lord Burnham had 
fumed at Bonar Law’s condemnation of the letter which he believed necessarily implied 
a condemnation of the Daily Telegraph.  Burnham hastened to let it be known that 
Lansdowne had informed him that Balfour and Hardinge had been consulted, and he 
intended therefore to publish an article stating that the letter had been approved by the 
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Foreign Office.  In the end, he kept silent, however, after Bonar Law and Riddell 
convinced him to subordinate “his own interests to those of the nation.”157 
Stirred to action, and armed now with Riddell’s War Diary, his father’s own 
account of the days leading up to the letter’s publication, and the 1916 memorandum—
which had only been revealed in detail in 1928 when printed in Asquith’s memoirs—
Kerry himself went to the press.  On August 1, 1933, he sent a letter to The Times that 
reignited the whole controversy, and unleashed a series of letters to the editor.  It looked 
to Kerry that Lord Newton had inexplicably overlooked the very documents that 
exonerated his father.  He also was convinced that Balfour had understood and assented 
to his father’s intentions, but had just “never anticipated that it would raise such a 
storm.”158  Blanche Dugdale, Balfour’s niece and biographer, soon joined the fray and 
claimed that Balfour had not seen the letter before publication, and in fact had not even 
read it.  Moreover, she added that it was well-known in the family that the Foreign 
Secretary had “greatly deplored” the letter.159  J. S. Sandars, however, who had been 
long estranged from his former employer, questioned deridingly whether Balfour’s 
assessment had come before or after the letter’s publication.160  In the end, both Kerry 
and Dugdale accepted the rationale that Balfour did not need to read the letter because he 
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knew already the substance of what it contained, but this did not solve the question of 
whether or not it had in fact been officially approved.161         
Of all the principals of the controversy still alive in 1933, it was Hardinge who 
most regretted its recrudescence.  He wrote to Kerry privately advising him that 
reopening the matter would not do anyone or anything any good, including Lansdowne’s 
reputation.  He argued that he had taken Lansdowne’s word that Balfour had approved 
the letter’s publication, and that when he had raised the advisability of it the marquis had 
replied that his decision to send it was final.  Hardinge claimed that the assistance he 
provided Lansdowne was simply that of “a technical expert,” and maintained that the 
assertion that approval could be found in Balfour’s remark, “Hardinge knows my mind,” 
was “pure assumption.”  Moreover, he believed that the marquis’s own words that the 
letter was his responsibility alone to be much more significant.  Hardinge concluded his 
note by pleading again with Kerry to change his mind and “not reopen this painful 
controversy which can do no good to anybody.”162   
Most of Hardinge’s claims are born out by his correspondence with Lansdowne 
immediately after the publication of the letter in 1917, but while the marquis took full 
responsibility for the substance of the letter, the former Permanent Secretary would 
never admit that he had remarked that it was “statesmanlike” and would “do good.”163  
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After receiving a complimentary copy of Kerry’s article, Hardinge responded one final 
time expressing his hope that the matter would now “be allowed to sleep.”164 
Lord Newton, in some sense the primary object of Kerry’s wrath, found Riddell’s 
account “rather perplexing,” but informed his lordship that “fresh revelations” would be 
needed to prove that the Foreign Office officially condoned the letter.165  After 
reviewing all the new evidence he informed Kerry that he still believed that Lansdowne 
had mistakenly assumed the support and assent of that office.  Moreover, he concluded 
that not wanting to be “troubled” with the letter, Balfour simply agreed to pass it on to 
Hardinge.  Newton added that no matter how “badly” Balfour, Hardinge and The Times, 
had treated Kerry’s father, he could find “no indication” that the Foreign Office had 
“officially approved the letter.”166 
Lord Newton’s assessment appears well-founded.  In a memorandum circulated 
to the War Cabinet in December 1917, Balfour stated that he had agreed to the letter 
assuming that it would contain only those parts of Lansdowne’s proposed question for 
debate in the House of Lords to which he “had raised no objection, and that it would 
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contain nothing else of moment.”167  The Foreign Secretary believed, or perhaps chose to 
assert after the fact, that the letter subsequently published had strayed too far from his 
friend’s original proposal and his own pointed critiques.  As shown above, Lansdowne 
recognized the sensitive nature of the letter he was writing, and knew well that Balfour 
thought the project a poor idea.  If it had been 1904, with both men at their former 
ministerial posts, Balfour’s commentary on Lansdowne’s proposal would have been 
assumed by the latter as putting an end to the whole scheme, and correctly so.   
Dugdale also argued that Balfour probably did not know of, or ever read, the 
“hardly fair” government statement disavowing any knowledge or responsibility for the 
Peace Letter.  She believed that if he “had realised that Lord Lansdowne might be 
silently suffering some injustice through the communiqué, Balfour would have made the 
complete facts public at once.”168  This appears, however, an overly generous 
conclusion.  In February 1918, Lansdowne enquired of Balfour:  
My Dear Arthur, How long is it since we have met, and are we 
going to meet again?  I hope so, altho [sic] I suppose I must be reckoned 
assuring the infidels.169   
 
It does not appear, however, that his old chief was sympathetic to his plight, and from 
the date of the Peace Letter only two letters between them still exist in the papers of 
either man; both were from Lansdowne to Balfour, and the last was written in February 
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1922.170  Of his former Unionist colleagues, it seems that Austen Chamberlain, Curzon, 
and Selborne were among the few who remained in personal contact with the marquis, if 
one were to judge by the post.  He did continue for some time to attend sessions of the 
House of Lords, however, so much is left to speculation.  
Lansdowne never revealed publicly his conversations with Balfour and Hardinge, 
and neither did he reveal the existence of his November 1916 memorandum.  The 
existence of the latter in fact had leaked to the press in vague terms in late 1916, but with 
the publication of the Peace Letter even the generally friendly Manchester Guardian 
effectively buried this significant information in an out of the way paragraph.171  
Lansdowne did his best to diffuse the controversy, and to the reporters who trekked out 
to Bowood he let it be known “positively” that the letter was “entirely” his own, and that 
he had “consulted no one about it.”  When asked if he had written the letter “on 
impulse,” Lansdowne replied good-naturedly that a man of his age was not likely to act 
in such a manner.  As for its meaning, he remarked simply: “The letter speaks for 
itself.”172  No one in the government ever came to Lansdowne’s defense. 
The Peace Letter was not perceived or interpreted by the public or press in the 
manner the author intended, nor was it universally welcomed for what it meant to 
achieve.  Many years later, Sandars could only wonder at how Lansdowne had “screwed 
himself up to do it,” but recalled as well how the marquis had reacted with “horror 
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tinged with apprehension” at the outset of the war.173  Perhaps Kerry found some 
comfort in a letter he received from George Bernard Shaw, who observed that “What 
people call greatness is nothing but a sense of values; and your father had to pit his sense 
of values against the whole of his world and against the patriotic mob as well.”174 
 
Last Years 
Lansdowne followed the Peace Letter with two subsequent missives which both 
received much public attention.  In the second letter, published in early 1918, he nearly 
begged the new German Chancellor, Count Hertling, to make Germany’s designs on 
Belgium, or lack thereof, clear.  The next time Hertling spoke publicly, however, he did 
not mention Belgium at all.  Even Prince Max of Baden, also an advocate of a negotiated 
peace and who became Germany’s Chancellor in October 1918, was hesitant initially to 
support an open declaration on the complete restoration of Belgian independence, 
believing the devastated nation to be the only pawn that Germany had to trade.175  
Lansdowne’s third letter, an address to the Lansdowne Committee and published in July 
of the same year, castigated all the belligerents, somewhat hypocritically, for being 
“content with dialectic success,” instead of “searching for points of agreement.”176  Not 
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even the approval by Germany’s Social Democrats of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 
1918 could convince Lansdowne that his efforts for peace had been futile, or perhaps 
even dangerously naïve. 
Lansdowne never regretted publishing the letter.  In February 1918, he wrote to 
his daughter that he was, “quite unrepentant,” and in May while defending the freedom 
of speech of pro-peace groups in the House of Lords, he asserted again that he had 
“nothing to withdraw,” and “nothing to apologize for so far as the letters” were 
concerned.177  His lone expression of regret was that if he “had had more of the wisdom 
of the serpent,” he would have “added a good deal of padding” to show his “abhorrence 
of anything which could be called a German Peace.”178  As it stood, however, his Peace 
Letter was perceived as, and thus represented, a true threat to the efficient conduct of a 
bloody, but necessary, war.  With his new found feeling of “greater freedom and less 
responsibility,” he published a letter of calculated moderation in order to appeal to the 
peace-minded groups in Germany.  Lansdowne’s proposals did not appeal, however, to 
the man who actually held in his hands the ultimate responsibility for the security of 
Britain and its empire.  Lloyd George observed in his War Memoirs that “the only 
result” of a compromise peace in 1916 or 1917 “would have been a bigger Germany, 
better armed, [and] confident that her armies were unbeatable in the field even by 
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overwhelming numbers.”  Moreover, he wondered what would have happened if a peace 
conference had been held in 1916 yet failed to deliver all that the Allied governments 
would have found necessary; would the Allies have been able to rouse their populations 
once again as in 1914?  He thought not.179  There is, in many instances, no “half-way 
house between victory and defeat,” and on occasion sensible diplomacy is only a 
rationalization in the reckless crusade for peace.  Lansdowne’s most sensible and 
rational ‘policy of the entente’ did not make a friend of Germany, his abhorrence of war 
did not prevent it, and the majority of the people of Great Britain were most certainly not 
“right-thinking” gentlemen.  
In early October 1918, with an Allied victory looking more promising every day, 
Lansdowne began to show greater regard for not stepping on the government’s toes, and 
he counseled Lord Beauchamp against scheduling a meeting of the Lansdowne 
Committee which was intended to coincide with the parliamentary debate on the most 
recent peace offer from Germany.  “Harm might, I think, be done,” he warned, “if it 
were to appear that any section of the public was ready to impair the strength of the 
advantageous position which our successes in the field have won for us.”180  He 
continued to argue against unneeded revenge and further death, but if Prince Max had 
been expecting the “Marquis of Hands Up” to jump at the chance to speak out for any 
new German proposal, he had misunderstood Lansdowne all along.  In a letter to F. W. 
Hirst following the armistice, the marquis observed:  
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It may be that, as time goes on, people will come to see that an 
honourable but less dramatic peace, made a year or two years ago, would 
have been better for this country and for the civilised world than the 
catastrophic denouement which we are witnessing, but for the moment 
articulate public opinion is unanimously in favour of the dramatic 
conclusion which has been reached now, but could not have been reached 
then, and it is of no use to urge the contrary view.  The tide of passion is 
running too strongly.181    
 
In May 1919, Lansdowne was stricken with an acute attack of rheumatic fever 
and it was feared by his family and friends that his death was near.  Spending most of his 
recovery at Bowood, he was prevented from taking part in public life for two years.  
Newton believed it an “international misfortune” that the marquis was not a British 
representative at the Paris peace negotiations.  Lansdowne returned to the Lords in 
March 1921 and although he remained intellectually intact, his posture was now bent 
and his nimble stride had been subsumed by, in Newton’s words, an “appearance of 
extreme frailty.”182  His physical wreckage, however, paled in comparison to that with 
which he had always been concerned.  “My country will, I fear, have to [pass] through 
many anxious years,” he wrote to Lord Channing in May 1921, “before the wreckage of 
which you speak is cleared away.”183  That same year Lansdowne traveled to France to 
visit his son’s grave for the first time.184 
                                                          
181 Lansdowne to Hirst, November 24, 1918, LP, Working Files: Peace Proposals, no.5, “Papers relating to 
the ‘Peace Letter’ 1916-1933.”  Hirst was a former editor of the Economist. 
 
182 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 485, 487. 
 
183 Lansdowne to Lord Channing, May 7, 1921, LP, Working Files: Peace Proposals, no.4, “Papers 
relating the ‘Peace Letter’ 1915-1933.”  Formerly in Lansdowne MSS, Box (5) 88. 
 
184 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 488. 
 
 433
It would appear that Lansdowne, in fact, did spend much of his remaining days 
“excommunicated,” as he had feared.  He expressed himself as very “grateful” for a 
letter he received in late 1924 from Selborne, observing sadly: “I see scarcely any one 
now, and few of my (not numerous) friends have time to write to me.”  For himself, he 
confessed, writing letters had “become a penance,” as he was “becoming more & more 
crippled.”  His political mind remained active, however, and commenting on the 
Conservative Party’s most recent victory over Labour he noted that he did not foresee “a 
Sedan in 1929—by which time I shall be beyond the reach of such catastrophes—but I 
do feel as you do, that unless our party shows courage as well as wisdom, our power will 
crumble, and we may find ourselves at the mercy of voters who are ignorant or 
hysterical, and who have no real convictions about anything.”  He had found the first 
Labour premier, J. Ramsay MacDonald, to be “not only an incompetent Prime Minister, 
but a ‘shabby fellow.’”185        
The marquis turned Lansdowne House over to Kerry in 1921, and it was 
immediately thereafter leased to H. Gordon Selfridge, the American born owner of the 
famous Oxford Street department store.  A few years after his father’s death, Kerry sold 
his great Berkeley Square mansion and its valuable grounds reportedly for upwards of 
£750,000.  Some years later the famed Lansdowne House was converted into flats, and 
eventually the aging structure was torn down.  In 1922, Derreen was burned down by 
Irish nationalists but was rebuilt in time for Lansdowne to enjoy it again during his last 
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years.186  The aged marquis was able only to traverse its grounds in a bath chair, 
however, and although he continued on occasion to engage in his passion for fishing, he 
wrote to Lord Inchcape: “I always feel that it may lead me to end my days in the 
river.”187  While journeying to Derreen in early June 1927, Henry Charles Keith Petty-
Fitzmaurice, the fifth Marquis of Lansdowne, died at the home of his youngest daughter 
at the age of eighty-two.188 
  
         
 
                                                          
186 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 488-489; The Times, February 18, 1921, p. 10; Ibid., November 14, 
1931, p. 12. 
 
187 Lansdowne to Inchcape, quoted in Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 489.  
 
188 Newton, Lord Lansdowne, p. 490. 
 435
CHAPTER IX  
 
A BRIEF CONCLUSION 
 
 Lord Lansdowne was not the greatest of Britain’s foreign secretaries, but Ian 
Nish was not wholly mistaken when he argued that the marquis had a “special genius for 
foreign policy.”1  This was only in the sense, however, that he had some talent for 
diplomacy and had become a seasoned professional diplomatist.  If Lansdowne did 
indeed have some innate talent for diplomacy, he aspired not to be the next Talleyrand, 
of whom he was reputedly a descendant, but to become an appropriately detached 
liberal-minded arbiter.  He was the true gentleman-diplomat who, as enlightened reason 
dictated, always wished to play cartes sur table.  Operating on a long-held coherent 
body of principles, Lansdowne throughout his political life pressed for the renewal of an 
enlightened—if informal—‘Concert of Europe’ which he hoped could be implemented 
worldwide.  His ‘policy of the entente,’ which reflected his belief in the efficacy of 
reasonable and ‘gentlemanly’ diplomacy to settle outstanding disputes, left him ill-
suited, however, to manage Britain’s position as a world power during this period of 
perceived relative decline. 
In these waning years of the supremacy of British power, the marquis believed in 
an empire forged no longer through fire and sword, but through the example of free 
institutions, just administration, and the influence of English culture.  He certainly 
believed that foremost it was these aspects of Western civilization that brought Pax 
Britannica to the Khyber Pass.  In pursuing his ‘policy of the entente,’ Lansdowne 
                                                          
1 Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 335. 
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presumed initially at least that his fellow European gentlemen would aid him in the 
higher mission of preserving civilization, and consequently, although secondarily to the 
Foreign Secretary, the status quo.  This, however, proved not to be the case.     
 Although Lansdowne played a most significant role in charting Britain’s new 
course out of isolation, he did not intend for this to be the precursor to the formation of 
the Triple Entente Alliance that fought the First World War.  He did not believe the 
Anglo-French Entente excluded a closer relationship with Germany, and even through 
the most trying of provocations he was quick to condemn the anti-German feeling of his 
own people.  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the only true alliance he forcefully pushed 
through the Cabinet, was concluded only because he recognized that the Japanese would 
accept nothing less, and he justified it on the presumed knowledge that the Japanese 
were not looking to go to war with Russia.  His supposed “equipoise” in the months 
leading up to the Russo-Japanese War, was merely the product of the conflicting 
loyalties he felt toward an ally, his devotion to promoting peace in the world, and his 
desire to settle finally all outstanding disputes with Russia.  The ‘policy of the entente’ 
proved beneficial to Anglo-American relations only in the sense that the Foreign 
Secretary was capable of gracefully relinquishing Britain’s place as the world’s 
preeminent Anglo-Saxon power with honor intact and through what he believed was 
reasonable, gentlemanly dealing.   
 George Monger concluded that Lansdowne was not a great Foreign Secretary, 
but added that “all things considered, Britain was fortunate in having him in charge of 
her foreign policy during five years of rapid changes and extreme danger.”  Monger 
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based his conclusion, however, upon Lansdowne’s famed ability to remain cool in a 
crisis and “aloof from the emotions of those around him.”  This essay, if nothing else, 
has sought to discredit the notion of such presumed Whiggish detachment as a 
universally good trait for a diplomat.2  In the extant historiography, as with Monger, 
Lansdowne has invariably been criticized and praised for the wrong reasons.  Nowhere 
is this more evident than with the Peace Letter.  At the time of the letter’s publication he 
was praised by those whose real aim was the democratization of foreign policy, which 
would have been anathema to Lansdowne, and condemned as an aged and infirm 
appeaser who was little better than a pacifist.  He had, in fact, never shied away from 
engaging an adversary when it needed to be confronted, and had always believed in 
displaying a firm front.  Nevertheless, in the many decades since such contemporary 
judgments were rendered, historians have for the most part simply echoed them.  If the 
Peace Letter tells us anything it is that the marquis was a man who, in Hume’s words, 
always sought higher things.  He did not believe the new millennium was around the 
corner, but he did have a reasonable expectation for its eventual arrival.  Although as we 
have seen, he held a decidedly nineteenth-century traditional Whig-Liberal view of what 
that superior civilization might look like.  
 Lansdowne was perhaps the right man to administer the empire, in much the 
same manner that he dutifully tried to look after and maintain his great estates and care 
for his many tenants and servants.  He was, however, not the right man to charge with its 
preservation and defense.  Fortunately, his policy proved impossible to carry out fully.  
                                                          
2 Monger, End of Isolation, p. 235. 
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He received little cooperation from the leadership of other great powers, and in the end 
the path of British foreign policy was impossible to guide or engineer in the direction he 
wished. 
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